T-desco is a well informed analyst of radical groups in Lebanon who comments regularly on SC and keeps track of the many contradictory news stories about the country's radical Sunni groups. He has been reluctant to generalize, but has made an exception this week. Here are two of the five comments that he added to the last post:

Militant arrested in Tripoli ‘is al-Qaeda No. 2 in Lebanon’ 

A man originally described as a leading member of Islamist militant group Fatah al-Islam when he was arrested in an apartment in Tripoli on Thursday, has now also been identified as Nabil Mohammad Ghasub Rahim, the No. 2 of al-Qaeda in Lebanon.

According to a report on the London-based newspaper Al-Hayat, Rahim is second only to the fugitive Palestinian chief of Fatah al-Islam, Shaker al-Absi.

Al-Absi purportedly released an audio tape message earlier this week on the Internet threatening renewed attacks on the Lebanese army and pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda.

The report said that Rahim, who is a Lebanese citizen, is the key to terrorism in Lebanon because he is the link there between Fatah al-Islam and other countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, with young Saudi nationals, who form the largest and most powerful component of the militant group.

Rahim, 36, took over as second-in-command from the Saudi national Bassam Humud, who recently returned to his home country.

Rahim is believed to have been hiding in the apartment in the Abu Samra neighbourhood of Tripoli for about 11 months from where he coordinated group’s activities including recruitment into the militant group.

He was in contact with another 11 terrorists and the investigators hope to extract from Rahim more information about Fatah-al-Islam, which fought a three-month battle with the Lebanese army last year. … AKI

T-desco summarizes:

Regarding “al-Qa’ida”: I think it is important not to imagine it as a “Leninist” organization with cadres waiting for orders from somebody sitting in a cave in Waziristan. Some have gone to the other extreme, claiming that “al-Qa’ida does not exist”. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. I like the idea that there are several “branches”, the Saudi branch, the Iraqi branch, the Algerian/Maghrebi branch, the Southeast Asian branch, the “HQ” in Pakistan/Afghanistan. The situation in “al-Sham” seems a little bit more unclear.

I don’t think that the organization has “state sponsors”, but there are probably some wealthy individuals in, say, KSA who support it.

Regarding the funding of Fatah al-Islam (as reported by Seymour Hersh), I believe that it is possible that some prominent Saudis (not necessarily Hariri) gave money for the creation of militias in Lebanon and that some of that money (or some of the weapons) ended up in the hands of Fatah al-Islam because these groups had friendly ties with each other. That is the version proposed by General Clark (as I understood it). Something similar seems to have happened in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Alex, I agree, a summary would be nice, naming names but at the same time making absolutely clear just how UNRELIABLE all this information is…

And it would be really helpful to get some of the questions about Nabil Rahim and his alleged connection to the Hariri investigation answered.

U.S. Wary of Warming Syrian-Turkish Ties
by Deborah Amos on NPR
All Things Considered, January 10, 2008

One place President George Bush is not visiting on his tour of the Middle East is Syria. Relations are icy, with Washington and Damascus at odds over Lebanon, the Arab-Israel conflict, the Iraq war and Iran.

But Syria is rapidly improving ties with a key U.S. ally in the region, Turkey. And that is a development that could have substantial repercussions, particularly for Washington.

Syrians Have Much to Gain

Syria's ambassador in Washington, Imad Moustapha, characterizes his country's ties with Turkey as a "honeymoon" and the "best possible relations between any two neighborly countries in the world."

Such enthusiasm over ties with Turkey is a worry for the United States, says Omer Taspinar, a Turkish analyst at the U.S. War College.

"I think the Syrians have a lot to gain. That's why it is in their interests to send a signal they are not isolated and they have Turkey on their side.

"Syria is perceived as the underdog against the U.S. So, the more the U.S. says, 'Don't talk to Syria,' I think, the more it will become attractive for Turkish public opinion," Taspinar says.

And that may be why Syrian President Bashar al-Assad got such a warm welcome on a recent trip to Turkey. With his attractive young wife, Assad toured the capital with Turkey's president and prime minister. The TV cameras were there as they opened a new Turkish shopping center. The coverage of smiling presidents and their wives surprised even Syrians, says George Sageur, a Syrian-American businessman.

The response to the president and his wife — as the face of Syria — has been tremendous in Turkey, he says. They were "received very, very well indeed."

Iraq War Marked Change in Syrian-Turkish Relations

It's a marked improvement from tensions a decade ago. The two countries seemed on the verge of war after Turkey accused Syria of harboring a Kurdish rebel leader.

But that was all before the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Now, Turkey and Syria have shared concerns. Both have sizeable Kurdish populations. Both worry about the nationalist goals of the Kurds in neighboring Iraq. And both are wary of U.S. plans in the region, says Taspinar.

"The real impetus for these visits is the Kurdish question — let's not miss the real picture here. I think Turks are very much disillusioned with this whole Iraq episode."

Syria has benefited from that disillusionment.

Alliance with Turkey Serves as Balance to Iran

Because of expanded trade relations, Turkish language classes in Damascus are now popular for Syrian Arabic speakers. Syria's deputy prime minister was in Turkey last week to sign an agreement for a joint natural gas pipeline.

"The relationship with Turkey has an economic aspect, but it is also very important for domestic legitimacy," says Josh Landis, an American academic who writes an influential blog on Syria.

Landis says the new partnership with Turkey has helped Syria's president blunt a domestic problem: Many of Syria's majority Sunni Muslims do not like Assad's close relations with Shiite Iran.

"Syria is very unhappy in this Shiite alliance because 80 percent, 75 percent of the country is Sunni. It's caused a lot of angst among your average businessmen in Syria," Landis says.

Turkey is a predominantly Sunni Muslim country. And on the political front, Turkey's moderate politics could offer an alternative to Iran, says Ibrahim Hamidi, a Syrian journalist and analyst.

"If we really want to support moderate policies in the region, if we really want to isolate Iran, we have to work to give a bigger role to Turkey in the region," says Hamidi.

Turkey Steps Up Role in Middle East

And this is exactly what Turkey's new government wants, says Henri Barkey, a professor of international relations at Lehigh University. He says Turkey's leaders intend to become players in Middle East politics. The opening to Syria is a major move to do just that.

"It is quite smart on their part … to say, 'Look we have good relations with everybody, everybody can come and talk to us, we will listen to anybody, we will help anybody,' so this is the way the Turks are pushing themselves up in the region," Barkey says.

It is a new role for Turkey, a welcome lifeline for Damascus, and a problem for the United States: Turkey, a key U.S. ally, is reaching out to Syria — which President Bush has called a dangerous regime.

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Tomorrow, the solution to Lebanon’s crisis may finally materialize. Unlikely perhaps, but the possibility does exist, as it always has, that the Lebanese will wake up tomorrow morning and discover at lunchtime, on a coffee break, or on the evening news that their hapless politicians have finally agreed to agree.

