Saudi Arabia’s New Peace Proposal?

Risk-taking in Riyadh

As the Forward went to press this week, reports from a senior Israeli journalist currently in Riyadh — those words themselves bespeak a revolution in Arab-Israeli relations — indicate that Saudi Arabia is preparing to roll out an elaborate new peace proposal. Formulated in the course of secret talks with Israeli and American officials, the new proposal reportedly is meant to fill the gaps that Israel finds most worrisome in the existing Saudi peace plan.

The main Saudi plan, first floated in 2002, promises Israel diplomatic relations and permanent peace with all 22 Arab states in return for withdrawal to the 1967 borders, establishment of a Palestinian state and honoring the Palestinian refugees’ “right of return.” Israel, after initially ignoring the plan, has lately taken to calling it “positive,” but rejects the idea of taking in a flood of Palestinian refugees. Israelis also worry about the apparent all-or-nothing nature of the plan; they want to talk it through, haggle over precise borders and build in reliable guarantees of their own security.

Those are the objections that the reputed new Saudi proposals are meant to answer. According to reporter Orly Azoulay, the Washington correspondent of Yediot Aharonot, who was in Riyadh to cover this week’s Arab League summit, the Saudis are developing on a plan to establish joint Israeli-Arab working groups that would negotiate the various specific elements and timing of the overall peace plan. The working groups would include representatives of the diplomatic Quartet — the United States, United Nations, European Union and Russia — and would operate under the auspices of an international conference to be convened by U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.

In a separate report, Yediot stated that the Saudis had reached an agreement in secret talks with Washington and Jerusalem on a refugee deal that would give Palestinians a choice between financial compensation in the countries where they now live or applying for resettlement in the new Palestinian state.

The newspaper reported that the new proposals were to be aired only in the most general terms at this week’s Riyadh summit, where the original Saudi plan was to be revived. The plan won unanimous approval when it was first presented to the Arab League in 2002, but reportedly faces bitter opposition this time from Syria and Libya. Other states are likely to seek a middle ground in order to preserve the semblance of consensus, which could spell trouble for the Saudi efforts to move toward Israel.

Israel faces its own minefields. The government of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was elected on a promise to seek a settlement, and public opinion favors a deal. It’s not clear, though, that Israelis are prepared for the magnitude of the sacrifice that will be demanded of them. Reaching a deal will require leadership and courage, and both of those commodities are in short supply in Jerusalem right now. Olmert’s political career hangs by a dozen fraying threads, and his main challenges come from the right.

This is a fragile moment, fraught with opportunity and danger. Opponents of any Israeli compromise will dredge up every argument in the book to discredit the Saudis and the rest of the Arab states. They’ll question the viability of the plan and the wisdom of Israeli security experts who favor it. Friends of Israel, seeking only to protect the Jewish state from its enemies, may be tempted to join the fray by picking up the warnings and repeating them loudly, thinking they’re building pressure for a better deal.

But that’s the wrong response. The Saudi plan contains risks for Israel, but those are risks that Israelis are capable of navigating. The greatest danger right now is that a genuine opportunity for peace will be lost. The Saudis are taking an enormous risk in exposing themselves to hardliners as Israel’s advocates. They need encouragement, not abuse.

The Arab League Summit: Arabism is Back – Syria is In

Arab Unity and respect for the Arab nation were the overriding themes of the Arab League summit in Riyadh. Saudi diplomacy at the summit represents an important break with US policy in the region, designed as it is to pit "moderate" Arabs against "terrorist" Arabs. The Bush administration views Arabism as fascism, conjoint with Islamism in its evilness. Saudi Arabia has rejected the Bush notion that Islamo-fascism is the root of Middle Easter problems.

By embracing Arabism, King Abdullah has come to the conclusion that only Arab unity can restore the regional balance of power — so skewed in Iran's favor by the destruction of Saddam's Arabist regime. To do this, Saudi Arabia must reach an accommodation with Syria, Hizbullah, and Hamas; it cannot destroy them, as the US recommends.

This is why King Abdullah gave Bashar al-Asad special attention, why he allowed Lebanon's long-ostracized President Lahoud the opportunity to extol the virtues of Hizbullah, and why he has constructed and championed the new Palestinian coalition government in an effort to relieve pressure on Hamas and the Palestinians.

Where the US and Iran seek to divide the Arab states in order to rule them, Saudi Arabia is trying to unite them.

The "moderate" Arab states have come to the conclusion that the Bush plan in Iraq is dead. By calling the US occupation or Iraq "illegal," King Abdullah announced that he is seeking a new policy toward Iraq, one designed for the post-American phase in Iraq and one that must be coordinated with Syria. The alliance between Syria and Iran was strengthened by the US occupation of Iraq. The US made it clear that it considered both Iran and Syria as rogue states, that would have to make dramatic changes to their policies if they did not want to face American induced regime-change. But when the US withdraws from Iraq this calculus will change. The alliance between Iran and Syria will face serious strains. It is in Syria's interest to team up with Saudi Arabia in order to tip the scales of power in Iraq toward its Sunni community. This will divide Syria from Iran, which will be pushing down on the Shiite side of the scale. So long as the US is strong in Iraq, Syria's interests are with Iran. Once the US is gone, Syria's interests will be with Saudi Arabia.

In order to smooth the way for Syria to make the transition from Iran to Arabia, King Abdullah must advance Syrian interests in Lebanon, by finding an accommodation between the Syrian backed opposition and the US backed government. Even more importantly, it must advance Syria's desire to get back the Golan Heights and sign a peace agreement with Israel, based on the return of all occupied territories. Saudi Arabia's rejection of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s call on Monday for Arab governments to “begin reaching out to Israel” and to make changes in the terms of the Arab peace plan, most notably the call for a right of return for Palestinian refugees to what is today Israel, must be seen in this light. Regarding the Palestinians, the king said Wednesday, “It has become necessary to end the unjust blockade imposed on the Palestinian people as soon as possible so that the peace process can move in an atmosphere far from oppression and force.”

Turki al-Rasheed, who runs an organization promoting democracy in Saudi Arabia, said “Bush wants to make it look like he is solving the problem. The king wants to actually solve the problems.”

King Abdullah said the loss of confidence in Arab leaders had allowed American and other forces to hold significant sway in the region. “If confidence is restored it will be accompanied by credibility,” he said, “and if credibility is restored then the winds of hope will blow, and then we will never allow outside forces to define our future nor allow banners to be raised in Arab lands other than those of Arabism, brothers.”

[End]

Alex writes of the Arab League summit: "I just listened to most of the speeches given during the closing session of the summit.

Bashar surprised all by having the shortest speech!… He said that he was very satisfied with the decisions taken at this summit and that they seem like they will have a good chance of being implemented. He is confident that Arab national security will not be allowed to be compromised by outsiders who thought they could do so with ease.

He then expressed his hope that the next summit in Syria will achieve similar gains for the Arab world ..etc. At previous summits, he delivered long lectures.

Lahoud delivered a very hard line speech, praising Hizbollah's performance in its struggle with Israel last summer. The rest of the closing remarks were bland and generic.

 Hassan Fattah has an excellent roundup, which I have quoted from above: "U.S. Iraq Role Is Called Illegal by Saudi King." He writes:

The Saudis seem to be emphasizing that they will not be beholden to the policies of their longtime ally.

They brokered a deal between the two main Palestinian factions last month, but one that Israel and the United States found deeply problematic because it added to the power of the radical group Hamas rather than the more moderate Fatah. On Wednesday King Abdullah called for an end to the international boycott of the new Palestinian government. The United States and Israel want the boycott continued.

In addition, Abdullah invited President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran to Riyadh earlier this month, while the Americans want him shunned. And in trying to settle the tensions in Lebanon, the Saudis have been willing to negotiate with Iran and Hezbollah.

Last week the Saudi king canceled his appearance next month at a White House dinner in his honor, The Washington Post reported Wednesday. The official reason given was a scheduling conflict, the paper said.

Mustapha Hamarneh, director of the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, said the Saudis were sending Washington a message. “They are telling the U.S. they need to listen to their allies rather than imposing decisions on them and always taking Israel’s side,” Mr. Hamarneh said.

In his speech, the king said, “In the beloved Iraq, the bloodshed is continuing

The Project for Democracy in the Middle East, an excellent independent organization highlights on its blog the consternation in Washington at the behavior of the Saudis.

Bush Rejected by Middle East Royalty?
In the Washington Post, Jim Hoagland discusses the meaning of Saudi King Abdullah's recent cancellation of a White House gala to be held in Abdullah's honor in mid-April. This, on the heels of Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit's angry rebuff of unacceptable "interference" by Condoleezza Rice in Egyptian affairs, indicates an increased willingness by Middle East allies to reject the White House, or as Hoagland suggests, an increased political need to do so.
Children of Abraham, an interesting program designed to bring together teenagers who are around 16-18 years old, is looking for Syrians who want to participate.
Children of Abraham is launching a ground-breaking online program connecting Muslim teenagers from Jakarta, Tehran, Riyadh, Dubai, Damascus and Cairo, and Jewish teenagers from Paris, London, Montreal, New York and Moscow. Participants are guided through a four-month program online using Wiki collaboration and photography that will require 2-3 hours per week.  For a description and objectives, you can read here: Program Description. A full list of eligibility requirements is here: Eligibility. The application questions are available here in Arabic and English.  But the ANSWERS must be filled out in English. Application 2007.

“Farid Ghadry, Syria’s Chalabi: From Washington to Damascus,” by Salim Abraham

Salim Abraham, a Syria journalist from Qamishli who worked for Associated Press in Damascus for years before winning a grant to attend the master's program at Columbia University's School of Journalism in 2005 and 2006, wrote this essay on Farid Ghadry. It is taken from his master's thesis, completed in the spring of 2006. Salim Abraham has recently moved to London with his new bride, who is also originally from Qamishli. He can be reached at [email protected]

A Power Struggle from Washington to Damascus: Syria's Ahmad Chalabi
By Salim Abraham
March 2007
Published by Syria Comment

The road from Washington, D.C., to Potomac, Maryland, snakes alongside the river that gave the suburban town its name. On this sunny Wednesday in December, the roads are covered with snow, as is the backyard of the red-brick Gothic-style home of the man I am visiting.

Farid Ghadry, 52, a Sunni Muslim from Syria, emerges from his back door, which leads directly into the guest hall. A large painting of three nude women hangs on the left wall in the sitting room. The windows overlook the front yard, where tables and chairs painted in white are set around a small, snow-covered pool.

Ghadry’s Lebanese-born wife, Ahlam, emerges from the kitchen where pans and pots hang down from the ceiling over island counter in its midst. Two red-and-white striped Lebanese flags sit on a table in a "V "shape, emerging from a vase full of red flowers embraced by green leaves. The house is empty of anything indicating Syria, the country which Ghadry left when he was 10.

“I don’t put the Syrian flag in my house because we need to change it,” Ghadry, a businessman turned politician, explained. “I will display the flag of the new, democratic Syria one day.”

Ghadry was the first Syrian to openly invite external forces to rid Syria of the Arab Socialist Baath Party. For 43 years the country has been ruled by the Baath and Syria's 18 million people still lacked basic freedoms. Its socialist-style economy is stagnant.

Soon after the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime in Iraq, Ghadry founded the Reform Party of Syria. He wants to mobilize the support of Syrian dissidents who will push for democratic change back home. He shocked Syrians by calling for American intervention to oust Syria’s Baath Party from power. “We hinted to the US administration that we want regime change by any means,” said Ghadry. Ghadry seemed to have the perfect opportunity. He has the connections. He has the favor of the Bush administration. So why is Ghadry, a political maverick, failing?

***

Born in the northern city of Aleppo, Ghadry is the eldest son of a well-known Syrian journalist, Nihad Ghadry, who still owns and edits the Beirut-based, Arabic-language newspaper al-Muharer al-Arabi – (or The Arab Liberator). Farid Ghadry learned the Quran, Islam’s holy book, early in his childhood before leaving Syria for Beirut. In Lebanon, he was educated at the Christian Maristes Brothers School. At 13, his father took him to Munich, where he learned about the Nazi concentration camps and the Jewish Holocaust. Ghadry’s father was on a journalistic mission to check the truthfulness of media reports that have said the Gamal Abdul Nasser’s government had laid a wreath of flowers on Dachau concentration camp – a step that signaled that Egypt officially recognized the Holocaust shortly after Israel occupied Arab lands in the 1967 Middle East War. Just a few years before, Nasser vowed to “throw Israel into the sea.”

Ghadry immigrated to the United States with his family when the civil war in Lebanon erupted in 1975. His father returned to live in the Lebanese capital only a year later to run his newspaper. Ghadry once held Saudi citizenship through his father.

Five years after graduating from American University with a degree in finance and marketing in 1979, Ghadry started an Arabic-language software company, International Techgroup, Inc., which he has since sold. Ghadry reached an agreement with Saudi government to digitize its Civil Register through his company, but the Saudis backed off after Ghadry spent more than a year working on creating the software. Today, Ghadry invests money in and analyzes the international real estate market.

Sources close to Ghadry explained that Ghadry's father, Nihad, took a 12-million dollar bribe from Saudi officials in France in exchange for retracting a book he wrote in 1987, the year the Ghadry's' Saudi nationality was revoked. The book, published in Paris, was highly critical of the Saudi government and royal family. The sources, who prefer to remain anonymous, add that Farid Ghadry's share was half the amount in exchange for the software business deal the Saudis backed off from.

***

Starting in the late 1980s, Ghadry began to discuss informally with Arab friends how to topple authoritarian regimes back home. In 1987, the Saudi Arabian government turned against Ghadry. The Saudis revoked his Saudi citizenship and passport because, he claimed, of his stance on democratic reforms there. “I have had communications and talks with Saudi reformists, Egyptian groups and Lebanese activists about Arab reform and enlightenment,” Ghadry said of his early political activism. “But we have always reached a deadlock.”

When the September 11, 2001 terror attacks struck New York and Washington, the landscape changed and paved the way for “a real political activity,” said Ghadry. Since then, Ghadry has reached out to other Syrian exiles and networked with the Bush administration officials. “When the September 11 attacks took place, we found them as a window for changes in the [Middle East] region at a time the atmosphere in America was changing,” Ghadry said.

Ghadry did what he could to win the US administration’s favor by linking up with political activists, such as Ziad Abdelnour, a New York-based Lebanese-born tycoon. In an interview in January, Abdelnour said he had introduced Ghadry to lobbyists, including Daniel Pipes, who runs the Middle East Forum, a neo-conservative think tank. Abdelnour claimed that he also introduced Ghadry to the administration’s influential politicians. “I introduced him to many guys in Washington,” Abdelnour said. He did not specify who. However, Ghadry strongly denied the claim. Abdelnour and Pipes produced a report to encourage the U.S. government to press Syria to leave Lebanon in 2000.

Nina Shea, a member of Freedom House and the director of the Center for Religious Freedom, said she facilitated American media coverage for Ghadry. “Ghadry is a very good guy,” Shea said in an interview at her office in Washington in December. “He is secular and advocates minority rights.” By late 2003, Ghadry had become a media celebrity: he has written columns for several American newspapers, including the Washington Times and has been invited to speak at the various universities, think tanks and European parliaments.

***

Ghadry said he is working for a post-Assad Syria, where freedom of expression and human and minority rights are respected. He also looks forward to rebuilding Syria’s economy based on a free market system. He is confident that his party “is going to win” the support of Syrians after toppling the Baath regime, he said, because non-liberal ideological parties, whether Islamic, communist or Arabist, are “all tested and defunct.” “The Reform Party is going to win because we are a more economic than a political party.”

To that end, Ghadry has adopted the model of the Iraqi politician, Ahmad Chalabi, to overthrow the regime in Damascus. Like Chalabi, he has saught  the favor of the Bush administration’s neoconservatives. Chalabi allied himself with administration hawks, such as former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle, chairman of Defense Policy Board, and helped convince the president to wage the regime-change war in Iraq in March 2003.

Like Ghadry, Chalabi left Iraq for Lebanon as a boy at the age of 12. In 1992, he founded the Iraqi National Congress to lobby for ousting Saddam Hussein. Chalabi helped galvanize an Iraqi uprising of Kurds and other Iraqis in the Kurdish north. The uprising in North Iraq was quashed, and hundreds of his supporters were killed by Saddam’s troops. But Chalabi backed regime change earlier: he lobbied for the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in February 1998. To this end, the State Department awarded Iraqi opposition groups in the north and south $97 million. His support mainly came from Pentagon and parts of the CIA. In the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Chalabi provided the U.S. government with information about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and Saddam’s ties to the al-Qaeda terror network. When Saddam Hussein was toppled, Chalabi returned to Iraq and was appointed as a member of Iraq’s Interim Governing Council by the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority. He served as the council’s president for one month in Sept. 2003.

But weapons of mass destruction were not found, and charges that Iraq had links to the al-Qaida turned out to be unfounded. "We are heroes in error,” Chalabi told London's Daily Telegraph in February 2004 in response to allegations that he provided false information. “As far as we're concerned, we've been entirely successful. That tyrant Saddam is gone and the Americans are in Baghdad. What was said before is not important." Today, Chalabi is one of the players in Iraqi politics as the present government’s deputy prime minister. But he did not even win a seat from Iraqi parliamentary election in December 2005.

“He is someone I like and respect because what he has done for his homeland nobody could do,” the soft-spoken Ghadry said. “His goal was to rid his people of despotism. Actually, my American friends call me ‘Syria’s Chalabi.’”

Both men still maintain close contacts. Early in 2005, Ghadry made a trip to Baghdad where he met with Chalabi and other Iraqi officials “to build a relationship for the future, when Syria is democratic,” as he later explained. In November 2005, Ghadry joined Chalabi in a meeting with Perle in Washington, where Iraq and “the next steps in Syria” regime change were discussed, he said.

