"Has Syria won?" This is the question that a number of reporters have asked me on the heals of Rice's meeting with Walid Moualem at Sharm al-Sheikh.

First, it is necessary to take the larger perspective. The meeting was not about Syria. It was about Iran. Michael Slackman of the NYTimes gets it right when he concludes: "Little changed in what many here saw as the crucial factor: relations between Iran and the United States."

Mottaki, Iran's F.M. walked out of the dinner, where Rice and he might have met, before Rice arrived. The Americans tried to spin this as Iranian prudery at work. Evidently, the excuse was that a Ukrainian violinist in a red dress had a plunging neckline. Mottaki couldn't abide the flesh and took Iranian leave. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack cracked, "I'm not sure what woman he was afraid of, the one in the red dress or the secretary of state."

Mottaki was more honest. He explained that the US needs Iran more than Iran needs the US. The US had not prepared for the meeting properly and was not willing to discuss the an agenda important to Iran, comsequently Iran passed up the chance to talk to the Americans at the ministerial level.

Mr. Mottaki said of Washington’s stance in remarks made at a news conference at the end of the two-day meeting. “Even the ordinary people of the United States realize that the policies pursued by the United States in Iraq are flawed, and they at least must admit that the policies have failed.” Iraq has been pressuring the US to sit down with Iran and Syria to help it reduce violence: “It is in my country’s interest, really, to see a reduction in the tensions,” said the Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari.

Mattaki is correct. The American public wants President Bush to engage Iran and Syria. The situation in Iraq demands it. Very troubling documents have surfaced recently that demonstrate that Iraq's Prime Minister Maliki is helping Iran infiltrate the two leading Shiite militias of Muqtada al-Sadr, America's enemy in Iraq, and of Hakim's Badr forces, which is backed by the US.

Saudi Arabia is upset by Iran's internal takeover of the Iraqi security forces, which has been done under American noses. Not only has Maliki been unable to stop this, but increasingly, it seems he is supporting it. Irans takeover is documented in this report by Memri. Iraqi secret memos written by Maliki to Sadr warn the Shiite militia leader to hide his lieutenants during the surge lest Washington kill them. More detailed is this Washington Times article, which quotes from a 40-page Saudi assessment of Iran's influence over Iraq's security forces. The author of the report, Mr. Obaid, writes:  "Ordinary police and military officers now have a stronger allegiance to the Badr Organization or the Mahdi Army than to their own units."  Hakim's Badr Organization, which is 25,000-strong and has roughly 3 million supporters, is the "key vehicle Iran is using to achieve its military, security and intelligence aims." The Saudis believe that Iran has thuroughly penetrated the new Iraqi state that the US is building.

Iran is in an increasingly strong position in Iraq and can afford to wait for America to recognize its failure. This is why Mottaki walked out on Rice. He doesn't want to give the Bush administration a photo opportunity for nothing. Beggars can not be choosers. This is the message, Iran is sending Americans.

Syria 

"Isolation has failed." Walid Moualem, Syria's foreign minister, said on al-Jazeera last night. The N.Y. Times agrees, "But perhaps the most significant development, many people here said, was the more humble face of American diplomacy. This change suggests that the Bush administration now agrees with what Arab leaders have been saying for years: that Washington cannot succeed in the Middle East with unilateral action."

Here is what the N.Y. Times writes:

On Thursday, Ms. Rice met for 30 minutes with the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem. It was the first high-level meeting between the two countries since President Bush recalled his ambassador from Damascus in February 2005 after the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former Lebanese prime minister.

The decision to unfreeze relations came after State Department officials concluded that directly asking Syria to crack down on the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq was worth facing criticism from conservative hawks in Washington who argue that America should not talk to its foes.

But despite the opening, the issue of Lebanon remains a huge obstacle to American-Syrian ties. The Bush administration still plans to seek a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing an international tribunal to prosecute suspects in the Hariri assassination, an inquest that is adamantly opposed in Damascus.

Aaron David Miller, a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a former senior adviser on Arab-Israeli relations at the State Department, said neither the United States nor Syria was willing to deliver what the other wanted. Syria, he said, wants the Hariri tribunal to go away, while the United States wants Syria to help with Iraq and to rein in the militant Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.

Even so, he said, the Bush administration, running out of options in the Middle East, “may be looking for another lever to pull in Iraq, Lebanon and the peace process.”

Washington Post

Rice said she repeated to Moualem the U.S. concern about "foreign fighters," who are recruited by the group al-Qaeda in Iraq and pass through Syria, and asked for cooperation in stopping them. But she cautioned against reading too much into the meeting. "Let's take this one step at a time," she said. "I'm very glad we had the opportunity . . . but this was not about anything other than Iraq, and we will certainly see whether we can observe words being followed by deeds."

Tehran Times:

"I didn't lecture him and he didn't lecture me," Rice said after the first Cabinet-level talks in years between the countries. "It's a start," Foreign Minister Walid Moallem said after the 30-minute session. Iraq's embattled prime minister was among those leaning on the U.S. to engage Syria and Iran, arguing they could help lessen the violence in neighboring Iraq.

Until now, Rice and President Bush had said Syria well knew what it could do to help Iraq — tighten its border — and did not need the U.S. to point it out. The U.S. claims Syria looks the other way while fighters from many countries cross its border to join the ranks of al-Qaeda and other insurgent or terrorist groups in Iraq. Ahead of the meeting, a U.S. military spokesman in Baghdad said Syria had somewhat stemmed the flow of foreign fighters. "There has been some movement by the Syrians," said Maj. Gen. William Caldwell. "There has been a reduction in the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq" for more than a month.

The administration has said it worries that Syria will use any contact with the U.S. as leverage in a dispute over alleged Syrian meddling in fragile Lebanon. Rice said that subject did not come up Thursday.

 "We are serious and we expect the United States to show the same seriousness," Moallem said. "We agreed to continue dialogue."

Buthaina Shaaban:

Expatriates Minister Buthaina Shaaban has said that Thursday's meeting between the two foreign ministers on the sidelines of an international conference on Iraq in Sharm el-Sheikh was "proof of the recognition by the US administration that it finds itself in an impasse in Iraq."

"It is also proof that the American administration needs the cooperation of Iraq's neighbors and of several other countries," she said.

"It changes nothing with regard to Syria's stance on the unity and territorial integrity" of Iraq, Shaaban said, adding "The main solution is establishing a timetable for withdrawal" of US forces from Iraq.

The Syrian press has almost no mention of the Moualem-Rice meeting on their Websites. In part, this is because it is Saturday, the weekend, but also they are not trumpeting the meeting. On the one hand Syria did not gain much. The US met with Syria in order to assuage Iraqi and Arab demands that the US re-engage, as well as to undercut opposition at home. The Democrats have been scoring points by pointing out how stupid the isolation policy has become. On the other hand, Syria is not trumpeting the meeting in order to maintain solidarity with Iran. Washington will want to suggest that it can split Syria from Iran. Syria does not want to give the impression that it is breaking ranks with Iran.