On that day – let’s be optimists and call it tomorrow – a great sigh of relief will emerge collectively from the body politic, rustling the pine needles of the Shouf and whistling through the alleys of Sidon and Tripoli. There will be much rejoicing (in the Lebanese style), some gloating, conspiracy theorizing, but above all, relief.

And then the day after tomorrow will arrive, and the Lebanese – and the Syrians – will be back at square one.

So much attention has been focused on the details of the current standoff that there has hardly been any serious speculation or debate about what will take place after the government is up and running again. What can the Lebanese expect in the medium-term? The short-term priority is obvious: solving the crisis in a manner that is satisfactory to all local and regional actors, and getting on with the business of governing. The long-term priorities are many and complicated: reforming the failed systems of government to promote increased efficiency, stability, and (hopefully, in the very long term) equality in political participation. Of course, there is also the economic crisis, the problems of corruption, and much more.

But the medium-term is far from clear.

Will Bashar al-Assad put Syria in a holding pattern, waiting until Bush is out of office before setting the new policy for Lebanon? Or will the regime seek to consolidate its renewed influence by supporting the pursuit of an electoral law that would give Hizbullah a larger share in parliament? What mechanisms will ensure its continued influence in the event that the opposition’s momentum flags once they are back in the halls of government? Will there be an exchange of ambassadors between Beirut and Damascus? Will the borders stay wide open to Syrian workers? What will become of the rabble-rousing politicians who – for three years – have defined their entire political platform (or had it defined for them by the media) in terms of Syria (i.e. pro- or anti-).

The day after tomorrow will be far more important in determining the answers to these questions than tomorrow itself.

According to Ibrahim Hamidi in al-Hayat, Syria insists that it is playing a positive role with the French in developing "a road map" forward for Lebanon. Foreign Minister Walid Mualem explains that Syria will not sacrifice its national interests for the Arab League meeting scheduled to be held in Damascus this spring. All the same, Mualem pointed out the achievements of the Franco-Syrian dialogue that has been taking place over Lebanon: there has been agreement over who the next president should be, Michel Suleiman; there has also been agreement that a national unity government should be formed and a new election law promulgated.

French parliamentary delegation affirms good relations with Syria despite spat over Lebanon (AP) Sarkozy had said that France wouldn't talk with Syria.

Hiyam Kossaify in the daily an-Nahar expresses a widespread Lebanese conviction that "Syria will never allow the Lebanese presidential issue to be resolved so long as it does not have a firm commitment from France to scrub the international trial on the Hariri assassination."

Rosana Boumounsef of an-Nahar also blames Syria: 

The French stand, as outlined by President Nicolas Sarkozy from Egypt, named Syria as the side that is blocking the presidential election process, and efforts by Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem to put the burden on Free Patriotic Movement leader Gen. Michel Aoun, were aimed at trying to avoid the isolation that Damascus is suffering from, Boumounsef wrote.

"The French who had repeatedly threatened to expose the side that is blocking the settlement have … declared the truth, named Syria and the opposition and held Speaker Nabih Berri responsible for the unprecedented closure of Parliament," according to the article.

Mualem insists that Syria cannot resolve the Presidential issue if the Lebanese opposition leaders are unwilling to accept the unity government offered by Hariri and company. The Syrians have been stressing that they do not have communications with General Aoun and cannot influence him. Although they acknowledge close relations with Hizbullah, they also insist they cannot order Hizbullah on such a crucial issue as the make up of a national unity government. Opposition representation in the new government will establish Hizbullah's power until elections are held in 2009.

Hizbullah maintains that it was stabbed in the back by the March 14th alliance in 2005 and cannot trust it to stick by political understandings – hence it wants a blocking third in the new government. It believes the Lebanese opposition will win the majority in free elections.

HIzbullah maintains that before the elections of 2005, it agreed with March 14 leaders to support eleven of their candidates in the parliamentary elections in exchange for a promise to support the "resistance," i.e. Hizbullah's right to maintain its militia and arms. What happened? Hariri and Jumblat turned against the resistance and hardly concealed their desire for Israel to wipe out Hizbullah during the summer war of 2006. Hizbullah believes it can take back many of the 11 parliamentary positions from Jumblat and Hariri in the 2009 elections, but in the meantime it wants guarantees that the government will not move against Hizbullah and that it can veto any election law of which it does not approve.

The devil is in the details of the national unity government. Initially there were reports that the president would be given ten members of the thirty member cabinet to appoint. This caused resistance among both the opposition and parliamentary majority. The opposition has called for each side being allotted a share of cabinet members in proportion to there membership in parliament, but this is not acceptable to March 14 as it would increase the opposition's authority. The March 14th group would like to keep the composition of the cabinet as close to what it is today as possible.

Hizbullah MP Mohammad Haidar said his party was awaiting Moussa's arrival to guarantee that there would be "no winner and no loser" as part of the Arab settlement plan. "We want to make sure that under the proposed formula, no party will be able to impose its decisions in the next government," Haidar said. "If this is the case, then we can have an elected president on Saturday," he added.

Israel planned 1991 strike on NKorea-Syria ship

President Bush signaled he would give Israel leeway to continue raids on Palestinian militants and to develop settlements in disputed parts of Jerusalem. (Transcript) (WSJ)

Bush has said Israel must end its occupation of some Arab land to enable the creation of a viable Palestinian state. No Golan statement. (BBC)

• Palestinian refugee families should be compensated, rather than returning to former homes in what is now Israel
• adjustments to the pre-1967 boundaries "to reflect current realities" – a reference to Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank
• a viable, contiguous, sovereign and independent Palestinian state

Mearsheimer and Walt argue that U.S. presidential candidates aren't doing the Jewish state any favors by offering unconditional support in their article: "Israel's false friends."

Ghassan Rubeiz in his Daily Star article, "Who should Arab Americans Vote For?," argues that "if Barak Obama wins, there is hope that he will be more open on the matter of Middle East justice than other front runners in the presidential race."

Steven Cook at the Council on Foreign Relations explains that: "The six leading candidates have expressed common themes on the subject of democracy promotion in the Middle East. For example, they all say (as does the Bush administration) that if Arabs are provided with an opportunity to express their grievances through democratic institutions, there would be less terrorism. However, in general the candidates have been vague about how the United States can promote such developments."

Shlomo Ben-Ami, argues in "From father to son, Arab despotism may have merit," that:

As countries like Egypt, Syria and Libya might be indicating, hereditary succession is not an inherently reactionary move. Rather, it means opting for a controlled transition to a post-revolutionary phase in which economic modernization and international integration might usher in greater political change in the future.

In a new opinion poll by www.statisticslebanonltd.com asks:

What is the most important: An Arab Lebanon, or a democratically oriented Lebanon? 

The majority of respondents (68.67%) considered a democratically oriented Lebanon to be the most important, while 27% considered an Arab Lebanon to be the most important. Only 3.17% considered a Muslim Lebanon to be the most important and 1.17% refused to answer. See figure 2

A majority of 91% of respondents support a revision of the Lebanese constitution to ensure the best equality among the Lebanese regardless of their sect.