***

Ghadry rose to public attention in Syria when he showed up on al-Jazeera in Jan. 2004. The Arabic-language cable network aired footage of a meeting he held with other exiled Syrian opposition groups in Brussels, Belgium. Soon afterwards, news about his activism and interviews with American and Israeli newspapers attacking Syrian President Bashar Assad’s regime spread throughout the country. Syria’s government-run Tishrin newspaper translated one of Ghadry’s interviews with the Jerusalem Post last year to discredit him as “a collaborator” with Syria’s staunchest foe, Israel.

The interest of the neo-conservatives in Ghadry also picked up when the US government announced its “Greater Middle East” initiative to promote “democracy and good governance” in that region in June 2004 at the Group 8 summit. Scott Carpenter, the deputy assistant secretary at the State Department’s Bureau of the Near East Affairs, said, “I think Farid was somebody who – for a very long time – has been talking about the need for democracy in Syria. And he was – for a long time – a kind of a voice crying in the wilderness frankly in the administration’s point of view.” Carpenter, who oversees the Middle East Partnership Initiative, continued: “But Farid now is a voice – and an important voice – among many other voices that we are interacting with and supporting.”

Indeed, Ghadry’s call to bring down the Syrian government came amid rising tensions between Washington and Damascus, which staunchly opposed the U.S.-led war on Iraq.

But tensions between the U.S. and Syria boiled over when former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was assassinated in Beirut. That, in turn, transformed the political landscape for Syria’s political opposition.

***

On Feb. 14, 2005, Hariri and 22 other bystanders and bodyguards were killed in a car bombing. The United Nations assembled an investigative team, led by the German prosecutor, Detlev Mehlis.

The preliminary U.N. report, released last October, implicated six Syrian senior officials, including Asef Shawkat, Assad’s brother-in-law and powerful chief military intelligence, in the killing. The U.S. withdrew its ambassador, Margaret Scobey, from Damascus two days after the assassination of Hariri without directly accusing Syria of plotting the car bombing. The ambassador has not returned since.

In mid-December, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1636, calling on Syria to “unconditionally” cooperate with the team investigating the killing of Hariri or face unspecified punitive action.

The Syrian government denied any involvement in Hariri’s assassination and said it would fully cooperate with the U.N. investigative team. But international and U.S. pressure on Assad’s regime started building up even before that.

In the summer of 2004, Damascus’s decision to extend Lebanese President Emile Lahoud’s term by three years angered Washington and France and drew world criticism of Syria’s meddling in Lebanon’s internal politics.

The U.N. Security Council Resolution 1559, sponsored by France and the U.S., called on Syria to pull its troops from Lebanon and disarm Lebanese Hezbollah guerrilla group. It was passed in September 2004.

Mounting international pressure on Damascus – especially after the Hariri killing – eventually forced Assad to withdraw the remaining 14,000-strong troops stationed in Lebanon since 1976. A Sunni Muslim, Hariri was a self-made business tycoon who rebuilt Lebanon from the wrecks of its civil war. He returned to Lebanon from Saudi Arabia in 1992 and served as prime minister until 1998. He returned to his office again in 2000 and resigned in 2004 upon his dispute with Syrian leadership over extending Lahoud’s term by three years.

Hariri’s assassination, and the investigation that followed, would send greater political tremors than Damascus might have expected.

The threat of international sanctions on Syria caused the Syrian pound go down to record low against the U.S. dollar. The price of the U.S. dollar stood for days at 67 pounds immediately after the U.N. resolution 1636 was passed in October before it returned to its regular value of about 54 pounds.

Such sanctions would weaken the already frail economy of Syria, where the unemployment rate stands officially at 12.3 percent. Many Syrians recall the days when the U.S. and the European nations imposed crippling 12-year-long economic sanctions on the country in 1986 after a British court accused Syrian officials of being involved in an attempt to plant a bomb aboard an Israeli El AI civilian jet. Syrians crowded the government-run retail stores to get their daily needs, and stood in long queues to buy bread, napkins, vegetables and fruits.

People in Syria’s northeastern town of Qamishli still recall a woman in her 60s who thrust herself into a throng of people buying tomatoes in front of one of the retail stores run by the government. She made her way to the salesclerk, bought a kilo of tomatoes and made her way out of the crowd only to find her tomatoes squashed. She tossed the tomatoes down on the sidewalk and began trampling them underfoot and shouted, “We sacrifice our blood and soul for you, Hafez.” In a matter of minutes, a security patrol hauled the woman away only to return her with her hair shorn off.

***

Along with the U.N. measures, the U.S. imposed “targeted sanctions” on Syrian officials implicated in Hariri’s assassination; the Bush administration froze the assets of Asef Shawkat, Assad’s brother-in-law, in January. It has also recently offered $5 million for Syrian opposition to the regime to finance their pro-democracy activism. But the internal opposition groups rejected the offer, claiming that change should be brought about by Syrians themselves and not outside forces.

U.S. pressure on Syria began even before the extension of Lahoud’s term. In December 2003, President Bush signed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act, imposing economic sanctions on Syria. For years, Syria had been on a list of countries accused by the State Department of sponsoring terrorism.

The bill bans all American exports to Syria except food and medicine. It accuses Damascus of not doing enough to prevent militants from slipping across its 360-mile-long borders into Iraq. The bill also accused Damascus of developing programs of weapons of mass destruction. Syria denies the allegations. Finally, the bill called for ending Syria’s 30-year military presence in its smaller neighbor, Lebanon.

***

Ghadry, like other regime’s opponents, started counting Assad’s days in power. Reflecting on Assad’s situation, Ghadry said he has “a historic moment” to seize as the American military is stationed next door to Syria, the neo-conservatives are in control of the Oval Office, the U.S. war on Islamic terrorism is still ongoing, and the Assad regime is under international and American pressure after being implicated in the killing of Hariri.

Ghadry insists an American plan for regime change is already in place. “There is a plan to change the regime,” he said. “But it’s prohibited to change the regime without something that fills the vacuum.”

So he accelerated his efforts to convince other dissidents to escalate their opposition to the Baath regime and to convince the American administration that he could bring people into his fold. By late December 2005, Ghadry’s cell-phone was burning up with calls from fellow Syrian-American activists inquiring about a conference he called to bring together all Syrian factions, including those inside the country. The meeting, which never took place, was to have concentrated on a “practical plan to destabilize Bashar Assad’s rule.”

“We are calling all Syrian opposition groups together for a national conference to create a parliament in exile and draft a new, secular constitution for Syria,” said Ghadry. “Then, take people to streets. Some people get killed. The international community gets further angry at the regime. Then, have NATO forces protect a safe zone in northern Syria,” on the border with NATO member Turkey. He grinned and concluded, “This way we will move right away into Syria.”

The constitution, written by the Baathists under Hafez Assad in 1973, provided for the Arab Socialist Baath Party, in power since March 1963, to be the "leader of state and society" in Syria. It doesn’t recognize Syria’s ethnic or religious minorities. An earlier interim constitution, enacted in 1953, had stipulated that Syria's president must be a Sunni Muslim. But the 1973 constitution eliminated the requirement that the president be "Sunni." This allowed Hafiz Assad, a member of teh Alawite sect, an offshoot of Islam, to rule Syria for thirty years until his death in June 2000. The constitution was kept intact until 10 days after Hafez died, when the People’s Assembly, the Syrian parliament, swiftly voted to amending a clause stipulating that the president be 40 or older in order to allow Bashar Assad, who was then 35 to assume the presidency.

Syrians are divided along ethnic and religious lines. Official statistics conducted over the last six months of 2005 say that the Sunnis, including ethnic Kurds, account for 70 percent of the population. The Alawites represent 20 percent – or 3.6 million people. The Christians, including Assyrians, are about 2.1 million people. The Druz, another Muslim sect, make up three percent of the population. Other smaller religious groups, including Shiites, Yazidis and Turkmen, represent about five percent of the population.

***

The next step in Ghadry’s plan is to create change on the model of Iraq, where a safe zone for Kurds was carved out of the mainly Kurdish north following the 1991 Gulf War. Meanwhile, the opposition factions inside Syria are first working for a peaceful change or “a Jasmine revolution” against the Baath regime on the model of the Ukrainian “Orange Revolution” and the Czech “Velvet Revolution.” But both Ghadry and the internal dissidents lack a solid vision for a post-Assad Syria to avoid the fate of Iraq, which is still mired in factional fighting and is suffering from nonstop attacks by Islamic extremists and Hussein loyalists.

But Assad’s opponents inside the country, including human rights groups, Arab nationalists, leftists and ethnic Kurdish and Assyrian factions, started a first step toward a peaceful democratic transformation. They formed a coalition and in mid-October 2005, signing a statement they named the “Damascus Declaration.” Thanks to external pressures imposed on Syria, including by France, a one-time friendly country, the declaration came into being after much deliberation and negotiation. An interim committee representing all factions was created to run the coalition.

***

This debate over Syria’s future, however, was unimaginable before the ascension to power of Bashar Assad in July 2000. Until then, voices for change in Syria were rarely heard. Since the secular Baath Party took power in Syria in 1963, the Syrian authorities have tried to subdue secular dissent and Islamic factions, including the Muslim Brotherhoods, which waged a bloody rebellion against Hafez Assad’s rule in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The darkest days of Syria’s opposition parties came when Hafez Assad harshly hit back at the brotherhoods’ rebellion, killing 10,000 people and destroying parts of the western city of Hama, then a stronghold for the rebels. All opposition political parties went underground. And prison was the fate of whoever opposed the regime.

After the death of Hafez Assad, a new era in Syria’s political life started emerging. Since he assumed office a month after his father’s death, the younger Assad has shown his willingness to change at least the image of Baath rule. He has presented himself as an open-minded Baathist who might recognize his political rivals and tolerate dissent. As a sign of openness, Assad has ordered the release of hundreds of political prisoners and has issued hundreds of laws aimed at liberalizing the country’s socialist-style economic system.

Syrians’ hopes were high that the younger Assad, a British-educated eye doctor, would bring an end to years of repression under his father and that he would build – even if at a slow pace – a country that embraces democracy and human rights.

Because of these hopes when he first became president, political discussion salons spread throughout the country. Syrian intellectuals freely discussed issues ranging from corruption of the Baath rule to minority issues.

But a year into his presidency, Assad ordered a crackdown on the salons and arrested the country's leading political and human rights activists, including lawmakers Riad Seif and Maamoun Homsi. The so-called “Damascus Spring” was as quickly halted as it was started. Following the U.S.-led war that toppled the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, however, voices of change in Syria once again grew louder.

Syria, a country slightly larger than North Dakota, relies on a Soviet-era economic system that leaves more than 30 percent of its 18 million people in poverty. Syrians hoped the Baath Party Conference, held June 2005, would advance genuine political reforms. But few changes emerged from the conference and even the Emergency Law, which clamped down on political dissent and has been in effect since 1963, remained intact.

***

In January 2006, seven activists representing the Damascus Declaration and human rights groups came from Damascus to the U.S. to join about 60 Syrian exiles, including Islamic activists, from the U.S., Canada, France, Germany and Switzerland for a Jan. 28-29 conference held in suburban Washington. The Syrian National Council (SNC), another Washington-based group that competes with Ghadry for the U.S. administration’s favor, organized the conference. Also, five dissidents inside Syria spoke on the phone from Damascus to the conferees to directly call for Washington’s help in that effort, stepping over one of the most feared “red lines” in Syria, namely, collaborating with external forces to bring about regime change in the country.

To the rapturous applause of the conferees, Seif, who was released from prison on Jan. 18, 2006 along with four other activists, including Homsi, declared on the phone through loudspeakers, “We are in urgent need of the external opposition’s help.” Sief, Homsi and eight others, leaders of the “Damascus Spring,” had been arrested in the 2001 crackdown. The Supreme State Security Court charged them with attempting to change the constitution by force and convicted them to five years in the infamous Adra prison on the outskirts of Damascus. Their release was seen as an effort to gain Syrians’ support for a government weakened by heavy international pressures.

But Suhair Atassi, the leader of the Atassi salon, was even more blatant: “We must sever all contacts with the regime and step forward to build a friendly relationship with the West,” she said, her voice tearing through stormy applause of the attendees. She was also speaking on the phone from her Damascene house, which used to host dissidents and intellectuals from various parts of Syria every first Tuesday of each month since Assad came to power. It was the only forum that remained operating after the government’s crackdown on democracy forums. Atassi was released in May 2005 along with seven other members of her forum after months in prison for allowing a statement from Sadreddin al-Bayanouni, the spiritual leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhoods, to be read in one of her forums. “The regime lacks legitimacy,” she daringly told the audience in the Marriott Crystal City hotel, the site of the conference.

***

Seif and Atassi and three other dissidents from Damascus ratcheted up opposition rhetoric. In Syria, multiple intelligence agencies, known as Mukhabarat, use hundreds of thousands of collaborators and informers to monitor every detail of political, religious and social movements. Allan George’s book, Syria neither Bread nor Freedom, states that those agencies employ about 65,000 full-time officers.

The alliance among Assad’s opponents from within and outside Syria took shape in force after Syria’s former Vice President Abdul Halim Khadam stunned Syrians by declaring his break from Assad on the al-Arabiya satellite TV channel on Dec. 30, 2005. Khaddam was a longtime member of the Baath’s Regional Command, the party’s most powerful body, for 30 years.

Khaddam was also Syria's nominal leader for a few days after Hafez Assad death, and helped transfer power to Bashar. He was Syria’s top official in Lebanon for years. He left his post in the Syrian government in June and now is leading an anti-Assad movement from his residence in Paris.

To the shock of the Baath Party, Khaddam joined the opposition’s calls for “peaceful regime change” in Syria. Since then, Khaddam has waged direct attacks against the Syrian regime and has accused President Assad of ordering Hariri’s assassination. Last February, Khaddam met with Al-Bayanouni and other opposition leaders to discuss plans for ousting Assad from power.

***

Ghadry was denied a place in the emerging alliances of Syrian opposition groups, even though he helped found the Syrian National Council early last year. Shortly afterwards, he withdrew from the council, which included exiled opposition groups from the U.S. and Canada, because, he said, it was “controlled by Islamists.” But the council officials said their group is diverse and it is not dominated by Islamic elements. Also, his call to hold his own national conference and form a parliament in exile was met by deaf ears inside Syria, where opposition leaders are reluctant to establish any contacts with “Syria’s Chalabi.” Ghadry said they are wary of him seizing power since he’s seen as an outsider. “Those dissidents say Chalabi came from the diaspora and he is now in power; [Afghani President Hamid] Karzai came from the diaspora and now rules Afghanistan; and Hariri came from outside to ruled Lebanon,” Ghadry said, laughing. “The opposition inside is afraid.”

Indeed, that fear among dissidents is well-established. It has its roots in a history of coups, reprisals, and ethnic violence.

***

For Syrians, Ghadry’s plan to force regime change conjures up nightmares of military coups, as well as Iraq’s anarchy and violence that followed the ouster of Hussein’s regime by military force. Ghadry said he doesn’t mind a short period of turmoil in Syria after overthrowing Assad. “There will be some revenge killings, unfortunately. There will be a fight among opposition groups,” he said. “But the U.S. and France will be like traffic cops, who would organize and ensure” a peaceful transformation.

But the instability and violence seething in Iraq, where the U.S.-led coalition forces face a growing insurgency, show the dangers of regime change. Similar religious and ethnic fighting could emerge in Syria after violent instability and a power vacuum.

A trail of military coups began to destabilize Syria in 1949, three years after Syria’s independence from France. Husni al-Zaim seized power in April of that year in a bloodless coup. The first Syrian president, Shukri al-Kuwatli, was imprisoned and later sent to exile in Egypt. Al-Zaim’s takeover, the first military coup in Syria’s history, had deep effects on the fledgling parliamentary democracy, the first in the region. It set off a series of violent military coups, one of which would unseat al-Zaim after only four and half months in power.

Four military coups followed until the first presidential elections were held in 1955 under the auspices of president Hashim al-Atassi. Kuwatli, having returned from Egypt, won the elections and stayed in power until Syria and Egypt merged in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic with the Egyptian Gamal Abdul Nasser president. The union collapsed in 1961 and another round of military coups began until Hafez Assad, then Syria’s defense minister, seized power in a bloodless coup in 1970 against Nuredeen al-Atassi, Suhair’s father. Assad often boasted that he could stabilize the country because he prevented regional and international powers from meddling in Syria’s internal affairs.

American interference in Syria is anything but new. William Blum says in his book, Killing Hope: U.S. Military Interventions since World War II, that the U.S. interest in Syrian politics goes back to 1956. Wary of the then-rising power of the Syrian Communists and leftist-leaning Baath party, President Dwight D. Eisenhower decided to help Adib al-Shishakli, who ruled Syria from 1951 till 1954, to return to power after being ousted two years earlier. The attempt failed.

Iraq’s religious and ethnic violence is another harbinger of potential sectarian unrest in Syria.

In mid-March of 2004, the government had to deal harshly with Kurdish riots that were sparked by the death of five Kurds in a stampede in Qamishli when fighting erupted at a soccer match. The riots swiftly spread to nearby towns as well as to Aleppo and Damascus suburbs. Twenty-five people were killed and a hundred others were injured during clashes between authorities and Kurdish rioters.

Seven months later, for the first time in Syria’s modern history, about 2,000 Assyrians took to the streets in the northeastern city of Hasaka in October 2004 to protest the killing of two fellow Assyrians at the hands of two Arab brothers, who insulted their victims as “Christian dogs.” The demonstrators demanded that justice and law prevail. As a result, sixteen protesters were rounded up, then released a few months later. These Kurdish riots and the Assyrian demonstration marked the growing impatience with the totalitarian regime, but they also were harbingers of ethnic and religious turbulence.

Joshua Landis, a historian at Oklahoma University who spent a year in Damascus as a Fulbright scholar, expressed such fears. “Syrians want democracy,” said Landis. “But they don’t want Syria to fall apart.”

