Peter Harling, the International Crisis Group director in Damascus, has just circulated his new report on restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations. (copied below)
Also see
Mona Yacoubian's report, "Syria's Relations with Iraq," for USIP, April 2007.
Main Points:
Syria's alleged "blind eye" to the funneling of insurgents and arms across its border into Iraq is a key issue dividing the two countries. Nonetheless, even if Syria were to offer full cooperation and completely stanch the flow of fighters and weapons, the overall impact on Iraq's security situation would be relatively marginal since the underlying dynamic propelling Iraq's violence is largely internal.
In particular, Syria has exploited its longstanding ties to key Iraqi government figures, many of whom sought refuge in Syria during Saddam's regime. For example, Iraq's Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki lived in Syria for 20 years, while Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, spent several years in Syria and even held a Syrian passport until 2004. By some estimates, 17 of the 25 top leaders of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)—at one time a key Iraqi opposition group and now a major player in the governing coalition—lived in Syria. Syria's ties to key elements in Iraq's Sunni community are also well-established.
With the costs of Iraq's chaos—massive refugee flows and heightened sectarianism—outweighing its short-term benefits, Syria will do what it can to help restore a measure of stability in Iraq. In the short-term, Damascus may improve security and intelligence cooperation with Baghdad. It will also seek additional international aid and support for its growing Iraqi refugee population. In the longer term, should Iraq manage to emerge intact from its crisis, Syria would clearly favor the establishment of an authoritarian government in Baghdad. Specifically, Damascus would seek an Iraqi strongman who could keep violence in check, prevent the establishment of a breakaway Iraqi Kurdistan, and stifle a genuine political opening.
Sami Moubayed's, "Missed opportunities." for historical context:
The fact that Olmert has not [accepted King Abdullah's peace plan] is the biggest missed opportunity since turning down the peace offer of the late Egyptian leader in 1952-1953.
Henry Siegman, "What the Arabs propose, and what they do not," in the IHT
There are no grounds for Israel's rejection of the Arab initiative. If … Olmert forgoes this opportunity to normalize Israel's relations with the entire Arab world, the only explanation will be that he believes a deadlock in the peace process serves Israel's interests better than a peace agreement.
President Asad gives an interview to "Mother Jones'," Reese Erlick, dated April 5, 2007, but done earlier. He talks about the thrust of Syrian government meetings with various Iraqi groups. (thanks Paul Solomon)
James G. Abourezk, "And How Bush Said "Thanks": How Syria Helped US in "War on Terror"," Counterpunch, April 10,2007.
Here is the ICG summary from Peter Harling in Damascus:
It is a great pleasure to inform you of the release of our latest report, Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations (click the link to download), which examines prospects for renewing peace negotiations between Syria and Israel against a backdrop of regional developments, including the July 2006 Lebanon war and the re-launch of the Arab peace initiative at the 28 March Riyadh summit. The report seeks not to present the guidelines of a peace deal, as we have done on several occasions in the past. Rather, it aims to tackle the obstacles preventing renewed negotiations.I would also like to draw your attention to a related opinion piece published in today’s edition of the Syrian daily al-Watan, copied below.
Very best regards, Peter
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Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations
Middle East Report: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Jerusalem/Damascus/Washington/Brussels, 10 April 2007:
Israel should seize the opportunity to renew peace negotiations with Syria while there is a real chance of success, or risk further destabilising the Middle East.
Restarting Israeli-Syrian Negotiations,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines prospects for renewing diplomacy between Syria and Israel against the backdrop of regional developments, including the July 2006 Lebanon war and the re-launch of the Arab peace initiative at the 28 March Arab League summit. Although not the region’s costliest, the Israeli-Syrian conflict has prevented broader normalisation of Israel’s relations with the Arab world and has helped maintain regional tension which could degenerate into another armed conflict.
The report examines Israel’s reasons for holding on to the Golan – such as suspicion of Syria’s intentions, the strength of the settler population, the territory’s role as a security-buffer and the appeal it holds for the Israeli people. "But the benefits of peace far outweigh those of continued occupation", says Nicolas Pelham, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst in Israel. "Recent regional developments have made an Israeli-Syrian agreement more urgent, more important and more attainable".