Conclusion:

The meeting was a mitigated win for Syria because it signalled an end to Syria's formal isolation by the Bush administration. President Bush was wrong about Iraq. It did not become a show piece of American power or democracy promotion. Bashar, who called the US invasion illegal and an expression of imperialism that would be a disaster for Iraq and the whole Arab World on a par with 1948 or the WWI post war settlements, has been proven largely correct. Even Saudi authorities agree. They are Washington's closest allies; they now call the occupation illegal. Americans recognize the adventure as a disaster. Bashar proved he could read the Arab street better than Bush. The administration predicted that by this time Arabs would be laying wreaths at its feet for bringing them freedom, progress and the American way. Syria is coming out of isolation just as Washington finds itself out in the cold, its policies out of sync with the rest of the world. Bashar is not the "blind eye doctor" or "bumbling" neophyte, as most analysts argued. Bush and America were blind.

There is nothing sweet about this victory, however. Everyone is a looser. The Iraqis most of all.

What has Syria lost? Syria lost Lebanon, which in the greater scheme of things is a good thing. But the process was bungled. Rather than coming in the context of a broader regional peace deal that would have included Israel, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon was forced unilaterally, leaving Syrians feeling vengeful and victimized. With Washington's attempt to yank Lebanon away from Syria's orbit without accommodating Syria's legitimate demand for the Golan, Bush ensured that Syria would resist with all its guile and limited might. This led to the murder of Hariri, Lebanon's invaluable uniter. It has ensured the disintegration of Lebanon's delicate sectarian fabric. Lebanon is in tatters, pulled to the breaking point between the antipodes of Syria and Iran on one side and the US, France, and Saudi Arabia on the other. This is the result of Washington's divide-and-rule policy. Smart diplomacy might have avoided this.

Hizbullah has not been tamed or brought into Lebanon's political process, as it should have been. Israel's summer war, meant to destroy Hizbullah, only added to the weakening of all sides. Like a wounded lion, Hizbullah will exact a price for the West's high-handed attempts to ignore Shiite grievances. It is already exacting that price by opposing the Hariri tribunal, rearming, and bringing the Lebanese government and economy to a standstill. Hizbullah's ability to attack Israel as a proxy for Syria and as an inducement to Israel to cough up the Golan has been reduced. Because of Hizbullah's weakness, Syrians have less hope of getting the Golan back today. All the same, their determination to do so has not been undermined. This is a recipe for continued conflict and unhappiness to everyone.

Washington was unable to starve the Syrians into compliance through economic sanctions. Nevertheless, Syria's economy, although growing at a higher lever than it was in 2003 when the war in Iraq began, is not performing as it should be. 1.3 million Iraqi refugees in Syria are creating many difficulties. Rather than the Europeans helping with the reform process and offering expertise and assistance, they have stood on the side lines. The economic barriers with Europe are beginning to come down, but it will take years before relations return to the pre-2003 level. Reviving economic relations with Washington will take much longer. A web of sanction laws have been spun over the last four years that will be very hard to undo.

Bashar has survived, consolidated his power, and turned the tables on the US, but the victory is pyrrhic. Syria has lost a lot in the past 4 years.

A UN official from UNESCWA sent me this report that he helped write, assessing the economic and political prospects for Lebanon, the Occupied Territories, and Iraq for the six months ending in Dec. 2006. He wrote:

I am in the process of preparing the political part of the new report that covers the period January-June 2007…. I have a notion (no substantial information) that a Syrian-Israeli war could breakout in the immediate future, possibly instigated by the Syrian side. I would very much appreciate you view on this (even on the blog).

Here is my answer: 

I have read your report with interest. The gloomy economic and political outlook for the future seems to be materializing, as you predicted. 

As for war, I do not think there will be fighting between Syria and Israel this summer, or anytime in the near future. Why? 

Neither country would benefit.  

Syria is too weak to contemplate war. It would be thrashed. Yes, it is getting its aging missile stock refreshed by Russia, but these can only annoy and create panic, they cannot win a war or defeat Israel, as we saw with Hizbullah.  Furthermore, the entire world would probably cheer on the Israelis as they bombed Syria. Israel would not be forced to stop the bombing, as it was in Lebanon, where even the US and Israel were concerned about damaging the government and growing international pressure. There would be little pressure placed on Israel to stop bombing until it had reduced Syria’s infrastructure to a farethewell. President Asad has promised his people that he will produce 7% economic growth in two years time. Syrians would not forgive him if he takes Syria down the Lebanon path. 

Since 1973, Syria has wisely learned that it can only fight Israel through proxies, and then, only in a limited fashion in order to avoid military retaliation.  

Asad needs to look a bit warlike in the Golan to remind Israel that it will pay a price for refusing to return the Golan. Most importantly, the old taunt used by many over the last decades — “Asad asad bi Luban; Asad, arnab bi Golan” – Asad is a lion in Lebanon; Asad is a rabbit in Golan – was revived by the Syrian opposition during the summer war to good effect. It had the ring of truth. Asad needs to look more like a lion in Golan. All the same, he cannot afford to act in any manner other than as a rabbit. 

Israel will not go to war because it has nothing to gain. Syria cannot challenge it in the Golan, even with a few extra missiles. Syria’s air force is an antiquated mess and no threat. There is no reason for Israeli preemption. 

Israel likes the Asad regime. All wings of intelligence and military have repeatedly confirmed that any conceivable alternative to Asad would be worse for Israel. Israel is well served by threats of war however, which help deflect growing internal demands that Olmert open a dialogue and peace negotiations with Syrians, which Bashar has been trying to sell to the Israeli public. Also, It reminds the US that Israel is an embattled ally. Moreover, It may have been thought a good strategy to produce a bit of rally-around-the-leader effect for the P.M.

I do not believe there is a general popular desire in Israel to return the Golan to Syria in exchange for the assurances Syria could provide. Fanning the fear of war is useful to defuse local or international pressure on Israel to open talks with Syria. 

In short, I cannot see any advantage to either side by war — saber rattling, yes. That is my appreciation of the situation.

I think the entire region and the US will place great pressure on both sides to keep their cool. No one is in a warlike mood anymore.

"What's up with the Hariri Tribunal?" was the question all Levant analysts in Washington were asking this week. They were in a quandary. Many thought establishing an international court would be a slam dunk. With full French and US backing, the way was clear in the Security Council to get a court established under chapter seven strictures that could try the murderers of Rafiq al-Hariri and drape the Syrian regime in chains, at least diplomatically if not actually.

"But now it looks as if President Jacques Chirac of France, who leaves office on May 16, may be about to lose the last battle of his 12-year presidential career," writes Patrick Seale.

