Photo thanks to John Wreford, whose gallery can be found at www.johnwreford.com

All the post election roundups are having a good time laughing at the Syrian elections for being a farce.

Emblematic of the coverage are these smarty-pants comments by Marty Peretz, the editor-in-chief of the New Republic. He writes:

It is mandated by law that this alliance of Ba'ath and castrated allies win these seats again, according to David Schenker, who was an adviser on Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinian matters to the Defense Department from 2002 until 2006. These credentials may not reassure you. So find us some other honest and smart person–which Schenker certainly is–who'll tell us something different. This immediately precludes Patrick Seale and Robert Fisk, both Brits, who believe that Bashir Assad, like his dad, is a true democrat.

Even the French are now disgusted with the Assad regime and, more important, actively hostile to it. For one reason at least: it is destroying Lebanon, which Paris wants as its last–tiens, tiens–remaining satrapy of empire.

Not only does he make the old "Bashir" mistake, but he argues that Seale and Fisk "believe Assad is a true Democrat." Yawn. Anyone who has read a word of Seale or Fisk know that they believe nothing of the sort. How did this guy win so many awards for journalism? I guess if you have money and own your own magazine, you can say what you want.

But no one addresses the larger dilemma – certainly not Peretz: how do you get to democracy in the Middle East without destroying what is there? Peretz and Schenker both made the really grievous mistake of arguing that America had the answers to Iraq's political system. It is easy to make fun of Middle Eastern regimes for running predetermined elections, but it is bizarre to see Americans still smugly righteous about how to rule Middle Eastern states. If America could do Iraq over again, it is hard to imagine that it wouldn't take a few pages out of the Syrian or Egyptian play book. Seale and Fisk had the insight to know that imposing an American order on Iraq would lead to disaster. Enough of my rant. Here is the round-up:

The best observations on the elections are by Andrew Lee Butters of the Time Middle East Blog: Democracy Syrian-Style. (Thanks to POMED for bringing Butters to my attention.)

AP writes this about the close of elections: 

State newspapers claimed there was “massive participation” and “fierce competition” in Sunday's polling, the first of the two-day election, but they provided no figures for voter turnout.

The government reserves the majority of seats in the 250-seat parliament for candidates from the ruling coalition. But Syria hopes the election will soften its authoritarian image and perhaps ease its international isolation.

The United States has dismissed the elections as useless.

The opposition called for a boycott, saying the results were known in advance, and that Syria needed an election law that provided for free and fair polling. Some government critics said the boycott campaign was responsible for the vote being even lower than usual.

Results from the voting are not expected before Wednesday.

Still, in the Arab world, where some countries do not have elections and others vote for bodies with very limited power, Syria's parliamentary elections and the tolerance of government critics mark a significant stride from the country's totalitarian past.

“We should all support this great leadership. No other Arab country has confronted American and Israeli policies the way Syria has,” said Salem Mohammed, 50, a merchant.

But Mohammed Arnous, 39, said he was angered by the “haphazard” way people were voting.

“We should really think about who we are voting for,” he said before entering a balloting station in downtown Damascus.

Some 2,500 candidates are running for the National Assembly in this country of 18.6 million people. Authorities have said that around 7 million citizens are eligible to vote.

Last week, the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, J. Scott Carpenter, described the vote as meaningless and “a missed opportunity” for change.

A senior member of the ruling coalition, Safwan Qudsi, replied that Carpenter's comments amounted to interference in Syrian affairs.

Hassan Abdel-Azim, a lawyer who heads a group of small parties opposed to the government, said the boycott call was a factor in the apparently low turnout on Sunday.

“Of course, the foremost reason for the low turnout is the feeling that the result of the election is a foregone conclusion,” he said.

The government denies this, claiming the boycott had no effect.

“The fate of all those who collaborate against their country is well known,” said Bouthaina Shaaban, a Cabinet minister.

AFP Writes:

The vote took place "in total freedom and transparency," SANA said on Monday, without giving turnout figures for the first day's vote on Sunday.

"Turnout is low but higher than yesterday," an official at a downtown Damascus polling station told AFP shortly before polls closed, walls behind him featuring posters of President Bashar al-Assad with his father and predecessor Hafez.

"Citizens, elections are a national democratic celebration. Vote for whoever you think is the most competent," read a nearby interior ministry sign.

While turnout on Monday appeared low at several other polling stations visited by AFP in the capital, an AFP photographer in Damascus' poorer southern districts reported "relatively high turnout" with people queueing to vote.

Residents appeared split on whether the election, totally lacking in suspense for most people, would bring any change.

Even the official Tishrin daily said last week that Syrians "have lost their enthusiasm for the parliamentary elections."

In Syria's second city of Aleppo, in the north, "candidates were disappointed by the low turnout," the independent Al-Watan daily reported on Monday.

BBC:

But there is one thing that is different in these elections – never before have Syrians so openly voiced their lack of interest in the polls, and that is a sign that perhaps something is changing in Syria, our correspondent says.

Everyone interested in the election process in Syria should read Ammar Abdulhamid's Tharwa Project, which is running interesting commentary on the elections in both Arabic and English. The Tharwa Community has gathered commentary from several Syrian cities on the progress of the elections. The cartoons and photos attached to each article are as much fun as the reporting is discouraging. I have copied a few from the Arabic section below.

The opposition has called on Syrians to boycot the election process. The Tharwa Community site, however, makes it is clear that a number of Syrian reformers are not heeding this advice. For example Bassam Ishak is running in the Hassakeh elections as an independent. He probably does not have a chance of winning because the regime has already selected the four independents that it wants to win in the region. I salute Ishak, however, who I got to know in Syria in 2005. He is smart, educated, and champions the best interests of Syria. He ran in the last elections, four years ago, and won an overwhelming victory by getting some 200,000 votes. He was not declared the winner, however, because the regime supported his opponent. But he is at it again. I think it is important for reformers to keep trying even if they know they will not be successful and the process is rigged.

Why is this important? The regime is constantly looking for the most effective way to control the Syrian provinces. In the Hassakeh region, it failed miserably to keep its hand on the pulse on the population. This was clear in 2004, when the Kurdish intifada broke out, leading to widespread disturbances and the killing of a number of demonstrators and the arrest of many more.

By running campaigns, reformers can demonstrating that an alternative elite exists. When the next round of disturbances breaks out, perhaps local authorities will be forced to compromise with the local wujha, or notables, who can represent the people and bring stability to and region by demanding change and better representation?

So long as there is no apparent alternative to the regime, it is all too easy for the authorities to exploit the situation and insist that they stand alone as the solution to Syria's situation. This has been the Syrian dilemma. The absence of a alternative has played into the regime's hands. I have no illusions about how difficult this is to do, but only persistence and constant work in the field by reforms is likely to bear results. Syrians do not want revolutionary change today. They are frightened of violence. Cultivating a responsible alternative seems to be the only realistic option for reformers and the opposition.

Sami Moubayed makes a different argument for why Syrians should: Vote on Sunday.

Here are some highlights from the Tharwa project coverage:

Evidently in Hassakeh in the Jazira, the regime created a shadow list of four independent candidates that it wrote onto the ballets so there would be no confusion about which candidates locals were to vote for. Most independents who were not on the shadow list have withdrawn, but Bassam Ishak and Alaa al-Din Riziko. 