French source tells Al-Hayat about details of negotiations with Syria…” from mideastwire.com

“A French source in the team of the French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner who attended his meetings in Beirut at the beginning of last month revealed that MP Al-Hariri never accepted in any form to give the debilitating third in the coming government to the opposition during his meetings with Kouchner and the parliamentary speaker Nabih Birri. He clarified in response to Al-Muallem’s affirmation that Al-Hariri agreed to give the debilitating third that Al-Hariri refused from the outset of the meeting to discuss any issue other than the amendment of the constitution to allow for the election of General Suleiman to the presidency. The source added that when Birri insisted on Al-Hariri agreeing to an announcement of principles sanctioning the formation of a government with 55% of the seats going to the majority and 45% to the opposition, Al-Hariri told him that if Birri guarantees “Hezbollah’s ok then I will agree to talking about the announcement of principles”

“The same source clarified that “there was no problem concerning the amendment of the constitution and the new electoral law but that the issue of the national unity government was discussed in depth but Al-Hariri refused to form the government based on the ratio of the size of the respective coalitions in the parliament”. The source announced that “a formula stating that the government will be formed according to a formula that will take into consideration the size of the parliamentary coalitions but without any specific details”. The French official declared that no agreement was reached concerning the announcement of principles because Birri didn’t agree to the path for the constitutional amendment.

“The source pointed out that the Syrians sent to the French president palace on the eve of the meeting between Kouchner, Al-Hariri, and Birri a draft for a joint statement between Birri and Al-Hariri which would “facilitate matters” but its contents were similar to Birri’s suggestions in that meeting. The source added that this means that Birri received the same draft that was sent by Al-Muallem to the presidential palace…” – Al-Hayat, United Kingdom

Nicholas Blanford writing in the CSM explains that many in Lebanon are skeptical the Lebanon deal announced in Cairo can gain backing from Hizbullah and General Aoun. he writes:

Although the Lebanese opposition, spearheaded by the militant Shiite Hizbullah, has cautiously welcomed the Arab plan, analysts suggest that it could founder as rivals discuss the finer points in the days ahead.

"The devil is in the details and there are plenty of opportunities to derail the plan in the future," says Michael Young, opinion editor of the English-language Daily Star newspaper.

The March 14 coalition, which holds a slim parliamentary majority, gave a more positive reception to the Arab League proposal than did the opposition. Saad Hariri, a top March 14 leader, hailed it as "historic and noble."

The proposal calls for the immediate election of General Suleiman, whose nomination as head of state is supported by both sides; the formation of a national unity government in which Suleiman would hold the balance of power through ministers close to him; and the adoption of a new electoral law.

Under the Lebanese Constitution, a new government is formed after the election of a president. The opposition has blocked Suleiman's election since November, demanding a prior arrangement on the composition of the next government as well as key civil service appointments.

Hizbullah demands enough of a share of the next government to allow it to block any legislation that it deems a threat, such as moves to force the organization to disband its formidable military wing.

Mohammed Raad, who heads Hizbullah's parliamentary bloc, says a final decision on the Arab League proposal would depend on subsequent developments. "We don't want to be pessimistic or block the route to any productive decision, especially in a complicated matter like the Lebanese issue."

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, a Hizbullah expert at the Carnegie Endowment's Middle East Center in Beirut, says the Arab League proposal appeared to be an attempt to "weaken the opposition and corner it. It seems that Hizbullah is not too thrilled about it and I think that the end result will be that the opposition will not agree."

Michel Aoun, Hizbullah's main Christian ally in the opposition who harbors presidential ambitions himself, is also likely to object to the proposal, analysts say. Granting the balance of power in the next cabinet to Suleiman, a Maronite Christian, as all Lebanese heads of state traditionally must be, will significantly weaken Mr. Aoun's political influence.

So why would Syria sign onto a plan that might weaken its Lebanese allies? One reason, analysts say, is the threat of a boycott of the Arab League summit scheduled to be hosted by Damascus in March. The summit is a prestigious annual event attended by Arab heads of state and will boost Syria's credentials in the region.

According to Lebanon's An Nahar newspaper, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem was warned on the sidelines of Sunday's Arab League meeting that Saudi King Abdullah would refuse to attend the March summit if Damascus failed to endorse the Arab League proposal.

"The Syrians want the summit to be a success," says Sami Moubayed, a Syrian political analyst, adding that although the Arab League proposal is "not perfect [for Syria] … it's the closest thing to perfect at this stage."

Still, Mr. Muallem, in Cairo, said that while Syria and Saudi Arabia have agreed to cooperate on Lebanon, Damascus "cannot put pressure on anyone in Lebanon because the solution [to the presidential crisis] should be Lebanese."

Some Lebanese analysts interpret Muallem's comment as an attempt to absolve Damascus of blame should the Lebanese opposition eventually reject the Arab League proposal and continue holding out for a better deal.

Alistair Lyon of Reuters conveys similar skepticism from the Lebanese he interviews:  

Regional antagonists Syria and Saudi Arabia, which support rival Lebanese parties, both said they backed the plan agreed in Cairo, but politicians and analysts said this was only a start.

"I'm not holding my breath," said Oussama Safa, director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, citing previous broken promises. "The problems are much more complicated than the Syrians just saying 'ok, we let the Arab declaration pass'."

Syria did not want to be seen to be putting spokes in the wheels ahead of an Arab summit in Damascus in March, but would not push its allies in Lebanon towards compromise, he argued.

Hezbollah, the armed Shi'ite political party backed by Iran as well as Syria, has reacted cautiously to the Arab plan and has not dropped its demand for opposition veto power in cabinet.

"I don't think the opposition can backtrack on that," said Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, visiting scholar at Beirut's Carnegie Middle East Center, noting that Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah had said the veto was vital to thwart U.S. designs on Lebanon.

STRATEGIC CONTEST

"We're not really talking about numbers for a political sharing, but about strategic issues that have become even more important for Hezbollah, Syria and Iran," she said.

"It's a question of Lebanon's political orientation, its identity, and of Hezbollah's weapons above all else."

Lebanon's fate often seems linked to a wider conflict that pits Syria and Iran against Washington and its Arab allies. Each side accuses the other of blocking a deal among the Lebanese.

Saad-Ghorayeb said Syria had limited leverage over Hezbollah and none over Christian opposition leader Michel Aoun. It would not risk an opposition split by pushing hard for the Arab plan.

Aoun, a former army chief who once fought Syrian troops in Lebanon, is now allied with Hezbollah and Amal, a pro-Syrian Shi'ite party whose leader Nabih Berri is parliament speaker.

Aoun says he still opposes Syrian influence in Lebanon, but shares the determination of his Shi'ite partners to prevent the U.S.- and Saudi-backed Sunni, Druze and Christian bloc led by wealthy businessman Saad al-Hariri from monopolising power.

Berri has called an assembly session for Saturday for its 12th attempt to elect a president, but another postponement is inevitable unless a surprise political deal emerges beforehand.