Ban Ki-moon, the head of the UN, shocked an expectant March 14 crowd when he delayed decision on the tribunal until the end of May, when the present session of the Lebanese Parliament (which isn't meeting) is scheduled to end. Anti-Syrian Prime Minister Fuad Saniora and 70 of parliament's 128 members have urged the UN Security Council to establish the tribunal. But Ban said he was not prepared to recommend council action now, and he refused to say how long he would wait. Lebanon's opposition has threatened that the country would be destabilized if a court is established under chapter 7 by the Security Council.

The March 14 coalition had pulled out all the stops to get a quick resolution establishing the tribunal, insisting that if there was to be action on the court, it had to be done before President Chirac left office in mid-May. Chirac was personally devoted to Rafiq al-Hariri and will be taking up residence in a Hariri owned apartment in Paris, upon leaving office. No one knows whether Sarkozy will choose to follow Chirac's anti-Syria policy, or whether he will decide that the Bush policy of confronting and destabilizing Syria is kaput, much as the Democratic Party in the US has.

The silence coming out of Lebanon following Ban's delay is deafening. Not a peep has emerged from the March 14th crowd, who had previously been trumpeting the tribunal as an "existential" need. 

Why the silence? Shock, perhaps, but a more likely reason is that the Lebanese government is still hoping that Sarkozy will take up their cause. They are keeping their powder dry for a second push. For the last week in Lebanon, all eyes have been riveted on the revenge murder of two Sunni boys who were found near Sidon. The boys were linked to Junblat's party. Their killings have been blamed on the four brothers of Adnan Shamas, a Shiite, who was killed in the January 25 riots by Junblat supporters. Junblat has called for calm, and all Lebanon has been on tenterhooks, fearing that the incident could plung the country back into civil war. The opposition has threatened that if the tribunal is voted into existence by the Security Council, it will destabilize Lebanon. The March 14th crowd cannot allow an escalation of violence or animate international fears that Lebanon is perched at the edge of a precipice and ready to plunge back into civil strife.

The US administration has been silent as well, neither admitting the defeat of its Lebanon-Syria policy nor promising success in a month's time.

Even Syria has been silent, cautious about claiming premature victory. President Assad has been solicitous of Ban, promising him that Syria will enhance border controls to stop weapon smuggling to Hizbullah. The Lebanese and Syrian governments have agreed to reactivate a committee that meets on border issues at a higher level.

Syria has also been agreeable on the Iraq border issue in an effort to defuse US tensions and deny the neocons their favorite chant — "Syria is running a Ho Chi Min trail to the jihadists in Iraq." "There is some possibility that Syria may have taken some actions to make it tougher for these foreign fighters to move through,'' said Gen. David Petraeus. Syrians will go to Cairo to talk with Iraqis. Foreign Minister Mualem said he would be happy to talk to Rice, if she would talk to him.

If Washington must begrudgingly cease complaining about Syria's behavior on the Iraq border, it can find many other Syrian faults to deplore. Syria just held its parliamentary elections, which are of largely symbolic significance. Increased press freedoms in Syria and the spread of the Internet served to highlight the way in which the Baath Party controlled the election process. Several privately owned Syrian news sources – Syria News, Cham Press, and All4Syria have printed scads of critical articles by a wide variety of Syrians. Ayman Abdalnour, the editor of all4syria has described the important coverage of the elections his newsletter was able to carry in this article in English. 

Syria's sentencing of Anwar al-Bunni, one of the country's leading human rights lawyers, to five years in prison, has been widely condemned by international agencies, the State Department, and Syrian activists. A letter written by Syria's leading political prisoners is posted on the Damascus Spring blog.

The sensitivity of the Tribunal issue at the UN is so high that the UN Undersecretary General for Legal Affairs Nicolas Michel, who has recently returned from Beirut, was only allowed to present an "oral" report to UN chief on the international tribunal. Presumably, Ban Ki-moon does not want a written report that might be leaked or passed around.

Lebanon remains paralyzed as government and opposition forces refuse to discuss any government bills until the tribunal question is resolved. Syria is playing it cool and insisting that the issue is none of its concern and something that must be resolved by Lebanese alone.

Meanwhile, the Levant states will be holding their breath for another month, to see how France's new president decides to position him or herself self in the Middle East labyrinth. Much can happen in a month. Should the Bush agenda continue to lose steam, there is little chance that even Sarkozy, should he be elected, will want to begin his presidency by placing his money on the March 14th government in Lebanon. Nor will he want to make the possibility of reopening dialogue with Syria more complicated, which the establishment of an international tribunal would certainly do. He has said that "Lebanon is important, but is not everything." Such ambiguous statements give him plenty of latitude.

Seale writes that a number of Security Council members, "notably Qatar, China and Russia, have indicated their reluctance" to establishing a tribunal under chapter seven. But as the world begins to think better of President Bush's policy of using force to solve Middle East problems, the three dissenting members of the Security Council are not the only states reluctant to endorse the tribunal. Lebanon is splintering and in no condition to be used as a battering ram to force change on the region.

The Economist writes:

Turkey, for instance, has rarely found itself at such cross-purposes with America since joining NATO in 1952. Over Iraq it finds itself more in tune with Iran and Syria, due to worries about its own large, restive Kurdish minority. Egypt and Jordan have close military ties to America too, but their governments must constantly parry sniping from such populist, exuberantly anti-American opponents as the Muslim Brotherhood." It concludes, "the State Department under Condoleezza Rice may be adopting less abrasive policies in the region. “They've come to realise that the multilateral approach can be more effective,” says an Arab ambassador…. America still chastises Syria, accusing it of meddling in Iraq and Lebanon. But Syria's relations with European as well as Arab countries, including Iraq, are thawing. It is probably a matter of time before Syria, Iran's closest regional friend, comes back from isolation."

Martin Indyk, the head of the Saban Center at Brookings, explains in a Washington Post op-ed that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia is also determined to bring Syria back in from the cold. He may not be as keen on a tribunal as many Lebanese believed. Indyk maintains that President Bush's team has misunderstood Saudi Arabia terribly because it listened to a freelancing Prince Bandar, who promised that Saudi would join Washington in pursuing an aggressive policy to undo Hizbullah and Syria. Here is the plan as Bush people understood it and Bandar presented it:

Working in tacit cooperation, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel would roll back Iran's regional influence by taking down the extremist Hamas Palestinian government in Gaza, containing Hezbollah's bid to control Lebanon and destabilizing Iran's main regional ally, Syria.

The Saudi King has a very different plan. Indyk writes: "His opening price is Bush's accommodation of Hamas and Syria as players in the peace process, and he'll settle in the end for Israel's withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the West Bank."

Given the broad regional shift away from the Bush agenda of confrontation, it is little wonder that Ban Ki-moon decided to punt on the International Tribunal. For the same reason it is unlikely that Sarkozy will try to revive it during his first days in office. He will be planning a fresh approach to the Middle East.