Here is reporting on the Hassakeh election process:

Syrian  Elector, Hassakeh (6:37 am Eastern/01:37 am Damascus) – This ballot from Hassakeh shows how the names of the Shadow List members were written in blue on the ballot. The printed names are those of the National Progressive Front. Section A is reserved for framers and workers. SEction B is for the rest. Hassakeh is alloted 14 representatives only, only four of them are independents, with one only falling in section A. the Baath has always sought to retain control over workers and farmers, leavig no room for businessmen and merchants. This is why, they have to run always as independents.

Syrian  Elector, Hassakeh (6:13 am Eastern/01:13 am Damascus) – Low turnout continues to be the order of the day in Hassakeh. Local authorities and Baath branches are bringing electoral cards of their members and those collected from various citizens (most likely army recruits, and prisoners, etc.) to the electoral centers. All will be used to support the National progressive Fronts and the Shadow List of course.

But not all bath members are happy. A local Baath member indeed acknowledges that the elections:

are not democratic, but an electoral skullduggery where security apparatuses impose their candidates that we are not convinced of, and that we know will not do anything to the Governorate. I say to whoever interferes in appointing [sic] the candidates in the Governorate of Hassakeh: “leave people choose whoever they want, let’s be democratic for only one day.”

Syrian  Elector, Hassakeh (3:18 am Eastern/10:18 am Damascus) – Voter turnout in Hassakeh is extremely low as as result of the early confirmation of the shadow list (the unofficial list of independents actually supported by the authorities). Baathists are currently finalizing the confirmation procedures as security officers write the names of the four candidates in blue, sealing the deal. 

Syrian  Elector, Hassakeh (3:09 am Eastern/10:09 am Damascus) – All independent candidates but two have withdrawn their names from the elections due to the confirmation by the local authorities of the pro-regime shadow list. The only known exceptions are Bassam Saeed Ishak, the son of a former Syrian President who ruled Syria for one day, and Alaa al-Din Riziko.

Here is another of the Tharwa photos used to spoof the election process in Syria. It is in bad taste, but invokes the derision that many Syrians express toward their electoral process and traditional Africans alike.

Addendum on photo: SimoHurtta corrected me and wrote

Memri has compiled a good selction of translations of the Syrian press and opposition figures writing about the elections here: Criticism of the Upcoming Parliamentary Elections in the Official Syrian Press and Among the Syrian Opposition.

Marc Perelman of the Forward, who has just returned from Damascus, has written another excellent article: "Syrian Dissidents See Prospects Killed by Bloodbath in Iraq." Here are highlights:

When Syrians head to the polls this week to elect a new parliament, Iraq will be on their minds — but not in the way that the Bush administration envisioned four years ago, when it held high hopes that toppling Saddam Hussein would set off a democratic domino effect that would unseat the region’s authoritarian rulers.

Instead, the American invasion of Iraq has produced a cauldron of sectarian violence, driving more than 1 million refugees into Syria. According to Syrian opposition figures, the chaos in Iraq has boosted the internal appeal of the stable, if dictatorial, Ba’athist regime in Damascus and dealt a heavy blow to the country’s already fragile and divided opposition by granting President Bashar al-Assad a ready-made campaign slogan: us or an Iraqi-style meltdown. Moreover, the open talk in Washington of bringing about regime change in Damascus after Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 has provided the authorities with a nationalist rallying cry against foreign powers and a golden opportunity to depict its opponents as Western stooges…..

Riad Seif says: “The image of the U.S. is so bad that if you’re against the regime, you’re an American spy.”…

The National Organization for Human Rights claims that 190 political activists, including bloggers, Islamists and members of the Kurdish minority, were arrested last year.

Ammar Qurabi, director of the Syrian human rights organization, acknowledged that repression in Syria these days is not nearly as brutal as under the senior Assad, noting that the number of political prisoners had decreased sharply, their treatment in jail had improved and prisoners of opinion were now facing civil tribunals instead of security courts.

Georges Jabbour, a Ba’ath member of parliament, said that while he disagreed with the arrests, “obstacles such as the international isolation following the Hariri murder make you more cautious.” Still, he argued that the democratic climate in Syria is improving, pointing to his advocacy for an end to the emergency regime and to efforts to set up a parliamentary committee on public liberties.

The problem, said Ibrahim Hamidi, the Damascus correspondent of the Saudi newspaper Al-Hayat, is that opposition groups fail to understand the main desires of their fellow countrymen. “The opposition,” Hamidi said, “has failed to understand that the majority of Syrians don’t care for democracy and human rights but about their daily struggles.”

David Schenker of WINEP explains how Washington is missing an opportunity to gain "leverage vis-à-vis Damascus" and sharpen another "arrow in the U.S. policy quiver" by pressing the democracy agenda more aggressively and getting MEPI money to Syrian opposition groups. He does confess that US policy must take some of the blame for this because most Syrian opposition members refused to accept US money for fear of "undermining the credibility of their pro-democracy efforts at home." He explains that almost none of the

$5 million in funding the Bush administration pledged in 2006 to support Syrian reformers… has been disbursed. The Syrian civil society organizations such as the National Democratic Gathering — a coalition of five pro-democracy Syrian civil society groups — have been loath to consider accepting outside funding, fearing persecution and undermining the credibility of their pro-democracy efforts at home.

I wonder why Syria's opposition find America money obnoxious when David Schenker talks about it as an arrow in America's quiver designed to gain leverage in Syria? Just a thought.

Schenker concludes:

Washington, it appears, has decided to stay clear of the Syrian elections, neither funding its reformer allies nor condemning the entire charade. No doubt, the administration debated the merit of wading into Syrian electoral politics — pressing for international election monitors, for example — but in the end, decided against it. Perhaps the decision against weighing in reflects the administration's new, more circumscribed view of the priority of democracy promotion. Given the increasingly long — and growing — list of U.S. grievances against Syria, however, the administration's disinclination to tangle with Damascus on the democracy issue is troubling.

Syria remains a problem for U.S. policymakers. This week's elections are yet another reminder, both to the administration and Congress, that Washington should harbor no illusions as to the true nature of the Assad regime. At the same time, good U.S. policy options on Syria are limited. For decades, Washington has been in search of elusive leverage vis-à-vis Damascus. And while democracy hasn't always been a winning issue, it does resonate with some of our European allies who are currently weighing a rapprochement with Syria. At the very least, democracy would be another arrow in the U.S. policy quiver. In this regard the U.S. tact on the elections represents a missed opportunity.

The Syrian "Muslim Brotherhood is opening an office in Washington, DC" according to the blog "friday-lunch-club." I cannot confirm this, but the National Salvation Front, which includes the Brotherhood, has been planing to establishing an office in Washington ever since their meetings with the NSC last fall. Here is what the blogger (unnamed) writes:

From sources close to the Syrian branch of the "MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD", I just learned that the "Bros" are opening an office in Washington, DC and their "counsel" will be former US Ambassador to Qatar Elizabeth McKune. The "Bros" have apparently studied all four corners of their strategy with "officials in Foggy Bottom, the NSC and on Capitol Hill, including deputy assistant Secretary of State, Scott Carpenter… Reminder: The "Bros" are the back bone of the "Syrian Salvation Front" with dissident former Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam as "front president."