Lebanon's political stalemate has lasted more than a year. The presidency barely functioned even before pro-Syrian Emile Lahoud left office on Nov. 23. The government limps on although its foes say it is illegitimate. Parliament has not met.

"This crisis has had devastating consequences on Lebanon," said Ghassan Moukheiber, a moderate member of Aoun's group in parliament. "We must have a president and a cabinet quickly. The country cannot continue at a standstill."

He said the Arab plan was balanced and took account of the concerns of the both sides, but was far from a done deal.

"It's a potential breakthrough because it seems to have taken care of the regional elements affecting or hindering the presidential election," Moukheiber told Reuters. "But it still needs to be ironed out by local actors, particularly Aoun, who would not be subject to direct influence from Syria or Iran."

Ghassan Tueni, publisher of the an-Nahar newspaper and an MP in the anti-Syrian majority, also voiced optimism that the Arab plan would eventually work because it had regional support, with Iran and Qatar encouraging the Syrians to accept it.

"But there are some difficulties," he cautioned. "Hezbollah was not party to the agreement and they are reluctant to admit that Syria can commit them to it, so they are trying to restate their exigencies, which I don't think will be acceptable."

A Lebanon agreement seems to be emerging that would give the Maronite president more power than he has had since the Taif Agreement of 1989 empowered the Sunni Prime Minister at the expense of the Maronites.

Arab ministers meeting in Cairo yesterday announced that they had arrived at an agreement, which would involve two important steps.

1. The first step is the immediate passage of a constitutional amendment to allow Michel Suleiman to become President.

2. The second step is to be the formation of nation unity government.

As we know, the nature of such a national unity government has been contested over the last year and has been the major point of contention between the opposition and parliamentary majority. Hizbullah and Aoun have demanded a blocking third of the cabinet, which has been unacceptable for the March 14 bloc.

Most news stories are still not including details of the proposed national unity government. Naharnet is an example: Suleiman For 'Empowered' President by Unanimous Arab Backing.

This al-Nahar article in Arabic spells out the deal as follows:

 – ???? ???????? ?????? ?? 27 ?????? ?????? ????? ?????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ?????.‏
????? ?? ???? ????? ????? ???? ??? ?? ???? ????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ??????? ‏????? ????? ?? 30 ?????? ???? ???? 10 ???????? ?10 ???????? ?10 ????? ?????????.‏

Of the thirty minister cabinet, 10 ministers will be appointed by the majority; 10 will be appointed by the opposition, and ten will be appointed by the president. This formula is a major innovation that gives the president important new power.

Thus, no side will be able to impose a decision or block a decision. (i.e. the ruling part will not have enough votes to impose a two-thirds majority decision, but the opposition will also not have the one-third vote to block decisions.

The president will have the power to break a cabinet vote that divides down parties lines.

This restores power to the Maronite president that was taken away at Taif and given to the Sunni Prime Minister. It does not give Hizbullah the power it demanded and seems to be a real concession on its part. Ultimately, it takes power away from the Muslims and places it into the hands of the Maronites.

One reading of the tea leaves suggests that Farouq al-Sharaa's visit to the Pope roughly two months ago was to reassure him that Syria favored a greater role for the Maronite presidency. Sfeir has been insisting for some time that a Suleiman presidency requiring a constitutional amendment would be better than a March 14 decision imposed by a simple majority in contravention of the constitution and in contravention of the spirit of the Lebanese tradition of consensus among the sects. Sfeir has been sensitive to Maronite anxieties that Hariri and the Sunnis have taken too much power from the Maronites. He has been leery of a Maronite backlash against a purely March 14 solution to Lebanon's impasse.

The length of a Suleiman presidency was also in dispute. It seems to have been resolved by the acceptance of a shorter term of 2 years, which would allow Suleiman to preside over parliamentary elections due to take place in 2009 and the drawing up of a new election law to precede the parliamentary elections. General Aoun had demanded that it not extend beyond 2-3 years. He hopes to become president following Suleiman's term.

Who benefits? 

Pro March 14 news outlets suggest that the deal only came about due to severe pressure on Syria. They suggest that it is a win for Saudi Arabia and the March 14 allies of the US and France.

Naharnet writes:

News reports said Muallem backed the Arab plan on Lebanon after his Saudi counterpart threatened that the Saudi Monarch would boycott the forthcoming Arab Summit to be held in Damascus in March if Syria continued to block the presidential elections in Lebanon.

Nickolas Blanford in Time explains that Syria faced greater isolation and a reinvigorated UN investigation because it had not disciplined Lebanon's opposition. Both France and the US were fed up with Lebanese opposition insistence on a blocking third. Bush had gone on record to say he was "fed up with Syria," and Blanford writes:

Sarkozy's efforts to engage Syria appear to have foundered, and, in a calculated swipe at the Syrian regime, he immediately followed his announcement of severed contacts with a promise to release funds for the international tribunal being established in the Netherlands to judge the accused killers of Hariri.

This is how Nasrallah responded to such threats in his televised speech: (Quote thanks to mideastwire.com)

"Indeed the recent statement of President Sarkozy in which he pointed to the issue of the international tribunal means that there is a sort of enticement and intimidation policy, which means that he might have informed Syria that if it extends some help on the Lebanese issue, they will suspend the international court. But in my capacity as a Lebanese oppositionist, I want to submit testimony for history. Syria indeed has an interest in resuming good French-Syrian relations and good Arab relations. Syria indeed has an interest in resuming good European-Syrian relations. It definitely has an interest in distracting the phantom of the international court. But if Syria was only considering its own interests, it would have came to the opposition and pressured it and embarrassed it.

"Eventually Syria is capable of applying pressures, but whether the opposition responds or not is another issue. What happened is that Syria came and talked to the opposition, not all the opposition indeed because there are no contacts for example between Syria and General Aoun. They came and asked us: You as an opposition, what do you accept and what do you refuse?

Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Saniora

called the leaders of Saudi Arabia and Egypt on Sunday, as well as other Arab officials, to thank them for helping find a solution to the crisis, his office said in a statement.

Saniora also called pro-government Lebanese officials and urged them to back the Arab initiative, calling it "a major development on the road to solving the crisis in Lebanon."

But Syrian and Iranian officials have also been underlining their positive role.

Larijani, Iran's foreign minister, who was visiting the Syrian capital of Damascus, said Iran supports any push to create consensus among the Lebanese people. "We wish success for Amr Moussa's efforts" said Larijani, referring to the head of the Arab League, who is scheduled to visit Lebanon in the coming days.

Speaking from Cairo,

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moallem told Hezbollah's Al-Manar television that his country has repeatedly said it is ready to help end Lebanon's political crisis but "cannot put pressure on anyone in Lebanon because the solution should be Lebanese."

Speaking about his meeting Saturday with Saudi counterpart Saud al-Faisal, al-Moallem said, "Syria has its friends in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia has its friends in Lebanon and we have agreed to cooperate."

Al-Moallem was apparently referring to Hariri, who holds Saudi citizenship and has close relations with the royal family in the oil-rich nation.