***

But Landis explains that Ghadry has play a role in the political struggle in Syria. “His party played an important role, because he has good links inside the [Bush] administration and forced Washington to begin looking at the Syrian opposition as a potential tool in its anti-Syrian diplomacy. Ghadry also convinced other opposition parties to begin looking to Washington as a potential ally," he said. "Whether one agrees or not with Ghadry's methods or objectives, there is no denying that he was the first Syrian to convince the Bush administration to begin developing a Syria politicy that included the opposition."

Ammar Abdulhamid, a Syrian scholar at the Washington-based Brookings Institute, also stressed that the best Ghadry “can do, in my opinion, the best fortune he can have, is to play the role as a communicator between the internal Syrian opposition and external Syrian opposition.”

“He is trying to do that but to no avail so far, I believe,” Abdulhamid added.

In order for him to play that role, Carpenter said, “Farid knows that he needs to influence people.” Indeed, Ghadry said he had many channels within the administration but he complains that leaders of opposition groups inside Syria marred his efforts. “I have contacts with the Pentagon, the State Department and even with the White House,” Ghadry said. “I opened the doors for the opposition inside to use my connections. The opposition inside has no power and they can’t move because they are besieged and restricted by the regime.”

However, leaders of the Muslim Brotherhoods showed interest in Ghadry’s efforts, seeing him as a vehicle to open up for them the already closed doors of Washington. “We have contacts with Ghadry although we have differences with him,” al-Bayanouni said.

But despite this relationship between the staunchly secular Ghadry and an Islamic party, Landis said, “The Muslim Brotherhoods keep a distance.” He went on: “The Muslim Brotherhoods are wooing America and trying to overcome the administrations ban on talking to moderate Islamist parties; to this end, they must preserve a modicum of civility with Ghadry. They are not going to get in bed with him, however, which would destroy their credibility at home.”

Encouraged by Khaddam’s break from the regime, al-Bayanouni turned his back to Ghadry. He announced on March 17 with Khaddam and other expatriate dissidents the formation of “the National Salvation Front.” At the end of the two-day meeting in the Belgian capital, which included other representatives of exiled, liberal and pro-democracy groups, the Front called on Syrians to stage anti-government demonstrations inside the tightly government-controlled country. The burgeoning front called for forming a six-month transitional government to “take up the reins of power at the appropriate moment” in order to avoid chaos and prepare for elections after toppling the Syrian regime.

The move was made to reassure Syrians that their country will not slip into violence the way Iraq did should they rebel against their government.

Of late, the Muslim Brotherhoods’ alliance with secular parties inside and outside Syria has been widely debated. Washington and secular Syrians’ fears run high that a democracy in Syria would bring Islamist to power. This fear was heightened after Egyptian parliamentary elections brought 88 members of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhoods to the parliament and after Palestinian elections swept Hamas to power.

Nevertheless, Carpenter said Washington will continue to exert pressure on Syria to democratize. After those elections, Carpenter said, “some people said: ‘Ah now the United States will ease up its pressure.’ We won’t, because our lesson from that election is that unless there is more political space, the only opposition to the regime are Islamists.”

Although its membership is punishable by death in Syria, the brotherhood is believed to be able to mobilize the already high religious sentiment in the country. In order to assuage those fears and pave the way to join the Syrian mainstream opposition, the brotherhood has renounced its unpopular violent rebellion in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s against Assad’s father, Hafez.

Mohammad al-Habash, a legislator and the head of the Islamic Studies Center in Damascus, said 80 percent of Syria’s Sunni Muslims are religiously conservative, while moderate Muslims represent only 20 percent. “If democracy were to come, the Islamic presence will be more effective in political life.”

But Habash, who promotes a moderate version of Islam, played down the brotherhoods’ influence on Syria’s politics. “Their history doesn’t help to have people sympathize with them,” Habash said, referring to brotherhoods’ rebellion.

Michel Kilo, a prominent writer and opponent of Assad’s regime, said before his arrest in May 2006 in a telephone interview from his home in Damascus that the brotherhood has “accepted democracy as a basis for their political activity.” Kilo, a Christian, continued, “There is no problem to have a temporary understanding with the Muslim Brotherhoods,” whose agenda includes establishing an Islamic state in Syria after Assad’s ouster.

But policymakers in Washington are divided on how to respond to religious groups, according to William Rugh, a retired U.S. ambassador to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates.

“There are people in the [U.S.] administration who say Islamists should be allowed,” said Rugh. “And there are people saying watch out before pushing for democracy.”

Landis said the Pentagon supports the secular Ghadry, while the State Department supports both Ghadry and the SNC, which also joined the Damascus Declaration.

Weighing the brotherhoods’ growing importance in Syria, Ghadry said the constitution he is trying to promote “must be secular but approved by the Muslim Brotherhoods.”

Ghadry hopes that “American support” for him will “ensure their approval of the constitution” that might run against their religious beliefs which restrict women's freedoms and stipulate an Islamic life style. Ghadry was playing on the brotherhoods’ willingness to open a dialogue with Washington for a possible regime change in Syria. But Carpenter said the Muslim Brotherhoods constitute a “problem” for U.S.’s Syria policy. “It’s a false choice,” he said.

But the head of the brotherhood since 1996, al-Bayanouni, emphasized his group’s commitment to a pluralist Syria. “We have stressed our commitment to establish a civil state, not religious,” he said. Al-Bayanouni, born in 1938 in Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city, recalled that the Muslim Brotherhood participated in election during the 1950’s and formed coalitions with other Syrian parties, including the Baath, which was established by the Greek Orthodox Michel Aflak and conservative Sunni Salah Bitar in 1947.

***

After Khaddam openly accused Assad of ordering the killing of Hariri, the U.N. investigation team demanded early in January that Assad and his top Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa be interviewed. Serge Brammertz, who was appointed in January 2006 to take over the U.N. team investigating the Hariri killing, reported on March 14 to the U.N. that President Assad and then foreign minister Sharaa agreed for the first time to meet with him in April. Brammertz, a Belgian prosecutor, submited his most report detailing his findings in Hariri’s killing in March 2007.

“I think we are waiting to see what the conclusion is of the U.N. investigation,” said Carpenter. “But I think it will certainly set the tone and stage for all that happens next in Syria.”

With Iraq’s post-Saddam violence in mind, Carpenter denied that the U.S. is seeking regime change by force. “The [Syrian] government knows what we are seeking. What the international community has asked for is a dramatic change in behavior,” Carpenter said. “We want to see change in the political system. We want to see change in Syria's foreign policy. We want to see change and openness.”

Rugh attributed the U.S.’s subordinate role to France in dealing with Syria to its problems in Iraq, where more than 2,100 American troops have been killed as of early January. He also expressed his belief that U.S. leverage inside Syria is not sufficient to force Damascus to respond to Washington’s demands. For example, “the American policy was not enough to force Syria out,” Rugh said. He was referring to France’s backing of U.S. efforts to have Syria pull its troops out of Lebanon.

Ghadry said he even dropped his call for a U.S. military invasion of Syria to topple Assad. “Our success relies on Bashar Assad’s mistakes. He is our friend,” Ghadry said.

***

“Farid wants to rule,” Hussam al-Deiri, a member of the executive committee of the SNC who worked with Ghadry on founding the council, said in an interview at his house in Georgetown, Washington. “We do not accept Farid ruling us.” However, he said the legitimacy of Ghadry’s activism is unquestionable despite Ghadry’s absence from Syria for more than 30 years. “At least, his hands are not soaked in Syrians’ blood like the Assad regime,” al-Deiri said.

Although they agree that without the superpower’s intervention, the regime in Syria may survive years longer, both al-Deiri and Ghadry differ on methods. “All we are asking of the American administration is to lift its protection off the Syrian regime,” said al-Deiri. “We do not want a military attack or a military coup. We want to move step by step in line with the opposition inside.”

But Ghadry bluntly said he hasn’t considered working with the dissidents inside the country since he founded his party. He slammed the Damascus Declaration as “a piece of paper, no more, no less.” Taking a sip of coffee, Ghadry continued, “Our goal was to strengthen ourselves through our relations with the international community, the American administration and certain people.”

U.S. officials, however, deny that Washington has a favorite politician for Syria. “We have selected nobody to be our guy,” Carpenter said in an interview at his office at the State Department late in February 2006. “There is no Ahmad Chalabi scenario for Syria.” He said of Ghadry, “It’s not for us to demand that he be included in anything. We are not going to lend the United States’ name to any specific individual to advance his or her objectives.” Carpenter added: “American policy is designed and devoted to building a network of contacts within the opposition.”

***

Ghadry drives his luxurious computer-equipped BMW to Washington, D.C. almost daily to meet with media people and U.S. officials, including Richard Perle, “to discuss steps to topple the [Syrian] regime.”

But Ghadry, who aspires to rule Syria, knows that the path from the Potomac back to Damascus will not be easy.

And for Ghadry to join the mainstream opposition in Syria, he has to “prove he is not part of an external design to weaken the country,” said Kilo. “The internal opposition agreed that we would not invite external [forces] to solve our problems and we would not give a hand to those who might shed the blood of Syrians,” Kilo stressed, referring to Ghadry’s call for American military intervention.

Al-Bayanouni, who lives in London, echoed the same sentiments. “Syrian people do not accept the American agenda,” He called on Ghadry to “distance himself from the external agenda” designed for his country.

But Ghadry sharply answered his critics. “When we leave things for the [opposition] inside, they can not do anything,” he said. Ghadry pointed to the slow pace of political movement inside Syria, saying, “They have been working for 42 years to no avail. This shows political immaturity.”

“We are using this historic moment and our connections with the Bush administration to oust the regime,” Ghadry said.

***

“Mom, I want food,” said the 24-year-old Omar, Ghadry’s oldest son, who studied economics in college and works for a marketing firm in Washington, D.C. In many respects, Ghadry leads a typical American, suburban life in Washington.

Dalia, 18, Ghadry’s youngest, pops out of her room. The high schooler asks her father about her Christmas gift. Christopher, Ghadry’s third child, appears with his blonde, American girlfriend, Alex. The whole family was waiting for the long-haired, bearded Samer, Ghadry’s fourth child, to come home from college for Christmas holidays.

Ghadry often switches between English and Arabic, but his children only speak flawless American English. For Ghadry’s four children, America offers them opportunities he could not enjoy during his childhood; Syria is foreign to them—a land without promise or even family.

But Ghadry is eagerly hoping to return to Syria and to create a niche in its politics for himself—though not “until it is liberated from Baath regime.”

Ahlam, Ghadry’s wife, agrees. She still speaks Lebanese-accented Arabic, and pines for her homeland. Like her husband, she hopes for better days in the Middle East. “Our region has to change,” she said. “I fully support Farid because someone must work for change.”

Ghadry assures her change in Syria is nearing.

“I think it’s in the summer of 2006,” Ghadry explained to me in January of that year. “Everything indicates that the change is coming soon.”

He looked at the vase where the two Lebanese flags were set and pointed his finger between them.

“I will place the flag of new Syria here.”

–   End –

France Urged Israel to Bomb Syria

I will be traveling for several days to give a talk in Florida. Here is a departing news roundup.

Ibrahim Hamidi, explains "Solana’s incentives to bring Syria back into Arab ranks and pry it away from Iran” (Trans. by mideastwire.com)

In the March 17 issue of al-Hayat Hamidi wrote: “If the recent war between Hezbollah and Israel last summer opened cracks in the wall of isolation that America and Europe tried to build around Syria following the assassination of the ex Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri, then the visit by the supreme coordinator of foreign policy in the European Union Javier Solana to Damascus a few days ago opened the doors wide in front of the European-Syrian path but with conditions concerning the “development of the [Syrian] behaviour”. The European Union had re-evaluated its policies following the July war last year which led to revoking the policy of isolating Damascus. Thus Damascus was visited by the Spanish, German, Dutch, and Belgian foreign ministers as well as by the foreign policy a dvisor to the British Prime Minister Tony Blair…”

Hamidii added: “Concerning the “contradictions in the European messages [to Damascus]”, an official meeting for the foreign ministers of the European Union in Brussels was tasked with the possibility of sending Solana to Damascus. According to the information available to Al Hayat, the French foreign minister Philip Douste-Plazy announced in this meeting that the situation in Lebanon is still critical and that there are divisions in its community and in the political regime and concluded that “a settlement is necessary to correct the political regime and ratify the statute of the international tribunal on the basis of no winners, no losers”. Thus he called for sending a clear message to Syria to support the tribunal and what the Lebanese want concerning a unity government capable of operating to the end of its mandate according to the previous elections…”

Hamidi continued: “Thus Solana went on his tour which included Beirut, Riyadh, and Damascus where he met with the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad, his deputy Farouk Al-Shar’a, and the foreign minister Walid Al-Muallem…It was noteworthy that the meetings included a session with Al-Assad which lasted for 50 minutes in which there was a detailed discussion of the Syrian-European relations…Concerning the details of the behaviour expected by Solana “for Damascus to return to the Arab ranks”, these include: “Lebanon first of all. Lebanon is an important country and is passing currently through some political troubles. It is an obligation to support stability, implement the international resolutions, and play a positive role there” in implementing resolution 1701, monitoring the Syrian Lebanese borders, and supporting the unity government.”

Hamididi added: “The second issue concerns applying pressure on Hamas to force it to take more pragmatic stances to facilitate dealing with the Palestinian track. In this context, it was noteworthy that Solana talked for the first time about the line of the 4th of June 1967 as borders to regain the Syrian Golan Heights but he considered at the same time that top priority should be given to the Palestinian track which would be followed by discussing the Syrian track. The third issue pertains to “continuing to develop the behaviour” towards Iraq and “translating talk into actions” to monitor the borders and support the political process while registering the positive developments on the Damascus-Baghdad line…What is Solana offering in return? He is working on a basket of incentives that include economic and political offerings such as signing the [Euro-Med] partnership deal, focusing on the Golan Heights and presenting aid to the Iraqi refugees…” – Al Hayat, United Kingdom

Michael Young of the Daily Star writes: "Syria's 'engagers' can't ignore Brammertz," Thursday, March 22, 2007

France Urged Israel to Invade Syria During War by Ezra HaLevi

France urged Israel to invade Syria during the war against Hizbullah this past summer.

Army Radio reported Sunday that French President Jacques Chirac contacted Prime Minister Ehud Olmert via a secret channel at the very beginning of the war in Lebanon. He informed him that France would support an Israeli invasion of Syria.

Chirac asked that Israel act to topple the Assad regime, and promised in return to block any moves against Israel within the United Nations or European Union.

"Chirac saw Syria as the primary one responsible for the [arming of Hizbullah]," Israel’s former Ambassador to France Nissim Zvili told Army Radio. "He saw Syria as directly responsible for the attempt to undermine the Lebanese regime and for the murder of [Lebanon’s former prime minister] Rafik al-Hariri.”

France administered Lebanon from 1920 until 1943, and President Chirac was a personal friend of al-Hariri’s.

Chirac warned Syria in March 2006 that destabilizing Lebanon would “trigger a response from the international community.”

The Maariv daily quoted a “senior Israeli official” who claimed that Chirac “misunderstood Israel’s interests,” which, he said, were to “end the war.”

Chirac’s proposal, tacitly supported by the US as well, according to Maariv, was discussed at several Foreign Ministry meetings.

Just last week Chirac threw his full support behind a conciliatory visit to Syria by EU Foreign Minister Javier Solana. "I back it without reservation,” Chirac said. “Europe speaks with one voice."

Mohammed Ali Atassi has written a moving tribute to Syria's most acclaimed filmmaker, Omar Amirlay: Thirteen Hours of Interrogation.

Omar Amirlay, an outspoken and prolific Syrian filmmaker and intellectual, is internationally acclaimed for his many films, and has helped put contemporary Syria on the artistic map.  So why is the Syrian government treating this cultural treasure like a common criminal?  Mohammed Ali Atassi reflects on the government’s complicated relationship with Amirlay and with the nation’s rapidly dwindling intelligentsia.   

Harry Clark in his “Thrice-Told Tales: Those Israel-Syria Peace Talks", gives an overview of the history of peace talks between Syria and Israel.

Gabriel Kolko’s work as a historian casts a giant shadow, but his recent account of “Israel, Iran and the Bush Administration” (CounterPunch, February 10/11) is open to challenge. The Israeli peace talks with Syria, which Kolko finds of “enormous significance,” are a thrice-told tale which has not yet come true, least of all because of intervention by the United States. ……”

Jacob Weisberg at Slate gives a summary of Bernard Lewis' talk at the American Enterprise Institute bash last week in his, "Party of Defeat: AEI's weird celebration.

In his address, the 90-year-old Lewis did not revisit his argument that regime change in Iraq would provide the jolt needed to modernize the Middle East. Instead, he spoke at length about the millennial struggle between Christianity and Islam. Lewis argues that Muslims have adopted migration, along with terror, as the latest strategy in their "cosmic struggle for world domination." This is a familiar framework from the original author of the phrase "the clash of civilizations"—made more famous by Harvard scholar Samuel Huntington. What did surprise me was Lewis' denunciation of Pope John Paul II's 2000 apology for the Crusades as political correctness run amok. This drew applause. Lewis' view is that the Muslims started it by invading Europe in the eighth century. The Crusades were merely a failed imitation of Muslim jihad in an endless see-saw of conquest and re-conquest.

Turkish DNA is less than 9% from Central Asia, according to a provocative study done on the genetic structures of over 500 Turks from the various regions of Anatolia. An earlier study, based on a much smaller sampling, claimed that roughly 30% of Turkish DNA had Central Asian origins. This newer and more scientific study has gotten Turks talking. See Excavating Y-chromosome haplotype strata in Anatolia, PubMed.