Within weeks of the Lebanon war, Damascus signalled it would resume talks without any precondition and indicated that its regional posture and relationships would change following a peace deal. Israel, however, has conditioned any dialogue on a broad change in Syria’s policy: cutting ties to Hamas, halting assistance to Hizbollah and fundamentally altering its relationship with Iran. What Israel demands could potentially be achieved, but only as part of a final deal, not as a precondition for it.
"Rejecting Syria’s overtures is a mistake which is fast on its way to becoming a missed opportunity", warns Peter Harling, Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst in Damascus. "The mood in Damascus is turning decidedly sceptical, and the regime is reverting to its more cautious habits. Mirroring Israeli doubts on Syria’s seriousness, officials here are deeply disillusioned with Israel, questioning its ability and readiness to negotiate in earnest".
If there is scant justification for Israel to put off peace talks, there is even less for the U.S. to oppose them. Quartet members should press for renewed Syrian-Israeli negotiations. While the U.S. and Israel may prefer to give precedence to the Palestinian over the Syrian track, lack of movement on the latter will inevitably hamper the former.
"Israel-Syria peace negotiations would profoundly alter regional atmospherics. A peace deal would fundamentally transform them", says Robert Malley, Crisis Group’s Middle East Program Director. "This opportunity may not last forever. It should not be wasted".
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Abruptly interrupted in 2000, Israeli-Syrian negotiations seem only a distant possibility but a renewal is urgent and would have a real chance of success. The obstacles appear daunting, including a weak Israeli government and a U.S. administration intent on isolating Syria. However, Syria’s President Bashar repeatedly has stated his desire to resume talks, and in recent conversations with Crisis Group in Damascus, senior officials have clarified these could take place without any precondition – thereby removing what had been a principal hindrance. Peace negotiations between Israel and Syria would profoundly alter the regional atmosphere; a peace deal between them would fundamentally transform it. This opportunity may not last long and should not be wasted.
The conflict between Israel and Syria is no longer the costliest – the border has been Israel’s quietest since 1974 – but it is harmful all the same. It has taken the shape of bloody proxy wars, involving Lebanese territory and both Lebanese and Palestinian groups, and the opportunity costs have also been substantial. It has prevented broader normalisation of Israel’s relations with the Arab world and helped maintain regional tension which could degenerate – directly or, once again, through Lebanon – into another armed conflict.
In Israel, a government discredited by its performance in the Lebanon war and tarred by myriad scandals will think long and hard before taking on the powerful settler lobby backed by a public that has grown accustomed to controlling the Golan Heights, sees little incentive to part with it and whose suspicion of the Syrian regime – which has provided rockets to Hizbollah – has grown with the Lebanon war. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of the 1990s, withdrawal from the relatively quiet Golan today likely would trigger stronger public opposition than would withdrawal from a violent and burdensome West Bank.
U.S. hostility to any dialogue with Damascus – with the recent, limited exception of the regional conference on Iraq – is a further significant obstacle. Although Washington denies it, there is every indication it has signalled to Jerusalem its opposition to resumed negotiations with Damascus which, in its view, Syria would use to break out of isolation, cover up greater intrusion in Lebanese affairs and shift focus away from the investigation into former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri’s assassination. As U.S. officials see it, Damascus might like to recover the Golan but desperately wants to recover Lebanon; since that is not something Washington is prepared to concede, there is little to be gained by discussions. Given their highly strained relations with Syria, even leading Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan are said to have privately counselled the U.S. against any move that would relieve pressure on Damascus.
As a result of these domestic and foreign factors, and due to scepticism regarding Syria’s intentions, Israel has conditioned any dialogue on broad, prior change in Syria’s policies: cutting ties to Hamas, halting any assistance to Hizbollah and fundamentally altering its relationship with Iran.