Washington may not see an opportunity to help the internal Syrian opposition, but it is continuing to work on exile groups.

I think it is a good idea for Washington to open a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood. I agree with colleagues Joshua Stacher and Samer Shehata, who wrote this op-ed recently: Hear out Muslim Brotherhood

The willingness of the Brotherhood to work with the US, however, has caused a number of Syrians to criticize it and caused some consternation.

The "Third Alliance", a group of liberal Syrian dissidents, who criticize opposition groups that advocate the destabilization of Syria, believe the Muslim brotherhood is undermining its credibility by partnering with Khaddam and brokering an agreement with the US. Here are two articles by members: one by Mohammad Jubeili.(in Arabic) and another by Abdol Mounaier, "Six Months in the Grip of the Salvation Front of Syria"

Also, do not miss the excellent article by Patrick Seale, Can Syria and Israel Make Peace?

A number of political analysts are coming to the conclusion that the international tribunal that is has been called for by the UN to try the Hariri murder case will be established under chapter 7 status by the UN Security Council. This would mean that the approval of Lebanon's Parliament would not be required for the tribunal to move forward.

Nicolas Michel, UN Undersecretary General for Legal Affairs, is in Beirut to make an assessment on how to proceed. He says he came to Lebanon to forge an agreement between the governing coalition and the opposition if he can. Everyone thinks he will return to NY unsuccessful, thereby sparking a move to get the court established under Chapter 7.

An analyst friend of mine in Washington wrote the following assessment when I asked him whether he believed the UN would pass a Chapter 7 resolution even though Russia seems to be playing for time. He responded:

The tribunal is less driven by the fortunes of Bush than you think. There is a real bureaucratic and policy consensus at this point that drives the process. This is not a mere Bush fantasy, this is an consensual approach of the US, Canada, the EU, key Arab states, implemented though UNSC resolutions and actions. It won't survive after 2009, but until then, that's what policy toward Syria and Lebanon will look like.

I think that at this point, the tribunal would pass under chapter VII, not without some diplomatic involvement though. But China and Russia would not veto something that the EU wants so badly (and it is not just a Chirac thing – Merkel and Blair are fully behind it). For Russia, it is a matter of which fight to pick with the US. And it voted in favor of sanctions with Iran, contrary to what many expected. The Russians, Europeans and the Americans are engaged in a real strategic arm-wrestle in Eastern Europe and over energy. Not the moment to make things worse.

If Russia were brought on board, China would certainly not vetoed. China has a record of never casting the only veto. China will only veto if Russia does so. Worse-case scenario: they abstain.

Despite the tensions with the US, Russia is trying to build an image of a responsible power. What it would love is to broker a deal that is face-saving to Syria (ie. Bashar sacrifices Sleiman and/or Assef and survives). But for this, you need Syria to show some flexibility. Hasn't been the case so far. They turned down Egyptian and Saudi face-saving proposals, something that has been detrimental to any potential rapprochement with KSA.

But Russia calculates that even if the tribunal is set up, there will always be room to wiggle in the future.

Nicholas Blanford of the CSM reports from Beirut:

Analysts in Beirut doubt that Michel's mediation will resolve the crisis and suspect that the UN Security Council will resort to sidestepping the Lebanese parliament by adopting the tribunal under Chapter 7 of the UN charter, which allows for the use of sanctions and military force to implement resolutions.

"Michel is coming with some explanations and guarantees for the opposition, but they won't accept it," says Sateh Noureddine, a columnist with Lebanon's As Safir newspaper. "His mission will be a failure and he will propose Chapter 7." ….

Hizbullah charges that the tribunal no longer represents international justice, but has become a political club wielded by the US to threaten Washington's enemies in Syria and Lebanon.

"The Americans are pushing the political conflict in Lebanon," says Nawaf Mussawi, Hizbullah's foreign affairs adviser. "The Americans and Israelis are dreaming of pushing Lebanon into a civil war to beat us."

Certainly, the US and France are powerful champions of the Hariri murder investigation and reportedly have urged a hesitant China and Russia not to veto a Chapter 7 tribunal. Analysts say Washington is gambling on Syria being held responsible for Hariri's murder, believing that indictments against senior Syrian officials will effectively cripple the Damascus regime, even if the Syrian leadership refuses to hand over the suspects.

On Monday, French President Jacques Chirac, a personal friend of the slain Hariri, implicitly endorsed the use of Chapter 7, saying that the UN Security Council would have to "take responsibility" for the tribunal's creation if the Lebanese parliament failed to ratify it.

"It's a very powerful political tool against the Syrians and their allies," says Paul Salem, head of the Carnegie Endowment's Middle East Center in Beirut. "Had it been some ally of the US that had been suspected [of Hariri's murder] I may not be surprised if they had vetoed it."

Still, supporters of the tribunal insist that the internationalization of the Hariri investigation was inevitable given the weakness of Lebanon's judiciary.

"If the Lebanese judicial process were capable of handling it, it should go to it, but since we can see it is incapable of doing so, the resort to international justice becomes necessary," says Chibli Mallat, visiting professor of international law at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson Center. …

"I think we are in for a long stalemate and we can't wait indefinitely for the tribunal. [Chapter 7] might help change Syria's attitude," says Walid Jumblatt, leader of Lebanon's Druze and leading member of the March 14 coalition.

Michel said in Beirut that the tribunal would not begin working for "at least one year" after it is adopted. However, legal experts say that the tribunal can begin working as soon as it is formally adopted, a location is set for the court and a panel of Lebanese and international judges are selected. Suspects can be indicted and tried before the court, even as the main UN investigation continues its work, legal experts say.

Michael Young, writing in the Daily Star, warns that the tribunal had better be established while France's president Chirac is in office, because "the front-runner, Nicolas Sarkozy, pointedly noted: "Lebanon is very important to me, [but] there is more than just Lebanon." Young adds:

Chirac's departure is accelerating what happens in New York, partly because he has good relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin and could help reassure the Kremlin; partly because the transfer of power to a new French president could delay the tribunal approval process, which senior UN officials, the United States, and France don't want to see happen…. Bush needs to better anchor his policy institutionally toward Syria, so it can endure once he leaves office.

Assistant Secretary of State David Welch made the case for tightening the noose on Syria before the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia.

The Daily Star writes: "Ruling coalition signals readiness to create Hariri court under Chapter 7."

The Wall Street Journal headlines: US Backs Plan on Trials for Hariri Killing

Emile El-Hokayem, a research fellow at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C., has written a brilliant essay on Hizballah and Syria. I  copied some important bits and his policy recommendations. Everyone interested in Syria or Lebanon should read the entire article. I will make a few comments after the article.

Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Relationship
Emile El-Hokayem
Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007, Vol. 30, No. 2

Terms such as “proxy” and “client” are often used to characterize the power dynamic between Hizballah and its allies Iran and Syria. These states’ vital resources and indispensable political sponsorship elevated Hizballah to the position it enjoys today. They each played a central role in past decisions of momentous importance for Hizballah. Today, however, this image of Hizballah as a client of Iran and Syria has become obsolete due to the power base the Shi‘ite group has nurtured and expanded in Lebanon and the growing political capital it has acquired in the Middle East thanks to at least the perception of its military victories, be they real or not, particularly in the summer 2006 war against Israel.