Addendum: (May 2)

A number of readers believe that there will be a tribunal, but perhaps some compromise court not established under chapter VII, which permits the the use of coercive action. Bilal writes from France:

I do not think that the UN will back down from the tribunal. After several UN security resolutions & a lot of $ Millions spent so far on the investigation and then forget about it? Why and for whom? They will ALL (Bush, Chirac, UN, M14, & international community) loose credibility. It is way too much of a price to pay to save Bashar & the Syrian Regime. He is definitely not worth it.

Another factor that I am hearing about is the negotiations by the Saudis regarding change of status to a non-Chapter 7 probe, which would take much heat off of Bashar Assad. This is in line with the Saudi-Iranian talks in Riyad a month or so back, regarding a compromise deal on Lebanon, giving more of a share of power to Hezbollah, etc.  All that seemed to hang on concessions to Damascus regarding the Hariri matter. The Saudis were negotiating with the Belgian judge and others regarding how to "modify" the Hariri tribunal resolution, so it would be less threatening to Syria, and likely get support from Hezbollah ministers with Damascus' OK.  Does this conform with things you are picking up?   

 friday-lunch-club quotes an article in L'Orient Le Jour:

Chairman of the Hague Tribunal: "An international Hariri tribunal, and hence under Chapter VII, cannot be in cards"

"C’est en tout cas ce qui ressort de la position exprimée récemment par le président du Tribunal pénal international spécial pour la Yougoslavie,Fausto Pokar, qui estime que « le Conseil de sécurité ne peut adopter le statut d’un tribunal dit mixte sous le chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations unies car le tribunal spécial pour le Liban (…) devra fonctionner selon les lois libanaises pour juger les auteurs des crimes commis localement et qui sont à caractère non international … Par conséquent, soutient l’expert, on ne saurait créer un tribunal mixte sans l’approbation de l’État concerné. Et quand bien même le Conseil de sécurité opterait pour le chapitre VII, l’État libanais devrait en ratifier le statut et la convention bilatérale, selon les procédures constitutionnelles en vigueur. Ce qui, si l’on en croit cette analyse, nous ramènerait, à la case départ, les institutions étant, à ce jour, paralysées."

On her plane en route to Egypt the secretary said she "wouldn't rule it out." Rice also said she felt Syria had an ultimate interest in helping a stable government emerge in Baghdad. Rice and Moualem will be in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm el-Sheikh for two days of meetings of Iraq's neighbors and U.N. Security Council permanent members.

A meeting between Rice and Moualem would mark a shift for the Bush administration. It is unclear how extensive an agenda Rice and Moualem would pursue.

Elaine Sciolino writes in the NYTimes:

Mr. Sarkozy is unabashedly pro-Israel. He stunned Arab ambassadors in Paris recently, opening his remarks by saying that his foreign policy priority as president would be to forge a closer relationship with Israel. He also has said in private that French policy has not been tough enough against Hezbollah, which he, unlike Mr. Chirac, brands a terrorist organization.

Much of the buzz is surely propaganda from the region’s Sunni governments, which are known to whip up fears of Shiite plots when it suits them. But there are signs in Syria of a possible shift. Over time, could this predominantly Sunni country change its religious orientation — solidifying its ties to Iran and creating strong repercussions throughout the Middle East? Pinning down facts is complicated not just by Syria’s restrictions on the press but also by growing Sunni-Shiite violence in Iraq, which has made normally hospitable Syrians wary of prying questions about sectarian issues. Furthermore, Syria is an authoritarian state that strictly enforces Ba’athism — a secular ideology that subsumes sect and religion under a pan-Arab identity. In most of the Arab world, meddling in sectarian issues is discouraged. In Syria, it is illegal.

Although the regime of President Bashar al-Assad hails from an obscure offshoot of Shiism — the Alawites — Syria is nearly three-quarters Sunni, with Alawites, members of other Muslim sects and a considerable number of Christians making up the rest. The country’s leading Islamic institutions reflect conventional Sunni beliefs and traditions. Over the last five years, however, Iranian donors have financed the restoration of half a dozen Shiite tombs and shrines in Syria and built at least one Shiite religious school near Damascus; the school is named after Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Meanwhile, Iran and the Shiite militias it supports in Iraq now sponsor a number of Arabic-language Internet portals as well as satellite TV stations broadcasting Shiite religious programming into Syria.

Direct inquiries into Shiite numbers in Syria raise more questions than answers, as the sensitive topic gives observers complex incentives to round up or down. When I asked Sayyid Abdullah Nizam, leader of Syria’s Shiite community, to estimate the size of his flock, he put it at less than 1 percent of the population of 19 million. Asked the same question, the leader of Syria’s Sunnis, Grand Mufti Sheik Ahmad Badr Eddin Hassoun, replied carefully; he said that 6 to 8 percent of Syrians now adhere to the “Jaafari school,” the school of Islamic jurisprudence followed by mainstream Shiites in Iran and Lebanon.

It was only when I met an actual convert that the mufti’s words began to make sense. Louay, a 28-year-old teacher in Damascus wearing jeans, a wool sweater and a close-cropped beard, seemed the epitome of the capital’s Sunni middle class. Yet within the last year, as Hezbollah rose to national prominence in the Lebanese government, he — along with his mother — began practicing Shiite Islam. He changed the wording of his prayers and his posture while praying, holding his arms at his sides instead of before him, and during Ramadan he followed Shiite customs on breaking the fast. In many Middle Eastern countries, his conversion wouldn’t be possible — it would be considered apostasy. The Syrian regime restricts its people’s political liberties, but unlike most other ruling dynasties in the Arab world, it allows freedom of religion. “In Saudi Arabia, they ban books on other faiths,” Louay said. “In Syria, I can buy whatever book on religion I want, and no one can say a word.”

Politics, it seems, is only one of the attractions of Shiism. In addition to Louay, I spoke with four other Syrian converts, who asked not to be identified for fear of harassment by Sunni fundamentalists. Louay and the others all spoke of religious transformation as much as of Hezbollah. “Half the reason why I converted was because of Ijtihad,” Louay said, using the Arabic word for the independent interpretation of the Koran and the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. Suddenly the mufti’s enigmatic answer became clearer. Ijtihad is practiced more widely by Shiites of the Jaafari school than by Sunnis. These Shiites believe that, on all but the largest moral issues, Muslims should interpret their faith by reading holy texts and reasoning back and forth between them and current issues. Many Sunnis say they quietly practice Ijtihad in everyday life as well, but conservative Sunnis do not encourage individual interpretation of the Koran.

For Louay, the difference is immense. “Take the Internet. Some conservative Sunni sheiks say the Internet is haram,” or illegal, he said. “If I go back to Jaafar al-Sadiq” — the eighth-century founder of the Jaafari school — “I will not find a ruling on it. So instead I use my mind to sort it out. On the Internet, some things are positive, some negative. I choose the positive for myself.”