Syrian Commentators writing on this site also argue that Syria comes out a winner.

Alex writes:

Basically, the president wins much more power … he has a number of ministers (appointed by him) who will make sure that

1) the majority (Seniora) does not have 2/3 as they wanted and

2) the opposition does not have the 1/3 they wanted

Not what Hizbollah wanted, and not what Hariri wanted … they both do not have enough power to force their agenda on the other side … only the President has that new power which is … a modification to Taif ! Hizbollah will be barely able to accept it .. but I hope they will.

The Christians win. The Shiites (Hizbollah) should be able to live with it even though they are not overly empowered through this arrangement (which makes them less perceived as a threat to the M14 group) and Syria gets its favorite man as President (General Sleiman) without worrying about a Seniora government that can be a threat to Syria. (In Arabic the full resolution)

And Syria wins. They got their man (Sleiman) to be the most powerful man in Lebanon … they did not disappoint Aoun (they did not sell him easily) and they weakened and constrained the Saudi (Sunni) power in Lebanon … without allowing Hizbollah to grow too powerful.

Isn’t that exactly what Syria wanted in the first place?

On top of that it looks like Syria was flexible.

EHSANI2 said:

Alex, Your analysis is on the mark. This is effectively the virtual undoing of the Taif accord. The power swings back to the Christian President.

Damascus played this chess game superbly. It agreed on the deal without seemingly being pressured by France or the U.S. It showed that it is only its leadership that can swing the vote. Its foreign minister stated that it supports a President for Lebanon “fawran…immediately”.

The U.S. has redefined victory in Lebanon in the election of a President there. It can now claim it won.

France has spent so much energy but won little publicly for this final resolution. Damascus upstaged it and won the publicity game as well.

Saudi seems to have agreed to yield more powers to the President’s office. Hariri does not have much to show for his efforts. Like Bush, his victory has been redefined as pushing for the election of Michele Suleiman. I guess he too can claim he won.

The Christians of Lebanon can thank Bashar but they will not of course. Events were moving beyond their direct control or understanding of the bigger picture encircling the region.

Regardless of who won or lost though, this is a major victory and breakthrough for the region.

Honest Patriot, a Lebanese, concludes:

Regardless of how the developments are spun by this or that as their victory, I just pray that deflation does indeed happen. All’s well that ends well and, speaking for myself, I really don’t care who gets the credit. [And judging by your prediction, it sounds like everyone will claim success]. The majority of Lebanese just want to be able to go to their jobs, work hard at advancing their status. I hope they will soon be given the chance to do this more effectively than the current conditions permit.

Nasrallah said in his recent speech that no one can pressure Hizbullah, not even Syria. But he added that as a friend, Syria can ask a lot and Hizbullah will consider it. Perhaps he was preparing his people for a climb down?

In conclusion, here is a final roundup by Alex:

This was not simply a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Arab league. A serious deal was reached, at the regional and at the Lebanese levels. Here is what happened:

1) Prime minister of Qatar visited Bashar in Damascus the day before

2) Foreign ministers of KSA, Egypt, Qatar and Syria met in Moussa's house. That's where the final agreement was reached. At first Saud al-faisal told Mouallem that Syria's allies are asking for the undoable and that Saudi Arabia (and Egypt) are not going to be attending the Arab Summit if Syria does not help convince her allies to reduce their demands (Which implies that KSA and Egypt WILL attend the Arab summit in Damascus now). Then, Moussa suggested a compromise .. which I suspect he knew already from the Qatari prime minister who was in Damascus earlier, that Syria will accept.

3) They called Seniora to inform him of the deal they reached (to inform him) and and he replied "I completely welcome" the agreement.

4) Hizbollah people were contacted and they expressed a similar opinion. But I have not heard a clear statement from Nasrallah yet.

As I said earlier, I expect that Hizbollah will require some clarification behind the scene when Mouallem comes back … this agreement is borderline acceptable to them. Although I tend to think that wen the Iranian envoy was in Damascus that day and gave his blessing to "Syria's efforts to settle the conflict in Lebanon" that Hizbollah took part in the decision to go along with the eventual Arab League formula.

5) Saad Hariri called this agreement "Noble and Historic" .. that's good enough I assume.

6) Nothing yet from Junblatt and Geagea. They also will need to hear some details from Tareq Mitri when he comes back to Beirut.

Before the Arab league meeting, M14 figures asked Arab ambassadors (Egypt etc) to take firm actions to punish Syria. Similar escalation came from the opposition side. Lebanese Information Minister held a news conference in which he compared the tense situation in Lebanon to that which preceded the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and expressed his worries that similar bloodshed might be ahead for Lebanon if an agreement is not reached.

Most likely we will see many new difficulties. But whatever the extent of the influence of outsiders (Syria and KSA at a direct level, then the United States and Iran behind them) an agreement was reached on the outside after consulting with their allies on the inside. We will now find out if the Lebanese themselves are to blame for their own problems or not.

It remains unclear how this deal will alter the Saudi-Syria competition in the region.

Syria is counting on its backing of Lebanon's Maronites to pay off in the future. It believes that Lebanon's Maronites are more naturally allies of Syria than they are of Saudi Arabia. If Syria can cement the growing alliance between Lebanon's Shiites and Maronites in order to separate them from the Sunni community, which has become ardently anti-Syrian and pro-Saudi, Damascus may be able to cultivate a friendly Lebanon well into the future. Syria is trying to position itself as the protector and benefactor of the region's Christians, not only by coming to their aid in Lebanon, but also by giving Iraqi Christians refuge as they are driven out of Iraq and by supporting secularism. As Washington allies itself with strictly Sunni Saudi Arabia, Syria is positioning itself as an ally – not just of Shiites, but of all minorities. This Syrian stand as the champion of all minorities and secular Arabs may actually convince Israel – the Jewish state – to take a second look at making peace with Syria.

SYRIA COUNTRY VIEW: OUTLOOK FOR 2008-09
THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
EIU ViewsWire 01 Jan 2008

      * The  president, Bashar al-Assad, is expected to remain in power in 2008-09. He will continue to rely on the strength and loyalty of the security services, which will keep opposition forces weak and ineffective.
     * Mr  Assad  will  devote  considerable  effort to ending Syria's political isolation, but it is questionable whether  he  is  willing  to  make any concessions on Syria's strategic alliance with Iran or its desire to influence events in Lebanon.
     * Economic  policy  in 2008-09 will focus on the need to diversify the economy and on encouraging investment, but structural fiscal reform will be constrained by the fear of alienating public opinion.
     * Syrian  oil  output  is expected to fall markedly over the outlook period, which will reduce export volumes and  government spending (which is heavily dependent on the level of oil revenue) and thereby curb economic growth.
     * The  Syrian  pound  will  appreciate against the US dollar in 2008 (largely because of dollar weakness) but will depreciate in 2009 owing to concerns about export competitiveness.
     * The  trade  account  will  fall  into deficit in 2009, as the negative impact of falling oil production and exports is compounded by a modest decline in global oil prices.

