“How to Defuse Iran,” by Leveretts

IN the wake of the new National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear program, Democrats and others are criticizing President Bush for again having “hyped” a nuclear weapons threat. This criticism, while deserved, does not address the critical policy question: What do we do now?

Clearly, the United States cannot ignore Iran. Tehran may have suspended the purely weapons-related aspects of its nuclear program, but it continues to master uranium enrichment, with no agreed limits in place. And Iran is well positioned either to facilitate or thwart American objectives in Iraq and across the Middle East.

At the same time, the Bush administration’s single-minded insistence on increasing international pressure on Iran seems increasingly detached from reality. Even before the intelligence estimate, there was no set of sanctions with any chance of being endorsed by the Security Council (or even the relatively cooperative European Union) that would have given Washington and its allies real strategic leverage over Iranian decision-making.

Indeed, as oil prices shoot up, American insistence that Iran’s hydrocarbons — including the world’s second-largest proven reserves of conventional crude oil and natural gas — stay in the ground until America gets an Iranian regime it likes is simply not practical over the long term.

The idea of “engaging” Iran diplomatically is becoming less politically radioactive than it was early in the Bush years, when any officials who broached it were putting their careers in jeopardy. Given official American-Iranian cooperation over Afghanistan and Al Qaeda after the 9/11 attacks (one of us, Hillary, was involved in those negotiations) and the current sets of talks between American and Iranian officials in Baghdad, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s claim that she is willing to change “28 years of policy” and negotiate with Iran is disingenuous.

Still, even Democrats who have talked about “engagement” have yet to spell out what it would take to engage Iran successfully. Most hide behind a vague incrementalism, epitomized in a recent statement by Hillary Clinton’s top national security adviser extolling the candidate’s willingness to consider “carefully calibrated incentives if Iran addresses our concerns.”

Why should any Iranian leader take such rhetoric as a legitimate invitation to the table? Iran has tried tactical cooperation with the United States several times over the past two decades — including helping to secure the release of hostages from Lebanon in the late 1980s and sending shipments of arms to Bosnian Muslims when the United States was forbidden to do so.

Yet each time, Tehran’s expectations of reciprocal good will have been dashed by American condemnation of perceived provocations in other arenas, as when Iranian support for objectives in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks was rewarded by President Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the “axis of evil.” Today, incremental engagement cannot overcome deep distrust between Washington and Tehran — certainly not rapidly enough to address America’s security concerns.

From an Iranian perspective, serious engagement would start with American willingness to recognize Tehran’s legitimate security and regional interests as part of an overall settlement of our differences. But neither Republicans nor Democrats have been willing to consider such an approach, because of the pursuit of a nuclear weapons option and support for terrorist organizations that Iran employs to defend what it sees as its fundamental security interests. Successful United States-Iran engagement requires cutting through this Gordian knot by undertaking comprehensive diplomacy encompassing the core concerns of both sides.

From the American side, any new approach must address Iran’s security by clarifying that Washington is not seeking regime change in Tehran, but rather changes in the Iranian government’s behavior. (While Secretary Rice has said recently that overthrowing the mullahs is not United States policy, President Bush has pointedly refused to affirm her statements.) To that end, the United States should be prepared to put a few assurances on the table.

First, as part of an understanding addressing all issues of concern to the two parties, Washington would promise that it would not use force to change Iran’s borders or form of government. (This would be a big shift: before the Bush administration signed on to a European-drafted incentives “package” for multilateral negotiations over Iran’s nuclear activities last spring, it insisted that all language addressing Iran’s security interests be removed.)

Next, assuming that American concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities, provision of military equipment and training to terrorist organizations, and opposition to a negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement were satisfactorily addressed, Washington would also pledge to end unilateral sanctions against Iran, re-establish diplomatic relations and terminate Tehran’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.

What would Iran have to concede? It would first have to carry out measures — negotiated with the United States, other major powers and the International Atomic Energy Agency — definitively addressing the proliferation risks posed by its nuclear activities. This would include disclosing all information relating to its atomic program, past and present, now being sought by the atomic energy agency, and agreeing to an intrusive inspections regime of any fuel cycle activities on Iranian soil.

Tehran would also have to issue a statement supporting a just and lasting settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on current United Nations Security Council resolutions. This statement would affirm the idea of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as expressed in the 2002 Security Council resolution, and also the Arab League’s commitment to normalized relations with Israel after it has negotiated peace agreements with the Palestinians and Syria.

Iran would also have to pledge to stop providing military supplies and training to terrorist organizations and to support the transformation of Hamas and Hezbollah into exclusively political and social-welfare organizations. Iran, in fact, proposed these steps as part of its offer for comprehensive talks that was passed to the Bush administration through Swiss diplomats in 2003. (Today, it’s clear that Hezbollah’s transformation would need to be linked to reform of Lebanon’s so-called democracy to end systematic Shiite under-representation in Parliament.)

Even if both sides agreed to such bilateral steps, a lasting rapprochement could be achieved only if Washington and Tehran worked out a more cooperative approach to regional security. The obvious first step would be collaborating on a plan to stabilize Iraq, acting in concert with that country’s other neighbors. Without a regional consensus on a post-Baathist political settlement, Tehran will continue its 20-year practice of supporting Iraqi Shiite factions and militias.

The goal of such cooperation would be a multilateral body analogous to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Each member nation would commit to abide by international norms regarding respect for other states’ sovereignty, the inviolability of borders and the observance of international conventions and United Nations resolutions on conflict resolution, economic relations, human rights, nonproliferation and terrorism.

Since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei’s death in 1989, United States policy toward Iran has not served American interests. Neither continuing to disregard legitimate Iranian interests nor timid incrementalism will improve the situation. In the long run, the real lesson of the new National Intelligence Estimate is that we need a comprehensive overhaul of American policy toward Iran.

Flynt Leverett is a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council and a senior fellow at the New America Foundation. Hillary Mann Leverett, a former director for Iran and Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council, is the chairman of Stratega, a political-risk consultancy.

Paranoia in the Land of Cedars

Lebanon has become a hot house for paranoid hysteria. Ever since Syria's invitation to Annapolis signaled a two degree thaw between Washington and Damascus, a Beirut Spring of strategic extrapolations has begun to sprout jungle-like in the land of Cedars. The Iran NIA served to nourish further the febrile hallucinations of March 14 minds. 

Raghida Dargham of al-Hayat is seeing Shiite Orcs marching to Uncle Sam's drum beat. Yes, in Dargham's considered opinion, Washington has struck a devil's bargain with Iran. And because Iran holds the armies of Middle Eastern Shiites in its sectarian thrall, George Bush can now issue marching orders to its new turbaned legions, who just happen to live atop the region's oil, Dargham darkly notes. The victim of this secret alliance are the jilted Sunnis. In essence, the Shiite crescent has been transmogrified into a living scimitar directed at the heart of the March 14th Movement. After all, why did the neoconservatives decide to overthrow Sunni Saddam and hand Iraq over to the "Iranian" Shiites? Dargham explains her anxieties thusly:

But there is another interesting theory. All of the indications at the time pointed to the pro-Iraq war group – from neoconservatives to those advocating the unleashing of what they called the "Shiite force" – all worked on the basis that the enemy were only Sunnis, who produced terrorism and the 11 September 2001 attack on the US. The basic idea for these people was Iraq, and its president, Saddam Hussein, constituted the "ideal" cover to justify a strike at the country, on the pretext of WMD. They said that the oil-rich Arab lands were inhabited by Arab Shiites, and that the best way to create an oil belt (a "Petrolistan") is to produce chaos in these areas. Then, it would be able to create a Shiite extension of influence in the Arab Gulf for Iran, and via the special Syrian-Israeli relationship, one could link to Israel via Syria and Lebanon.

See the Badger's careful exposition of Dargham's thinking at Missing Links.