Americans might find it surprising that the man Louay looks to for more current and oftentimes liberal guidance on controversial issues is Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran. For four decades, Syrians had to rely on advice from the local Sunni clerics who appeared in state-owned media. With the advent of satellite television and the Internet, however, Louay said he is now able to keep up with his favorite scholars across the Islamic world. You could easily draw a comparison with the way Protestants in Europe were able to follow the likes of Martin Luther after the introduction of movable type.

Even if Shiitization is at this point as much a rumor as a confirmed fact, the subject is highly charged. It is part of a much larger discussion among Washington’s Sunni allies about the rise of a “Shiite Crescent” — an Iranian-backed alliance stretching westward from Iran to Syria to Lebanon that could challenge the traditional power of Sunni elites. With its Sunni masses and minority Tehran-backed regime, Syria is the weak link in the chain. Many Syrians say they are worried Iraq’s sectarian strife might spread to Syria; the execution of Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, at the hands of Iraq’s Shiite-dominated government, infuriated many. The conversion of Syrians to Shiism could create still more conflict.

Meanwhile, the regional politics are becoming ever more delicate. Damascus is reportedly unhappy about Iran’s recent dialogue with Saudi Arabia over the future of Lebanon; Tehran, in turn, is rumored to be questioning Assad’s recent peace overtures toward Israel. Both sides denied a rift when Assad visited Tehran in February. But only days later, a group of Syrian intellectuals and parliamentarians loyal to Assad lambasted an Iranian deputy foreign minister in scripted fashion in a closed-door (but widely reported) session. The point of contention? Their unhappiness with what they saw as Iranian support for the Shiitization of Syria.

Andrew Tabler is a fellow at the Institute of Current World Affairs and the editor in chief of Syria Today magazine.

La nouvelle résidence des Chirac, quai Voltaire

President George W. Bush's top Arab allies, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saudi King Abdullah, are edging away from him, skeptical about his ability to end bloodshed in Baghdad, make progress on Palestinian statehood and contain Iran's nuclear program. Saudi Arabia, the third-biggest exporter of crude oil to the U.S., is cutting a foreign-policy path sometimes contrary to American interests, diplomats and analysts say.  "In the last quarter-century, never has America's standing with its core Arab allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, been as low as it is in this administration,'' said Bruce Riedel, a Middle East adviser to President Bill Clinton and to Bush in his first term. "They have come to the conclusion that Bush and his team are not part of the solution to their concerns, they are the problem.''

"The president of Yemen is coming here the beginning of May; they're friends of the United States,'' David Welch, the assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, said in an interview. "I know they're not as big as Egypt or Saudi Arabia, but it would be a little unfair to say we have a problem in the region across the board.''

"What you've got is a rather large gap between the way that the Saudis, or the way that Abdullah, wants to do business in the new environment and the way Bush wants to do business,'' Indyk said.

Two years ago, largely at the urging of the Bush administration, the first elections in Saudi history were held for municipal councils in a small number of cities, including Jidda, Riyadh and Mecca. Only men could vote and only half the members were elected, but still the elections were hailed as emblems of change.

"Two years after being forced out, Syria continues to be key to Lebanon stability" (AP)

"Two Openings March 14 Might Consider" By: Michael Young | The Daily Star

It's never easy to discern movement in the midst of glacial stalemate, but the ice has definitely budged in the past 10 days in Lebanon. The Hariri tribunal is almost certain to be established, whether through Lebanese institutions or through the United Nations Security Council; and the heat is building up on the opposition to agree to a presidential election amid a widening consensus that Emile Lahoud, whatever else happens, will not remain in office beyond the end of his term…

It was Russia's deputy foreign minister, Alexander Sultanov, who lowered the knife on Syria by indicating that Moscow would not veto recourse to Chapter 7 in the event the tribunal remained blocked in Lebanon. Sultanov's message to Syrian President Bashar Assad probably went like this: Accept the tribunal through the Lebanese constitutional process, since you can then influence what happens; but once it reaches the UN, there's little we can do to help you. There are no signs, however, that Assad intends to change direction.

In order to maintain the initiative, but also to block any outside effort to sow domestic conflict over the Hariri tribunal, March 14 needs to do more. It should open up in two directions: toward the Shiite community…; and toward Aoun…

With respect to the Shiites, the majority might want to think of putting on the table a quid pro quo: a timetable to discuss constitutional reforms and a redistribution of political power among all communities, in particular the Shiites, in exchange for Hizbullah's willingness to accept a timetable for its disarmament.

Danerous Delusion on the Golan By: Aluf Benn | Haaretz

There is a new idea dominating public discourse: Israel will recognize Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights and hold the territory under a long-term lease agreement. But those in the know and who are familiar with the detailed history of the negotiations with Syria say Damascus will not agree to such a proposal.

Al Qaeda Strikes Back By: Bruce Reidel | Foreign Affairs

By rushing into Iraq instead of finishing off the hunt for Osama bin Laden, Washington has unwittingly helped its enemies: al Qaeda has more bases, more partners, and more followers today than it did on the eve of 9/11. Now the group is working to set up networks in the Middle East and Africa — and may even try to lure the United States into a war with Iran. Washington must focus on attacking al Qaeda's leaders and ideas and altering the local conditions in which they thrive.

Playing Safe The Economist

The selection of Abdullah Gul, the foreign minister, as the candidate of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for next month's presidential election has taken much of the heat out of the issue.

Monitoring the Syrian Legislative Elections 2007: The Tharwa community has posted its latest roundup of the election process which is revealing. Low turnout. Violence in some rural areas. Local rivalries between branches of the government and competing patronage networks. Various methods of government manipulation. These are some of the topics discussed. In conclusion, it seems clear that the great mass of Syrians turned their noses up at the elections, not wanting to participate in a process that treats them as donkeys. But for the elite, politics remains important. Parliament and position confer benefits, prestige and access to the all important resources of the state.

Riots in Syrian Al-Rikkah province because of elections, Elaph, April 25. (thanks to mideastwire.com) Click here for source

Elaph, an independent Saudi owned news website, wrote on April 25: “With the start of the announcement of the results of the elections for the people’s council in some of the Syrian provinces, the Al-Rikkah province witnessed violent riots caused by “forgery in the elections” which necessitated the interference of the army and pushed the Syrian interior minister Bassam Abdul-Majid to go to the province. The interior ministry announced that it registered no complaints in the elections but the governor of Al-Rikkah Ahmad Chehadeh Khalil confirmed to the official Syrian media that the elections in the province will be repeated in 20 centers because of suspicions about the occurrence of mistakes in these centers. This announcement was accompanied by riots throughout Al-Rikkah in which tires were burned and roads were closed which led to some injuries.”