   DOMESTIC  POLITICS: Power remains firmly in the hands of the president, who is supported by key elements in the security services and by the ruling Baath party. There appears little prospect that any serious challenge to Mr Assad's  regime  will  emerge  in the outlook period. Since assuming power following the death of his father in 2000,  Mr  Assad  has stepped up repression of local opposition groups and activists, and has appointed his own close  allies  to  key  posts.  This has increased his control, albeit at the cost of narrowing his power base. Importantly,  the core of the elite is drawn from Mr Assad's minority Alawi sect, and is acutely conscious that to move against him would risk endangering the Alawi hold on power.

   INTERNATIONAL  RELATIONS:  Although  Mr  Assad  may  have  secured  his domestic position, he faces a number of challenges in the international arena (which will have a profound bearing on his popularity at home). Efforts to  emerge from international isolation have been ongoing for much of the year, but in November, Syria received recognition  from  both  Europe  (in  particular, France) and Arab countries. The new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy,  opened channels of dialogue, culminating in a large, high-profile team of diplomats being sent to the capital, Damascus. The diplomatic initiative was ostensibly aimed at reaching an accommodation between pro- and anti-Syrian  forces  in  Lebanon,  but  was  probably  also  part  of  Mr Sarkozy's wider ambitions to create a "Mediterranean  union",  involving  Europe  and  the  southern and eastern littoral states. From the Syrian perspective, it seemed to confirm that Syria had the right to be consulted about the next Lebanese president.

   POLICY TRENDS:  The  soaring  cost  of  the fuel subsidy bill, which is placing an unsustainable burden on the fiscal  account,  has  led  to  heated  economic  debate  between the government's more reformist, technocratic elements, led by the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Abdullah al-Dardari, and the more conservative Baath  party  members. Mr Dardari is pushing for structural fiscal reform, including cuts in fuel subsidies and the  introduction of a value-added tax (VAT). However, some Baath party members oppose these reforms, in part because of concern about their negative impact on disposable incomes. As a result, the proposed introduction of VAT  has now been delayed until 2009. Fuel subsidy cuts also appear to be on hold. Indeed, in late November the Ministry  of  Petroleum issued a tender invitation for the development of a smartcard system to administer fuel rationing.  The  Economist Intelligence Unit expects any cuts in fuel price subsidies to be piecemeal and to be offset by compensatory payments to low-income families.

   INTERNATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS: We forecast that world GDP growth will average 4.6% in 2008-09 (at purchasing powerparity  exchange rates), down from an estimated 5.1% in 2007, largely as a result of a sharp slowdown in the US economy in 2008. International oil prices are expected to remain high, however, as buoyant demand in emerging  markets  offsets  any  slowdown  in  OECD oil demand. The benchmark dated Brent Blend is expected to rise to an average  of  US$78/barrel  in  2008,  before  easing slightly to US$72/b in 2009, but risks are weighted on the upside.

   ECONOMIC GROWTH: The Syrian economy is expected to grow steadily over the outlook period, at an annual average rate of 4.5%, as falling oil production is offset by persistent expansion in the services sector, boosted by solid growth in tourism and demand for goods and services, in part from the large Iraqi refugee population. Our growth forecast is also underpinned by the expected recovery in the agricultural sector (after drought conditions in parts of the country depressed growth in 2007).

   INFLATION:  We  estimate  that  inflation will have eased in 2007 to an average of 7.4%, down from 10% in 2006. However, holiday-related demand for foodstuffs will have compounded the impact of higher global food costs, and the  increase  in petrol prices in November will feed through into distribution costs; as a result, we estimate that  the end-2007 inflation rate will have risen to 8.9%. Although we expect average inflation to rise to 8.7% in  2008,  it  will  fall over the year as the new exchange-rate regime helps to contain imported inflation and domestic demand pressure ebbs. In 2009 lower global oil and non-oil commodity prices will help to reduce the inflation rate to 5.9%. Moreover, a significant return of Iraqi nationals to Iraq would also lower inflationary demand  pressures in 2008-09. However, if the government were to enact more phased cuts in fuel price subsidies in 2008-09, this would lead to a significant upward revision to our inflation forecast.

   EXCHANGE RATES:  Since the beginning of October 2007 there has been a marked appreciation of the pound against the US dollar, suggesting that the new exchange-rate regime–a peg to a basket of currencies based on the IMF's special  drawing  rights–has  finally  been  implemented.  The  currency  will not be allowed to float freely, however, with the government continuing to prioritise stability. The regime is well placed to protect the value of  the  pound, because of the dominant position of the state-owned banks and the control that the Central Bank of  Syria  retains over foreign-currency transactions, even as some laws are relaxed. Consequently, we forecast that  the  pound  will  remain  relatively  stable  in  2008  (partly  as  a result of dollar weakness), before depreciating  modestly in 2009 owing to concerns about the competitiveness of Syria's non-oil exports (and some strengthening of the dollar against the euro).

   EXTERNAL SECTOR: We estimate that the value of merchandise exports will have risen in 2007, with strong growth in  non-oil  exports more than offsetting the decline in the value of oil exports. The estimated fall in oil export revenue is the result of lower Syrian oil production. Non-oil exports are continuing to benefit from the relaxation  of  foreign-exchange  controls, which has led to more exports being officially recorded, and strong regional demand.  We  have raised our forecast for export earnings in 2008 following an upward revision to our global  oil  price  assumption  for  that year. The higher price will offset the negative impact of falling oil production, and we expect still strong growth in non-oil export revenue. Import spending growth will also remain  strong in 2008-09, partly as a result of the ongoing process of tariff liberalisation. As a result of these  trends, the trade account will register a surplus of US$377m (0.8% of GDP) in 2008, slightly larger than in 2007, and a deficit of US$257m (0.5% of GDP) in 2009, as oil production falls and international oil prices ease.
Jan/03/2008

Syria's Deputy Premier Wants Further Relations with Turkey
BBC Monitor: Turkish news agency Anatolia.

Ankara, 3 January: The Syrian deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Abdallah Dardari and an accompanying delegation met officials of Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) in Ankara on Thursday [3 January].

Dardari said there is a common culture and a strong political grounds between Turkey and Syria, and relations between the two countries should be further developed for a much competitive place in global economy in the future.

Dardari also recalled that Turkey and Syria decided to cooperate in energy, natural gas, electricity, oil, transportation, railway, maritime and highway transportation.

He said officials agreed to build an organized industrial zone in Syria in association with Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB).

Dardari noted that Syria will adopt arbitration law and a Turkey-Syria joint arbitration board can be established.

Originally published by Anatolia news agency, Ankara, in English

Damascus (dpa) – Syria and Turkey have decided to form a joint oil exploration and development company bolstering the countries' cooperation in the oil sector, Syrian Oil Minister Sufian al-Alaw said Thursday.

With the project, the two neighboring countries will also cooperate on importing and exporting oil extracts, in addition to setting oil distribution stations in Syria, said al-Alaw, currently part of a high-profile economic delegation visiting Turkey.