Lee Smith, has been insisting at "Now Lebanon" that President Bush is not dumping March 14. In his article, "No deal," Smith writes that, 

Despite rumors and fears, no backroom bargain was cut at the expense of the US's Lebanese allies.

President Bush himself has been pressed into reassuring Washington's allies. Elliot Abrams and NSC chief Hadley arranged for a meeting between Syrian oppositionists living in the US and President Bush himself. Amar Abdulhamid, one of the Syrian contingent, has written about the Meeting. He describes how Bush "spoke passionately in defense of human rights in Syria and worldwide and revealed in-depth knowledge of developments inside Syria."

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is another March 14er, who believes that Lebanon is being sold down the river by Washington. Without evidence, he posits that King Abdullah's trip to Damascus the week before Annapolis was in reality a fireside sale. Syria is getting back the Golan, he insists, but Bashar hasn't "flipped" yet! What does this mean? Stupid American suckers for Syria. Read his article.

The price of being suckers for Syria

Hussain Abdul-Hussain
11 December 2007

Daily Star

English
(c) 2007 THE DAILY STAR, BEIRUT, LEBANON.

Beirut — The question as to whether Damascus can be made to break its alliance with Iran and alter its ways, as Western and Arab governments have sought of late, has confounded all those answering in the affirmative.

When Lebanon's March 14 coalition recently approved the candidacy for president of army commander General Michel Suleiman, the pro-Iranian Hizbullah displayed reluctance in accepting. This suggested a possible crack between Syria and Iran, because Syria had long been viewed as supportive of Suleiman. Yet Syrian-Iranian divergences might really be more a product of Western wishful thinking than anything else.

Diplomats believe that during his recent visit to Damascus three weeks ago, Jordan's King Abdullah relayed to Syrian President Bashar Assad what he described as a "final offer" for Syria to distance itself from Iran. Abdullah's package reportedly included proposals that Syria would regain control of the occupied Golan Heights and would receive international aid, while the international tribunal to try suspects in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri would be scaled down.

In return, Damascus would have to ratify a peace treaty with Israel, cease its intervention in Lebanese affairs, end its ties with Iran, and cut off Iran's proxy groups, particularly Hizbullah and Hamas.

The idea was that if Assad walked in the footsteps of Libyan dictator Moammar Gadhafi, he would end his country's isolation and rejoin the international community as a full partner. Alternatively, if Assad refused the offer, he would have to endure more international opprobrium and be abandoned to his alliance with an increasingly isolated Tehran.

The assumptions behind such a scheme jar with what we already know about Syria and its behavior in the past. The Syrian regime has never taken one side or another when asked to do so, and this is particularly true of its relationship with Iran. For example, recently Damascus sent Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad to Annapolis for the conference on Middle East peace. Yet only days earlier, Foreign Minister Walid Moallem had flown to Tehran to explain to the Iranians his country's perspective on the gathering, which Assad had depicted as a likely failure.

Damascus wants to have the cake and eat it too. It wants the Hariri tribunal scaled down and its international isolation ended. At the same time, the Syrian regime wants to maintain its links to Hizbullah, preserve its ties to an Iran that has bought off Syria's debt to Russia, and re-impose its hegemony over Lebanon. No matter how much international aid Syria receives, this would never sweeten Syria's financial pot as did its control over Lebanon before 2005, the year its army withdrew from the country.

The Syrian regime also believes that if the international community is not willing to give Syria all it wants now, it might be willing to do so in the future. Damascus feels it has plenty of time to wait for the balance of power to change in a way that all its demands are eventually answered.

Now that the Annapolis conference is over, the Syrian regime can pretend that it has actually taken Abdullah's offer. However, once the United States sends its ambassador back to Damascus and the international community scales down the Hariri tribunal, Syria would only ask for more. Among these demands is the restoration of its influence over Lebanon. As time goes by, Damascus would find excuses to reestablish its links to Tehran – assuming it severed them at all. In no time, Syria would have reneged on all its commitments, while the regime would have raked in all the benefits the international community had to offer.

Some history might be useful here. After the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in summer 1982, Syrian troops were forced to withdraw from Beirut. Five years later, however, Damascus managed to send its forces back into West Beirut not only to restore civil peace after Amal and Hizbullah had fought a bloody conflict in the capital's southern suburbs, but also supposedly to help release Western hostages. Washington approved the return. Between 1982 and 1987 circumstances had changed, yet the Syrian regime stood its ground and heightened its chances for a comeback. It succeeded.

There is no guarantee this won't happen again. In early 2008 there will be a new administration in Washington and international circumstances will have probably changed. The recent release of a US National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear program has the potential to substantially alter American calculations in the Middle East, which could offer Syria greater room to maneuver. Nothing guarantees that Damascus won't try to take advantage of the new situation in order to return in some way to Lebanon and take the country back to where it was before the Cedar Revolution. The world should be aware that this is the real Syrian game.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a journalist based in Washington. He wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.

Arrests of Damascus Declaration for Democratic Change Conference Participants

This note came from Damascus today. 

Syrian authorities began an arrest campaign yesterday evening among participants of a conference held a few days ago by the Damascus Declaration for Democratic Change.  Some were arrested after begin summoned to branches of the security service while others were taken from their homes.  While some were released shortly after questioning, the latest figures indicate that at least 18 are still in custody, including Najati Tayar, Muafaq Nairabia, Gazi Qador, Osama Ashor, Radeef Mustafa, Peer Rustom and others.

all the best

SHRIL

Syriatel and Turkcell Courting

It is hard to tell what the potential sale of a majority stake in Syriatel to Turkcell means. For some it may have important symbolic implications. It suggests that Rami Makhlouf, the majority owner of Syriatel and cousin of the president, may be taking a lower profile in Syria's economy.

This is not the first time that he has appeared to give up a high profile position. At the end of 2005, he left for the Arab Emirates for a spell. It was rumored at the time that he was being "banished" in order to reassure Syrian businessman and foreign investors that the president was policing economic fairness and didn't want family members to play such a dominant role in the economy. This turned out to be little more than a month long vacation.

Some suggest that Rami M. may want to take capital out of Syriatel in order to start something new. We don't know. 

Syriatel, Syria’s largest private corporation, to change hands

10 December 2007 from The Syria Report

Syriatel, Syria’s largest private corporation, is about to be sold by its main shareholder, Mr Rami Makhlouf. Earlier today, Turkcell, one of Turkey’s three operators of a mobile phone network filed a public notice with the Istanbul Stock Exchange to notify that it was finalizing documents to bid for at least 51 percent of the shares of Syriatel Mobile Telecom, giving it a controlling stake in the larger of the two GSM operators in Syria. Turkcell did not provide any information on its potential final stake in the company or on the value of the deal.

Turkcell is a joint-venture between Sonera Holding B.V., a Scandinavian GSM operator, and Turkish investors. As The Syria Report went to press, Syriatel’s management was not available for comment. It is not clear how far the two parties have gone in discussions related to the sale or if any other GSM company is putting forward another bid. If the deal goes forward, it would be the second Syrian mobile phone company that changes hand within a year. Late last year, Areeba Syria was sold to MTN, a South-African mobile phone operator, within a broader deal involving the sale of all the shares of Investcom, the mother company of Areeba, by its shareholders, the Mikati family from Lebanon…. 

By Seda Sezer
     Dec. 10 (Bloomberg) — Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri AS, Turkey's biggest mobile-phone company, plans to bid for a majority stake in Syrian cellular operator Syriatel. 
 Turkcell will make an offer for at least 51 percent of Syriatel Mobile Telecom, according to a filing with the Istanbul Stock Exchange today, which didn't give further details. Turkcell has said it plans to expand in regional countries. It has a unit in Ukraine, owns stakes in other Central Asian networks, and made unsuccessful attempts to buy companies in Iran and Greece.
.

Turkcell Interested in Bidding for Stake in Syriatel Mobile
Shardul Shrimani
10 December 2007
English
Copyright 2007, Global Insight Limited. All Rights Reserved.