The website added: “The lawyer Abdullah Khalil announced to Elaph that the main reason behind the riots were the forgeries sanctioned by the regime in the elections by appointing committees to tally the votes loyal to some of the nominees and the ruling Ba’th party which caused scandalous forgeries throughout the electoral circles starting with Ma’dan to Al-Salkha, to Al-Rikkah Samra, and Al-Salhabiyah. Al-Khalil, who lives in Al-Rikkah (400 kilometres north east of Damascus) announced that the forgeries pushed each of the candidates to hold on to his victory so that when the authorities decided to repeat the elections, the riots started in the first day around the center of the tallying of the votes in the heart of the province and then the riots expanded to include rural areas which caused the severing of the Al-Rikkah-Dayr Al-Zoor highway from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m. but the lawyer added that the road was opened again today.”

The website continued: “The lawyer added: “The situation calmed down now after a settlement which resulted in considering the candidate Abd Al-Muhsin Al-Rakkan a winner along with Muhammad Sayf Al-Huwiedi while the candidate Abdul-Mahdi Hammud and Isma’il Al-Balikh were considered among the losers. All of these candidates were from among the tribes of Al-Rikkah and all of them were claiming that they had won”. Al-Khalil confirmed that there were forgeries in all the electoral centers. He confirmed that there were confrontations inside the city of Al-Rikkah which pushed the army to deploy and forced all the shops to close. He pointed out that there were intermittent confrontations between the members of the police and the supporters of the nominees which deteriorated into fights with young children not connected to the elections.”

The website added: “Al-Khalil confirmed that there are a number of wounded people in the hospitals. He pointed out that some of those injured are completely unconnected with the elections as they didn’t even vote. He clarified that the police used tear gas and live bullets but didn’t cause any injuries. He added that cars and private property were assaulted and damaged belonging to citizens that weren’t connected to the elections which caused anarchy to spread for more than four hours until the army managed to take control of the situation…”

Muhammad Al-Rumaihi, editor of the Al-Arabi magazine which is published in Kuwait, wrote in the April 25 issue of the independent Saudi owned newspaper Al Hayat: “Much effort was invested in the Arab summit which was held in Riyadh but if we take into consideration what was announced last week about delegating Egypt and Jordan to talk to Israel about the Arab initiative, then this seems a repetition of what took place in the last 50 years in different forms. For it is not the first time in which the Arabs failed to reach a unanimous agreement on taking courageous and clear steps towards Israel. The kitchen that decided upon this last step faced a number of options, the least important of which was delegating a larger number of the representatives of Arab countries to participate with Jordan and Egypt – for Cairo and Amman are not the only capitals to possess diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv as there are a number of other Arab capitals that h ave clear and direct communications with Israel through representative offices. If all these capitals were enrolled, then the Arab initiative could have been described as comprehensive.”

Al-Rumaihi added: “This is one side of the problem. The other concerns the Palestinian attitude as up to this hour, no clear and decisive delegation has been given to a Palestinian negotiator who possesses the final word in talking with Israel. The Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas goes to the Israeli negotiators with Hamas’s suspicions trailing him as not all the mutual doubts between Hamas and Fatah have been buried yet. The disagreements between the two movements aren’t secret to the public but in private sessions the talk reaches the extent of a looming divorce between the two Palestinian organizations because of the struggle which is mainly a struggle for power more than a disagreement over the goals. On the other side stands Syria which looks at the previous agreements between Israel and some of its neighbours, including the Palestinians, as an abandonment of “Syrian rights” – thus the obstructing Syrian stick stretches through its allies in Lebanon to foil any agreeme nt or attempt at an agreement in which Syrian interests don’t possess a clear cut slice.”

Al-Rumaihi continued: “The Syrian interests focus on liberating the Golan Heights as specified in the old negotiations between Syria and Israel or what is known as Rabin’s legacy which recognizes Syria’s rights to go back to the borders of 1967 which is also included in the Madrid conference in 1991. The Arab initiative starts with the wrong end: the Israelis and the Palestinians. The correct end to start at is the Syrian Israeli end. If this happens then it would cool down a hot front that is sending off warning sparks, i.e. the Lebanese front in which a major and active player, Hezbollah, monopolizes enough power to sabotage the country and start a regional war and not only foil agreements or spark unexpected wars. Matters have reached this level of seriousness despite the fact that the Arab initiative was launched based on an Arab agreement in Beirut but it was not able to even help Lebanon avoid the tough summer war which shook up the Lebanese internal situation.”

Al-Rumaihi added: “The disparity which is clear between the official Arab desire for peace and between the “popular Arab mood” which is creating an atmosphere opposed to peace is a failure in marketing resulting from a hesitation to take clear steps and sell them to the populace. This failure is not restrained to the Arabs as it includes a large sector among the Israelis… The important equation lies in the ability of Damascus to apply pressure but without paying any price in return. But, and it is a big “but”, what about the status of its allies whether in Lebanon for internal reasons or in the Gulf where Iran is facing a huge international show? …It seems that the strongest ring is owned by Damascus but only until the explosion occurs but when this explosion finally occurs, this ring will become the weakest…” – Al Hayat, United Kingdom

Caroline Glick, writing in the Jerusalem Post on April 20, 2007 had this advise about Israel's need to fight a preemtive war against Syria – Fighting the Next War

Syrian Agrees to Rice Meeting By: Betsy Pisik | The Washington Times

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem said yesterday he would "gladly" meet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at an upcoming Iraq conference, one of several steps Syria indicated it would take to soothe tensions in the Middle East.

Turkey

Other important news comes from Turkey where Abdullah Gul seems to be on his way to becoming President in elections to be begin on Friday.

Is the U.S.-Turkey Alliance at an End? By: Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush | The Washington Post

Turkey and the United States are approaching a critical strategic crossroad that will determine both the shape and the content of their relationship for the foreseeable future. The pressures forcing change on this long-standing alliance — which has endured since the Truman Doctrine in 1947 — are powerful.

In Turkey, a Sign of a Rising Islamic Middle Class, By Sabrina Tavernise, April 25, 2007, NYTimes
Abdullah Gul, 56, the foreign minister, whose wife wears a Muslim head scarf and who is Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s closest political ally, is expected to be confirmed as president by Parliament in several rounds of voting that begin Friday. That will boost Turkey’s new political class — modernizers from a religious background.

“These are the new forces, the new social powers,” said Ali Bulac, a columnist for a conservative newspaper, Zaman, in Istanbul. “They are very devout. They don’t drink. They don’t gamble. They don’t take holidays. They are loaded with a huge energy. This energy has been blocked by the state.”

Turkey is a Muslim country, but its state, founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, is strictly secular, and the presidency is its most important office. The current president is Ahmet Necdet Sezer, a secularist with a judicial background whose term is expiring.

Mr. Gul, an affable English speaker who has long been his party’s public face abroad, nodded to secular concerns in a news conference in Ankara after his nomination, saying, “Our differences are our richness.” His candidacy was a concession: the choice most distasteful to the secular establishment was Mr. Erdogan himself, who deftly bowed out.