By holding its ground against Israel, the region’s strongest military, Hizballah demonstrated its capacity to shake the Lebanese and regional political landscape. Hizballah resisted Israel’s onslaught without substantive Syrian support. By partnering with Hizballah, Syria hoped to defy isolation and reclaim its role as a pivotal power in the region, as well as give the Asad regime a new lease on life. The shifting dynamics of this relationship, however, with Hizballah asserting itself as a more-autonomous actor, have considerable implications for policies aimed at engaging or isolating Syria, as well as for dealing with the Hizballah challenge. ….

Today, for strategic and ideological motives, Syria is more pro-Hizballah than Hizballah is pro-Syria.

[The following are selected bits from the article]

Hafiz al-Asad and Hizballah

The writings of prominent U.S. and Israeli peace negotiators as well as interviews with Syrian officials confirm that Hafiz sincerely desired a negotiated settlement with Israel, contingent on the full recovery of the Golan Heights in exchange for a flexible mechanism for its return, including mutual security guarantees, water arrangements, and diplomatic relations.6 Although Hafiz hoped to orchestrate an Arab front to strengthen his own negotiating position, the collapse of the elusive Arab front after the 1993 Oslo accords and the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement forced Syria to look elsewhere for leverage. ….

Lebanon, firmly anchored in the Syrian orbit, served as Damascus’s strategic depth. It guaranteed good-faith negotiations over the Golan Heights from a position of relative strength. The Western and Israeli assumption underlying Syrian-Israeli talks was that Damascus would constrain and eventually disarm Hizballah once peace was reached. As former Western and Arab diplomats put it, there was an informal understanding that once peace between Syria and Israel was signed, a treaty between Israel and Lebanon would follow, providing a framework for Hizballah’s disarmament and the integration of its fighters into Lebanon’s regular armed forces.7 Yet, Hizballah’s future was never explicitly put on the table, and there is no clear indication that Syria was asked to offer written guarantees to that end. …

During the Period of Syrian-Israeli peace talks of the 1990s

Midlevel Hizballah officials were naturally concerned about the future of their movement when the much-publicized land-for-peace formula assumed the dismantlement of its armed branch. Yet, they also held a belief, born from Hizballah’s political successes, that Hizballah could genuinely transform itself into a political party if need be.16 Ironically, while Hizballah’s military successes in 1993 and 1996 raised its value as a Syrian asset in negotiations, they also gradually transformed it into a more autonomous player with enhanced Lebanese and regional prestige, creating some confidence that it would survive any Syrian-Israeli peace.

Ultimately, of course, there was no grand bargain between Syria and Israel. In its place, after repeated Israeli failures to degrade Hizballah and to break Syria’s linkage of southern Lebanon to the Golan Heights, a set of rules were formulated in 1993 and formalized in 1996 to manage the escalation of violence and enforce redlines in Lebanon. Hizballah agreed to limit its attacks on Israeli forces and their surrogates in southern Lebanon, while Israel pledged not to strike Lebanese civilians. These rules augmented Syria’s leverage by formalizing its role as a guarantor of stability in the area.

After 2005

Hizballah’s actions since the 2005 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon are often presented as an extension of Syrian and Iranian policy.21 To be sure, its interests often coincide and reinforce those of Syria and Iran, but many overestimate the influence that they have over Hizballah’s decisionmaking and preferences. Syria today is more pro-Hizballah than Hizballah is pro-Syria. Hizballah is no longer a card or a proxy; it has become a partner with considerable clout and autonomy.

Paradoxically, there is little love today for Syria among Hizballah’s supporters.22 They see Syria as having constrained Hizballah’s political potential. The Lebanese Shi‘ite community also suffered from Syrian workers competing for the same jobs. Furthermore, Hizballah owes no particular heritage to Syria, contrary to Iran, which remains a supreme religious and ideological reference. An anecdote making the rounds in Beirut has Hizballah militants comparing Syria to a ring and Iran as a finger on Hizballah’s hand. The ring can fall off or be taken off willingly, whereas the finger can only be severed.23 This contrasts with the attitude of the Syrian public, which identifies with Hizballah. Syrians view the Lebanese as fractious, greedy, and ungrateful for Syrian sacrifices in Lebanon, but they see Hizballah as righteous and animated by a just, pan-Arab cause.

Hizballah’s objectives are often misunderstood. Hizballah’s raison d’etre has become the very idea of perpetual but not necessarily active muqawama against Israel. A former Hizballah activist put it this way: "Resistance is like a one-wheel[ed] bike that Hizballah is riding. If it stops pedaling, it falls."24 …

Hizballah has genuinely adjusted to the sectarian fabric of Lebanon’s society, gradually emphasizing muqawama instead of Islamism in its rhetoric and ideology. Hizballah has not abandoned its Islamist ideal, but to the extent that this goal complicates its ability to pursue muqawama or erodes its image, Hizballah is willing to do away with it. What Hizballah today wants most is to ensure that nothing, especially Lebanese domestic considerations, can constrain its ability to conduct its resistance agenda in the time frame and form of its choosing.

Syria’s departure from Lebanon meant that Hizballah could no longer count on an external enforcer to protect its weapons. This left Hizballah with three options: build alliances with other forces and deepen its political engagement to eventually govern the country, manipulate sectarian politics to create a Shi‘ite shield, or a combination of the two. All of these options are highly dissatisfying. They turn Hizballah into a political party like the others and conflict with the nonsectarian image it cultivates for national and regional purposes….

This fear of the end of a national consensus over its armament prompted Hizballah to enter the Lebanese government for the first time in 2005 and to obtain a formal Cabinet statement endorsing the resistance as "a sincere and natural expression of the Lebanese people’s right to defend its land and dignity in the face of Israeli aggression, threats, and ambitions as well as of its right to continue its actions to free Lebanese territory." Hizballah’s concern was quickly validated as its rationale for remaining armed came under heavy domestic criticism.

The necessity of reaffirming the value of its arsenal led Hizballah to launch the fateful July 12 operation that started the summer 2006 war with Israel with the stated objective of obtaining the liberation of the remaining Lebanese prisoners in Israeli jails. For its supporters, the war validated the need to preserve Hizballah as a militia to defend Lebanon. For its critics, it illustrated the dangers of Hizballah’s continued resistance.

A senior Hizballah official confirmed this in December 2006: "Now we are demanding [a greater government share] because our experience during the war and the performance of the government has made us unsure. On several occasions they pressured us to lay down our weapons while we were fighting a war."28

The U.S. government and others, including Lebanese politicians, misrepresent Hizballah’s push to obtain more governmental power as a Syrian- and Iranian-engineered attempt to overthrow the Lebanese government….

Hizballah pursues [the objective of blocking the International Tribunal into the Hariri trial] for a different motive: guaranteeing an institutional cover for the resistance by seizing a veto over government decisions in order to prevent a further erosion of its domestic position.

Engaging Syria?