SyriaTel is owned by Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf, and has been offering GSM services in Syria since 2001. SyriaTel has 3.47 million customers and a 55% market share in Syria. The country has a slightly lower mobile penetration compared to other operators in the region, currently standing at 33%, according to MTN, which is SyriaTel's only mobile competitor and has the highest growth potential after seeing a rise in subscribers from 1.5 million to 2.2 million at the end of 2006. ARPU levels in the country are between US$17 and US$20, but have remained relatively stable over the last few years.

Turkcell has been interested in snapping up Middle Eastern licences and stakes in operators for some time. However, the operator has expressed pessimistic views on obtaining licences in countries where larger mobile operators are more dominant. Within the Middle East, Turkcell was unsuccessful in bidding for the third Kuwaiti licence, which was recently won by STC, and also lost out on an Iraqi mobile licence this year, which saw Korek, the small Iraqi operator, win and then partner with existing player Orascom (see Kuwait: 26 November 2007: and Iraq: 17 August 2007: ). Although the operator lost in Iraq, the territory is still classed as a high-risk investment region.

Outlook and Implications

There are very few Middle Eastern mobile licences available now, as heavy liberalisation over the past few years has greatly limited the investment opportunities in the region. Last month, Kuwait offered a third mobile licence to STC, leaving Qatar, which has the final mobile monopoly in the region and is expected to award a second licence by the first quarter of next year. Even then, this could be the last available licence for 2008. Turkcell has not got the investment powers of dominant mobile operators in the Middle East, such as Etisalat and MTC, and a stake in a smaller operator would give the company a much better chance of investing in the region.

Turkcell's investment in SyriaTel will greatly benefit both operators. Turkcell has the highest market share in Turkey, but is facing competition from Vodafone and Avea, and will suffer further when mobile number portability is implemented by the regulator. The duopolistic mobile market in Syria provides Turkcell with the ideal opportunity to enter the market. Both MTN Syria and SyriaTel are in trials for 3G, and a full service launch could be as early as the first half of 2008.

While the country has all the characteristics of high-growth potential, the government has indicated in the past that it may introduce a third mobile operator. This was originally indicated early in 2007, and there have been no further developments as yet, but SyriaTel must build on its market-leading position before a third operator enters the market (see Syria: 8 September 2005: ). 

Iraq Wants US to Engage with Syria and Iran. Facebook Minister Soaped

Iraqi security adviser tells US to engage with Iran and Syria
By Roula Khalaf in Manama, Bahrain
December 10 2007: The Financial Times Limited 2007

Iran and Syria have taken measures to curb violence in Iraq, a senior Iraqi official said yesterday in a rare acknowledgement of a shift in tactics by the two allegedly troublesome neighbours.

Mowaffak al-Rubbaie, Iraq's national security adviser, also called on Washington to engage with both Damascus and Tehran, warning that security in the Gulf was interlinked and "you cannot stabilise Iraq and destabilise Iran".

Speaking at a conference in Bahrain, Mr Rubbaie sought to assuage fears that Iraq faced the threat of falling under Iranian dominance, saying that Baghdad was working on a long-term strategic agreement with the US that would underline its outlook towards the west.

Mr Rubbaie pointed to signs that Tehran had tightened control over its border and made arms shipments to Shia militias "more difficult". Syria too, he said, was stopping militants from crossing the border with Iraq and had improved controls at Damascus airport.

American military officials confirmed that the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq through Syria had been substantially reduced. But Admiral William Fallon, commander of the US central command, told the FT that he did not see "such a clear change" in Iranian behaviour, which the US alleges includes supplying Iraqi Shia militias with sophisticated explosives, charges that Tehran denies.

"I believe there's some restraint in the activity of the extremist militias but I don't know the cause and effect," said Admiral Fallon.

However, in a veiled criticism of perceived US efforts to build a Sunni Arab front against Shia Iran, Mr Rubbaie yesterday said his country was becoming a stage where Iran and Saudi Arabia were playing out their rivalry.

"Until they [the US] engage with Iran and Syria, long-term regional security will be in doubt," he said. "We cannot continue playing on Tehran and co. versus Riyadh and co."

But senior American officials attending the conference, organised by London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, showed no sign of an easing in US policy towards Iran, and were instead seeking to limit the damage provoked by last week's US intelligence report, which said Tehran had halted its atomic weapons programme in 2003.

The National Intelligence Estimate baffled America's European and Middle Eastern allies and is likely to complicate the US-led drive to drum up international support for a tightening of UN sanctions against Iran.

In an apparent effort to reassure supporters of diplomatic pressure, Robert Gates, the US secretary of state, struck an unusually tough tone on Saturday, accusing Iran of provoking instability in the region.

"There can be little doubt that their destabilising foreign policies are a threat to the interests of the US, to the interests of every country in the Middle East, and to the interests of all countries within the range of the ballistic missiles Iran is developing," he said.

He stressed that the National Intelligence Estimate also said Iran was keeping its options open and could resume its nuclear weapons programme at any time – "if it has not done so already".

The Arab world has reacted to the NIE with a mixture of relief that the prospects of military action against Iran have diminished, if not disappeared, and concern that diplomatic pressure will now also ease, boosting Tehran's confidence.

But the intelligence report also revived favourite conspiracy theories, including long-standing Arab concerns that the US was paving the way for a comprehensive deal with Iran that would be struck at the Arabs' expense.

.
"Syria sees isolation fading after Annapolis" is a good Reuters article by Alistair Lyon. (Read it in Arabic …[???? ??????] )

Syria … is emerging from Western and Arab ostracism without sacrificing its anti-Israeli alliance with Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas.

No one expects a dramatic warming of U.S.-Syrian ties, but Syrian analysts and Western diplomats spoke of modest prospects for constructive engagement after years of mutual mistrust….

"Syria is rising now and the United States is collapsing in the region," said Imad al-Shuaibi, a Syrian political analyst familiar with government thinking. He dismissed the idea that a U.N. tribunal to try Hariri's killers posed any threat to Syria.

Syria is now looking to improve ties with Saudi Arabia and other U.S.-backed Arab countries before an Arab League summit in Damascus in March, without dropping Iran and its other allies.

"After Annapolis, we hope we are entering a new phase," a European diplomat said. "Syria's overall behavior on Annapolis and Lebanon shows it is trying to reintegrate itself in the Arab family and play things in a way that would benefit the region."…

better ties with Baghdad go down well in Washington and could further reduce U.S.-Syrian tensions. Such a detente would have repercussions across the region. But any notion that Syria can easily be "flipped" away from Tehran is premature.

"No one should imagine that Syria will get rid of its relationship with Iran and Hezbollah," Shuaibi declared.

Iran signs $2bn oil deal with China Dec-09 (Only a week ago China said it would join sanctions on Iran.)

Iran has signed a $2bn oil contract with Sinopec of China, sending a signal to western companies that they might miss out on potentially lucrative contracts if they continued to heed US-inspired sanctions against Tehran –

Assad fires official who barred Facebook

Syrian President Bashar Assad on Saturday replaced Syria's communications and religious affairs ministers, the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency reported.

Assad issued a decree naming Imad Abdul-Ghani Sabbouni as minister of communications, replacing Amr Nazir Salem. Sabbouni had been Salem's advise.

Local Syrian Web sites in recent months had been critical of Salem, who had been nominated to the post in February 2006, for blocking some Web sites including www.all4syria.org and the Arab online newspaper www.elaph.com as well as online social networking site Facebook.

Recent reports have said that Syrian authorities blocked Facebook, the popular Internet hangout, over what seems to be fears of Israeli "infiltration" of Syrian social networks on the Net.

Residents in Damascus said that they have not been able to enter Facebook for more than two weeks. An Associated Press reporter got a blank page when he tried to open the Facebook web page Friday from the Syrian capital.