High resolution SNP analysis provides evidence of a detectable yet weak signal (<9%) of recent paternal gene flow from Central Asia. The major components (haplogroups E3b, G, J, I, L, N, K2, and R1; 94.1%) are shared with European and neighboring Near Eastern populations and contrast with only a minor share of haplogroups related to Central Asian (C, Q and O; 3.4%), Indian (H, R2; 1.5%) and African (A, E3*, E3a; 1%) affinity.

I wonder what one would find in Syria, if a DNA study like this were undertaken.

A Response to Michael Young

"A Response to Michael Young
By Joshua Landis
March 20, 2007
Syria Comment  

Michael Young wrote an article in the Daily Star, "The blogosphere's foreign informant," taking issue with my post on Lebanon and making a number of accusations about me, the most damaging of which was the suggestion that I "intentionally" and "dishonestly" justified Michel Kilo's arrest. I will answer this slur, but first let me address the larger ideas on which Michael and I differ.

I used Michael Young as an example of the Lebanon analysts and commentators who support the Bush administration's stand against negotiations with Syria or accepting the various deals advanced by Middle Eastern mediators, meant to bring an end to the political impasse paralysing Lebanon.

Let me start, by saying that I have the greatest respect for Michael, whom I consider the most thoughtful and convincing advocate for boycotting Syria, refusing to negotiate with its allies — whether Hizbullah or Iran — and supporting the Bush administration's premise that the use of force can bring advances to democracy and peace in the region. I have disagreed with Michael in the past, arguing that the US would fail either in bringing about regime change in Syria or forcing the Asad regime to make a "Qadhafi-type reversal" of its policies, as many of the administration neocons advocated. Michael persists in supporting this general policy, even as it looks less and less likely to succeed. In the article that I took issue with, Michael wrote, "Syrians have to be made to realize that their regime can only last if they make fundamental concessions in the region. Assad is too brittle to demand more than recognition of his survival."

This analysis is at the heart of our differences. I have never believed that the Asad regime was particularly brittle or its survival threatened by Western isolation. On the contrary, I have consistently maintained that the use of military violence in Iraq or economic sanctions against Syria in an effort to starve it into compliance would neither bear fruit nor advance democracy in the region, a goal that both Michael and I share.

I think the facts bear me out. Iraq is a human disaster; the Palestinian issue is more hopeless than ever; Lebanon is immobilized by its endless standoff and threatened by the constant escalation of extremist rhetoric and militias; but more pertinent to my dispute with Michael, the Asad regime has been given new legitimacy in the eyes of its people; it is less brittle today than at any time in the last seven years since Bashar al-Asad came to power. The basic social compact between the regime and the Syrian people that was hammered out under Bashar's father has been give a new lease on life by America's misguided policies. The regime offers stability and security in exchange for submission of the populace. This is not unique to the region. Throughout the Arab world authoritarianism is under-girded by the same compact. We are now witnessing the reversal of the tentative democratic advances that were achieved in the wake of 9-11. The Economist recently ran an article cataloging the long and desultory list of crackdowns, imprisonments, and authoritarian retrenchments in Egypt, Bahrain, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and many other countries of the region. The reason for the strengthening of authoritarianism in the Middle East is simple. Dictators and monarchs of the Middle East are exploiting the fears of their people to strengthen themselves. The rise of extremism, threat of instability, and hatred of America — all of which have been immeasurably increased by the Bush administration's violent policies — make it all too easy for cynical governments to throw troublemakers in jail in the name of maintaining stability. No one wants to experience what the Iraqis are living through. The silent majority throughout the Middle East is acquiescing to the sad argument that they are not prepared for democracy. Michael Young suggests that the US should persist in its present policies by refusing to negotiate with adversaries such as Syria. I believe the administration's policies are not working and will only retard the emergence of democracy and the spread of liberal institutions in the region. This is my fundamental difference with Michael, one he chooses not to address. Instead, he finds secondary disputes.

Sectarianism: I do not for a second believe that Michael is sectarian. I wrote in my article that "Young is one of the smartest hawks in the Lebanese firmament and he has written thoughtfully on the need for a more equitable power-sharing in Lebanon." He objects to my using the term "Shite Crescent" for its sectarian implications. This is a distraction. It is not Shiites Michael warns against, It is the "crescent" or alliance between Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, and Hamas – the very un-Shiite member of the group.

The point of my article was to highlight how America's policy of refusing negotiations with its adversaries undermines movement toward democracy. By not moving decisively to resolve long-standing injustices in the region, Washington prevents the formation of consensus, which is the only soil upon which civil society can grow. The US should be on the side of working out a new power-sharing arrangement in Lebanon rather than obstructing it. Eventually this will have to include taking a new census in Lebanon and revising the Ta'if Accords, as Lebanon's National Pact is called. Michael himself has advocated this in recommending that Lebanon move toward a bicameral system of government, a solution everyone can applaud. But why not begin the difficult task of finding an accommodation with the opposition today? Opponents of the governing coalition have legitimate criticisms of the Lebanon's democracy. One of the reasons they refuse to relax relations with Syria and Iran is because they have not been able to advance their claims through negotiation. Instead they cling to resistance. The spring 2006 "national dialogue" between Lebanon's za'ims or communal chieftains came to nothing, demands for new elections were refused, and now a deal for increased representation of the opposition in the cabinet has seemingly been scuttled. Lebanon's factions must find a way to address the inequalities in their system of representation, which were at the root of the civil war and continue to bedevil relations among Lebanese communities. My provocative title, "Counting Lebanon's Shiites as Slaves: Why the Lebanon Deal is Obstructed," was a way to draw attention to the very real social and political issues that are at stake in Lebanon. Shiites in Lebanon are not treated as slaves. I make this abundantly clear in my article, but they are not counted for the purposes of parliamentary representation in proportion to their actual numbers. We can dispute whether they are counted as half or two-thirds of Lebanese from some other faiths, but quibbling over how badly they are underrepresented cannot obscure the fact that they are underrepresented. The only way to find out the correct numbers of Lebanese is for the government to take a new census, something it has refused or neglected to do since 1932 because entrenched authorities have much to lose.

The US will fail to build the trust it requires in the region in order to advance its policies so long as it refuses to throw it's weight behind settling long outstanding issues of representation in Lebanon, the return of the Golan to Syria, or respect for Palestinian statehood in the occupied territories. Iran or some other power inimical to US interests will champion these causes so long as the US refuses or fails to resolve them in an equitable manner.

Talking to Syria and negotiating a broader Arab-Israeli peace in the region is not extreme. Increasingly, this argument is being put forward by America's most experienced Middle East hands. Haaretz reported a week ago that James Baker told an Israeli audience, “The Middle East has grown less stable during the presidency of U.S. President George W. Bush, but dramatic improvements could be made by opening broad talks with Syria." Zbigniew Brzezinski said in January, "The U.S. refusal to explore the possibility of talks with Iran and Syria is a policy of self-ostracism that fits well into the administration's diplomatic style of relying on sloganeering as a substitute for strategizing.” Top Israeli intelligence and army officers have come to the same conclusion.

Michel Kilo: Finally, let me address Michael Young's scurrilous accusation that I jeopardized Syria's leading opposition figure, Michel Kilo, who I have long championed. (See this article I wrote when he was arrested, May 16, 2006: "Michel Kilo the Patriot." Young suggests that I "intentionally" and "dishonestly" justified his arrest. Let me quote Michael:

Take a piece on the Syrian opposition that Landis co-authored in the Winter 2007 issue of The Washington Quarterly. In it he asserted that the Damascus Declaration, an October 2005 document signed by Syrian opposition figures calling for democratic change, “grew out of a clandestine trip to Morocco only a few months earlier by intellectual Michel Kilo to meet with [the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood leader Ali Sadreddin] Bayanuni to discuss a new initiative to unite forces.”

This item was quite damaging to Kilo, who had been languishing in Adra prison for having purportedly colluded with Syria’s enemies. Where did Landis get this information? In reading the article you see that the authors have footnoted an article by Andrew Tabler, which I happen to have read. But as an astute reader reminded me, Tabler only wrote that “two unnamed members” of the Syrian civil society movement had met with Bayanouni. There is no mention of Kilo at all in the piece, because Tabler could not confirm his presence in Morocco. One of two things happened: Either Landis read Tabler as carelessly as he reads everything else he quotes, which still doesn’t explain how Kilo’s name slipped in; or, knowing the impact of what he was saying, Landis mentioned Kilo intentionally, effectively justifying his arrest, then dishonestly attributed this to Tabler.

I’m increasingly inclined to believe the latter.

Why was Michel Kilo arrested and what is he charged with?

Kilo's arrest and the charges brought against him by the Syrian government have nothing to do with the Damascus Declaration or the trip to Morocco that prepared the way for the Damascus Declaration of 16 October 2005, about which I wrote. My article, entitled "The Syrian Opposition," which I coauthored with Joe Pace, a Harvard researcher, was published in the December 2006 issue of the Washington Quarterly.

Kilo was arrested with other opposition members following the publication of the "Beirut-Damascus Declaration," which they signed in May 2006, more than half a year after he helped prepare the Damascus Declaration. The charges brought against him have nothing to do with the Damascus Declaration. On March 6, 2007, the last time he was brought before the military prosecutor in Damascus, Kilo was accused, according to Reporters Without Borders, "of inciting fellow inmates in Adra prison, near Damascus, to sign the 'Beirut-Damascus, Damascus-Beirut' joint statement, which he himself signed in May 2006 and for which he is being prosecuted by a criminal court." The notion that Joe Pace's and my article had anything to do with his arrest or persecution is nonsense. Young writes that my article "was quite damaging to Kilo." He invents this. It is not true.

Did I tell the Syrian government something it did not already know?

The Syrian authorities knew whether Michel Kilo was one of the two opposition members who traveled to Morocco long before I wrote my article. Andrew Tabler, an excellent reporter and good friend, wrote in March 2006 that two unnamed opposition members traveled to Morocco, where they met counterparts in the Muslim Brotherhood to hammer out the rudiments of the Damascus Declaration. Kilo and other leading opposition members were arrested in May. If the Syrian authorities did not already know who had travelled to Morocco, they would simply have looked in their passports to ascertain which of them had. Opposition members can not hide where they travel. Any effort to do so would be useless and self-destructive. Young knows this. He also knows that Syrian military courts act pretty much as they wish. Blaming me for Kilo's predicament is petty and wrong.

Did I make up the claim that Kilo travelled to Morocco?

No, I did not. Several members of the opposition said he was one of the two members who went in February 2005. I checked this as thoroughly as I could. I communicated with reporters. I asked a friend to confirm what I had been told. I will send the record of what I learned about this to Michael Young. He did not ask for it before making his allegations even though we were in communication by email. Before his arrest Kilo told an excellent reporter that "he wrote the first draft of the Damascus Declaration," which then went through several permutations as it was worked over by the various opposition parties who were asked to sign it. Michel Kilo did not try to hide his role as one of the central architects of the Damascus Declaration.

On the contrary, like most other brave and daring reformers, he was proud of his role and tried to get as much coverage for the opposition as he could. Talking to foreign reporters and researchers was part of that campaign. As a reporter, Kilo knew that getting his and the opposition's story out was as important as signing agreements, maybe even more important. That was how I could help him.

Michael Young suggests that I was working on behalf of Syrian authorities with the intent of harming Kilo.

This is malicious nonsense. On the contrary, I championed the opposition. Living in Damascus during 2005 as a Senior Fulbright Fellow, I made it my mission to give as much coverage to the opposition as I could. Using my daily posts on Syria Comment, I decided to provide a platform for the Syrian opposition. They had struggled in almost complete obscurity. To fulfill this goal, I teamed up with Joseph Pace, a Harvard student writing his thesis on the opposition. I gave him a list of top opposition members to interview. He got interviews with most and came back to me with ten-page, expertly translated transcripts. I published them on Syria Comment and sent them out to the Daily Star, where a few were re-published. For some, it was a rare chance to be published in English. For almost all, it was the first time that they were given a lengthy platform in English to expound fully and in depth on their activities or to critique the regime. Previously, most had gotten one-line quotes by foreign journalists. Joe Pace was fearless and a skilled interviewer. He became celebrated for his opposition interviews published on Syria Comment. He was eventually expelled from Syria. What is more, Syria Comment was very nearly shut down by the authorities. Not a week went by when Syrian friends and journalists did not warn me to stop carrying interviews with the opposition and to stop courting a confrontation with the authorities. I ignored their well meaning admonitions.

I appeared with Michel Kilo on al-Jazeera's hour-long show, "Open Dialogue." The only quote that was later repeated to me by dozens of Syrians and my in-laws in Damascus was: "There is no democracy in Syria." I did not defend the regime. Michel Kilo and I spent a long day together taking a taxi to Beirut and back in order to do the show with Ghassan Ben Jiddou. We talked about the opposition the entire time and met on other occasions, when we had a chance to talk about his ambitions for the opposition and the role he played in it. He was forthright with me because he trusted me and knew Syria Comment was an effective way to get heard by foreign correspondents and in diplomatic circles. Michel Kilo did not hesitate to talk about his central role in bringing together Syria's fragmented opposition and writing drafts of agreements. He was proud of it and knew the risks he was taking.

I came to admire Michel Kilo above all other opposition leaders. I wrote about him and published his articles frequently on Syria Comment. I criticized the government when he was arrested or brought to trial on what were clearly trumped up charges. I had his letter from prison translated and published as soon as it came out in Arabic. Syria Comment was the first and only place on the web that offered an English translation of the Damascus Declaration for months after it appeared in Arabic. No other American source has done more than I have to introduce Michel Kilo's views to a Western audience, translate his writing, and hold him up as a true Syrian patriot. Joe Pace's and my article on the Syria opposition, which Michael Young tries to discredit, is part of our continuing effort to get out the story of Syria's courageous reformers and explain their importance to a western audience. No one writing about the Syrian opposition can hide Michel Kilo's important role, nor should they. The Syrian regime knows perfectly well what he has done. It is the rest of the world that undervalues him. Nothing can be gained by obscuring his history or relevance. 

Michael Young wrote that he would "make no pretense of maintaining the high road" in depicting me as "The blogosphere's foreign informant." He was true to his word. But far from informing on Michel Kilo, I have championed him. The articles I have linked to in the preceding paragraph make this very clear. My record speaks for itself. Rather than justifying his arrest, I have advocated his freedom. Michael Young has avoided debating the basic issues on which we differ. Instead, he decided to go after the messenger.

Brammertz V – Comments and Contextualization (by t_desco)

Analysis of the Brammertz V Report: the on-going UN investigation into the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri, former Prime Minister of Lebanon
By t_desco

March 18, 2007, for Syria Comment

The new Brammertz report ("Brammertz V") merits a detailed analysis. I will also try to put it in the context of the previous reports.

My earlier posts on this blog (all on the same topic) can be found here, here, here, here, here and here.

(All quotations from the new report will appear in italics. Quotes from older reports are referenced by using the name of the investigator and number of is report.)

"c) Aerial delivery theory

19. … Preliminary technical findings indicate that this theory is unlikely."

(Brammertz V, §19)

As expected. The Aerial delivery theory never sounded very plausible, but it is nevertheless important that it was included in the investigation. §55 of the previous report stresses that the "Commission believes its role is to investigate all possible hypotheses that arise from the investigation and analysis of the Hariri assassination" (Brammertz IV, §55). This is a notable difference to the way Detlev Mehlis conducted his investigation. For example, would Mehlis ever have considered writing the following paragraph? –

"59. … Another hypothesis under consideration is that apparently obvious motives were used by the perpetrators as a convenient cover, with the real intent being to propel other individuals into the frontline of accusation." (Brammertz IV, §59)

This may refer to the possibility of Syria being framed (though there are other possible interpretations) and this is clearly one of the many hypotheses that have to be considered by the investigation.

The difference between Brammertz and Mehlis is best illustrated by this nice contradiction between their reports:

Mehlis I: “175. As noted above, in the course of their investigation, the Lebanese interviewees included Mr. Abu Adass’s friends and associates, former neighbors, acquaintances from the mosque, colleagues from former jobs, and classmates. A number of these individuals were re-interviewed by UNIIIC … ; most reported that they shared with their interrogators their view that Mr. Abu Adass was a loner and introvert who did not have the intelligence to be capable of committing such a crime.”

Brammertz III: “45. Following extensive investigative steps and analysis of electronic data, documents, artefacts and other items, the emerging profile of Ahmed Abu Adass and his activities is becoming clearer. His profile is distinct in that he seemingly had more academic and intellectual interests and less technical orientation than that associated with members of terrorist groups engaged in the operational aspects of terrorist activities, at least in Lebanon.”

(my emphasis)

The conclusion is very similar, but the reasons given for it are diametrically opposed: in one case he is not intelligent enough and in the second case he is too intelligent. Needless to say that Brammertz is much more credible (and not just in this case). Mehlis also did either not know or omit that the mosque frequented by Adass and where Mehlis interviewed some of his "acquaintances" was attended by "individuals associated with extremist groups" and that "Adass was acquainted" with them (Brammertz V, §42; see below).

"f) Geographic origin of the alleged bomber

24. … The Commission can now also add that the man had significant exposure to lead pollution in an urban environment up to the age of about 12, and that such exposure was low during the last ten years of his life, … ."

(Brammertz V, §24)

Of course, not just the lead pollution but also the source of the polluting lead may have changed in the past ten years, leading to a different isotope composition in the same place today and making identification difficult.

"25. In order to advance this line of inquiry, the Commission has collected a total of 112 samples from 28 locations in Syria and Lebanon. Over the coming weeks, it will collect samples in three other countries in the region, and further countries are identified for another series of sampling missions."

(Brammertz V, §25)

It is a little bit strange that they took samples from Lebanon, having already established that he "did not spend his youth" there, but perhaps this is to determine where he "was likely situated" in the last two to three months before his death.