If talks were to begin, Bashar would be expected to demonstrate his willingness and ability to constrain Hizballah and then to disarm it once an agreement is reached. Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon has eroded its capacity to deliver on both counts. Syria could theoretically cut off the supply of Iranian weapons to Hizballah as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the summer 2006 war with Israel. Further, Hizballah could still be negatively affected by changes in Damascus, particularly if Bashar awakes to the precariousness of his position. To be sure, Damascus retains leverage over Hizballah because it receives logistical support from Syria. Yet, although Hizballah and Iran give Bashar short-term legitimacy and strategic confidence, they cannot offer him regional and international acceptance or much-needed economic assistance.

The Syrian regime, despite some bombastic statements during the summer war, cannot embrace Hizballah-style resistance because it has a lot more to lose to an Israeli attack than Hizballah does. Syria is also nervous about growing Iranian power in the Levant, a powerful constraint on its diplomatic options. …

Hizballah could turn the tables on Syria if it felt outmaneuvered, most likely by provoking Israel without Syrian knowledge but at Syrian expense. Testing Syrian intentions without a clear process and end goal could therefore backfire.

In reality, despite encouraging signs from Damascus, including high-profile interviews of Bashar in Western media and meetings with U.S. senators, Syria is in no position to respond constructively to potential U.S. overtures anyway. A Syrian list of demands and apparent readiness to talk do not amount to a coherent and encouraging negotiating posture. Bashar welcomes the process of dialogue mainly because it replaces the narrative of 2005 as Bashar having systematically miscalculated with a new one of Bashar having correctly positioned Syria to take advantage of the rapidly changing landscape in the Middle East. Moreover, calling for dialogue while knowing that the other side will not respond makes Damascus seem open to compromise and makes Washington look intransigent and arrogant. Bashar may well calculate that, were he to survive the next two years and wait for the next U.S. administration to adjust to the many U.S. failures in the Middle East, he would emerge on top, stronger and vindicated.

Although Syria could negotiate peace in good faith during the 1990s because of its strong strategic position, the loss of Lebanon as its economic and political depth and the apparent international consensus on preventing its return to Lebanon suggest that Syria will not sacrifice its ties to its few remaining strategic partners, Iran and Hizballah. Bashar is prisoner to the radical outlook he has espoused in order to gain domestic and regional legitimacy. He can hardly jump ship in the current regional environment. Syria is in a position of relative weakness vis-à-vis its partners.

His narrow sectarian base, though loyal, is hardly expandable; and Syria’s crippling economy, sectarian fabric, and domestic discontent are a recipe for internal instability.

The new relationship between Syria and Hizballah profoundly impacts how peace should be pursued in the region. Seeing Hizballah only through a regional prism and assuming that Syria will systematically determine Hizballah’s behavior is flawed. ….

The underlying assumption that Israeli peace with Syria will lead to Hizballah’s disarmament must also be reassessed. There is no more symmetry in what to expect from Syria with regard to Hizballah. Today, Syria probably retains the power to ignite Hizballah and hopefully to restrain it, but it has lost the power to disarm it. This prospect alarms Israeli strategic thinkers and explains their measured enthusiasm for the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. The summer 2006 war between Israel and Hizballah even suggested to some that the predictability of a deterrable Syria controlling Lebanon is better than the alternative of an unbound Hizballah….

What Next for Hizballah?

Despite its summer 2006 victory, Hizballah’s position in Lebanon remains precarious, with a risk that it might overplay its hand.

The need to avoid domestic strife, which would durably taint Hizballah, could lead it to respond positively to Iranian or Arab pressure to accept an unsatisfactory political compromise, although Syria could emerge as an obstacle to such a settlement….

Hizballah is also in the process of reframing muqawama to include the United States, now seen as an existential threat to be countered. Given this emerging reality, an overly aggressive U.S. posture will only reinforce Hizballah’s rationale for pursuing the muqawama instead of undermining it. This is why reaching a political accommodation with Hizballah, as unpleasant as it may be, is so essential.

The fates of Syria and Hizballah are intertwined, but addressing the challenges they pose requires differentiated approaches. Hoping that Syria is the key to Hizballah ignores the reality that although Syria retains some influence, Hizballah has gained leverage and independence over its former patron. Although Syrian and Iranian nods, as unlikely as they may be, would go a long way in containing Hizballah, confrontation by proxy is no longer enough. Rather, only the Lebanese political process, as messy and imperfect as it is, can constrain Hizballah. Political reform and progress on some of Hizballah’s demands, including those related to the Lebanese-Israeli track, will undermine its main levers of power and influence. This is of course fraught with considerable risks and is premised on the capacity of the Lebanese polity to demonstrate adaptability and farsightedness. Nonetheless, this is the approach that the international community should promote to prevent another dramatic explosion of violence.

[End El-Hokayem] Download the full article, available in Adobe Acrobat [.pdf] format.

Landis Comments:

El-Hokayem's analysis of the Hizballah-Syria relationship and Syria's interest in it as leverage against Israel is excellent. The only point on which I disagree is on Syria's weakness.Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon has put a dent in Syria's ability to influence Hizballah and threaten Israel. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Israel and particularly the West should discount its importance or hesitate to engage it.

El-Hokayem paints an overly dire portrait of Bashar al-Asad's position in Syria. He is not weak and he is not going away. Emile very correctly argues that the US must not try to confront Hizballah, but should pressure it into relinquishing muqawama in exchange for a larger, but not overly large, role in politics. He has no illusions that this will be easy because the top leadership of Hizballah is wedded to resistance. Nevertheless, he believes that the "middle level" party leadership is willing to take the political path.

Because Syria no longer plays the dominant role in Lebanon and is no longer Hizballah's master, he suggests that the US can move toward peace with Hizballah and cut Syria out of any broader regional deal. Indeed, he implies, or at least that is how I understood his policy prescription, that the US should cut Syria out. Why? Because Syria is too wedded to Iran, has a weak economy, does not want peace with Israel, and Bashar, being an Alawite, lacks legitimacy and cannot deliver. What is more, he argues that Washington should not reward Syria or Asad by helping it get out of isolation or get back the Golan.

These are arguments similar to those made by Giora Eiland in an article, which I recently posted. I must confess that they don't make much sense to me. Bashar al-Asad is not going away and retains formidable powers to either hinder or help the US in the region. It will hinder the US so long as the US does not help it to retrieve the Golan.

Trying to persuade Hizballah to give up resistance and fully join the political process in Lebanon would be infinitely easier if Syria were helping in the process. Hizballah's weapons come through Syria, which translates into major influence. The only way Damascus will be inclined to stop the flow of weapons to Hizballah is if it gets back the Golan.

More importantly for the US, Syria will be crucial in dulling the power of Iran in the region once the US begins pulling out of Iraq, which it will have to do eventually.

The Iranian-Syrian alliance is founded on their common interest in containing a powerful and threatening Iraq. The two countries came together when Saddam attacked them in the 1980s. They rejuvenated their moribund alliance when the US invaded Iraq in 2003 and threatened both countries from Iraqi soil. Once the US leaves Iraq in a mess and weak, however, Iran and Syria's interests will diverge. It is in America's interest to win Syria to its side. It is in Saudi Arabia's interest to win Syria to its side. This is why we saw the Saudi King being nice to Asad at the Arab League summit in Riyadh, despite their differences of opinion over Lebanon.