Syrian officials were not available for comment Friday because of the Muslim weekend, but some reports have suggested that the ban was made to prevent Israeli users from infiltrating Syrian social networks.

Lebanon's daily As-Safir reported that Facebook was blocked on November 18. It said the authorities took the step because many Israelis have been entering Syria-based groups.

Here is the WSJournal's editorial on the Iran NIE

Iran Curveball
This latest intelligence fiasco is Mr. Bush's fault.

Saturday, December 8, 2007 12:01 a.m.

President Bush has been scrambling to rescue his Iran policy after this week's intelligence switcheroo, but the fact that the White House has had to spin so furiously is a sign of how badly it has bungled this episode. In sum, Mr. Bush and his staff have allowed the intelligence bureaucracy to frame a new judgment in a way that has undermined four years of U.S. effort to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions….

The Chinese are backing away from whatever support they might have provided for tougher sanctions against Iran, while Russia has used the NIE as another reason to oppose them. Most delighted are the Iranians, who called the NIE a "victory" and reasserted their intention to proceed full-speed ahead with uranium enrichment. Behind the scenes, we can expect Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to expand their nuclear efforts as they conclude that the U.S. will now be unable to stop Iran from getting the bomb.

We reported earlier this week that the authors of this Iran NIE include former State Department officials who have a history of hostility to Mr. Bush's foreign policy. But the ultimate responsibility for this fiasco lies with Mr. Bush. Too often he has appointed, or tolerated, officials who oppose his agenda, and failed to discipline them even when they have worked against his policies. Instead of being candid this week about the problems with the NIE, Mr. Bush and his National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, tried to spin it as a victory for their policy. They simply weren't believable.

It's a sign of the Bush Administration's flagging authority that even many of its natural allies wondered this week if the NIE was really an attempt to back down from its own Iran policy. We only wish it were that competent.

Bush Engages for Foes as Syrians Make a Come Back

Two new articles by Solomon and Moubayed chart the about-face in Bush foreign policy, which promises to be much more productive than the old slash and burn strategy.

Bush Engages Foreign Foes
As Policy Shift Accelerates
Direct Talks With Iran?

By JAY SOLOMON
December 7, 2007; Page A9

WASHINGTON — The White House said that President Bush sent a letter directly to North Korean leader Kim Jong Il seeking cooperation in implementing a pact to dismantle its nuclear arms in exchange for full normalized relations.

The move is the latest example of the White House accelerating its reversal on numerous foreign-policy fronts.

ABOUT-FACE

•  The News: President Bush sent a letter to Kim Jong Il asking him to dismantle North Korea's nuclear programs.
•  The Context: The letter comes as the White House is also reversing course on hardline policies in several other places, including Syria and Lebanon.
•  What's Next: Some diplomats hope talks with Iranian President Ahmadinejad could be next.

Earlier in his presidency, Mr. Bush designated Pyongyang a member of an "axis of evil" and expressed loathing for the communist state's dictator. In recent months, however, contacts have picked up amid an accord on dismantling Pyongyang's nuclear program.

On other fronts — particularly Iran, Syria and Lebanon — the Bush administration is also shifting tactics in ways that could affect American interests long-term, say U.S. officials and foreign policy analysts. President Bush is generally receiving praise for engaging Pyongyang and Damascus, but he is also risking alienating the Republican Party's conservative wing, which believes the U-turns will undermine U.S. standing around the world.

"Our foreign policy is in free-fall at the moment," said John Bolton, Mr. Bush's former ambassador to the United Nations and an ally of Vice President Dick Cheney. Mr. Bolton argues that engaging dictators will only "diminish our prestige and influence."

[George Bush]

The release this week of a U.S. intelligence report playing down the threat posed by Iran's atomic energy program is already undercutting President Bush's high-profile campaign to pressure Tehran into suspending its nuclear activities. Mr. Bush used financial sanctions and the threat of force, and a growing number of foreign diplomats now say it will be increasingly difficult for Washington to push a new round of economic sanctions through the United Nations.

The National Intelligence Estimate concluded that Iran froze its nuclear-weapons program in 2003, though it continues to aggressively enrich uranium to produce nuclear fuel.

Both conservative and liberal pundits see the report as so weakening the White House that the U.S. may have no option but to more aggressively seek direct talks with Iran. Even some U.S. diplomats are seizing on the hope that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could use the intelligence report to open up talks with the West.

"If they want to pursue our offers to negotiate, they now have the perfect face-saver," said a U.S. official.

In addition to the report on Iran, Washington's sudden opening to Syria and President Bashar Assad has also stunned many diplomats and foreign-policy analysts. For most of the past six years, the White House viewed Damascus as among its most intractable foes in the Middle East, charging it with supporting militant groups fighting in Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. Many U.S. officials also believe Damascus was directly involved in the 2005 murder of Lebanon's former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, a charge Syria denies.

[Kim Jong Il]

In recent weeks, though, the U.S. has displayed a growing willingness to talk with Syrian leaders. Damascus's Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad addressed the Annapolis peace summit last month, just weeks after it was uncertain that the State Department would even invite the Syrians. And U.S. officials say they are considering backing a Russian initiative to promote direct peace talks between the Syrians and the Israelis.

Pentagon and State Department officials say their optimism toward Syria has been driven by a lessening of the number of foreign fighters being allowed to cross into Iraq from Syria. They also say they hope Mr. Assad can be constructive in helping Lebanon elect a new president after a yearlong political crisis in Beirut.

Still, there are fears that any U.S. engagement with Syria could ultimately cost Lebanon's pro-Western government. In recent days, the Bush administration has indicated it would accept a Lebanese general as president who has longstanding ties to Mr. Assad's regime. Many Lebanese fear this could restore Syrian influence inside their country, just two years after President Assad withdrew nearly 30,000 Syrian troops.

The most pronounced reversal of policy between Mr. Bush's first and second terms involves North Korea. After eschewing any direct talks, the State Department is now regularly sending envoys to Pyongyang and is even promoting a performance by the New York Philharmonic there early next year. Mr. Bush was also encouraged by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to directly contact Mr. Kim through the letter.

In his letter to Mr. Kim, President Bush wrote: "I want to emphasize that the declaration must be complete and accurate if we are to continue our progress," according to an excerpt of the Dec. 1 letter reviewed by the Associated Press.

The payoff has been a nuclear accord among the U.S., North Korea and four other parties that calls for dismantling Pyongyang's nuclear-weapons program by next year. There's also hope that Washington could sign a peace agreement with North Korea, China and South Korea, formally ending the 1950-53 Korean War.

"The Syrians are Back," by Sami Moubayed is a must read for an excellent history of the thaw in US-Syrian relations.

"friday-lunch-club"  explains that "The US is 'quietly' supporting a UNDP program to supply Syria with sophisticated surveillance equipment + computers to monitor borders"

Lebanon, Iran & US

Top of the Agenda: Lebanon Stability Fears
Council on Foreign Relation's summary
December 6, 2007

Lebanon

Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have also held talks with the Syrian leader about Lebanon, where the majority and pro-Syrian opposition are trying to agree on changes to the constitution and a consensus candidate for president.

The presidency has been vacant since November 24 following the end of the mandate of pro-Syrian head of state Emile Lahoud.

On Friday, a parliamentary session to elect a president was postponed for the seventh time, with a new date set for next Tuesday.(AFP-Naharnet)

Washington's reliance on reviving the Middle East peace process as the linchpin of its strategy to contain Iran is also problematic. Bush administration officials are assuming that resumed diplomacy between Israel and its neighbors will assuage the Arab street, rally Arab governments behind the United States, and lay the groundwork for a united Arab-Israeli front against Iran. But this hope disregards the fact that in their current state, Palestinian and Israeli politics will not support the types of compromises necessary for a credible breakthrough. Both Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas are too weak to press their constituencies toward the painful concessions that a viable peace compact would require. The expectations of Arab leaders far exceed those of Israel and the United States: while they have been openly demanding final-status negotiations, Secretary Rice has been talking only about creating momentum toward peace.