Still, if Mr. Gul is confirmed, his party would occupy the posts of president, prime minister and parliamentary speaker, a lineup that the opposition party leader, Deniz Baykal, called “unfavorable.” His party later announced that it would boycott the vote.

In the Middle East, where mixing religion with government has been seen as poisonous for modernity, Turkey’s very light blend stands out as unusual, even unique.

“This party has done more for the modernization of Turkey than all the secular parties in the previous years,” said Joost Lagendijk, a member of the European Parliament who heads a committee on Turkish issues. “They were willing to open up the system, to challenge the elite.”

The party that Mr. Gul helped found, known by its Turkish initials, AK, sprang from the Islamic political movements of the 1990s. But the AK became significantly more moderate after taking power on a national scale in 2002. Since then, it has applied pragmatic policies that helped create an economic boom and opened up the state in ways that the rigid secular elite, which relied heavily on state control, had never imagined, in part to qualify for membership in the European Union.

Although the party is publicly adamant about keeping religion separate from policy, bristling at shorthand descriptions of it as pro-Islamic, it draws much of its support from Turkey’s religiously conservative heartland. Once on the periphery, these traditional Turks are now emerging as a powerful middle class that has driven Turkey’s boom. The economy has nearly doubled in the four years that the AK has been in power, largely because it has stuck to an economic program prescribed by the International Monetary Fund.

Mr. Gul’s candidacy goes to the heart of the secular-religious debate, because the presidency is such a revered symbol with real powers — he is commander in chief and has a veto. Turkish military leaders in the past have remarked that they would refuse to visit the presidential palace if a woman in a head scarf were living in it.

“How can she now become the host of a palace that represents the very same principles?” said Necmi Yuzbasioglu, a professor of constitutional law at Istanbul University.

Mehmet A. Kislali, a columnist with the newspaper Radikal, who has contacts with the military, said: “The military should not be underestimated. Thousands of officers are watching the developments.”

But the party’s only real application of Islam has been its grass-roots approach. In practices that would be familiar to Shiite Muslims in Lebanon or to Palestinians in Gaza, women’s groups go door to door offering aid, community centers offer women’s literacy classes and sports centers give free physical therapy to handicapped children.

The question of religion aside, economic progress under the AK has been extraordinary, with a steady rise in entrepreneurship. In Istanbul, fuel-efficient taxis zip down tulip-lined streets. New parks have sprung up. The air is less polluted….

Muslims Believe US Seeks to Undermine Islam 
Majorities Want US Forces Out of Islamic Countries And Approve of Attacks on US Troops

Large Majorities Agree With Many Goals of Al Qaeda, but Oppose Attacks on Civilians

Most Support Enhancing Role of Islam in their Society, but Also Favor Globalization and Democracy

An in-depth poll of four major Muslim countries has found that in all of them large majorities believe that undermining Islam is a key goal of US foreign policy. Most want US military forces out of the Middle East and many approve of attacks on US troops there.

Most respondents have mixed feelings about al Qaeda. Large majorities agree with many of its goals, but believe that terrorist attacks on civilians are contrary to Islam.

There is strong support for enhancing the role of Islam in all of the countries polled, through such measures as the imposition of sharia (Islamic law). This does not mean that they want to isolate their societies from outside influences: Most view globalization positively and favor democracy and freedom of religion.  [Read More…]

SENTENCED: Syrian human rights activist Anwar Bunni (pictured) was sentenced April 24, 2007 to five years in prison by a Damascus criminal court for 'spreading false information.' (REUTERS)

DAMASCUS —  Syrian human rights activist Anwar Bunni was Tuesday sentenced to five years in prison on charges of "spreading false information," his lawyer said.

Khalil Maatuk said his client was sentenced in a Damascus criminal court.

Bunni, himself a lawyer, was arrested in the Syrian capital in May 2006 after signing an appeal for radical reform in relations between Syria and neighboring Lebanon.

Syria's state prosecutor said in February that Bunni would be prosecuted for spreading false information.

Bunni was the director of a legal rights center in Syria, financed partly by the European Union and established by a Belgian non-governmental organization. The center was closed down after his arrest.

In a statement to the court in January, Bunni said he was being judged for his opinions and had in no way violated the Syrian constitution or the law.

The "Beirut-Damascus Declaration" published in the Lebanese capital in May 2006 was signed by nearly 300 Syrian and Lebanese intellectuals.

In a crackdown that followed in Syria, Bunni was arrested along with nine others, including journalist and writer Michel Kilo and communist activist Mahmoud Issa.

The best interview with Bunni remains Joe Pace's, published on Syria Comment in Aug 2005. Bunni lays out in detail his views on the Syrian opposition, the Kurdish issue, US foreign policy and how Syrians should work to change the situation in their country.

Anwar al-Bunni: Interview with Syria's leading … Here is a small quote from the long interview:

Pace: But there are people who are unwilling as a matter of principle to accept an American victory. How do you convince them that American pressure is in their interest?

Bunni: Those people are one element of many. There is no entity that wants to see an end to American interference more than the Syrian regime itself. But like I said, we need to exploit American pressure, not for the sake of American interests, but for the sake of achieving our own goals. And this is what the current opposition doesn’t understand. It doesn’t understand how to play the game. Even regards to people like Farid Ghadry—we have an expression in Syria: “better the dog bark with you than at you.” Let Farid bark with you. Don’t degrade him.

The opposition has no conception of how it is going to bring about these grand political changes. This is why I say they will collapse with the regime. They have no program; they have no role outside of opposing the regime’s existence. Who are they going to oppose after the regime’s collapse?

The regime’s political strategy depends on planting landmines throughout society. But the mine doesn’t explode if you place your leg on it—it explodes when you remove your leg from it. The regime planted the land mines then placed their legs on them so that if the regime goes, the society will explode. We can expect the same thing that happened in Lebanon to happen here. We suffer from the same problems of competing nationalisms, sectarianism, and extremism. So we are held hostage by a regime that says to us “if I leave, the world will end. You’ll suffer through civil war. Best leave me in place.”

We need to mobilize the people to build a new society and minimize the potential for this explosion. But nothing is free. No country can progress without paying a price, be it blood or civil war. Even America had to undergo civil war before it could become a great power—hundreds of people had to die. Europe had to suffer through the Second World War to become what it is today. Big changes require big prices. But we need to work to minimize the price we will have to pay for progress.

This is the role for foreign pressures—to enable people to mobilize and build a new society that will not explode as soon as the totalitarian boot is lifted. To allow people to build a society that will neutralize that landmine.

Addendum: Hassan Fatah and Hugh Naylor of the NYTimes write:

Bunni's attorneys and many analysts said, the verdict appeared to be a stark warning to the Syrian opposition.

"It was a message to the entire opposition movement: Pursue democracy, get punished," said Razan Zaitounah, an attorney on Bunni's defense team.

Witnesses said the courtroom was hushed as the judge read the verdict Tuesday morning, then erupted in shock at the harshness of the sentence.