This is a mistake which is fast on its way to becoming a missed opportunity. In March 2007, Crisis Group engaged in a series of high-level discussions in Israel and Syria in order to assess the two parties’ positions and the prospects for renewed talks. While official resistance to negotiations was clear in Israel, it waned rapidly among both senior military and intelligence figures and members of the political establishment who recognised the value of testing Syria’s overtures and the risks entailed in ignoring them. In Syria, appetite for peace talks may have diminished – a function of repeated Israeli rebuffs and of unwillingness to appear to be begging – but persists nonetheless. Most importantly, officials in Damascus provided their clearest indication to date both that they would resume negotiations without any precondition and that the country’s regional posture and relationships with Hamas, Hizbollah and Iran inevitably would change following a peace deal. In other words, what Israel demands could potentially be achieved, but only as part of a final deal, not as preconditions for it.
Even assuming Syria is more interested in the process than the outcome – itself a debatable proposition – the mere fact of Syrians negotiating with Israelis would produce ripple effects in a region where popular opinion is moving away from acceptance of Israel’s right to exist. The onset of a peace process also would affect the behaviour of militant movements close to Syria; Hamas and Hizbollah are not mere tools of Syrian policy but they are adept at reading the regional map and would likely adapt their policies in response to signs of a changing Syrian-Israeli relationship. The same holds for Iran: Syria would be unlikely to break ties with its closest ally for two decades but Tehran would have to adjust its behaviour as it faced the prospect of a peace agreement.
Resuming talks with Syria is all the more imperative given ongoing efforts to revive the Arab (Beirut) peace initiative in the wake of the 28 March 2007 Arab League summit. While both the U.S. and Israel may prefer to give precedence to the Palestinian over the Syrian track, lack of movement on the latter inevitably will hamper the former. Damascus possesses multiple ways of undermining Israeli-Palestinian talks, whether by encouraging Hamas or Islamic Jihad to resort to violence; vocally criticising Palestinian concessions; or, in the event of a peace deal, obstructing the holding of a referendum among Palestinian refugees in Syria. Likewise, unless it makes a deal with Syria, Israel cannot achieve normalisation with the Arab world – a core objective without which its leaders will find it far more difficult to convince their public to endorse historic concessions to the Palestinians.
The outlines of a solution by now are well known. They were put forward in a 2002 Crisis Group report and recently restated in the context of an unofficial peace initiative involving two private Israeli and Syrian citizens. Under such conditions, there is little justification for Israel to put off peace talks – and even less justification for the U.S. to oppose them.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Israel:
1. Respond positively to Syria’s unconditional offer to resume peace negotiations.
2. Halt efforts to augment settler presence in the Golan.
3. Facilitate family reunions for Syrian nationals living in the Golan and lift restrictions on visits to Syria by Israeli nationals.
To the Government of Syria:
4. Support Arab League efforts to explain and market its peace initiative to Western and Israeli audiences.
5. Engage in public diplomacy by:
(a) restating clearly that Syria is ready to negotiate without any precondition;
(b) giving select Syrian officials a clear mandate to disseminate both Syria’s version of past negotiations and its current position;
(c) committing to provide information on Israeli soldiers missing in action and return the remains of executed Israeli spy Eli Cohen in the early stages of resumed negotiations; and
(d) facilitating access to Syria for Israeli nationals with relatives or ancestral roots in Syria, including Israelis of Palestinian and Syrian origin.
To the Members of the Quartet (UN, U.S., EU and Russia):
6. Press for renewed Israeli-Syrian negotiations, beginning by holding parallel discussions with both sides.
Jerusalem/Damascus/Washington/Brussels, 10 April 2007
Read the full report here.
EHSANI2 responds
Dear Idaf,
Mr. Shami first attempts to convince his readers that Syria’s reform and structuring program has been faster than usual. He then tries to remind us that “Syria has not adopted ready-made reform programs suggested by the IMF and the World Bank, despite the fact that it has taken advantage of the IMF and the World Bank in the developing countries.”
The latter part of the above sentence is too poorly worded for me to make any sense of it. Who is taking advantage of whom?
Clearly, Mr. Dardari is the author’s main source for the story, so let us move to that part:
Mr. Dardari’s first claim is that the growth rate of the “country’s economy” is 5.25% in 2006 against 5.50% in 2005.
The next time someone tells you that the GDP of a country has increased by X%, please remember to ask: Is it in real terms or in nominal terms
Since prices fluctuate (generally they rise), one cannot know for certain whether more or less goods are being produced and sold just by looking at the revenue earned (or income generated). What economists usually do is deflate (correct for inflation) current or nominal income/spending. In effect, they isolate the effect of price fluctuation from measures of income and spending. This allows practitioners to distinguish between real growth in income as opposed to growth arising from price inflation.