In the previous report, Brammertz mentioned having received additional (non-forensic) information about him, but this information does not even seem to have been detailed enough to limit the sampling missions to one country:

“The Commission has also received other information concerning geographic origin which it is unable to disclose at this time.” (Brammertz IV, §31)

The same seems to be true for the distinguishing dental mark:

“The upper right central incisor found at the crime scene in February 2005 and belonging to the unidentified male shows a distinguishing mark related to the lingual surface shape of the crown, which has the form of a spade. This feature is rarely seen among people from Lebanon.” (Brammertz IV, §34)

Brammertz deems it necessary to stress the limitations of this methodology:

"26. As stated in the previous report, the Commission is mindful that results should be carefully interpreted and the limitations clearly understood. The Commission will treat future results as forensic information to be used primarily for lead purposes in the investigation."

(Brammertz V, §26)

At least isotopes have the advantage that they do not lie (like witnesses)…

Further signs of progress:

"31. Investigations are on-going into the acquisition and storage of the Mitsubishi van, and its preparation with explosives. The Commission has received a body of new information relating to this topic, and over 500 pages of data are being prioritized for translation and analysis. The Commission is developing recent leads concerning the van, investigating the history of the vehicle from the most recent time it was known to be in Lebanon, and working backwards in time from that point."

(Brammertz V, §31)

This is in line with the previous report:

"41. …The Commission has received new information specifying details of the preparation of the van and establishment of the route of the van as it was brought to the St Georges hotel area prior to the attack." (Brammertz IV, §41)

"a) Communications

34. The Commission’s analysis of communications traffic continues in order to support and validate different points arising from the investigations. Much work has been done to support the interviews conducted, in order that respective communications contact with other persons of interest to the case can be discussed with witnesses. Patterns of communications traffic, including frequencies and timings of calls, and linkages and clear associations to others, are all developed and elicit investigation leads."

(Brammertz V, §34)

One should note that several breakthroughs seem to have happened in that area. The first was mentioned in the third report:

"64. For example, from the perspective of mobile telephone communications traffic alone, one individual using multiple numbers has been preliminarily linked in a broad geographic context and within a specific common temporal period to a number of the attacks. Four other people have been linked to this person in some of those attacks." (Brammertz III, 64)

The follow-up in the fourth report:

"79. … One individual using multiple numbers has been preliminarily linked to a number of attacks, and the Commission has conducted a number of interviews related to this issue." (Brammertz IV, §79)

A similar breakthrough seems to have happened in regard to the Hariri case itself. It was first mentioned in the fourth report:

"43. The Commission has conducted seven interviews in connection with the alleged bombing team and their use of six telephones to communicate on the day of the attack and in the days leading up to it. … Analysis of the use of other associated SIM cards is also on-going.

44. The location of the telephones when used, and the purposes for which some of the linking numbers were used have revealed the high degree of security-aware behavior exhibited by individuals under investigation. Some persons used multiple mobile cellular telephones during a short period of time or registered telephones using aliases. …

45. During the reporting period, communication traffic analysis has continued in support of the other investigative projects. This work is comprised of interview preparation for key persons …" (Brammertz IV, §43-45)

In order to determine that a person is using several mobile phones under aliases, one has to identify that person. Interviews in connection with the alleged bombing team are also most likely conducted with persons either belonging to that team or at least knowing some of its members. It is also interesting that more SIM cards could be associated with the six telephones used in the attack, although those phones were only used to communicate with each other.

"39. One working hypothesis is that the bomb team had to ensure that Hariri was indeed dead after the explosion in order for the video claim of responsibility to be delivered and to have resonance with its intended audience. It is possible that the team, and those commissioning the crime, could not afford to deliver a claim of responsibility to the global media if Hariri had survived the attack."

(Brammertz V, §39)

Assuming that Syria was behind the attack, would its failure make the need for a scapegoat less urgent? Obviously not.

"b) Ahmad Abu Adass

41. In this reporting period, the investigation has developed its understanding of how Ahmad Abu Adass was identified and chosen to be the person to make the video claim of responsibility, who involved him in this activity and where and when this occurred. A working hypothesis is that he was identified because of his personality and other specific characteristics. It is possible that his association and relationship with one or more individuals whom he met at his place of worship led him to depart his home on 16 January 2005, for reasons that are currently unknown.

42. The Commission is aware that Ahmad Abu Adass was acquainted with individuals associated with extremist groups, at least because they attended the same place of worship which he frequented regularly, and where he occasionally conducted prayers. The Commission has also conducted extensive analysis of communications traffic records associated with Ahmad Abu Adass, including analysis of the telephone communication at his home and place of work and on lines belonging to his alleged associates."

(Brammertz V, §41-42)

The Fitzgerald report identifies the place of worship in question as the Al-Huri mosque:

"41. Enquiries carried out by the Mission established that approximately three years ago Ahmad Abu Adas changed from being a carefree teenager to becoming a religious fundamentalist. Approximately one month prior to going missing Ahmad Abu Adas informed his family that he had met a new friend at the Al-Huri mosque, where he sometimes led the prayers." (Fitzgerald report, §41)

It would be very interesting to learn if the alleged associates of Adass are also "associated with extremist groups".

"43. A working hypothesis is that Ahmad Abu Adass was either coerced or duped into making the video-taped claim of responsibility. The claim he read out on tape was made on behalf of a group, and Ahmad Abu Adass himself did not state he would be the one who would carry out the attack. In relation to the tape’s production, it is of note that relatives and persons who knew him before his disappearance have stated that his appearance on the video tape was physically different from that before 16 January 2005. To some, he appeared even thinner than previously; his beard had markedly grown, indicating that he may have made the tape towards the end of the approximately four week period between his disappearance and 14 February 2005. His clothing was also different from his usual style in that he had headwear and clothing that his close friends and family had not seen him wearing before."

(Brammertz V, §43)

I wonder if the wording is exact here. It does not seem to make sense that Adass was "duped" into making the video. What would that mean? That he stood behind the claim, but that the claim was not real? A more reasonable version would be that he was duped and lured to be in that place and then coerced into making the video.

Al-Akhbar had an interesting article some time ago analyzing his body language in the video as showing signs that could be interpreted as fear and apathy, which would be in line with the idea that he was coerced to do it.

"44. It is of interest to the investigation that a note was included with the video on 14 February 2005 which stated that the bomber was indeed Ahmad Abu Adass. From its forensic findings, the Commission believes this to be highly unlikely. One working hypothesis is that the video and the accompanying note could have been designed to deceive. Another working hypothesis is that while an extremist group may have been involved in part in committing the crime as outlined in the tape and note, this group was actually manipulated by others for another objective not related to its own organizational aspirations."

(Brammertz V, §44)

As I noted earlier, there are two unusual aspects about the "martyrdom video" of Ahmed Abu Adass:

1. It was released very quickly after the attack. In comparison, the video of Mohammad Sidique Khan, to name just one example, was published about two months after the London tube bombings.

2. Adass is fully identified, not in the video itself but in the accompanying note. This would probably make sense in a real "martyrdom video", but we now know for sure that the suicide bomber was somebody else.

Brammertz writes that it "could have been designed to deceive", but are there any other examples of fake "martyrdom videos"? In any case it is very unusual.

As we have seen, the current report reveals that Adass was indeed acquainted with individuals associated with extremist groups who also frequented Al-Huri mosque.

The first Mehlis report quoted information allegedly linking Adass to the "Ahmed Miqati and Ismaíl Al-Khatib network" via a computer shop where he once worked and to Jund al-Sham via Ain al-Hilweh and visits to Abu Obeida, but it was highly uncertain how reliable this information was.

Why choose Adass for the video? If the extremist group was either fake or manipulated, then these links to other extremist groups may have made him a suitable candidate.

On the other hand, if the extremist group was real, then they were probably not aware that the Al-Ahbash had already taken notice of Adass and they thought that he was still completely unknown, perhaps in contrast to the real suicide bomber.

Still, from the perspective of an extremist group, there was absolutely no need to put out a video which clearly revealed the identity of one of its members. For example, al-Zarqawi himself showed his face only in his last videos; before that he always appeared disguised.

If the group was real, it is interesting to ask "what happened to him afterwards" (Brammertz IV, §46) as Adass obviously was not the suicide bomber. An extremist group would have little reason to kill one of their own, unlike an intelligence agency dealing with members of a manipulated group, but in the second case it remains a mystery why no DNA evidence of Adass was found at the crime scene, as it could easily have been planted by the intelligence agency either in the Mitsubishi van itself or by tampering with the crime scene after the attack.

As you can see from the following quote by then Interior Minister Suleiman Franjieh, the concept of DNA analysis was not unknown to the Lebanese authorities:

"Franjieh, however, said he could not confirm the homicide attack theory and was awaiting DNA results from those killed."

Also interesting is the question why the suicide bomber did not take the place of Adass in the "martyrdom video" (the question is valid both for the case of a fake and a real extremist group):

1. As stated above, one possibility is that in comparison to Abu Adass he was too well known.

2. Another possibility (also considered by the famous witness Mohammed Zuhair Siddiq; Mehlis I, §108) is that he did not know that the attack was directed against Hariri and that he believed to be attacking somebody else.

Siddiq claims that he was an Iraqi and that he thought that the target was Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, but this would have created certain logistical problems for the perpetrators as they could in no way be sure to be able to carry out the attack while Allawi was still in town (cf. Brammertz V, §50, which speaks of a " “window” of opportunity to deliver the attack on Hariri rather than one specific day").

3. A third possibility that has to be considered is that he did not speak Arabic well enough.

This is what Ghassan Ben Jeddou said about the first caller to Al-Jazeera:

“In the first telephone call, a man whom Mr. Ben Jeddou described as speaking poor Arabic in an African, Afghan or Pakistani accent, claimed that Al-Nasra wal Jihad was responsible for Mr. Hariri’s execution by a suicide bomb.” (Mehlis I, §78)

"45. Thus, the Commission continues to investigate the various possibilities concerning the group that executed the crime. The Commission has received information in relation to individuals who operated in Lebanon and beyond who may have been involved in the production of the Ahmad Abu Adass tape, and also may have participated in the attack on Rafik Hariri in more than one context. In connection with this information, the Commission has undertaken a number of missions outside Lebanon, conducted 23 interviews to date, researched over two hundred gigabytes of data from numerous computers, USB devices, CD-ROMs, mobile telephones and SIM cards, and has analyzed large volumes of communications traffic."

(Brammertz V, §45)

The previous report already mentioned this large amount of electronic data, saying that some of it is written in code:

(45.) “Ahmad Abu Adass and associated individuals?…?50. (In this regard, the Commission has) collected substantial quantities of computer and electronic information and documentation … .

51. In support of this work, the Commission has researched over 200 gigabytes of electronic data, … .

53. … To add to the complexity of this painstaking analytical work, some of the electronic data received by the Commission is written in code, some is encrypted and some had already been deleted.” (Brammertz IV, §45-53)

I had argued at the time that the fact that “some of the electronic data … is written in code” may indicate that these are the communications of an extremist group. It is well known that internet savvy extremists communicate in code in order to avoid NSA surveillance and detection.

Interestingly, Khaled Taha showed suspicious behavior that could be interpreted in such a way: “Further investigation revealed that three of Mr. Taha’s e-mail addresses went through Damascus and the fourth went through Lebanon itself while purporting to be in Turkey.” (Mehlis I, §174)

Having said that, I later discovered that the previous UN reports did mention a case of deleted data: the military intelligence archives which had been erased. –

“Likewise, the Commission’s earlier suggestion to restore military intelligence archives for its review remains an ongoing line of investigative inquiry.” (Brammertz I, §37)

“The archives have been erased, but measures are being undertaken in order to restore the deleted data for further review.” (Mehlis II, §50)

As quoted above, Brammertz says that “some of the electronic data received by the Commission is written in code, some is encrypted and some had already been deleted.”

So it could also be data from the restored military intelligence archives, but there are some hints that the "over two hundred gigabytes of data from numerous computers, USB devices, CD-ROMs, mobile telephones and SIM cards" come from a different source (e.g., military intelligence archives usually do not contain video cameras; cf. Brammertz V, §47; see below).

One possibility (and, in fact, the only potential source that is publicly known at the present time): the alleged terrorist cell possibly linked to Adass' friend Khaled Taha and arrested in January 2006.

"46. A working hypothesis is that a small number of individuals belonging to a larger group may have come together to undertake the filming of the claim of responsibility, acquire the Mitsubishi van and have it prepared with explosives. They may also have participated in the acquisition of an individual who was to detonate the bomb, and may also have assisted in delivering him and the bomb to the scene of the crime."

(Brammertz V, §46)

If "group" is used here in a more general sense, it could refer to an intelligence agency (with very interesting consequences), but one would usually expect the term "organization" in that case. (Note that §96 also cites information regarding "groups" among the four formal RFAs submitted to the Syrian Arab Republic). On the other hand, "a small number of individuals belonging to a larger group" seems to make little sense in the case of an extremist group.

The wording for the recruitment of the suicide bomber is also a little bit peculiar: "acquisition". Perhaps it is just meant to be a neutral expression because the precise circumstances of the recruitment remain unknown?

While whoever made the tape had complete control over the circumstances of its production and it is hence conceivable that Adass was coerced into doing it, the same cannot be said of the suicide bomber.

It seems likely to me that the bomber acted voluntarily. While possible, it would be extremely risky to force somebody to do it and to let him drive around freely with several tons of evidence which he could simply hand over to the authorities. I also doubt that a person under duress would be in a state of mind to act with “a high degree of time precision” (Brammertz IV, §23). One cannot, however, exclude the possibility that he was duped (just as Brammertz hypothesizes in the case of Adass).

The extremist group may have acted on its own, but, obviously, collaboration, infiltration and/or manipulation are other logical possibilities. Any group can be infiltrated and it would probably also be possible for intelligence agencies to create fake groups with the sole aim of manipulating the unsuspecting members (cf. Brammertz V, §44, quoted above).

"47. The Commission has a number of investigative leads to follow up, further interviews to conduct, and further communications traffic analysis and forensic collection missions to perform. It also awaits the final forensic analysis of various artifacts that are possibly associated with this working hypothesis, including video cameras and related equipment, cassette tapes, computer hardware and other items. …"

(Brammertz V, §47)

Does this mean that they have found the video camera that was used to film the Adass tape? That would be truly remarkable. And it is difficult to see any other explanation.

Interestingly, some of the reports that appeared on occasion of the arrest of the alleged terrorist cell in early 2006 explicitly mentioned that the group was involved in filming the Adass video, but one should stress that these reports were never officially confirmed.

"c) Individuals with prior knowledge of the attack

48. The Commission believes that beyond those directly involved in the crime and those who decided it should take place, certain other individuals may have had prior knowledge of the attack. …

49. The Commission is developing a hypothesis whereby the final phase of the operation to assassinate Hariri took shape by early February 2005, at which point all necessary components for the operation were assembled. These include the van, acquired and prepared with explosives and ready for use; the bomber, prepared, briefed and ready to be deployed; the minimum necessary information acquired, and surveillance and reconnaissance conducted, to be able to undertake the operation; the bomb team undiscovered and able to execute the operation; the video-taped message of Ahmad Abu Adass completed and ready to be delivered upon the success of the operation; and most importantly, the intent still present in the minds of those who ordered the crime to go ahead with the operation."

(Brammertz V, §48-49)

Note the "still" in the last sentence. I will come back to that later. If the attack was the work of a relatively small group of extremists, the number of people knowing about it in advance should be very small. If, in contrast, a greater number of people had advance knowledge, a different explanation would be required, e.g. the involvement of an intelligence agency, etc.

"50. A working hypothesis is that the bomb team was working within a “window” of opportunity to deliver the attack on Hariri rather than one specific day, given the significance of the target and the time which would have been spent in overall preparation of the attack. That preparation time was most likely measured in weeks rather than days."

(Brammertz V, §50)

Keep this in mind, as it will lead to the only clear contradiction in the text.

More signs of significant progress:

"51. The activities of some potentially relevant individuals were noticeably altered during this period, as the bombing team began what became the final activities prior to the attack. The Commission is investigating such issues, and is finding that attitudes, behavioral patterns and comments made by certain persons in the period before the killing could have relevance."

(Brammertz V, §51)

From all the paragraphs quoted above it seems likely that an extremist group was indeed involved in the attack, though it may not have acted on its own.

At the same time, the "motive to assassinate Hariri" discussed in §52-63 seems to point to Syrian and/or Lebanese opponents of Hariri rather than to an extremist group. This is all the more notable as the previous report had explicitly mentioned such a possibility:

"59. The Commission continues to work on numerous alternative hypotheses in examining the motives to kill Rafik Hariri. Included among these are the following: that Hariri was the victim of an extremist group which assassinated him because of his links to other states in the region and in the west; …" (Brammertz IV, §59)

"3. Motive to assassinate Hariri

…

53. The following issues shaped Hariri’s environment in this period: the inception of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004) and the political implications of its implementation; the extension of the term of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud; the personal and political dynamics which existed between Hariri and other political parties and leaders in Lebanon, Syria and other countries; preparation and maneuvering ahead of the parliamentary elections due to be held in May 2005, as well as other business matters in which he was involved. All of these factors came together and were handled by Hariri, sometimes proactively, and sometimes in reaction to events around him. The Commission believes it is likely that a combination of these factors may have created the environment in which the motive and intent to kill him arose."

(Brammertz V, §53)

So Brammertz did not say, as some misleading headlines had suggested, that the extension of the term of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud was the reason for the attack on Hariri.

"54. Whereas the Commission had previously adopted a broad focus in the investigation of possible motive, the current reporting period saw these significantly narrowed down to the group of inquiries linked to Hariri’s political activities. …

57. In the last months of Hariri’s life, he was very focused on the forthcoming 2005 elections. …

59. It is of some note that Hariri was killed on the day that Parliament was scheduled to debate the electoral law to be applied in the forthcoming elections. Another working hypothesis for the Commission is that those who decided upon the assassination saw it as beneficial to kill him before he formally began his election campaign, especially given the perception in the media at the time that he was likely to win."