Even if the peace process can be successfully relaunched, the notion that Arabs see the rise of Iran as a bigger problem than the decades-old Arab-Israeli conflict is misplaced. After years of enmity, the Arab masses and Arab opinion-makers continue to perceive Israel as a more acute threat. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad understands this well: he has been raising the heat on the Palestinian issue precisely because he wants to make headway among the Arab people and understands that they do not share the anti-Iranian sentiment of their governments. Along with his inflammatory denunciations of Israel and Tehran's assistance to Hamas and Hezbollah, Ahmadinejad's embrace of an Arab cause has garnered him ample support among the rank and file. In fact, Tehran enjoys significant soft power in the Middle East today. Washington assumes that its proposals regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process will redirect everyone's worries toward Iran; Tehran believes that current efforts will not satiate Arab demands. A careful reading of the region's mood reveals that Iran is on firmer ground than the United States.

Indeed, it is not the Palestinian issue that will decide the balance of power in the Middle East but the fate of the failing states of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon, where Iranian influence has found ample room to expand. The Palestinian issue remains important to Israel's security, stability in the Levant, and the United States' image and prestige. It is also a catalyst for regional rivalries. But the Palestinian issue is not the original cause of those regional contests, nor will it decide their outcome. For all its worrying about Iran's growing power, Washington has failed to appreciate that the center of gravity in the Middle East has indeed shifted from the Levant to the Persian Gulf. It is now more likely that peace and stability in the Persian Gulf would bring peace and stability to the Levant than the other way around….

The last time the United States rallied the Arab world to contain Iran, in the 1980s, Americans ended up with a radicalized Sunni political culture that eventually yielded al Qaeda. The results may be as bad this time around: a containment policy will only help erect Sunni extremism as an ideological barrier to Shiite Iran, much as Saudi Arabia's rivalry with Iran in the 1980s played out in South Asia and much as radical Salafis mobilized to offset Hezbollah's soaring popularity after the Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006. During the Cold War, confronting communism meant promoting capitalism and democracy. Containing Iran today would mean promoting Sunni extremism — a self-defeating proposition for Washington….

But envisioning that a grand U.S.-Arab-Israeli alliance can contain Iran will sink Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon into greater chaos; inflame Islamic radicalism; and commit the United States to a lengthy and costly presence in the Middle East.

A NEW ORDER

Instead of focusing on restoring a former balance of power, the United States would be wise to aim for regional integration and foster a new framework in which all the relevant powers would have a stake in a stable status quo. The Bush administration is correct to sense that a truculent Iran poses serious challenges to U.S. concerns, but containing Iran through military deployment and antagonistic alliances simply is not a tenable strategy. Iran is not, despite common depictions, a messianic power determined to overturn the regional order in the name of Islamic militancy; it is an unexceptionally opportunistic state seeking to assert predominance in its immediate neighborhood. Thus, the task at hand for Washington is to create a situation in which Iran will find benefit in limiting its ambitions and in abiding by international norms.

Dialogue, compromise, and commerce, as difficult as they may be, are convincing means. An acknowledgment by the U.S. government that Tehran does indeed have legitimate interests and concerns in Iraq could get the two governments finally to realize that they have similar objectives: both want to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq and prevent the civil war there from engulfing the Middle East. Resuming diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and the United States, as well as collaborating on Iraq, could also be the precursor of an eventual arrangement subjecting Iran's nuclear program to its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. If Iran enjoyed favorable security and commercial ties with the United States and was at ease in its region, it might restrain its nuclear ambitions.

Electronic Iraq
AFP – Iraq's government acknowledged Tuesday that it cannot handle a massive return of refugees, as the UN announced a $11 million relief package …

Petraeus Has Rare Praise for Syria, Not Sure About Iran

Voice of America
International Herald Tribune
Jordan Buys 50000 tons of Wheat from Syria with Preferable Prices (This seems to be the price King Abdullah received from his visit to Damascus to ask Asad to go to Annapolis) Jordan News Agency (Petra)

“Landis: Syria Key to Middle East Peace Process,” CFR Interview with Gwertzman

Landis: Syria Key to Middle East Peace Process
Council on Foreign Relations – New York, NY,USA

Interviewer:
Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor

December 5, 2007

Joshua Landis Let’s start with the Annapolis Middle East peace conference last week. I think many people were surprised that Syria showed up, albeit with a deputy foreign minister instead of a foreign minister. How did this happen?

Syria was wooed. There was intense diplomacy prior to Syria’s accepting. The prime minister of Turkey, Recip Tayyip Erdogan, apparently called the Syrian President Bashar Assad four times. The Saudis called him as well. King Abdullah of Jordan visited him. It was the first time he’d done that in years, and he was very solicitous. Various European foreign ministers visited Lebanon and they talked to the Syrians. Everybody was pushing the Syrians to come.

Why?

Because this is a turning point and Syria is key to the peace process. If you keep the door closed on Syria, many people believe the peace process can go nowhere. The Saudis did not want to come and genuflect to the whole peace process if the Syrians were not along, because they needed Arab nationalist cover. And there were two agendas going on here: One agenda was to push the peace process forward and try to get the Bush administration committed to it in a serious way. The other factor on the agenda was to create some sort of Arab community in order to isolate Iran and raise the pressure on Iran, because I think it’s widely understood that the only way you’re going to isolate Iran in the future is to repair the deep schisms and divisions between Arab states—and this schism is primarily between Syria and Saudi Arabia, because Iran’s reach into the Arab world, and its influence, is largely through Syria. Of course it’s through Iraq as well, but we can’t do much about Iraq. The idea of flipping Syria has been on everybody’s lips. If you can draw Syria away from Iran and back towards Saudi Arabia, then arms cannot get to Hezbollah in Lebanon because they go through Syria from Iran. Hamas, in Palestine, also would become much more isolated than it is now. It would have no support within the Arab world.

What actually happened at the conference? Did Syria say much?

They did not say much. They were very quiet, and they were jubilant. What happened at the conference was that, evidently, the Lebanese delegation was blindsided by the announcement that Michel Sulieman, chief of staff of the Lebanese Army, was being put forward as a compromise choice for that country’s new president. This was seen largely, and by the Lebanese delegation, as a victory for Syria and the opposition, Hezbollah, and a defeat for the March 14th group [an anti-Syrian political coalition set up in the wake of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the former prime minister of Lebanon in 2005]—and for America, which had insisted that there should be no amendments to the Lebanese constitution and that the democratic process should carry forward according to law. In order to have the chief of staff become president, there needs to be an amendment to the constitution, because it is currently illegal.

What’s your opinion? Do you think this is a great defeat for March 14th, or is it a good compromise?

I think it’s an excellent compromise for Lebanon, and I think that many people, even within March 14th, felt that this is the best way forward for Lebanon. Unfortunately, because of the ideological divisions between America and Iran, because of the terrible bad blood between the opposition and the majority, everything is seen in terms of defeat and victory. Unfortunately, that’s where we stand, and it’s not clear that Michel Sulieman will come through this whole process, because there are many jealousies and there is a lot of anger in Lebanon.

So even though France and Egypt, who seem to be the main architects of this compromise, went up to the Lebanese delegation during Annapolis and said, “Congratulations on your new President,” and the March 14th group said, “Yes we will accept this,” it’s not clear that even the opposition had agreed. Because General Michel Aoun [a pro-Syrian Maronite Christian], who wanted to be president, is balking at this. He wants further compromise. There’s still a lot of factualism.

It’s not a deal?

It’s not a done deal. It’s just that France, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the outside powers all support it.

I thought Aoun had said he backed it.

Well he’s now saying he would back it, but he said “Yes, but I want to guarantee that I have a position…” There’s a long list of things he wants. And, you know, everybody’s trying to get their last-minute extra. There’s a lot more haggling in Beirut. In a sense, though, this seems to be a major victory for Bashar Assad, because, two years ago, everybody was saying, “He’s on his last leg, he’s weak, and his regime is shuddering, it may fall.”