In the case of Syria, prices are supposedly rising by close to 9% per annum. This means that to get a “real” growth rate of 5.25%, current or nominal growth must rise by 14.25%. To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Dardari has never specified whether the growth rates he announces are nominal or real (inflation adjusted). Were his 5.25% to be real, I think that it would be very useful for him to supply us with the deflator or price measure that he is using to adjust his numbers.
My next problem with the article concerns the discussion on net trade:
Mr.Dardari supposedly pointed out that the deregulation of trade in early 2005 was accompanied by the increase of non-oil exports from 213 to 327 billion Syrian Pounds. Such a rise has contributed to the decrease of the budget deficit from 78 to 24 billion Syrian Pounds in 2006, despite the decline of the oil imports value.
Surely, the writer must mean the trade deficit and not the budget deficit. Syria’s external trade reporting has always been fraught with difficulties. This is because the country had used multiple exchange rates in its reporting system. Recently, this arcane system has been simplified as the multiple exchange rates gave way to a more uniform rate. Having said this, I am still uncertain whether both exports and imports are subjected to an identical exchange rate.
My final observation on the article concerns the following paragraph:
“The Syrian GNDP is estimated at US $38 billion, and according to economic experts it could attain US $50 billion. Mr Dardari commented by saying, “If the Syrian economy wants to have a regional role after the change of the surrounding circumstances, the Syrian GNDP will have to be equal to that of Jordan and Lebanon together, and this means that our GNDP will attain US $47 billion by 2020, which requires a 7-percent annual growth rate.”
The author clearly gets the “GNDP” notation wrong. There is no such thing as “GNDP” It is either GDP or GNP. My hunch is that he meant to write GNP. Mr. Dardari cleverly avoids the clarification.
GDP v.s. GNP
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) measures what is produced inside the country in a year. Gross National Produce (GNP), on the other hand, measures what is produced by the citizens of a country, derived from the resources they own.
The GDP of Syria, for example, includes not only the value of goods and services produced by Syrians but also the contribution by foreign workers and foreign investors in the country.
The GNP of Syria, in contrast, measures the production by Syrians and Syrians only. These Syrians might be working overseas. These Syrians might own properties overseas and are making a decent living from the rent collected. They might also set up businesses abroad and earning considerable profits.
This is the first time that I have heard the figure of $ 38 Billion as being the size of Syria’s GNP. Various international organizations have pegged the size of the country’s GDP at close to $ 23 Billion. Given the numbers of Syrian citizens residing and earning income outside the country, it seems that Mr. Dardari has decided to start using GNP rather than GDP when it comes to measuring the size of the economy. For the record, in a country like the U.S. for example, the difference between the two measures is negligible.
The last problem with this error-filled article is an arithmetic one. If the size of the economy today is $38 billion and if this number grows at 7%, then by the year 2020, it will reach $91.6 billion and not $47 billion as the article suggested.
In conclusion, without publishing the data to support their claim, it is very difficult to verify the numbers cited by the country’s economic policy makers. My comment above dealt with some of those potential difficulties. It is my impression that the country’s fiscal predicament is not healthy. It is clear that Dardari thinks that some of the subsidies will have to go. I think that this is inevitable. Politically, however, it is a very difficult thing to implement. The recent jump in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country has been impressive. The prices of most real estate in the country used to be undervalued when compared to other countries in the region. Clearly, given the recent price increases, this undervaluation has largely disappeared. Moreover, little of this FDI has gone into manufacturing and industrial investments. This has meant that the increased in foreign investments has not been accompanied by a commensurate rise in jobs and incomes. For that to happen, the country must adopt a very strong export strategy that can take advantage of the higher global economic growth, as the country’s present local demand is insufficient. This is what Turkey did under the leadership of the late Turgot Ozal. The recent free trade with Turkey is an excellent first step. Entering the WTO must also be a top priority. Fixing the country’s legal system is one of the prerequisites needed to make this happen of course.
[End]
This article may also be of interest: Property prices in Damascus go through the roof