According to the Syrian Arab News Agency, the countries had also discussed the possibility of importing natural gas from nearby Azerbaijan and Iran through a Turkish oil company, in addition to connecting Syria to the Turkish natural gas pipeline network. Syria's oil production has experienced a decline in the past few
years, with output falling to 370,000 barrels per day in 2007, from 380,000 barrels previously.

The following is a false story. It is a fabricated piece of positive news. Unlike the widespread use of fabricated negative Syria news which often made its way to Washington through numerous sites and blogs that Washington supports or trusts, such as some Syrian opposition or Lebanese March14th sites.

American Middle East policies are affected by the systematic distortion of the facts… and probably one of the reasons why President Bush never wanted to meet the Syrian president for the past seven years.

2 hours ago

WASHINGTON (APF) — US President George W. Bush will make his first trip to Syria in January, hoping to help forge a peace deal between Syria and Israel before he leaves office one year later, his spokeswoman said Thursday.

Analysts expect the president to also discuss Syria's role in facilitating Lebanon's presidential elections.

The January 8-16 visit will also take him to Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to promote talks launched at a peace conference in Annapolis, Maryland, late last month, said Dana Perino.

The President will indeed visit The Kingdom of Bahrain (253 sq mi), but will NOT visit Syria.

To find the extent of the fabrication of negative Syria news, read my earlier post below which has numerous examples.

Posted by Alex 

In November 2005, US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton warned the Syrians "What we want are not speeches or words," . "We want cooperation, full and complete, and immediate". The same week, French President Jacques Chirac added "It is not conceivable, admissible, acceptable for the international community … that Syria refuses to cooperate," … Chirac warned of sanctions if al-Assad "persists in not wanting to listen or understand". The United States described Assad's speech that month as "appalling".

Serious warnings to Bashar … the "Evil Moron who's running Syria" 

The past few days we found out that the civilized world has given up on Syria again, long time ago in the case of President Bush, more recently in the case of President Sarkozy who earlier gave Damascus a public deadline (until Saturday) to interfere in an effective way in Lebanon. Syria missed the deadline and failed to interfere… or "help" as they call the desired Syrian interference lately. Syria refused to (failed to) "help"… not to be confused with American/French/European/Moderate Arab demands last few years for Syria to stay away completely from Lebanon.

In his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on the Near East on November 8, 2007, David Welch explained how his administration is

"working with our partners in Europe and in the Middle East to coordinate efforts so as to maximize effectiveness, especially in the run-up to Lebanon's elections. As an example of this coordination, Secretary Rice led a meeting on the margins of last week's Expanded Neighbors Conference in Istanbul with the Foreign Ministers of France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan, as well as the Secretary General of the Arab League to discuss the upcoming elections in Lebanon. We expect to consult more closely with our partners in the region on this subject in the coming weeks"

Syria's foreign minister who was in Istanbul that day was not invited. Apparently his presence was not as necessary to "maximize effectiveness" as that of the UAE's foreign minister.

Yet it was Syria, and not Saudi Arabia or Egypt (or the UAE) that disappointed the French and Americans in its failure to enable them to announce that they (The French and the Americans) succeeded in making the Lebanese democratic presidential elections a success.

Since we did not witness any new assassination of anti Syria Lebanese politicians for many months (El-Hajj was pro Syria) and since Syria got credited more than once by American generals in Iraq for its seemingly effective efforts in helping calm the violence in Iraq, Syria's evilness is not the issue these days. The apparent main (new for 2008) reason why the two presidents gave up on Syria seems to be related to their impression that Bashar is not very honest or trustworthy… he promises things that he does not deliver.

You can't trust the Syrians. Sarkozy has been dealing with Assad (by phone) for about a month now. Assad had a whole month to deliver a solution in Lebanon. He did not. He lost the confidence of the civilized world (Which includes Saudi Arabia by the way).

No one put any such deadlines on the numerous Saudi, Egyptian, French, American, Arab League, Italian, Spanish, or Russian initiatives that were promising to help Lebanon. Since Syria was ordered out of Lebanon in 2005, the other countries had sufficient time (and influence) to demonstrate, collectively, that they can replace Syria in dealing with Lebanon's considerable challenges and difficulties. They did not. Instead, they came back to Syria in the last minute to ask for a quick solution to all the mess they created the past two years. A mess that is not only limited to Lebanon. Syria was expected to deliver a solution in Lebanon without the luxury of being able to even have an active direct discussion with Lebanon's new management: The United States and Saudi Arabia.

Two years ago, the Syrian President offended and outraged many people when he called Lebanese Prime minister Fouad Seniora "abdon moussayar li-abden moussayar" (led slave of a led slave). He was referring to his impression of Seniora's place in the real hierarchy of Lebanese politics: Seniora's boss is young billionaire Saad Hariri (who picked Seniora for the job), Hariri's boss is Saudi King Abdullah.

In case any reader is still saddened by Bashar's unfair characterization of the leader of the truly independent and democratic Lebanese M14 government, here is what Mr. Fouad Seniora, President Bush's one and only acceptable Lebanese, wrote in Saudi Newspaper Asharq al-Awsat last August:

???? ????? ??? ???? ?? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ???? ?????? ?????? ?????? ????????? ?????? ??????? ????? ?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ????? ??????? ???????? ??? ????? ?????????? ??? ??? ??? ????? ???????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????? ??????? ???????? ????? ?????????? ????? ??????? .

Translation: "As for King Abdullah Ben Abd alaziz (King of Saudi Arabia), the grand human being, the grand leader, the noble knight, may god preserve his friendliness and prolong his rule, and allow us to continue enjoying his presence and his work, reward him for all that he provided and participated in, reward him for his struggle and hard work for the success and progress of the kingdom … citadel of all Arabs and Muslims, and his struggle for the benefit of the Arab world and for peace and freedom and Arabism and independence and stability of Lebanon's democratic system and its successful coexistence."

Given how highly Mr. Seniora thinks of the Saudi King and his indispensable role in Lebanon (and the whole universe actually), wouldn't it be fair to not expect much from the Syrians given that the Saudi King can not even receive a phone call from their President? Where is the hard working Saudi King when you need him?

But apparently, even the Saudi King has given up on the Syrians.

Here is a quote from Michael Young's column this week:

"This week, a story in the Kuwaiti daily As-Siyassah quoted a Lebanese diplomat in Cairo as saying the Saudis believe Syria has sponsored anti-regime Salafists in the kingdom itself. As-Siyassah is close to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and no Lebanese diplomat would have made such a charge on the record without getting a Saudi green light to do so."

Michael Young, opinion editor of the Lebanese Daily Star, is one of the more determined Syrian regime fighters in the media. In this opinion piece he is concluding that "Damascus may have just lost the Arabs". And he is quoting the Kuwaiti daily As-Siyassah.

The amazing As-Siyassah … the Kuwaiti newspaper "close to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia".