Syria is key to the peace process. If you keep the door closed on Syria, many people believe the peace process can go nowhere.

The Syrian opposition said, “We’re going to be in Damascus in six months.” The Syrians were anxious. Today, there is no anxiety about this. Now, what do you do with this? A diplomatic victory only takes you so far, and Syria is a poor country, a weak country.  It’s got to turn this upswing into money and a chicken in every Syrian’s pot. The economic question is the big question going forward: can this government carry out economic reforms and really drag Syria into the globalized world?

It would seem to me, as a non-Syrian expert, that a peace agreement with Israel would be the highest priority, because that would open up Syria to outside investments.

It would. That’s what’s dividing Syria from Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia essentially wants to team up with Israel against Iran. That undermines Syria’s position. The more the Arab world forgets about the Palestinians and the Arab-Israeli conflict and teams up with Israel, the less Israel has to care about making peace with Syria, and the less leverage Syria has to get back the Golan heights. So Syria has to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict alive—with Hezbollah, Lebanon, Hamas, or with any proxy it can, because Syria does not have the capability to hurt Israel militarily.

Now let’s talk a bit about the Golan Heights. Back in 2000, Israel and Syria were excruciatingly close to a peace agreement. Can it be revived?

The problem is that Syria is weaker than it was then. You know everyone argues about whether the war in the summer of 2006 was really a win for Hezbollah or a win for Israel. And, in the long-run, although in the short-term it seemed to be a win for Hezbollah, in the long-term Israel has made considerable gains.

What Syria has done is announce that it is willing to bargain. It’s not going to stick with Iran against the United States, come hell or high water.

Hezbollah has had its ears pinned back. It’s now about twelve miles away from the Israeli border, and even though it’s trying to rearm and so forth, it’s not clear that Hezbollah would want to or can carry out another confrontation with Israel.

Israel frightened Hezbollah and set them back, and this was a lesson to Syria. Israel in September carried out this air raid on Syria [against a suspected nuclear plant] without any repercussions, seemingly. It’s very clear that Syria does not have the kind of military option it had before through proxies, when Hamas seemed to be victorious in the occupied territories, and Hezbollah was the greatest power in Lebanon.

You know, it’s interesting, because there’s been a lot of speculation that, because the Palestinians are so divided, with two different Palestinian governments, that it would be easier for Israel to negotiate a deal with Syria.

The trouble is that Syria is too weak.

You mean it can’t give up a strip of land?

Yes, but it’s too weak in a sense that all the Israelis I talk to say, “Syria’s asking too much for the Golan.” In other words, they want too much. They have to make some major concessions. And, most recently, we’ve seen a number of Israeli politicians say, “Well, let’s have a hundred-year lease for the Golan.” That seems to be the starting point for an Israeli negotiation: Let’s roll back to where we were in 2000.” A lease evokes a very different sort of relationship, and this is what the Israelis are putting forward, so it means the Syrians have to negotiate back from this kind of idea. And they, of course, want everything according to international law.

I see. So the Syrians want what the Egyptians got in the 1979 peace treaty with Israel—the return of all the occupied land in the Sinai?

They want everything. They say, “Let’s follow the line, let’s follow international law.” And, even there, international law is a little bit ambiguous, because there are several different lines. There’s the 1923 line, there’s the 1967 armistice line, and they want the one that is the most favorable to them, which is 1967.

Okay, so in your view the likelihood of any negotiations starting is what, slim?

Well for official negotiations, I think it is fairly slim. But on the other hand, everybody wants to keep the door open for a number of reasons. Israel wants the peace process, and not necessarily peace. I know this is the phrase Israel usually uses against the Syrians, but in this case I think it’s been reversed.

Why do they want the process? For two major reasons: One, it means that Hezbollah will stay down in the farm, because as long as Syria is trying to woo Israel, it’s going to put the brakes on any activity from Hezbollah. Secondly, Israel can carry out negotiations with the Palestinians more easily, so long as Syria is being sweet. Because they can always threaten the Palestinians: “Well, if you don’t make a deal with us, we’ll just go off and make a deal with the Syrians and you’ll be totally isolated and we’ll kick you around. We’ll put more pressure on you.” It’s a much better negotiating position for the Israelis, to have both countries.

What does this mean in terms of the Syrian-Iranian relationship?

What Syria has done is announce that it is willing to bargain. It’s not going to stick with Iran against theUnited States, come hell or high water. Over a year ago, Bashar Assad had said if the Golan is on the table, he would put relationships with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas on the table. Everything is on the table. By coming to Annapolis, he upset the Iranians. He upset the Palestinians.

Maybe the NIE Is Not So Good for Syria?

Here are a number of interesting comments on the NIE, which downgraded the Iranian threat

EHSANI2 said:

Since it was me that made the comment that “Syria stands to reap the benefits in a most spectacular fashion”, I think that I owe some of the readers a more detailed explanation.

During Bush’s press conference, he admitted that he first knew about the NIE report one week ago. We will never know of course whether he was blindsided or whether he was the architect behind the report. As many people know, The U.S. was already pushing for a third round of U.N. sanctions against Iran. Just two days earlier than the report came out, Undersecretary of State Burns met in Paris with British, French, Russian, Chinese and German counterparts to seek support for a new Security Council resolution. Now that the report is made public, diplomats seem to think that the findings may cripple U.S. attempts to win that third round of sanction. Given the above, it is more logical to assume that the White House was indeed blindsided rather than being the architect of the report.

Let us now go back to Syria.

Atassi makes a very good point when he argues that the elimination of the nuclear capability of Iran may actually harm Syria rather than help it in so far as its main patron is not the nuclear power it thought it was hiding behind. Moreover, hawks within the White House are unlikely to dramatically alter their strategy towards Iran as of yet. Indeed, Bush tried to offer a picture of nothing-has-changed during the conference.

While this is all true, it is also a fact that the political landscape in the U.S. has changed dramatically since. One only needs to watch the Democratic candidates debate the matter. Senator Clinton now finds herself facing heavy criticism for supporting a Senate resolution that her rivals said encouraged “saber-rattling rhetoric” from President Bush towards Iran.

Syria’s leadership has long felt that the hawks within the U.S. Administration want to weaken Syria to the point of pushing it to “sell out” to Israel and/or to go for a regime change altogether.
Not surprisingly, Damascus has tried to design its own master plan that would unsettle this train that it sees coming at her. Set below is a summary of what I think its plan entailed:

1- Do everything possible to slow down the Americans in Iraq.
2- Build on the existing relationship with Iran to help its weak military position
3- Design an improved alliance with powerful and Sunni Turkey.
4- Insure that Lebanon does not fall under the U.S. umbrella and that Hezbollah is not disarmed.
5- Cushion the negative impact of the sanctions by encouraging foreign investments.

I am sure that the above list is not conclusive and that one can think of other parts to the strategy.

The recent events in Lebanon, Annapolis and the NIE report cannot but leave one with the impression that Syria’s leadership has indeed passed this test in a “spectacular” fashion.

Where Syria continues to face enormous challenges, however, is to do with the performance of its economy and future energy needs.

According to the Al-Khaleej newspaper, a recently presented report shows that Syria had witnessed an average 2.9% economic growth rate in 2006. The report related this low growth to declining performance by the sectors of petroleum and agriculture.

This morning we learn that Iraq and Syria are planning to bold a pipeline before 2010 that will feed Syrian power plants with Iraqi natural gas. According to the Syrian oil minister, the country is struggling to cope with rising electricity consumption. Plans are underway to bring gas from Iran and Egypt too.

Recently, Mr. Dardari has admitted that close to $30 billion of investments are needed before the country can expand its economy at levels that keep being promised by the economic cabinet.