(Brammertz V, §54, 57, 59)

Note the slight contradiction to §50 which states that "the bomb team was working within a “window” of opportunity to deliver the attack on Hariri rather than one specific day", e.g. the day that "Parliament was scheduled to debate the electoral law".

It is unclear to me why such an extremist group should have been particularly concerned about Hariri winning the 2005 elections. They would probably have been opposed to him for more general reasons like his relation to Saudi Arabia (cf. Brammertz IV, §59).

"62. The Commission is developing a working hypothesis that in the period immediately prior to his death, Hariri and others in the national and international political arena were taking steps to defuse the tensions that had arisen between him and others on the political stage. These initiatives apparently included the development of diplomatic and political dialogue between Syrian and Lebanese individuals and Hariri. This dialogue had previously been managed through other Syrian and Lebanese channels, which had apparently fuelled misperceptions and aggravated the already tense political environment."

(Brammertz V, §62)

You can read about this in Nicholas Blandford's book, "Killing Mr Lebanon". If I remember correctly, at least three initiatives of rapprochement were underway at the time when Hariri was killed. All were initiated by Hariri and directed at the Syrian president, one via Moallem and one via Nasrallah (and a third which I don't remember at the moment…).

"63. A working hypothesis is that the initial decision to kill Hariri was taken before the later attempts at rapprochement got underway and most likely before early January 2005. This leads to a possible situation in the last weeks before his murder in which two tracks, not necessarily linked, were running in parallel. On one track, Hariri was engaged in rapprochement initiatives and on the other, preparations for his assassination were underway."

(Brammertz V, §63)

As As'ad AbuKhalil noted, this paragraph "all but names the Syrian regime as the party that killed Hariri", but one should stress that less harsh readings are equally possible (I also disagree with his remarks regarding Brammertz' professionalism; so far it is beyond reproach. He should take into account that Brammertz is coming from an institution, the International Criminal Court, that is, by its own logic, engaged in widening the relative autonomy of the juridical field (in Bourdieu's terminology)).

In light of this paragraph we can see a possible explanation for the "still" in §49, "and most importantly, the intent still present in the minds of those who ordered the crime to go ahead with the operation" – still present because unaffected by the rapprochement initiatives started by Hariri?

However, there are some problems with this interpretation implicating "the Syrian regime" in the crime. If the Syrian regime planned the attack, could it not have stopped it at a moment's notice? Moallem would certainly not have hesitated to inform his president of the rapprochement efforts by Hariri.

As I had argued earlier, (and also in this thread) it seems highly unlikely that Bashar al-Asad was involved in the plot or that he had any clue that an attempt was underway to kill Hariri.

If we can trust Robert Fisk on this, as I think we can, the Syrian president spent the minutes immediately before the attack with Seymour Hersh, engaging in a detailed discussion of all the problems that Hariri was causing him and his family (including a conflict over the cell-phone business in Damascus which I have not seen mentioned anywhere else, including Blandford's otherwise very detailed book). Obviously he was hoping that Hersh would be able to use the information in a future article, implying that he was expecting Hariri to be alive and well when said article would have been published. He obviously had absolutely no clue that Hariri was about to be killed, otherwise he would certainly have glossed over the issue or avoided it altogether.

Perhaps this was the tragic irony of the situation that all the rapprochement initiatives and messages aimed at preventing an attack, including the warning delivered by Richard Armitage, were directed at Bashar al-Asad, but he was unable to prevent the attack from happening because he was not the one plotting it.

Having said that, the new report does a good job in detailing A (the perpetrators, possibly an extremist group) and B (the motive of those who allegedly commissioned the crime, possibly Syrian and/or Lebanese opponents of Hariri), but (so far) it fails to link A and B in a plausible way. Any judgement about Brammertz professionalism will ultimately depend on how effectively and convincingly he manages to solve this problem.

Hizbullah’s MP Nawar Sahili Interviewed by Hugh Macleod

Interview with Hizbullah's MP Nawar Sahili
By Hugh Macleod, March 2007 
Published by Syria Comment 

As Lebanon and international players struggle to find a solution to the four month old political crisis in Beirut, British journalist Hugh Macleod spoke to Hezbollah MP Nawar Sahili about the roots of the dispute and the future of Hezbollah’s armed resistance.

In the 2005 parliamentary elections after Hariri’s assassination, Hezbollah formed part of the ‘Four Party Alliance’ that united you with your Shia rivals in Amal, and with the Druze of Waleed Jumblatt and the Sunnis of Saad Hariri. What happened to that alliance? 

After Hariri’s assassination we needed to reduce tensions in the country. Saad Hariri was very positive and told us he did not believe Hezbollah had anything to do with his father’s death.

It was a strategic alliance to give us a government of national unity. On one election list Hezbollah gave 15,000 votes to make sure there was a majority for the Alliance.

So we ended up with a government of 24 cabinet ministers, with five ministers from Amal and Hezbollah and three allied to Emile Lahoud, with Tarik Mitri as the neutral. That was the one third plus one formula. Some months later Lahoud’s minister’s Elias Murr and Charles Rezk changed their politics and went to March 14 so there was no more equilibrium. We had been betrayed and Jumblatt and Hariri said the Alliance had never existed.

What happened after the war to precipitate the crisis? 

After the war everybody realised there was a big political crisis. We could not continue in government as only numbers sitting at the table without any power in decision making. Each time there was a big issue to discuss they [March 14] threatened to take it to a vote. By the constitution, a two thirds majority passes any bill, so we felt they were forcing through their will.

We felt there was no solution: either we form a government of national unity or the government can rule alone.

 

During round table discussions on November 9 last year Saad Hariri met Nabih Berri and Mohammed Fniesh and there was a sort of agreement on dealing with the international tribunal at the same time as forming new government. Saad was clear: ‘If you give us the international tribunal we not against you taking 11 seats [in the new 30 seat cabinet]. But I need to see my allies.’

 

And you know his allies are Jumblatt and Gea Gea who are totally against an agreement because we think they are totally under US policy and until now the US does not want a solution in the region as they are lumping Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon together.

 

The opposition say Hezbollah resigned from the government because it is opposed to the formation of the Hariri tribunal. They say Damascus is to blame for Hariri’s killing and that as allies of Damascus and reliant on the transfer of weapons across Syria’s border with Lebanon, Hezbollah is protecting its masters in Syria. What do say to that? 

They say the problem is the tribunal. It is not true. They say the problem is Syria and Iran. It is not true. We simply want the tribunal to be judicial and criminal, not a political lever setting one party against another.

For us the problem is the government. If we want to reach an agreement between the two sides then let’s have a discussion of the draft and begin to compose a new government draft as discussed by a commission who will then pass it to the government where all the cabinet can agree on it and then I assure the president will sign it and it can go to the parliament for a vote by all MPs.

It is better for Rafik Hariri to have the agreement of all of Lebanon and if the US government would not put a veto on the issue, we could solve the problem in 48 hours. Jumblatt and Gea Gea are the US government’s officers in Lebanon and are doing Washington’s bidding.

As for our alliance with Syria and Iran, I am not a speaker for either country, but it is not something I am ashamed of.

We have a political alliance and they support the resistance, but the alliance stops when it is against the interest of Lebanon. We did not give our young guys’ blood for the sake of Iran or Syria. It was to defend all Lebanon and not for the sake of anyone outside Lebanon.

For example, when resolution 1701 was passed by the Security Council, Iran and Syria said they were against the resolution but Hezbollah said we were with it, but with some remarks. Then Iran and Syria said they were with it. If we are an arm of Iran or Syria we would not have been able to agree with the resolution.

Let’s talk about the status of the Shebaa Farms. When the UN drew the Blue Line they ruled that the Shebaa Farms was Syrian territory, that it was part of the Golan Heights, thereby verifying Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.  The Syrians say it is Lebanese territory yet they have never officially ceded the land through the UN to Lebanon. If Hezbollah wants to liberate Shebaa Farms why not go to Damascus?  

First of all, the Shebaa Farms is Lebanese territory. We have official papers issued by the government in the 1930s that state it is Lebanese land. So why should we go to Syria to ask them to say it is our land?

If Syria officially ceded the land to Lebanon it would mean Israel would be in violation of resolution 425 and while acknowledging that it would certainly not be the only resolution Israel has not implemented, surely putting Israel in violation of 425 would strengthen the resistance’s effort to liberate the land? 

 

There is no legality in the international community. When you have a paper saying this land is your land you do not need to go to an international tribunal. The international community made a mistake, so why should we accept it?

 

Why should I tell my neighbour to go to the international community for the purpose of the international community only? Siniora had a solution to get UN soldiers into the area and he discussed this with Waleed Mualem during the war.

 

Yes, so why has there been no movement on resolving the issue? 

The problem is with Israel not Syria. The Shebaa is a strategic place and the Israelis will not withdraw from it easily.

Let’s talk about Hezbollah’s other key demand: the return of Lebanese prisoners from Israeli jails. We know Hezbollah is demanding the return of Samir Kantar and there are maybe half a dozen more Lebanese in Israeli jails.  Yet rights groups say there are some 280 Lebanese prisoners once held in Syrian prisons and still unaccounted for. Why is discovering the fate of those Lebanese not the priority of the resistance? 

The Syrians were here not as an occupying army. We cannot compare a neighbour to an enemy. The very people who are fighting Syria now were the ones who asked Syria to intervene.

You cannot compare the civil war among Lebanese to the big war which is against Israel. We are not against asking Syria to give back any Lebanese, but we are not going to war with Syria over it.

Syria has said there are no more Lebanese prisoners, but it’s a big question mark. They were taken during the civil war, which was a very dirty war.

We have tried several times with the Syrians and they say there are no more Lebanese prisoners in their prisons. They were all killed during war. But certainly if there are Lebanese who are still living in Syrian prisons then we hope Syria will give them back. 

The Times of London recently reported Hezbollah militants were preparing a new line of armed defence just north of the Litani River, out of reach of UNIFIL. What is Hezbollah’s position on resolution 1701?  

We agreed on 1701, no one obliged us. When UNUFIL came they asked if Hezbollah considered them an enemy or friend. We said we only have one enemy, the one who occupies our land and attacks our people.

I do not have the information to speak about our security strategy, but I can assure you that the resistance is still here. We did not close the file. We still have the three components; occupied Lebanese land, our prisoners in Israel, and the Israeli threat to our people.

We still have to resist. We cannot wait with our hands in the air.  

Now we are leaving the south of the Litani for UNIFIL and the Lebanese army, but if one day Israel attacks Lebanon I don’t think UNIFIL will defend Lebanon. So if one day Israel attacks and UNIFIL withdraws, the Lebanese army is not strong enough to defend, so it will be the job of the resistance to defend Lebanon again.

Can you see a day when Hezbollah could be incorporated into a strong Lebanese army, as a kind of special forces unit?   

Our point of view is that the resistance is strong because it is secret and popular. The day it becomes part of the army regular army the Israelis will come and attack the Commander in Chief, the Defence Ministry or the Prime Minister’s office, and then there will be a war between Israel and Lebanon.

Our strategy of defence is to keep the resistance but to have a link to the army, be an aide to the army, but not part of it. Before the war the military intelligence services captured an intelligence group working for Mossad which was good for Lebanon and good for the resistance.

But fundamentally if you have an armed group operating beyond the control of central government and the army and taking security decisions that can lead the country into war, then you are undermining the army and ensuring it can never be strong . . . 

It is the matter of a political decision. Before the war everybody said Hezbollah was against the army going to the south, and now we have changed.  This is not true. Before the war, there was no decision given to the army that if they went to the south they would be there to defend the border. We were afraid the army was going as a policeman to protect Israel not Lebanon.

When the decision was taken that they should go to the border to fight then we agreed. It’s a beginning. Maybe one day the army can be strong with anti-aircraft missiles to defend the country.

 

Resolution 1559 called for the disarming of all remaining militia groups in Lebanon. Hezbollah has made it clear it will not disarm. Is 1559 a concern for you? 

We do not consider ourselves a militia. The definition of a militia is a group that uses its arms against its own people. We have never used our arms inside Lebanon. We are a popular resistance, so 1559 does not exist for us. The weapons of the resistance are an internal Lebanese issue and one that we have positively discussed in the National Dialogue talks before the war.

Hugh Macleod is a British journalist who has been based in Syria and Lebanon working for the British and US press for the past three years. From early April highlights of his work can be found at www.hughmacleod.co.uk

‘Syria’s Revenues in Danger,’ Finance Minister Warns – Discussion by Ehsani2

Ehsani2 – Syria Comment's "Mr. Economy" – initiated a discussion in the previous comment thread about Syrian Finance Minister's interview with Syria News in which he ran though some economic forecasts and proclaimed that the country's revenues were in danger. Ehsani answers questions on why he things that is so. It is an interesting discussion and deserves its own post. (T_Desco promises a run down on the new Brammertz report. He gives a few preliminary observations below.)

First here are two recent articles demonstrating that the government is worried.

"Crackdown on state corruption in Syria" by The Oxford Business Group on Tuesday, 13 March 2007: (Thanks Atassi)

Syria has launched a high-profile crackdown against corruption among state employees, part of its campaign to enhance public accountability, reduce losses and improve the country's image.

Here is an article on Syria's talks with Iraq on linking their energy networks in a deal that could lead to the country importing Iraqi crude as its own production declines, a senior Syrian official said on Tuesday.

Syria produces 400,000 barrels per day of crude, of which half is exported, but its two refineries in Homs and Banias have been unable to cope with domestic demand for fuel for years. Syria wants to resume its role as a main conduit for Iraqi oil exports through its Banias terminal on the Mediterranean and eventually take in crude for three refineries it plans to build, Abdallah al-Dardari, deputy prime minister for economic affairs, said. "Linking the two oil and gas networks is in our mutual interest. We are studying with the Iraqi side how Syria could become an important link to deliver Iraqi output to the world and to the Syrian market," Dardari said.

"There are detailed plans to link the commercial, transit and oil infrastructure. The Syrian side of the pipeline is ready and we are also ready to revive a project to build a new pipeline."He added. "Syria is the closest point for Iraq on the Mediterranean and it's in Iraq's interest to export crude efficiently. We also have a stake in earning transit fees and using Iraqi crude to operate a group of refineries we plan to develop," he said.

"We are concerned to see stability and prosperity in Iraq.We need the Iraqi export market and closer commercial ties. Projects to develop our ports and highways are geared toward Iraq," Dardari said….

Dardari said building new refineries that would stop the financial drain is a priority. Despite delays, he said the government was negotiating financial and legal details with China to build a 70,000 bpd refinery in Deir al-Zour. "We are in the final touches. It will handle Syrian light and heavy crude as well as Iraqi flows," he said. A consortium that includes Gulf shareholders is being formed to build another 140,000 bpd refinery in Deir al-Zour, he said. Venezuela and Iran have been approached to build a second refinery in Homs and 18 companies have submitted offers to overhaul the Banias refinery.

Now for Ehsani's comments and the discussion: 

EHSANI2 said: Dr. Landis,

As you recall, I have long held the view that the Syrian economy’s prospects were in a much worse shape than was commonly believed.

On their part, most government officials had followed the unified and consistent theme that there was nothing wrong with the economy. Indeed, all we heard was that investments were soaring and that a 7-8% economic growth was in the offing.

The article below needs no comment. I expect it to be the first of many that will start to warn the public that the country’s finances are in a desperate position. Only three sectors in the public sector are not in the red. Oil is going to be experiencing a deficit as early as 2008. If higher tax collections is going to indeed be the only source of future revenue, then God help this country’s economy.

When the country’s Finance Minsiter claims that the government’s “revenues are in danger”, there is not much else to say for the rest of us.

http://www.syria-news.com/readnews.php?sy_seq=50255

syrian said:

Ehsani2,

 

What do you make of a Syrian Minister talking about potential financial difficulties for the government.

It can indicate that the government is prepping the ground for privatization and possible government layoffs (get rid of the bloated bureaucracy). Remember they are working (supposedly) on establishing a stock market by the end of 07 which would serve as a great tool to dump the big government owned businesses that do nothing but bleed the economy. So, in a sense, that can be positive news. I will have to read the article again more slowly since my Arabic is not what it once was.

EHSANI2 said:

Syrian

You are absolutely right. They are laying the groundwork for the lifting of subsidies and “hopefully” for the divestiture of some of most bleeding public sector companies.

Desperate situations call for desperate measures.

In this case, hopefully privatization and the lifting of the subsidies will be the means to turn this ship in the right direction after 44 years of sailing into the abyss.

ausamaa said:

Ehsani2,

There are immense difficulties for sure, and balanced privatiztion is important, but lifting of subsidies? I doubt it!

As to the Finance Minister, on the two occasions when I met while he was doing the rounds outside Syria, he was for privatization but he was worried about a repeat of the Egyptian experience.

As to the news about the falling Oil revenue, I would take that with a pinch of salt. The true figures of the oil reserves were never publicized. The fields are extensions of the Iraqi fields. Very close actually.

His message in the Article four fold:

1- We intend to tax the “evaders” and will be tough with them, BUT the courts have the final word.
2- We need investment and we depend on it, so investors are safe,
3- Public Spending has to be curtailed
4- We need HELP, our Oil revenues are falling

But I do believe that it should be taken in the general context of the political dialouge going on. He is primarily highlighting the fact: Don’t forget that we need financial help!

But again Ehsani2, what is needed most is the Human Element. The managerial and the entrapernual element. They will bring in the money. They know where it is, they know how it is made, they helped make it for the investors, and they speak the language of those investors. Their mere presence would be an assurance to investors and to the country.