Arab unity will be the only shield against a powerful Iran that is allied to an independent Iraq. Once the US has withdrawn from Iraq, Syria's interest will be in seeing that the Iraqi Sunni community has an important share of power — an interest it will share with Saudi Arabia, the US, and Turkey.

Of course Syria will not "flip" overnight. It will need assurances that its stability will not be undermined by the West or Israel. Once the Golan issue is resolved, Syria will have every interest in becoming a reliable partner to the West. It wants trade with the West. It wants loans and economic assistance. It wants investment. Iran cannot supply these things. Syria became anti-American because of its conflict with Israel, not because it is perverse. It became anti-American well before the Baath came to power. Getting Syria to work with the West should be a major policy goal of any new US administration. An understanding with Syria would help Lebanon solve its problems. It would help Israel solve its Palestine problem and help the US, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey ensure that Iran will not be able to project its power into the center of the Arab World.

El-Hokayem's excellent argument about Hizballah does not need to exclude a solution to the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The chances of bringing Hizballah into Lebanon's political process and out off the resistance business would only be increased if such a effort were also extended to Syria. By including Syria in a regional peace solution, the chances of the Lebanese building a modicum of political unity will be immeasurably improved. Just as importantly, the US would regaining some of its stature in the region as a super power that respects justice for everyone.

Parliamentary elections will be held in Syria on April 22-23. The public takes little interest in the elections because parliament does not write or modify legislation, merely ratifying it. Voter turnout is expected to be between 4 and 10 percent, according to unofficial estimates. "Only one third of the 250 parliamentary seats are actually up for grabs. The other two thirds (167 seats) are automatically allocated to the Nationalist Progressive Front (NPF), a coalition of the Baath party and nine other parties that has ruled Syria since 1972. NPF candidates are selected for their loyalty to the party line and clean record with Syrian security services. The only real competition is among thousands of independent candidates for the remaining 83 seats. Independents have been allowed to run for parliament since 1990, a step that was intended to add a gloss of legitimacy and representation to the People's Assembly." Read the informative article by Omayma Abdel Latif, "Syria: Elections without Politics," published in the Arab Reform Bulettin.

These have included bumping up real GDP growth in 2004 from 4% to 8.5%, changing the current-account balance for 2005 into a large surplus, rather than a deficit, as reported by the IMF, and changing the inflation figure for 2006 to 10.5% from 17.9%. The high level of growth claimed by the government appears to be at variance with the evidence pointing to a steady decline in oil production, with the finance minister, Mohammed al-Hussein, recently stating that in 2006 Syria became a net oil importer. 

Riyad Sayf, an ex MP in Syria's parliament who was jailed for five years because of his activities as one of the leading activists of the Damascus Spring movement of 2001 has published a very long article in As-Safir, describing his experience in the People's Assembly or parliament.

This translation of only the first bit of the article is thanks to mideastwire.com. The parts that were not translated relate how the leaders of parliament and government that Saif criticized took their revenge on him by taxing him to death, threatening him and ultimately jailing him. The main conclusion is that it is impossible to fight corruption without democracy. He writes, "Corruption is a natural result of tyranny and its legitimate offspring."

My experience in people’s assembly: delusions of democracy under tyranny

Riyadh Sayf – ex MP in the Syrian People’s Assembly,
As Safir on April 18:

Renewed Negotiations with Syria: Currently Not in Israel's Interest
By Giora Eiland
Strategic Assessment, Vol. 9, No. 4, March 2007
The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University 

I am among those who believe that a political settlement is a good thing. Rafael (Raful) Eitan was once asked if he supported a peace settlement between Israel and Syria based on the principle of land for peace, and he said, "Certainly. If they give us more land, I will be happy to go toward them in peace. . . "

A peace treaty is better than a situation without peace. It is certainly better than war, but one must determine what kind of peace is offered versus the alternatives. In fact, doesn't the peace agreement on the Syrian agenda create a reality that is liable to lead to war more quickly than the absence of an agreement?

One of the issues most commonly raised in Israeli public discourse is: is Basher Asad serious? is he interested? is he willing? This is followed by: is he capable? These are important questions, but not the most important ones. The most important question is: what do we want? Answering this question requires a brief look at Israel's interests in this situation compared with other alternatives. My conclusion differs from the common assumption that if Asad is serious we should initiate peace talks with Syria.

There are five reasons why Israel should not engage now in negotiations with Syria over a peace treaty similar to the one discussed seven years ago, and especially if there are chances that the negotiations might succeed.

What the Agreement Lacks

The first reason concerns what cannot be obtained through an Israeli-Syrian peace settlement. First, a treaty with Syria will not remove the Iranian threat, which is mainly a nuclear threat. Syria needs Iran but Iran does not need Syria, and certainly not on the nuclear issue. Whether or not Iran pursues its nuclear ambitions depends on matters in which Syria plays practically no part or none at all. Thus, this threat is talked about – with some justification – as a viable and growing threat, and it will continue irrespective of a peace treaty with Syria or lack thereof.

A peace treaty with Syria does not solve the Palestinian problem. The dispute between Israel and Syria is ultimately a territorial dispute between two countries. There are dozens of such disputes around the world. Some have been going on for decades and even centuries. There are conflicts that are solved, some that are not solved, and some will never be settled.

Not only would a solution to the Israeli-Syrian conflict not help solve Israel's problem with the Palestinians; it even exacerbates almost every aspect of the problem. If Israel advances on one axis, it is unlikely to be able to advance on another. Yet to the Palestinians, a resolution of the Syrian dispute would be a kind of slap in the face and would likely prompt a new and growing intifada. In addition, if there were any thoughts of reaching a peace agreement at some time with the Palestinians based on borders that are not identical to the June 4, 1967 borders, reaching an agreement with the Syrians that validates the borders of June 4, 1967 will make it very difficult to effect the changes needed in a resolution with the Palestinians.

A peace treaty with Syria will not solve the problem of Lebanon, and herein lies the big difference from the past. Had Israel reached a peace settlement with Syria six or seven years ago, it could have done so with Lebanon as well. As such, the Lebanese would have been forced – together with Hizbollah – to swallow the bitter pill and agree to a Syrian dictate, including disarmament of Hizbollah. That was then, while Syria was in control in Lebanon. Today the situation is different. Now Israel could reach a peace agreement with Syria without its impacting in any way – and certainly not decisively – on the situation in Lebanon. The Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon bolstered Hizbollah and reinforced Iranian intervention in Lebanon. Thus, if there is a peace treaty with Syria, Hizbollah will remain unaffected, and the Lebanese problem will be aggravated.

Peace with Syria will not lead to any comprehensive agreement vis-?-vis Israel's relations with the Arab world, as the root of the hostility between Israel and the Arab states that have not signed a peace treaty with Israel is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus if this problem is not solved, another peace treaty with an additional country – Syria – will at best be like the treaty with Jordan; in other words it will not impact measurably and certainly not solve any significant problem.