While Syria may have won the last political battle (not whole war), it continues to face formidable challenges from its economy and population demographics. The political tension with the west has impeded the country’s effort to attract investments in oil and gas exploration as well as many other industries. Its proven reserves of 3.2 billion barrels are expected to last about 10 years according to energy experts.

For Syria to truly feel confident about its future, not only better relations with the west and its Arab neighbors is required but a strategic rethinking of its economic policies is also needed. For the country to attract the huge investments needed, a confident and dramatic turn to capitalism and open markets is required.

Observer wrote (Written before Ehsani's comment): 

The latest NIE is a bombshell that Bush has been sitting on since Wed. It essentially excludes the use of force in the coming year. What does this mean:
a) Annapolis is a fiasco on the Palestinian Israeli side as Olmert has already dampened expectations.
b) Olmert will lose the coalition partners if he makes too big concessions
c) the “moderate” Arabs got screwed as Bush did not share this info with them ahead of time
d) the pretext to attack Iran is gone they will have to deal with the regime
e) Ahmadinejad has clearly dominated the GCC meeting with a vision that none of the leaders had. They meet usually to discuss details and avoid big decision making such unpegging the dollar
f) concerted sanctions are out the door as China and Russia will not follow along.
g) Europeans will feel that they were being used to advance the US agenda.
h) Jumblat is eating his words in the interview of his son Timor. (A reader has objected to this linked article as a hoax.) In a way the son asking for a change of leadership in the Druze community may well save his father’s life. This last one is the most telling of the reversal of fortunes of the coalition.

Iran will surely replace the US as a guarantor of the Gulf security and would strike a bargain with the US and Europe to insure that the oil production and flow remain completely open and smooth going. They will also do it exactly in an opposite way to that of the Shah with soft rather than with hard power. I sense that Syria may have become less important to Tehran now but the alliance will remain as neither side is able or willing to part ways.

The current administration is now the “Pretzel” administration as it is contorting itself in various ways to appear as if they had any role in forcing Iran to abandon the weapons program ( if it ever existed ) while at the same time maintaining that Iran remains a threat. Now that the so called surge, the end of the ethnic cleansing locally, and the influence of Iran have resulted in some mode of stability, the urge to withdraw the troops will increase rather than decrease. The US will have not much to show for its adventure except that it is diminished in the world. The great thing about this is that it is not perceived in such a traumatic way as Vietnam did when the images of embassy evacuation were all over the screens and therefore a right wing backlash a la Reagan will not occur soon except of course if there is another terror attack on American soil.

Atassi said:

This intelligent report may possibly be hurting the Syrian regime too.

This report revealed the facts about the none existence of the Shiia N-bomb program. The Syrian regime may have started to realize the fact it was betting on the wrong “Air-full” horse for long term strategic protections shield.

I think Dr. Landis and others are giving too much unearned credit to The regime leaders with its executed and misshaped domestic, regional and international policies.
keep in mind, This current baath regime NEVER delivered any of the Syrians aspirations and we shouldn’t expect it to do so…

Was Bush Behind the Iran Report? (Thanks Alex)
By Robert Baer

Bombing Iran, it seems, is now off the table. There’s no other reasonable take on the latest National Intelligence Estimate that concludes Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

But there is also no doubt that the Bush White House was behind this NIE. While the 16 intelligence agencies that make up the “intelligence community” contribute to each National Intelligence Estimate, you can bet that an explosive, 180-degree turn on Iran like this one was greenlighted by the President.

And explode is what the hawks in and outside the Administration are about to do. They were counting on Bush being the one President prepared to take on Iran. As recently as last month, Bush warned of World War III if Iran so much as thought about building a bomb. Bush’s betrayal is not going to go down well. The neocons, clinging to a sliver of hope, will accuse the intelligence community of incompetence, pointing out that as late as 2005 it estimated “with high confidence” that Iran was building a bomb.

Bush’s National Security Adviser, Stephen Hadley, put the best face on the new report, claiming that it was our diplomacy and saber rattling that forced the Iranians to back down. As for the intelligence community, it explained its reversal by hinting that new intelligence had surfaced.

Neither explanation is entirely accurate. The real story behind this NIE is that the Bush Administration has finally concluded Iran is a bridge too far. With Iranian-backed Shi’a groups behaving themselves, things are looking up in Iraq. In Lebanon, the anti-Syrian coalition and pro-Syrian coalition, which includes Iran’s surrogate Hizballah, reportedly have settled on a compromise candidate, the army commander General Michel Suleiman. Bombing Iran now would upset the fragile balance in these two countries. Not to mention that Hizballah has threatened to shell Israel if we as much as touch a hair on Iran’s head.

Then there are the Gulf Arabs. For the last year and a half, ever since the Bush Administration started to hint that it might hit Iran, they have been sending emissaries to Tehran to assure the Iranians they’re not going to help the United States. But in private, the Gulf Arabs have been reminding Washington that Iran is a rabid dog: Don’t even think about kicking it, the Arabs tell us. If you have to do something, shoot it dead. Which is something the United States can’t do.

So how far is Iran from a nuke? The new NIE says 10 to 15 years, maybe. But that’s a wild guess. The truth is that Iran is a black hole, and it’s entirely conceivable Iran could build a bomb and we wouldn’t know until they tested it.

Yet for now we should at least be happy with the good news: Armageddon is postponed.

Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer assigned to the Middle East, is TIME.com’s intelligence columnist and the author of See No Evil and, most recently, the novel Blow the House Down

swerv21 said: Edit

 

Baer says that the NIE was greenlighted by POTUS.

many of the posters over at Syria Comment are suggesting that, as a result of the NIE, Syria stands to benefit ’spectacularly’. …

my question is this:
if the U.S. intelligence community has now effectively called Iran’s bluff, with WH blessing, what does that do to the value of ‘flipping’ Syria?

if the price of a syrian-israeli peace deal was being negotiated now, id say that the cost to syria just went up significantly. This is especially true when you consider the ‘restoration of isreali deterrance capablity’ we saw a few weeks ago.

the silliest thing that supporters of israel can do right now is to continue to trumpet the ‘iranian’ threat- this just plays into the syrian hand in that it inflates the value of a ‘flip’….

the result of the NIE is that prospects for a syria deal are much lower- barring a dramatic game-changer (for that i’d be looking at huzbullah right now). the isreali price will be too high.

 

Nukeless Nation ‘Not Evil Enough,’ Says Korean Madman (thanks Alex)

One day after a National Intelligence Estimate revealed that Iran halted its nuclear arms program in 2003, North Korean president Kim Jong-Il ejected Iran from the Axis of Evil, calling them “not evil enough.”

A visibly furious Kim called a press conference in Pyongyang today to excoriate the Iranians as “evildoer wannabes” and “pussies.”

“I can’t tell you how many times Mahmoud Ahmadinejad looked me in the eye, told me he was developing nuclear weapons, and cackled like a madman,” Kim said. “That man does not deserve to cackle.”

Kim added that when Iran was admitted into the Axis of Evil in 2002, “they knew the rules: no nukes, no membership.”

The National Intelligence Estimate, Kim said, showed that Iran was not holding up their end of the bargain: “They said they were enriching uranium and all the while they were going all Libya on my ass.”

As for who would take Iran’s place in the Axis of Evil, Kim said there was no shortage of candidates: “Right now we’re looking at Venezuela, Syria, and Rupert Murdoch.”

Elsewhere, natural honey is a more effective remedy for children’s coughs than over-the-counter medicines, according to a study commissioned by the National Association of Bees.

What Does the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran Mean for Syria?

Ehsani writes:

Dr. Landis,

The latest NIE report on Iran is another significant event in the region. Some analysts describe the report as "sensational," and I agree. To underscore the importance of this development, President Bush decided to hold a press conference this morning to discuss the implications of its findings.

While the President tried to project the image that nothing has changed in his Administration’s policy towards Iran, the truth is that this report has dealt the existing policy a severe blow.

During the press conference, Bush admitted that he had learned about the NIE report a week before it became public yesterday.