Gibran said: (March 16th, 2007, 11:19 pm / #) Edit

Brammertz: Lahoud’s Term Extension a Motive Behind Hariri Killing
A U.N. commission probing the assassination of ex-Premier Rafik Hariri said the extension of President Emile Lahoud’s term was one of three motives behind his killing.

majedkhaldoun said: (March 16th, 2007, 11:21 pm / #) Edit

corruption, and money taken out of the coubtry by Asad family and his loyalist, such as Khaddam Shehabi Makhloof etc. are major reason for the budget to be in such condition, one will ask how come real estate prices are such high,yet the tax on real estate is low,my bill for property tax on my house in Maliki is $20 , I was told my house worth $20 million lira last year, the same house in the USA have a tax bill of 2400 dollar, the goverment must be reduced, 2 million employee is too large for Syria, probably 1/4 of them are security forces,this is the cost of dictatorship.

ugarit said: (March 16th, 2007, 11:31 pm / #) Edit

$20 tax for a $400,000 dollar home! No wonder the government is running out of money. Where I live in the US the rate is 0.88/100 dollars.

EHSANI2 said: (March 16th, 2007, 11:58 pm / #) Edit

Majed,

The system is broken. The example that you cited is one of so many things that need a total overhaul.

Ausamma,

The minister is telling you that oil is running out. Most independent analysts confirm this. Just because Iraq has an abundance of oil does not mean a neighboring country of her will also have it in abundance.

Your last paragraph was as follows”

“They know where it is, they know how it is made, they helped make it for the investors, and they speak the language of those investors. Their mere presence would be an assurance to investors and to the country.”

I am sorry but I don’t get it. The capital that is outside Syria is massive. It has not come back. What has come back to the country is a tiny fraction. Such investments do very little to improve the fiscal position of the government’s ledgers. I cannot see how this government can embark on a credible wave of privatizations or lifting of subsidies. Instead, the changes that are likely to come will be of the too-little-too-late category which has been the hallmark of this government’s economic policy.

The Syria of today is in desperate need of bold, decisive and visionary economic policy. Regrettably, what it will get is a cautious, indecisive and slow set of reforms that will do little to address the challenges facing it.

ausamaa said: (March 17th, 2007, 12:17 am / #) Edit

Ehsani 2,

Oil, we will not know about. The oil minister says 2022!

What you Qouted was in reference to my saying that the Human Element is important. The Manegerial and Entrapernual Element; hence the “they know where the money is, they know how to get it..”

And, no Sir, I am not talking about “Syrian” money outside. I am not counting much on “such” money! I was talking about the massive capital you mentioned which is outside Syria. Gulf primarily. They are just looking for a way to invest it. Out of frustration, most of it is being pourd in Real Estate projects in Dubai, Bahrain and Qatar.

And your last paragraph seem to only highlight my point: the Human Factor. “Bold, decisive and visionary economic policy”, can not be expected to grow on trees. Sure, not on the existing trees. You are talking about total shakeup. With which I cannot agree more. It is needed. But is it gonna happen? Not if it is TOTAL. You are asking incumbants to vaccate their seats, and you have no assurance of the compatibility of the successors. And So, you have to accept a somewhat slower pace with a Big input from the outside. You need good change management. I would not trust the System to implement it, but at the same time I would not want to see it left to the likes of Ernest Young and KPMG alone.

I wish it was simpler!

EHSANI2 said: (March 17th, 2007, 12:27 am / #) Edit

“You are asking incumbants to vaccate their seats, and you have no assurance of the compatibility of the successors.”

This is not what I said. Syria’s economic system is akin to a patient diagnosed with a dangerous disease. The government keeps convincing us that an advil will do the job. It will not. I am afraid that the patient will end up dying.

Syrian said: (March 17th, 2007, 12:29 am / #) Edit

Ehsani2,
I would be interested to hear the reasoning that leads you to be so pessimistic.

EHSANI2 said: (March 17th, 2007, 12:40 am / #) Edit

Syrian,

Which part would you like me to expand on? The fiscal situation? The labor situation and the low GDP growth relative to the growth of the labor force? The lack of an export policy? The insufficient infrastructure to attract business?
The lack of property rights? The subsidies system?

ausamaa said: (March 17th, 2007, 12:47 am / #) Edit

Ehsani2, of course you did not say that. But it was implied in “the bold visionary economic policy”. You can not have Al Hassan and Dardarri wake up one morning and put out such a policy. The good persons they are. But it is just not gonna happen. Look at that example $ 20 per year on an Al Maliki house! Hell, we have four houses in Damascus, and I never really bothered what taxes we pay on them. Look at that example and tell me how easy it would be to reform such a system overnight. hell, you can imprison as many people as you want, and Damascus will be calm next morning. Try to implement that $0.80/$100 propert tax mentioned above, and next day the army would not be able to get to into Damascus.

Ehsani2, again, and without taking any from the importance of change, but it is not that easy or simple.

And why did you skip over my remark that I am not counting on expat “Syrian” money to come into Syria to develope it? I hope it was unintentional, because if like myself you beleive that we should not count on it, then this leads to a worse conclusion; the WHOLE system, people and government. And that leads to examining wider considerations relating to other more important areas.

“We” need To change! We can not just dump it on the System and turn our back. “We” are the System.

Not to imply that we should despair, but if we do understand our collective shortcomings, then we will have a hope.

norman said: (March 17th, 2007, 12:55 am / #) Edit

Ehsani2 and Syrian , I hope the subsidies in general and on a wide scale will be lifted but that should accompany support for the poor Syrians untill their income increase , rich Syrians should pay market value for products and that will decrease smugling to Lebanon and Jordon , they can do that like what we do in the US via subsdies on elecric and Gas bills for the low income Americans,most poor Syrians do not have cars to worry about Gasoline prices.

Majed , as you well know that many Syrians park their money in real estate , that make some people own many houses and with low taxes on real state owners do not have the presure to rent or sell empty houses ,that increases the problem of housing availabelty ,
To correct these problem ,first house should not have taxes (that will increase housing ownwrship )but taxes should be paied on all other houses and should be clear that money can not be given from father to children without paying gift tax so people will not avoid paying taxes by puting the after the firs house in the children names .having more houses available will decrease the prices and children will be able to start their families without living with their parents.

majedkhaldoun said: (March 17th, 2007, 1:01 am / #) Edit

Ehsani;
I agree total overhaul is necessary, but should not include major increase in tax, nor it should be sudden, it must be gradual, remeber tax is close to be a crime.( I am from Milton Friedman school) in USA the tax is extremely high, as for Ugarite, remember your tax on property is .11/100 dollar, the rest is to pay for schools,hospital and bonds etc,which is not for services for the real estate. but again the cost of dictatorship is very high,since they need protection from the people.

Syrian said: (March 17th, 2007, 1:14 am / #) Edit

Ehsani2,

It is this statement that made me ask the question.

I cannot see how this government can embark on a credible wave of privatizations or lifting of subsidies.

Can you see a different government able to embark on a credible wave of …

What are the different charactaristics of this other government and can the current government do anything to morph into a credible one.

Syrian said: (March 17th, 2007, 1:17 am / #) Edit

P.S. I found this study (undated) which you may have seen. Just skimming through, there seems to be quite a bit of activity in the “reform” arena.

20 Page pdf file Here

EHSANI2 said: (March 17th, 2007, 1:34 am / #) Edit

Privatization and lifting of subsidies is likely to face a significant opposition. The security apparatus will warn against it. The Baath party dinasors will vote against it. The President is unlikely to push for it in this political environment. This is why I made the statement that I made. Taking risks is not the hallmark of this leadership. Maintaining the status quo has served it well. Versions of the status quo is what we will get. Changes are likely to be of the too-little-too-late category for as long as they eye can see. Indeed, Syrians have become genetically programmed to prefer the go-slow approach. Dramatic and bold changes are always met with calls of caution, patience and let-us-not-rush type of mentality. The Advil tablet approach rather than a cancer-removing surgery is what the nation has been taught to embrace. The result is Chinese-torture style cracking of the system.

Syrian said: (March 17th, 2007, 1:53 am / #) Edit

The opposition to wholesale privatization and lifting of subsidies is not likely, it is absolutely there. The problem is not one of will, it is ability. Fixing the Syrian economy fast will require measures that no one is able to accomodate. Massive layoffs, increasing prices and complete destruction of the production system (as lousy as it is, it still produces) is not an overnight undertaking. The attraction of foreign investment can indeed create jobs that are superior to the jobs granted by the government and can start the incentive process for people to seek those jobs.

Ehsani2,

In your opinion, can the government be in the process of building a foundation from which a private economy can emerge? If not, what things can they do to facilitate the process faster?

When I ask about what they can do, I am asking you to take into consideration the popular opposition to the different policy alternatives that they may come up with.

norman said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:04 am / #) Edit

Syrian , interesting discution.I am enjoying it.

majedkhaldoun said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:04 am / #) Edit

why should the syrians give Bashar another seven years?
Are we better off now than what we were seven years ago?
Is inflation is under control?
Is the eceonomy is better?
is our relation with the arab countries improving,especially Lebanon,KSA or Egypt?
did we get back the Golan Heights,or is our army is stronger today that there is hope of regaining the Golan Heights?
is the enviroment better,the health care is improvingthe goverment services are improving.
is there freedom of speach,or the people who talk are still go to jail,? did we abolish emergency rule?or law # 49,or military tribunals for civilians who speak their mind?
do we have democratically elected representatives?
seven more years of what?

ugarit said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:06 am / #) Edit

Let’s not forget the impact on the Syrian economy of the 1.2 million Iraqi refugees in Syria.

ugarit said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:09 am / #) Edit

Let’s hope that Milton Friedman’s economic “philosophy” is not implemented in Syria. It would be a disaster.

http://www.counterpunch.org/grandin11172006.html

EHSANI2 said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:15 am / #) Edit

Syrian,

A private economy can emerge when the government offers the sector an environment of reduced red tape and less burdensome regulation. The private sector is not allowed to enter into a fair competition in sectors where the public sector already has presence (and it is plenty).

What they “can” do is embark on an export drive concentrating on labor intensive industries. For that to happen, Syrian and foreign industrialists need to feel safe in investing the vast amount of money that is needed for such capital intensive manufacturing businesses. For that to happen, infrastructure needs to be overhauled. This is what they can do. I doubt that it will happen.

Ugarit,

What “philosophy” would you recommend?

majedkhaldoun said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:20 am / #) Edit

investment can not succeed where there is dictatorship, you need democracy for investment to succeed.

norman said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:36 am / #) Edit

Majed , Spain under Franco was very successful.and that was a dictatership.

Syrian said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:42 am / #) Edit

What they “can” do is embark on an export drive concentrating on labor intensive industries. For that to happen, Syrian and foreign industrialists need to feel safe in investing the vast amount of money that is needed for such capital intensive manufacturing businesses.

1. Is it labor or capital intensive industries you are promoting.

2. Every industry in Syria is likely to be Labor intensive. With labor being the cheap resource, investors will either seek labor intensive projects or will substitute labor for capital in order to take advantage of the cost savings. To give you an example, since my wife is not of Arabic heritage, I tend to rely on canned products for my middle eastern cuisine. I had wondered why I was not able to find canned middle eastern food of Syrian origin. Well, one day I found a canned pickled eggplant product that was the product of Syria, and I had to get some. Wouldn’t you know that the kind of can used was clearly not the automated type (Had a top that could be pried open with a fork.) The stuff was clearly canned by hand and I could not bring myself to eat it because I was concerned about the contamination possibilities that come up when you are hand packing for exports. The point is, canning is much cheaper in Syria when done by people than it is when done by machines. And as much as the government would like to modernize and introduce efficient technology, the incentive structure is there to use people and not machines.

Infrastructure is expensive but I believe the system is being overhauled. It was not long ago that I read somewhere that the government was providing additional phone lines and communication lines. I had seen an estimate that private automobile ownership increased 50% after the government reduced the import tarrifs on automobiles. New roads will be needed to accomodate this growth in automobiles and the government will have to provide them. Also, do not forget about the proposed improvements to the Tartous harbor, proposed rebuilding of the Iraqi oil pipeline, talk of trying to build new oil refineries…

majedkhaldoun said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:47 am / #) Edit

Norman
I disagree IN 1995 a group of physicians(syrian american doctors) we presented the goverment with a plan to build GM factory in Syria,to build cars, it was denied.

norman said: (March 17th, 2007, 3:01 am / #) Edit

Majed, 1995 was before Bashar took office , try now to open a factory , I think you will see diffrent reaction.

Alex said: (March 17th, 2007, 7:29 am / #) Edit

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DJ said: (March 17th, 2007, 8:08 am / #) Edit

Well Ehsani2,
If the oil is running out, how come we’ve stricken a 2 $ billion deal with Shell to prospect for oil around Deer Al Zoor area?

DJ said: (March 17th, 2007, 8:14 am / #) Edit

Dr. Landis:
Given the significance of Minister Al Hussein’s statement, don’t you agree we need a fresh post dedicated only for discussing it?

t_desco said: (March 17th, 2007, 1:38 pm / #) Edit

Unfortunately, I was unable to complete my analysis of the previous reports, but I am glad to see that the new Brammertz report confirms the impression that significant progress has been made in the investigation (they may even have found the video camera which was used to film the Adass tape (!); see §47) and that an extremist group was most likely involved in the attack, though it may not have acted on its own:

“44. … Another working hypothesis is that while an extremist group may have been involved in part in committing the crime as outlined in the tape and note, this group was actually manipulated by others for another objective not related to its own organizational aspirations.”

At the same time, the “motive to assassinate Hariri” discussed in §52-63 seems to point to Syrian and/or Lebanese opponents of Hariri rather than to an extremist group (e.g., it is unclear to me why such a group should be particularly concerned about Hariri winning the 2005 elections).

The new report merits a more detailed analysis and I will try to post more about it later.

trustquest said: (March 17th, 2007, 1:56 pm / #) Edit

I know some of the commentators are experts in their fields. My question is to Ehsani 2?
It seems to me that the government in Syria are too fragmented that the mister of finance on one wave and others on different waves. We hear from one minister but we do not see public and expert participation although there are plenty. This could be normal in Syria before 2000; however this is intolerable and is unacceptable in open economy. The government did not find their way in dealing with current and mounting economic problems. They need investors, experts and public participation but they keep all silenced. I believe they stuck with their own making and they are showing inability to find a way out of it. The recent news about widening Faisal Street and the confiscation of big part of the old city, shows how government is unable to stop its self from shooting themselves in the foot. Stupid acts continue, they could not realize that killing a sector dealing with building materials, a whole market, Almankhlia, with over 900 shops which has a face value (froogh) about 18 billion Syrian pounds, not to mention the chunk of the old city properties which is priceless is actually a removal of a big segment from the economic engine of the country. The old set of minds of the sixties, they still look at themselves as the savoir and at the merchants as the fat money mongers who are bad people who they should not worry about, are still life and well well. As an engineer working for a consultant in the USA, I find these types of projects are disastrous to the economy. Please if you can comment on this subject I do appreciate that.

EHSANI2 said: (March 17th, 2007, 2:47 pm / #) Edit

Dear Trustquest and all the other participants,

One of the main areas of contention with my writing on the economy seems to concern the issue of the oil industry. Some believe that by 2010 the country will start to face a declining output. Many don’t believe this. Instead, they think that this is too alarmist and that 2022 is the earliest for such problems to surface. For the record, the issue is not whether the oil will run out. It is that the country’s demand for energy is running ahead of its ability to export it. As this product’s import bill exceeds what it earns from its exports, the government’s finances will suffer immensely. This is what this minister was trying to tell us.

More generally, the fact that we are even discussing and arguing over this point is a clear indication the country’s economic planning is non-existent. Given the importance of this sector to the country, one would have thought that a professional and objective study would have been performed and then presented to the public by now. The guesswork must stop. Syriacomment readers and others must rely on hard figures and data form the government rather than arguing amongst themselves with subjective statements that add little to our understanding of the basic facts. My comment here is not directed exclusively at the oil sector. The labor situation is very alarming. The number of jobs being created is far below the number of new people entering the labor force and seeking jobs. For the record, this occurs when a country’s economy grows below its potential (defined as the growth of the labor force plus productivity). The government seems largely silent on the issue and its repercussion on society.

But who is in charge?

As far as I recall, this President is yet to make a single appearance to exclusively discuss the economy. Why hasn’t he taken the time to make a speech to inform the public about the country’s oil sector and about the fiscal challenges facing its people? Instead, what we are left with is reading through the tealeaves to understand what Dardari, Hussain or others have to say. One is for privatization. The other is against it. One says that the oil sector could be in trouble by 2020. The other says that we need not worry till 2020.

This must stop. We need to learns “facts”. The president needs to step forward and articulate “HIS OWN” economic views and agenda.

One suggestion is for him to appoint one person to be the country’s economic czar. That person must report to the President himself. He must be a respected figure in international finance. He must have the respect of the international community of bankers and investors. He must set a new standard by declaring his full wealth before taking office. In sum, his integrity and qualifications must be beyond any doubt, He must finally get introduced to the world with this brief statement by the President:

“I have appointed this man to be the country’s economic czar. He reports to me directly. He promotes and represents my personal agenda. The buck stops at his desk when it comes to any questions or policy matters relating to the economy. I want to assure the people that I will hold a daily briefing with this man and will be personally involved in this critical issue given its importance to the country’s people”

Kurds Commemorate the “Intifadah” of 12 March 2004

Abdullah Ghadawi, an Arab reporter in Damascus sent me the following interviews with Kurdish students at the University of Damascus on the topic of Kurdish rights, Kurdish nationalism, and their attitude toward US pressure on Syria and serving in the Syrian military. The students were preparing to go out onto the streets of Damascus to commemorate the 12 March 2004 "Intifadah," as they have named the Kurdish uprising of three years ago.

 

How the riots began has been the subject of some debate. The version I heard many times is that a football game was being played in Qamishli, a north-eastern provincial capital, which has a mixed Kurdish and Arab population. Kurdish fans began to chant, "Long live George Bush," Arab fans responded by chanting, "Long live Saddam Hussein." A melee broke out and quickly spread to other norther Syrian towns where the Kurdish population is concentrated.