Finally, an agreement would not solve the problem of Israel's standing in the world, as in this area as well, a kind of myth has evolved, namely, the real problem is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a treaty with one more country will not enhance Israel's international standing at all.

These five interests will not be achieved or advanced through a peace agreement with Syria. It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the give and take of direct negotiations with Syria is in Israel's interest. In this context, there are four more reasons why Israel does not currently have any interest in peace talks with Syria.

The American Factor

Of lesser importance though not irrelevant is the fact that right now, the United States has no interest in encouraging a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. This is a secondary consideration, since if peace with Syria had immediate value for Israel, Israel would try to persuade the US to change its mind on the matter. But as of now, the clear American approach – both the official approach and the behind-the-scenes one – is that the United States has no interest in Israel arriving at a peace agreement with Syria. Would it be right to "confront" America over this particular issue? And if so, would an agreement with Syria earn us all the potential America rewards, compared with the benefits bestowed by the United States following agreements it was eager to promote?

The Agreement's Lifespan

At issue is the potential stability of such an agreement and what would happen if it did not last. Syria is a minority-ruled country. The minority is the Alawi sect, which comprises only 14 percent of the country's population and is looked upon by the Sunni majority as inferior and not genuinely Muslim. In a situation of this sort there is no certainty with regard to the fate of such a treaty once the rule of the country is removed from the Alawis.

Since Basher Asad assumed the presidency, two main factors have kept the Alawi minority in power. The first is the support of Iran, though this could be withdrawn at any point. This support is not only military and political, but also of a religious nature in the sense that the Shiite establishment in Iran recognizes the Alawis as legitimate Muslims and therefore does not challenge the Islamic authenticity of the regime.

The second factor is that Syria is ruled by an emergency regime that enables the government to intervene anywhere where there is commercial, financial, or political activity. All this is based on the argument that an Israeli attack is expected and that emergency laws are essential for defense of the country. Once there is peace between Israel and Syria and thousands of Israeli tourists begin swarming into Syria, this argument will no longer be relevant. The Sunni majority, with a considerable degree of justification, will demand its share of power and will ultimately assume control in Syria. The Sunnis' strength will increase dramatically with the collapse of their great enemy, the Alawi regime. There is no guarantee that a Sunni government of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria would honor a peace treaty signed by "the non-legitimate heretics of the Alawi minority." In other words, Israel may sign a peace treaty whereby the chances of its longevity are highly doubtful.

Security Issues

Even if it is possible to reach a security agreement between Israel and Syria, I believe such an agreement would be unreasonable, and I would even define it is as dangerous. There are two explanations for this: the deterrence concept, and erosion of capabilities and deterrence.

What is deterrence? What is the model of the security agreement? The model is based on the sufficient eastward withdrawal of the Syrian tanks. If Syria decided to breach the peace treaty and move its tanks to the Golan Heights, Israel would have sufficient time to dispatch its forces, which would be stationed to the west of the Jordan River, and be able to repossess the Golan Heights. This would mean that the battle between Israel and the Syrians would once again take place on the Golan Heights. However, this approach is based on four assumptions that are problematic at best, if not outright unlikely.

• The Syrians will adhere religiously to the agreement and the demilitarization and will not undermine the treaty. This seems to me highly unlikely, if not impossible.
• If there is any Syrian movement or there is a Syrian decision to engage in military action, Israel's intelligence will identify and interpret this correctly. The world, including the Middle East, has witnessed dozens of examples of intelligence errors in understanding the other side's intentions. This is aggravated by an element of deceit, whereby the other sides tries to "convince" you that the real story is otherwise. It is very risky to formulate a security concept on faith in perfect intelligence
• The Israeli government, as soon as it identifies any intention of war, will make the right decisions, including mobilizing the reserve forces and instructing the IDF to move into Syrian territory on the Golan Heights. The "game" between us and the Syrians is not balanced. The Golan Heights can be demilitarized on both sides, but it would be Syrian. Entry there by the Syrian army would only be an infringement of a treaty; Israeli entry there would a declaration of war. Thus, taking such a decision quickly and in real time is problematic.
• Israel can comfortably contend with a new military reality on the Golan Heights. In fact, the relatively simple current reality (an area that is mostly uninhabited, without irrigation channels and other "civilian obstacles") would probably change and the military difficulties would increase accordingly.

Any peace agreement will naturally impact on capabilities and deterrence. Assume that the terms of the settlement in question are the same ones we would have reached in 2000. This settlement offers a solution for one security problem but does not solve two far more serious security problems. The settlement provides a solution for the issue of Syrian tanks. Assume that the Syrian tanks will move back to an adequate point, and that deterrence – despite its four (problematic) assumptions – will be maintained. Even this optimistic scenario does not solve the two more serious problems.

The first is the arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles in Syria, including missiles with chemical capabilities that can strike any location in Israel. The second is that as soon as the Syrians control the whole of the Golan Heights, a large number of towns like Bint Jbail will be established along the Jordan River. This will enable them to maintain many "civilian" soldiers with advanced anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons. No demilitarization will be able to supervise such a development. Then, even if Israel succeeds in maintaining deterrence and had enough time to take the Golan Heights (before the Syrian tanks get there), it would have to break through a line of towns like Bint Jbail built along the Jordan River. There is no appropriate military answer to this situation, and again, a demilitarization settlement does not provide a total solution.

In terms of security, agreeing to such a treaty would mean taking an unreasonable risk unless Israel changes its security concept relating to warfare on the Golan Heights. This means that from now on, Israel understands that should war break out with Syria it will not be waged along the Golan Heights ridge and eastward; rather, it would start from the Jordan River and proceed towards Safed and Tiberias, "and we will somehow manage." While it is true that Israel encountered this challenge in 1948 and 1967, I would not advise revisiting this situation a third time.

Today Israel's security concept vis-?-vis Syria is based on the fact that as long as the IDF is stationed on the Golan Heights, the military result will be attained through Israel's ability to create an immediate threat to governmental assets, including IDF forces reaching Damascus. As the Syrians are aware of this, an effective deterrence has been maintained over the years. Israel's solution to the Syrian threat, including the threat of surface-to-surface missiles and non-conventional weapons, is the deterrence capability, meaning that the Syrians are aware of the price its government is liable to pay if its starts a war. When the military reality changes, Syria's temptation to attack will increase.

A stable reality, with or without a treaty, is maintained (particularly in the Middle East) only when the cost of breaching it is greater than the expected benefit. It is not maintained only because there is an agreement or because there is international supervision. I do not see how such a mechanism can be generated if Israel withdraws from the Golan Heights.

The Ethos

Ethos is also a subject that should be addressed. The question is in what sort of country we in Israel want to live. Israel may be able to reach a peace agreement, and assume that solutions can be found on the Golan Heights and elsewhere. The question is whether we want to live in a country that within thirty or forty years will be full of concrete, with all that that entails. The Israeli people have a genuine need to live in an area with space, views, water, and agriculture and, yes, rich in Jewish history.

In this respect the Golan Heights is more than a security requirement. It is part of the ethos of the Israeli and there is no need to apologize for it. I was asked about this in a radio interview: "Wait a minute, so what are you saying?" the interviewer asked me, "are we doomed to stay on the Golan Heights forever?" – as if we were talking about some form of punishment.