The dumping of March 14th, the invitation of Syria to Annapolis and that of Iran to the G.C.C conference is a startling dynamic that is sweeping the region.

Syria stands to reap the benefits in a most spectacular fashion

Report May Reset Debate on Iran

Case for Military Strikes
Blunted by View That Work
On Atomic Weapons Ended
By JAY SOLOMON and SIOBHAN GORMAN
December 4, 2007; Page A3

WASHINGTON — A new report from 16 U.S. intelligence agencies concludes that Iran halted its development of atomic weapons in 2003 — a surprising finding likely to shift the debate over Iran's nuclear ambitions both at home and abroad.

The National Intelligence Estimate, demanded by Congress in 2006, could undercut calls from hawks inside the Bush administration — as well as those on the presidential campaign trail — who have urged military strikes to combat Iran's program. U.S. diplomats say it also could undermine Washington's ability to use financial sanctions to pressure Tehran into giving up its long-term pursuit of nuclear technologies, especially if it emboldens Iran's allies such as China and Russia.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: IRAN
[Image]1

"We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran's announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran's previously undeclared nuclear work." Read the full report summary (PDF)2 .

At the same time, the report could pose a challenge to the Iranian regime, which has expanded its strategic influence across the Middle East partly on the back of its nuclear ambitions. Much like Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Tehran has employed belligerence over the nuclear issue to bolster its regional credentials by standing up to the U.S.

The NIE, the consensus view of U.S. intelligence agencies, says Tehran appeared committed to developing a nuclear weapon until 2003. It froze its activities following a mixture of diplomatic pressure and the prospect of U.S. military force and financial sanctions, the report says. The report also says Tehran's decision was driven in part by the exposure in 2002 of some of its covert programs.

"International isolation and international pressure," said one senior intelligence official, "created an atmosphere that clearly led to this decision."

The official said it wasn't clear whether the 2003 invasion of Iraq or other events — including Libya's decision to end its nuclear program and the dissolution of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear-weapons network — influenced Iran's decision.

Regardless of the freeze, the NIE warns that Iran continues to enrich uranium at a rate that could allow it to obtain enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb sometime between 2010 and 2015. Iran continued through this year to install new centrifuge equipment but faced significant technical problems operating it, the report says.

Iran's decision to freeze its nuclear-weapons program took place two years before the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as president. While he has become the face of the country's nuclear ambitions, his ultimate influence over these matters is uncertain, since much power in Iran is held by a council of senior clerics.

•  The News: A report from 16 U.S. intelligence agencies concludes Iran halted its development of atomic weapons in 2003.
•  What It Means: The report could undercut calls for military strikes on Iran, and may undermine Washington's use of financial sanctions to pressure Tehran into giving up its nuclear program.
•  The Warning: The report says Iran continues to enrich uranium at a rate that could allow it to obtain enough fissile material for a nuclear bomb sometime between 2010 and 2015.

The White House sought to play down the significance of the estimate, arguing that its most significant finding was that Iran continues to press ahead with its uranium-enrichment work. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley told reporters the estimate suggests President Bush "has the right strategy" in confronting Iran.

The Bush administration and its Western partners, particularly France and the United Kingdom, have been working in recent months to pass a United Nations resolution penalizing Tehran for its uranium-enrichment work. Now, a number of U.S. officials believe China and Russia, and potentially other countries, will balk at coercive actions, citing the diminished threat.

Last week, talks between Iran's senior nuclear negotiator and the European Union collapsed in acrimony, with the Iranian, Saeed Jalili, bragging about his country's recent advances.

Congress mandated the report in a defense bill last year, and intelligence officials said yesterday it was also a part of their continuing review of their information on Iran. Such a report had already been requested by Senate Democrats earlier that year, and in a May 19, 2006, letter to President Bush, Democratic senators, including Harry Reid, now Senate majority leader, and Carl M. Levin of Michigan, now Senate Armed Services chairman, said the report was needed to "avoid repeating mistakes made in the run-up to the conflict in Iraq."

U.S. intelligence officials said the report was delayed because of the need to gather additional information. This was deemed crucial, these officials said, to avoid a repeat of the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which is widely seen today as having overstated Saddam Hussein's weapons capabilities ahead of the U.S. invasion.

The report's findings diverge from statements made by administration officials as recently as this year, and also from the most recent NIE on Iran, issued in 2005. In February, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell told Congress that "we assess that Tehran seeks to develop nuclear weapons." President Bush in October said that denying Tehran a nuclear capability was central to any international effort to avoid "World War III."

Officials at U.S. spy agencies came to believe after their 2005 report was issued that Iran had suspended its weapons program. The differences between this assessment and the administration's public comments prompted them to make the report public, officials say.

Republican and Democratic presidential front-runners Rudy Giuliani and Hillary Rodham Clinton have cited the Iranian nuclear threat as perhaps America's No. 1 security issue. Both candidates endorsed the administration's coercive actions against Iran.

Write to Jay Solomon at [email protected]3

 

Syria ‘path to peace in the Mid-East’
December 03, 2007

JERUSALEM: Israel should drop its preconditions and immediately resume peace talks with Syria, a confidant of Israel’s Defence Minister said yesterday.

Labor Party legislator Danny Yatom also told Israel Radio that it would be easier to reach a deal with Syria than with the Palestinians, and that progress with Syria could accelerate Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.

“I think the time has come to renew negotiations with Syria,” he said. “After Annapolis, we need to take advantage of the new atmosphere.”

Yatom was reportedly briefed by Defence Minister Ehud Barak after the minister returned from the international Middle East conference held last week in Annapolis, Maryland. The Annapolis conference focused on the Israeli-Palestinian track but Syria also sent a representative, raising hopes it could be persuaded to break its alliance with Iran if talks with Israel were to resume. An Annapolis follow-up conference, tentatively scheduled for Moscow in the northern hemisphere spring, may address the Israeli-Syrian conflict directly.

Yatom, a former chief of Israel’s Mossad spy agency, said the Government should drop a series of preconditions and start talks with Syria immediately. In the past, Israel has demanded the Syrian Government withdraw support for militant groups, including the Palestinian factions Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the Lebanese guerilla group Hezbollah. In exchange for peace, Syria wants Israel to return all of the Golan Heights, a plateau captured by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War.

Yatom suggested negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians be conducted simultaneously, but said it would be easier to reach a deal with Damascus.

Secret ‘diplomatic’ overtures to Hamas
30/11/2007 By Anshel Pfeffer Jerusalem

A diplomatic back-channel is intensifying between Israeli and Muslim religious leaders, including figures identified with Hamas.

The aim of the talks, taking place with the full knowledge of the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, is to provide a wider consensus at the grassroots for an eventual accord.

While all eyes have been on preparations for this week’s Annapolis summit, talks have continued between senior religious figures on both sides.

Israel has insisted on not talking to Hamas politically until it recognises

Israel and renounces violence, but politicians are aware of the need to engage with Hamas on some level.

There is also a need to supply some degree of support for a possible peace deal within the Palestinian public, especially among the more Islamist elements. While a dialogue between Jewish and Muslim leaders has been taking place for over a decade, a senior Israeli government source told the JC this week that "it has greatly intensified over the past six months and is of a much serious order than in the past"…..

"We all feel that in the end, the success or failure of the Annapolis summit and subsequent negotiations, is tied to the goodwill of the public on both sides."

Abbas needed to gain support also within Islamist circles, he added. "Also, for many Israelis the fact that there is no consensus within the Palestinian people causes widespread scepticism and we are trying to disprove that."

Rabbi Melchior said that one aim was for a fatwa by senior Islamic clerics to affirm the right of a Jewish state to exist in the region.

Among others, the leadership of Israel’s Islamic Movement and representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are involved. Both have close political and religious ties with Hamas. As Sunnis, they also have a joint interest in minimising Iranian-Shia influence in the region.