 

The political context of the riots was linked to events in Iraq. The interim constitution, guaranteeing broad autonomy to the Kurdish north of the country, had just successfully passed the Iraqi parliament, helped by strong American pressure. Included was an article stipulating that no future amendment to the constitution could be made that was blocked by three or more provinces. Because the Kurdish provinces are at least three, this meant that the constitution could not be changed without Kurdish consent. Kurds everywhere were ecstatic. many Syrian Kurds believed it would be the beginning of a sea-change for them as well. They believed America was on their side and that their status in Syria would change as a result. Some saw it as an event that prefigured the establishment of a greater Kurdistan.

Gary Gambill wrote an article arguing that the riots were not spontaneous, but  were planned as part of an effort to undermine the Assad regime amid rising tensions with the United States. "Although fueled by popular frustration in the Kurdish community," Gambill claims, "the riots were a politically timed initiative to pressure the Assad regime in the face of heightened Syrian-U.S. tensions and Iraqi Kurdish political gains." The report asserted that the Syrian Kurds were organized by Kurdish leaders in neighboring Iraq.

The Syrian government cracked down on the Kurds, arresting many and later releasing many. The suppression of the Kurdish population in the North-east continues, however. Human rights organizations such as Damascus based Shril continue to list the names of Kurdish intellectuals and activists who are arrested or go on trial each month. There was much hope that stateless Kurds in Syria, which number close to 300,000 would have their citizenship, which was taken from them in 1962 shortly before the Baath took power, restored in 2005. The Baath Party Congress of that summer announced that many would, but nothing has since materialized of this promises.

Nadim Houry of Human Rights Watch wrote an op-ed, "The road to Damascus," published the eve of EU President Solana's visit to Damascus yesterday in which he writes, "Javier Solana's visit to president Assad signals a fresh start for the EU's relations with Syria. But human rights must not fall off the agenda." He brings up the issue of stateless Kurds.

Here are the interviews by Abdullah Ghadawi:

Ammar: Damascus University, Fourth Year, History. 24 Years of Age from Qamashli.

 

  • The one thing that brings Kurds together in the Middle East is the Newroz Day. Kurds consider it the Day of Freedom. In this day, Kurds wish that Kurds, and the world at large, will positive in freedom and democracy when the next Newroz comes.  
  • Kurds gather together on their historical land in the Middle East, that is, The Great Kurdistan which extends from south-east of Turkey to the south of the Syrian and Iraq and north-west of Iran.
  • We are proud – Syrian Kurds – of the Kurdish experience in North Iraq. What happened on March 12, 2004 was one of the products of that experience.
  • We hope solve the Kurdish case with Damascus. We have always sought to engage in dialogue with the regime.
  • We have no social problems with other Syrian ethnic groups. But we have political problem. We do not feel politically integrated.
  • I love to be Kurdish.
  • In the military service, I do not feel I serve a homeland country.
  • When it comes to foreign support and interference, we do not mind diplomatic and political interference from Europe and USA, but not military.

 

Kaniwar: Mechanical Engineering, second Year. 22 Years from Tal Tamr

 

  • Kurds in Syria lack the ability of self-expression and their culture and. nothing could achieve this freedom but the existence of the Great Kurdistan.
  • We suffer a clearly chauvinistic policy in Syria.
  • There exist no problems between Arabs and Kurds in Al-Jazeera (the eastern part of Syria) and this is created by the government. They take lands from Kurds and give them to Arabs. For example, they took around 300 hectares from Hajjo family and granted it to Arabs. This case has reached the European Union but no reply as yet. This problem will have real bad consequences in the future had the government done nothing to sort it out.
  • The Kurdish experience in Iraq has inspired the Syrian Kurds in a way that they have started to yearn for federalism like that of the Iraqi Kurds and it is a reasonable solution.
  • We are not against the idea of Kurdish-government dialogue but we are hopeless that the government will do something.
  • What does Islam mean to you?
    Nationalism first and then religion. We can never give up our nationalistic pursuits.
  • I love to be Syrian Kurd.
  • Military service is obligatory and we have no other choice. We encourage any foreign assistance, no matter what it is.
  • To engage in a dialogue with the regime is wasting time. They promise but they do not do. We will continue to demand our civil, cultural and political rights no matter what happens. We will never give up. As for violence, we do not want it and it is the last in our list.
  • Integration with the Syrian society is a relative issue. Generally integration depends on the other side – to treat in kind.
  • I wish to have a Kurdish identity and character but no problem in being like Iraqi Kurds – to be a Syrian Kurd.
  • For the time being, we do not want foreign interference but in case the government doe not listen to us, then foreign interference and support becomes a must for the Kurds.
  • Do you trust Arabs?
    Arabs cancelled 'the other' and they are racists. In this case, we can not live together.

  

Darios: Chemistry, Third Year. 25 years of age, from Qamashli.

 

  • All the Kurds in Syria share one real tragedy, which is the lack of freedom and democracy and the absence of the civil and cultural rights.
  • Kurds in Syria do not believe in military struggle. It is unacceptable in the international society, which is why it is not accepted in the Kurdish mentality.
  • Foreign interference will happen anyway, whether we like it or not. I believe that we need to make use of the foreign interference for our benefit. We have no problem with any side interfering in Syria affair as far as it is to our interest.
  • We will defend Syria forever but we are not going to defend the regime.
  • Economically, Kurds are suffering a lot and the problem is exacerbated by the regime trying to make Kurds poorer and poorer.
  • The Kurdish experience in Iraq is, in effect, of no paramount influence as the Kurdish political movement in Syria has always been strong before the war and till now.
  • Kurdish parties and Kurds in general are not against making a coalition with Muslim Brothers as a political party because the Brothers Party was the only Syrian party that supported and stood with the Kurdish uprising on March 2004.

     

Students demonstrating in Baramke in front of the Economics faculty. More about the commemoration can be read here. (Arabic)

Zozan: English Literature, Second Year. 22 Years of age from Tal Tamr.

  

  • It is the Newroz Day that unites Kurds and brings them together. Each Newroz, Kurds wish that the Kurdish people will be free with all their cultural and human rights acknowledged. In this day, we wish that we will be recognized as a nationality and as humans.
  • Kurds live in fear and anxiety all the time in Syria.  
  • Our everlasting message is to engage in a dialogue with the authorities and only the government has the key to solve the problems and it seems that the government does not want to do anything.
  • When it comes to integrity, generally we do not feel it with the Arabs. 'The other' think that we want to take something from them, even when we demand our own human and cultural rights. They feel that we do not have the right to have these rights. Even at school or university, nothing is mentioned about Kurds – Saladin in one example.
  • If the regime does not like foreign interference, let it solve the problems by itself.

 

          Rojeen: English Literature, 21 years of age, from Dirbaseeah.

 

  • We feel that we do not exist in Syria and we do not belong. Many Kurds are still treated like foreigners in Syria with no acknowledged rights. They do not have identity cards and they can not enter school or universities as if they did not exist.
  • It is difficult to integrate in the Syrian society. Many Syrians do not know who the Kurds are.
  • Separation from Syria is the solution. The solution to our national and cultural and existence problems and it is a very good solution for Kurds but it is also a difficult choice.
  • I wish to be Kurdish.
  • In fact, we do not want foreign interference but reality entails that that, whatever the interference is.

 

Ameen: Journalism. 29 years from Dirik, Qamashli.

 

  • Our goal, in general terms, is to establish the Great State (Kurdistan). In fact, all Kurds in the Middle East agree on the same case.
  • If Kurds obtain their civil and political rights it is then one step, but the ultimate goal is still the Great Kurdistan.
  • We are not separatists from the countries that we live in. We only seek self-determination in Syria, Iran, Iraq and Turkey. It is actually the step towards the Great Kurdistan.
  • Iraqi Kurdish experience has a great influence on Kurds in Syria. But now, before independence, we want an acknowledgement of us as a nationality and after that will work to achieve of the Kurdish Dream.
  • Dialogue with the regime is like talking to the deaf. Nobody hears and nobody understands the other. What the regime is concerned in is only its own self interest.
  • I can not work for a party whose slogan is: One Arab Nation. We are serving a group of people not a homeland.
  • Kurds, as a community, can and is willing to integrate with all communities and have no problems with any group, but the main problem is with the regime.
  • What will make Kurds more secure is a constitution-based recognition of their due rights. This recognition help Kurds live side by side with Arabs and encourage them give up the idea of independence or federalism.
  • We struggle for our full rights and equality with other Syrians.
  • Foreign interference is useful for us as well as other Syrians.

 

Houseen: journalism, 25 years of age from Ifreen, Aleppo.

 

  • Kurds have existed in nations not by their own will but because certain foreign colonist powers wanted that. No Kurd can forget that he or she belongs to a greater state, which is Kurdistan. Kurdish mentality is programmed on this Great Kurdistan.  
  • The Kurdish problem in Syria is not solely with the regime. It has started to be social as well. The government is trying to deepen it.
  • The demise of the Iraqi regime and the rise of constitutional Iraqi Kurdistan has given some vent to the Syrian Kurds. Kurds in Syria do not accept Damascus as their capital and so as the Kurds in Iraq, as far as I know. At the same time, it appears that Kurds is relying too much on a foreign interference to change unlike the Kurds in Iraq.
  • As for the centre of Kurds, they consider Amid ( Diar Bakr) as their Mecca and their political and historical centre.
  • We have no problem when it comes to engaging in a dialogue with the regime, as far as there is a genuine will to dialogue on the part of the regime. Today, it is the Syrian regime that needs us not the other way round. That is because it needs the Kurds to make a democratic change in the area.
  • Kurdish social integrity is something positive and they are integrated but not with the political system, and this is something shared with the majority of Syrians.
  • I only accept to be a Kurd.
  • Foreign interference is something sensitive because if we deal with the USA, we will lose Arabs and we live with Arabs not with Americans. However, we are not against European and US support of our human rights, and it is the optimal solution for us.

As far as the military service is concerned, there is a common saying among Kurds that goes like this: Instead of serving a country that is not our own, serve your homeland country, Kurdistan. This hints at the Kurdish revolution in Turkey caried out by the Kurdish Workers Party, led by Abdullah Ojalan. 

By: Abdullah Ghadawi                   

“U.S.-Syrian Relations” by Amassador Moustapha

U.S.-Syrian Relations: The Untold Story and the Road Ahead

By Ambassador Imad Moustapha
Originally published in Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs

It is no secret that Syrian-American relations have been quite strained, to say the least, for some time now. Initial talks of a U.S. invasion of Iraq sparked the first signs of tension with Syria’s fierce opposition to such a plan. While we were Saddam Hussain’s arch-enemies, the notion of infringing on another country’s sovereignty to dispose of its leader based on dubious, or even fabricated, pretexts was unacceptable to us—and should have been for everyone else. Besides, we were absolutely convinced that any foreign occupation is a perilous concept that will create serious problems and yield grave consequences.

Consequently, relations between both countries continued to spiral toward diplomatic stalemate. Nonetheless, while the administration and, for a while, Congress refused to engage or listen to what we had to say, the so-called “rational center” (academia, think tanks, the media, and thoughtful American citizens) were eager to hear from us and advocate engagement with Syria.

Although the paradigm concerning Syria has shifted drastically in the past few months, it is important to review the events that led to the current deadlock and share a side of the story that has yet to be revealed…

Syria’s Untold Side of the Story

Relations between the U.S. and Syria were not always this strained. Syria was one of the first countries to condemn the atrocious terrorist attacks of 9/11 and approached the U.S. with intelligence on al-Qaeda—which, according to Secretary of State Colin Powell in a letter addressed to Congress, was “actionable information” that “helped save American lives.” 

This security coordination faltered after the invasion of Iraq, however, when the U.S. started leveling accusations at Syria claiming that Syria was allowing the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq. In March 2004, I was directed by my government to initiate contacts with officials from both the State Department and the Pentagon to address these accusations. The aim was not merely to “refute” these allegations but, more importantly, to formally inform U.S. officials that Syria was willing to cooperate with the U.S. on securing these borders. I conveyed to the U.S. officials Syria’s willingness to do whatever it takes to secure these borders, including exchanging information, sharing intelligence, holding field meetings between Syrian and U.S. military officers, and even participating in trilateral border patrols with the Iraqis and Americans. Needless to say, while my suggestions aroused serious interest in the State Department, they were flatly rejected by the Pentagon.

 

In September 2004, I delivered an official letter from the Syrian leadership to the U.S. administration in which Syria explicitly offered cooperation toward securing and stabilizing Iraq. The U.S. reply was a deafening silence.

In January 2005, when former Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage visited Damascus, Syria agreed to further enhance security and intelligence cooperation with the U.S. to include any terrorists crossing from Syria into Iraq, or those operating from within Syria. Meanwhile, I had strict directives from Damascus to inform high-ranking officials at the National Security Council, the State Department and the Pentagon that if they wanted Syria’s security cooperation to continue, the U.S. administration had to cease its somewhat-daily diatribe against Syria. The underlying message was that Syria is not a charity. If the U.S. wants cooperation with Syria on security issues, political engagement should ensue.

Ostensibly, the U.S. was not interested.  Washington withdrew its ambassador from Damascus and embarked on a vicious political offensive on Syria. Still, the U.S. continued requesting Syria’s security cooperation! Unfortunately, I had to announce in April 2005 that Syria was severing all cooperation between Syrian security agencies and their American counterparts. Damascus would refuse to cooperate behind closed doors and be lambasted in the open.

Where to Go From Here

An interesting pattern is emerging out of Washington regarding U.S. policy toward Syria. While the Bush administration has invested so much into isolating Syria, it seems that the plan has only backfired, resulting in the isolation of the administration itself in regards to various major players in the region. Top congressmen and senators from both sides of the aisle have stressed the importance of re-engaging with Syria. In their response to President Bush’s State of the Union address, the Democrats stressed the role of a “regional diplomatic effort” in order to achieve stability and peace in Iraq. Key Republican figures, such as Senators Richard Lugar, Arlen Specter and Chuck Hagel, have stressed the same notion. Such a “regional diplomatic effort” will ultimately include Syria, among other neighboring countries.

Also, while Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice—who has yet to visit Damascus—downplays engagement with Syria as “fruitless,” former secretaries of state who have actually negotiated with Damascus have all stressed the importance of dialogue with Damascus. Only recently, former Secretary of State Powell told Newsweek that “we got plenty” from talking with Syria. Prior to that, one of the two top figures behind the Iraq Study Group report, former Secretary of State James Baker, who dealt extensively with Syria, recommended that the U.S. talk to Syria. The list of former secretaries of states calling for engagement with Syria also includes Madeleine Albright and Henry Kissinger.

The Bush administration’s isolation is not confined to the political realm. It seems they are in isolation from their own military, as well. Col. William Crowe, in charge of the border area between Syria and Iraq, was asked by reporters at a Jan. 12, 2007 Pentagon briefing about the number of foreign fighters infiltrating Iraq from Syria. The colonel candidly replied, “There is no large influx of foreign fighters that come across the border.” He added, however, that “smuggling has been taking place in this part of the world for thousands of years.” In most cases when his troops had caught an infiltrator moving across the border—a possible average of two per day—Colonel Crowe hastened to add, “it turns out it is someone smuggling sheep, eggs, or cigarettes.”

Moreover, on Feb. 13 Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid declared that, based on the National Intelligence Estimate, “Syria …[is] not causing the strife within Iraq…

The…Syrians have nothing to do with it.” Yet, Washington is still somehow adamant in its accusation of Syria’s involvement in allowing infiltrators into Iraq.

The administration is in isolation from its Iraqi allies, as well, regarding Syria.  In January of this year, to the chagrin of the U.S. administration, Syria and Iraq re-established diplomatic relations after a lapse of 25 years, resulting in a Security Memorandum signed by the two countries. Our foreign minister paid an official visit to Baghdad, and Iraqi President Jalal Talibani concluded a weeklong visit to Damascus. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration continues to blame Syria for its own failed policies in Iraq.

Syria firmly believes that the only way to achieve progress in Iraq is through the political engagement of all parties, without exception or exclusion. This includes all Iraqi factions, regional neighbors of Iraq, and international players with interest in stabilizing the situation in Iraq. A strategy of consensus and dialogue is the only way forward. Syria can play a constructive role if such a path is adopted. Alas, the new strategy formulated by President Bush will only lead to more violence and bloodshed.

In February 2007, the U.S. State Department invited me to a meeting aimed at discussing the status of Iraqi refugees in Syria. I told them that Syria refuses to discuss one consequence of failed U.S. policies in Iraq and opts, instead, to engage with Washington on the very policies that led to the series of disasters—of which the refugee strife is but one example. I also had to remind them that whereas more than one million Iraqis fled what they call “an oasis of democracy” into our “rogue state,” the U.S., which bears the full responsibility for everything taking place today in Iraq, had granted refugee status to only 450 Iraqis. They claimed that the number would be raised to 7,000 by 2008.

Syria’s willingness to sit at the negotiating table arises from two aspects: self-interest and empathy with the Iraqi people.  Syria is not looking for a deal on Iraq. The humanitarian toll paid by the Iraqi people through daily killings, exodus, hunger, and other brutal conditions is unacceptable, based on human and international law. While not comparable to the suffering of the Iraqis, Syria also has shouldered some of the weight of Washington’s failed policies in Iraq. Syria has welcomed around 1,300,000 Iraqi refugees—a tremendous burden on any country.

Whether it is for the benefit of the Iraqis, the Syrians, the neighboring countries, or the young American and British soldiers dying on the ground, the chaos needs to come to an end.

This is not America’s war, nor is it the world’s war—it is President Bush’s war.  Nonetheless, it is the duty of America and the world to put an end to the suffering of Iraqis, primarily, and the suffering of every party shouldering a burden from this administration’s uncalculated failed policies.  The road ahead undoubtedly will be difficult. Yet, if we are to bring this sad chapter in our history to an end, it will inevitably require all of us to take this road together, and work toward a brighter future.