"It's not a matter of what Anwar did; the regime is trying to send a message to the opposition movement, and that is: 'Shut up!,' " said Yassin Hajj Salih, a columnist and analyst linked to the opposition who attended the court session Tuesday. "The regime wants activists to be afraid, to be careful of what they do."

WASHINGTON (AP)–The U.S. has imposed sanctions on 14 foreign people, companies and government agencies, including the Syrian navy and air force, as it boosts efforts to stop transfers of advanced weaponry to and from Iran and Syria.

The 14 – which also include Lebanon's radical Hezbollah movement and firms from China, Malaysia, Mexico and Singapore – are accused of selling to or buying from Iran or Syria missile technology or material to make weapons of mass destruction.

The sanctions, announced by the State Department on Monday, bar any U.S. aid, government contracts or export licenses to the named entities for two years. They may be renewed at any time during that period.

State Department officials refused to comment on specific allegations against those listed in the notice because the determinations involved sensitive intelligence. But, they said Washington had "credible evidence" they had been involved in illicit transfers.

The measures are largely symbolic because many of the targets are already subject to U.S. sanctions for previous similar transactions, most recently in December 2006, officials said.

However, the Syrian navy and air force, have never before been identified as violators of the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act, they said. Neither has Hezbollah, which is backed by both Syria and Iran and is covered by existing U.S. sanctions because it is designated a "foreign terrorist organization" by the U.S., they said.

Other violators named in Monday's notice are:

– the China National Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation, or CPMIEC;
– the Shanghai Non-Ferrous Metals Pudong Development Trade Company of China;
– the Zibo Chemet Equipment Company of China;
– Iran's Defense Industries Organization;
– Singapore's Sokkia company;
– Syria's Army Supply Bureau;
– Syria's Industrial Establishment of Defense;
– Malaysia's Challenger Corporation of Malaysia;
– Malaysia's Target Airfreight;
– Mexico's Aerospace Logistics Services; and
– a Pakistani individual named Arif Durrani;

Ibrahim Hamidi, Al-Hayat's Bureau Chief in Damascus, has written the following article about the results of the Syrian elections. He added this short note in English to highlight the most important points. The al-Hayat article is copied below.

Dear Joshua,

.

This article explains what happened in the elections and the changes in the political balance in the parliament. The Baathists will have 134 deputies instead of the 132 they preserved for themselves in the previous parliament. The National Progressive Front members are now 36 instead of 35. This means that the number of deputies that belong to the Baath and government sponsored NPF parties have been increased by 3 from 167 to 170. The parliament has 250 deputies in all, so the number of independent deputies will be reduced by 3 in the new parliament to 80 instead of 83, as they were in the 2003 elections.

An interview with the Syrian Ambassador
by Shafique Jamal, MPAID1
Staff Writer
Wednesday March 21, 2007

On Wednesday March 21 the Syrian Ambassador to the U.S., Dr. Imad Moustapha, spoke at KSG. Sponsored by the Dubai Initiative, his presentation “The Middle East: A Perspective From Within” examined both US-Syria relations and Syria’s role in the Middle East. Moustapha (IM) spoke here with The Citizen (TC):

TC: How can Syria help bring peace to Iraq?

IM: We have excellent relations with all political groups in Iraq, including the Kurds and former Baathists.We used to host [Iraqi President] Jalal Talabani and gave him a Syrian diplomatic passport. There are 1.3 million refugees in Iraq. The U.S. should include all of Iraq’s neighbors in the discussions.

TC: What do you think about partitioning Iraq in order to solve the sectarian violence?

IM: The idea of partition is a stupid idea that comes from the neo-conservatives.We are totally opposed to discussion of partition – it will only lead to a bloody civil war.

There is no military solution. Only when the power controlling Iraq, that is the U.S., starts to include all political parties, many of which feel disenfranchised, will there be a resolution. There needs to be a political process. Everything else, including the [troop] surge, the new security plan, is an illusion. The U.S. should realize that all neighboring countries should be involved.

TC: In your opinion, what motivates U.S. antagonism towards Syria?

IM: Syrian relations with the U.S. have been worse under the second Bush administration than in previous administrations. Previous presidents from Nixon to Clinton have visited Syria. This administration has not.

Definitely, the source of hostility is Syria’s refusal to support the second invasion of Iraq. Ever since then we’ve not had much official communication with the U.S., except for after 9/11 and very recently. In fact after 9/11 Syria provided information on Al-Qaeda to the U.S. Then Secretary of State Colin Powel said Syria provided actionable information that has saved American lives.

The willingness of the U.S. to talk to us now about Iraq is because of domestic pressures from the political establishment, and even this is much less than what the U.S. and Syria used to enjoy.

TC: What is the nature of the relationship between Syria and Iran?

IM: We have excellent relations with Iran. Iran has never occupied Palestine, they didn’t kill over a thousand people in Lebanon. If the U.S. has a problem with Iran they should deal with them bilaterally and not by pressuring us with their bellicose attitude.

TC: What do you think is the future of U.S.-Syrian relations?

IM: Communication has been superficial so far, but I do think there is a realistic probability that relations will improve. The U.S. could play a constructive role in the conflicts in the region. It is the only country that can pressure Israel into entering into peace negotiations with Syria. Previous administrations have encouraged this dialogue.

TC: How has Syria changed since Bashar Al-Assad became president in 2000?

IM: We’ve opened up socially, politically, economically. The latest World Bank report in the last three years shows a large improvement in friendliness to business. The relative progress in this area has been the largest.

While we continue to face challenges we recognize that the Syrian leadership has been careful to not cause upheaval. For example look at the case of Russia. Under their reforms a few people became very rich while many did not do very well. So we’ve paced the reforms such that we opened the economy without hurting the less fortunate. The price is that we haven’t seen tremendous levels of wealth, but we’ve also not seen extreme economic inequality. Still our growth rate is at 5% GDP.

TC: In recent months Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad has offered to negotiate peace with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has refused to negotiate.

Some supporters of Israel say that the offer to negotiate is intended as a diversion to relieve the diplomatic pressure on Syria.What is your response?

IM: This is an absurd argument. For the past 15 years Syria has been offering Israel land for peace, and we have always honored our agreements. Why do they really refuse? It is because of the Zionist regime’s ideology, of expansion of settlements, for example. Israel will eventually realize that they can’t continue with a military solution forever, because the military option is bound to fail.

TC: What can Syria do to bring Israel to the negotiating table – what is Syria’s leverage?

IM: There are constituencies in Israel that are interested in peace.We just have to wait for them to have a stronger influence.

Also See: "A Little Less Lonely These Days" By Dan Ephron, Newsweek: "The Syrian Ambassador to the US didn't used to get many visitors. Suddenly, his date book is filling up. What he makes of the new American outreach- and how Syria hopes to gain from it." Read Full interview here.