What Then?

These five reasons indicate to me that even if there are seemingly positive conditions, in the sense that Basher Asad is willing and possibly able, it would not be right to reach a peace agreement based on such substantive, tangible Israeli concessions for such poor returns.

At this point, the necessary question is: Will Israel be in this situation forever? And does this eternity likely guarantee more wars? The answer goes beyond the issue addressed here and touches on the general challenge of settling the Israeli-Arab conflict – and whether it can be solved only in accordance with the Arab dogma whereby Israel returns all the occupied territories in return for peace. In other words, there can only be peace if Israel gives up all the territories and returns to the 1967 borders. I think this is the wrong narrative.

This incorrect version is not ours. Unlike others, I do not believe that this is or has to be the only narrative.

Postscript: The Lebanon Issue

My last point concerns the issue of Lebanon. It seems that one of the parameters that has changed in the last seven years, even if there is disagreement over other aspects to the argument presented here, is Syria's ability to compel Lebanon, all its forces there notwithstanding, to honor an agreement between Syria and Israel.

About two and half to three years ago there was debate in Israel about whether Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon was a positive development. The decided position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that it was good for Israel that the Syrians leave Lebanon. This position was adopted by Prime Minister Sharon and became official policy.

There were others who thought differently. It wasn't as if Israel was the main factor and certainly other parties decided on Syria's withdrawal of its forces from Lebanon, but Israel undoubtedly encouraged them as much as it could. I believe that was a serious historic error. It would have been better for Israel had Syria remained in Lebanon. The Syrian interest in Lebanon was at least on a par with its interest in the Golan Heights. It would have better for the Syrians to be engaged in maintaining their assets in Lebanon. Now, having lost them, what remains is to fight for the next asset – the Golan Heights.

There is another issue here, and I will inject a personal angle at this point. I did not participate in any negotiations with Syria, but I was part of the team that, as a secondary effort, prepared a possible treaty between Israel and Lebanon. In other words, in 2000, talks were progressing with Syria at the same time that a draft of a treaty with Lebanon was being prepared. At the time I was head of the IDF's Operations Branch, which addressed the security implications. The position was approved by the political leadership. We believed that Syrian presence in Lebanon was preferred, or at least, Israel had no interest in insisting on the opposite. We said: as long as the status quo in Lebanon is maintained and the Syrians stay there and move no further south and do not introduce their air force or missiles, the situation is tolerable end even desirable.

Syria's withdrawal about two years ago started a process that is, of course, bad for the Syrians. However, this does not necessarily mean it is good for us. This shows that when it comes to interests, there are sometimes strange convergences. The withdrawal of the Syrians from Lebanon did not match Syria's interest or Israel's. The sum-zero thinking that if it is bad for our enemies it is good for us is not necessarily correct. Israel's enthusiasm two years ago in encouraging the Americans, the French, and the UN to pressure the Syrians to withdraw from Lebanon was a mistake.

Listen to a debate on: U.S. Policy Toward Syria at WAMU 88.5, Washington D.C.'s Public Radio Station. It is an hour in length segment of the Kojo Nnamdi Show.

Real Audio
Windows Media

Here is the show's blub:

To some it's a key sponsor of terrorism, a nation that deserves our scorn rather than our cooperation. To others, Syria is a nation that we ignore at our own peril. Join Kojo for a look at U.S. relations with Syria and the impact of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's recent visit to Damascus.

Guests:

Joshua Landis, Co-Director of the Center for Peace Studies at the University of Oklahoma; Author of SyriaComment.com blog

Tony Badran, Research Fellow, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies; Author, "Across the Bay" blog on Syrian politics

Murhaf Jouejati, Professor of Middle East Studies, Near East/South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Adjunct Professor at George Washington University

"Why Don't Arab Dictators Declare Themselves Kings?"
Ehsani
April 15, 2007

Of the current 22 members of the Arab League, one can argue that the leaders of 14 have it harder than the other eight. I am referring of course to the form of government that these leaders inherited, usually from their colonial masters. The lucky eight inherited or built monarchies, either quasi-constitutional or absolute. Who are the lucky eight — Morocco, Jordan and the six nations that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The unlucky 14 were bequeathed or transformed themselves into republics, either presidential or parliamentarian. Libya’s Qaddafi was the most innovative. His unique “Jamahirriya” has been successful in permitting him to hold power largely unchallenged since his coup in 1969.

Jordan's quasi-constitutional monarchical system allowed King Hussein to bequeath his son the crown following his death in 1999. In Bahrain, there was little fanfare as the Emir of that tiny monarchy passed the throne to his son after he passed away. In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Al-Sauds have it just as easy. Armed with their inherited mode of governing, opposition figures can only watch as the throne is passed from father to son or from one brother to another.

Life is not as simple for the Presidential Republics.

In contrast, when Hafez Assad decided to pick his son Bashar as successor, it was hard for people to comprehend how a presidential republic would allow for one family to monopolize power.

Indeed, those that were dismayed have reason to be. Among current world leaders, only four succeeded their fathers. In DR Congo (Zaire), Joseph Kabila succeeded the assassinated Laurent Kabila. In Togo, Faure Gnassingbe succeeded Gnassingbe Eyadema. In North Korea, Kim Jong Il succeeded Kim Chong-il. It is not easy to inheret power from your father if you live in a republic, but it can be done.

This leads us to ask if any of the non-monarchies in the Arab World are true Republics?

The Oxford English Dictionary defines a republic as a state in which supreme power rests in the people and their elected representatives or officers. This popular sovereignty stands in stark contrast to monarchies, in which sovereignty in invested in the king.

In 2005, three Arab nations elected their representatives by national elections: These were Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine.

Syria’s example of handing the presidency from father to son has provided a precedent for the remaining 11 nations. The leaders of both Egypt and Libya are looking for ways to hand power over to their sons. Thus far, however, only Syria has pulled the trigger. Given that none of the remaining eleven republics behave as such, their populace seem to be subjected to a charade of fake and silly election cycles that constantly insult their intelligence. Syria’s version of this charade will be on full display during this election season.

The republics of the Arab world are republics in name only. Behind the walls of their presidential palaces, leaders conduct affairs much as their monarchical brothers do. They do not intend to surrender power. Only military coups or U.S. marines can unseat them. Talk of political reform and free elections is just a lip service. In reality, none of the leaders of the eleven republics is likely to surrender power without a fight. Opposition members seem to think that they will succeed in dictating a different outcome. One can only admire the courage of the present crop of reformers and liberals in the Middle East who fight against the region’s current dictators, nevertheless, one cannot be optimistic about their cause. They are fighting a losing battle. The recent experience of Iraq has made it a taboo for opposition members to seek foreign help in fighting their rulers. What is more, Middle Eastern leaders have learnt how to coup proof their regimes, making it next to impossible for military officers to plot their overthrow. The safety measures taken by regional leaders combined with America's failure in Iraq has made it practically impossible to unseat them. The Arab masses have come to view maintaining order and national security as their primary concern. This is the one thing that their dictators can claim to do very well.

This writer has an easy solution that can make our lives much easier:

Why don’t the Arab republics convert to monarchs and put us all out of our
misery?