Few month ago, after the neocons and their friends in Israel started to "leak" on a daily basis stories to Murdoch-owned media (the London Times, the WSJ …) that Israel hit a Syrian/Korean nuclear reactor during its mysterious and "top secret" mission over the Euphrates, I received a phone call from an Israeli journalist who told me: "My editor just informed me that while researching the subject he uncovered a year-old story published in Kuwait's As-Siyassah newspaper in which they reported that Syria was already working with North Korea on a nuclear reactor!". The Israeli newspaper was about to publish this shocking discovery as its main headline story.

I told my Israeli friend that I will email him something that will make his editor forget about this story.

Since we just switched to 2008, this is a good time for me to share with you some of my collection of the most honest anti-Syrian-regime news and analysis that I have been saving over the past few years.

The sources are: Saudi owned media, Lebanese March 14th media and blogs, "Syrian oppositions" sites and blogs… some independent and many Neocon/Saudi financed, supported or promoted.

But most of these creative stories started from the Kuwaiti As-Siyassah … the newspaper "close to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia" newspaper. The stories are hilarious. But at from 2004 until today many Syrian regime adversaries (journalists, politicians, readers …) were quoting them and cross referencing them as if they are facts. If you argued with any regime opponent on any blog you probably noticed that these stories were quite successful in convincing many people that the regime is about to fall .. that Mehlis got the perfect smoking gun … that Syria, Iran, hizbollah, Bashar, the Alawite army officers are all ready to stab each other in the back out of their desperation.

I wish President Bush can read these examples of all the honesty, productivity, objectivity, reliability, independence, and professionalism of his favorite side in the Middle East… then to remind us again why he is fed up with the Syrian regime.

From Beirutletter.com

????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ?? ??? ????? , ?? ???? ?????? ???? ?????, ???? ????? ?? ????? ??????? ??????, ?????? ??????, ?? ?????? ????? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ??? ???? ??? , ??? ???? ????? ???????? ????? , ???? ????? ????? ???????? , ????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ????? ?????? ???? ????? (100 ??? ?????) ???? ??? ?? ??? ???????? ???? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ??? ?????? , ??????? ??? ??? ?????? ???????? ?? ?????

Bashar, who is suffering from grave sickness (both physically and mentally) and can not sleep at night, was very worried that Khaddam is becoming too powerful and that the Syrian people in all the mosques are getting restless … therefore, he rushed to buy expensive gifts to the generals in charge of each of the divisions of the Syrian army … Bashar bought each one of them a Mercedes and gave each one $100,000 as a bonus for their loyalty… and for the Eid! (which Bashar never did before he got this scared)

From Levant News (widely quoted opposition site), more bad news for Bashar:

???? ????? ?? ???? ?????? ?????? ?? ????? ???? ??? ????? ?????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ?? ????? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ??????? ??? ?????? ??????? ?? ????? .. ??? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ?????? ??????? ?????? ??? ?????? .

Tehran asked Assad to delay his visit .. they just met with Saudi Prince Bandar and they were about to dump Syria for the more profitable relations with Saudi Arabia!

(No wonder he was a nervous wreck at this point)

Even more bad news for Bashar: From CedarGuards.org
?? ???? ?????? ?????? ?????? ????? ????? , ???? ??? ???????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ??????? ????? ??????? ???????, ?????? ???? ????? ????? ?? ??????? ???????? ???????, ?????? ?????? ????????? , ??????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ?? ???? ??????.. ?? ????? ????? ????? ?????? ???????? ?? ???, ????? ???? ???? ??????? ???????? ????? ??????? ?? ????????? , ??? ?? ???????? ???, ???? ??? ??? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ???????, ???? ?????? , ?? ???? ???? ?????? ?? ??? ??????? ???????? ???????, ????? ??????? ?? ????? ???? ??? ??????? ???????

Farouk Sharaa tried to meet with the Saudi King but his request was turned down. Sharaa left the Kingdom even more depressed …

Also

??? ???? ??? ?? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ???????, ???? ????? ????? ?????? ??????, ????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???? ???? ???? ??????? ????? ?? ???? ????????? ?? ??????? ??????? , ?????? ???? ??????? ?? ????? ?????? ????? ?????? , ??? ?? ??? ????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ????? ????, ?? ?????? ??????? ?????.

??????? ??????? ???? ???? 25 ??? ?? ????? ????? ????? ??????, ???? ???? ?????? ???????? ??? ?????, ??? ?? ???? ????? , ??? ?? ???? ?????, ???? ?? ??????? ?????? , ???? ??????? ?? ?????? ??? ?? ???????? ??????, ?????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ??? ?? ??????? ??????? ?? ????????? ?? ?? ???? ?????? ?? ??????? ???? ??????? ???? ?????? ?? ????? ?????? , ????? ?? ?? ???? ????? ?? ???? ?????? ???? ???? » ????? ????« ?? ???? , ??? ???? »????? ??????? « ??? ?????, ???? ?????? ???? ???? ?? ?????? ??? ????? ?? ??? ????.

Former Syrian Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi who knows everything about the Syrian army is now working with the Americans to help them overthrow Bashar through a swift American military operation … it is practically a done deal.

Poor Bashar.

Defending Sunnah reported:
????? ???????" ???? 8 ???? ?? ???? ????? ?? ????? ???????

??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?? ?????? ??????

Assad lost 8 kilos! … worried … unsettled … does not play with his children. 

Leb4all.yix.org (another Lebanese anti Syria forum) has this one:

???? ??????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ?????? ?? ??? ????? ??? ????? ???? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???????? ?? ???? ???? ??? ????? ???? ???? ????? ?????? ?????? ?????? .

The Iranian ambassador in Damascus became the true ruler of Syria … Bashar the Iranian puppet does not know what to do!

A Kurdish site quotes this story:

???? ???? ??? ?? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ????? ?????? ??????, ??? ?? ?????? ???? ??????? ???? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ??????? ????? ??, ????? ????? ????? ??? ????, ??? ?? ???? ??????? ????? .. ??? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ?????, ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ?? ???? ?? ???? ?????? ?????, ????? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ????? .
??? ??? ??????, ???? ??????? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ??????? ????? ???? ???? ?????, ???? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ???????? ??????? ????? ?? ????, ?????? ????? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? , ???? ???? ??????, ???? ??: ????? ???? ?????? ?? ???? , ?????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ??????? ?? ??????. ???? ??? ???? ?? ?? ??????? ???? ????.. ??? ???? ????? ????? ??????? ??? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ??? ???? ???? ??????????? ???????? ??????? . ????? ???????? ?? ???? ???? ????? ?? ??? ???? ?? ???? ????? ???? ?????? ?? ???? ??????? ??????? ??? ????? , ?????? ????? ????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ?? ?????? ?????? , ?????? ???? ?????? ???????, ????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ??????? ????????, ??? ??? ????? ????? ??????? ??? ????? ??????? ?????? ?? ??????? ???????? ????? ?? ????? ???? ??? , ?? ???? ??????? ???, ????? ??? ????????? ?? ?????, ???? ???? ??????? ????? ?????? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ?? ???????? …

Basically … Assad and his other regime thugs panicked when they realized that Hariri had a recording pen when he met Assad and that pen has a recording of Assad's voice telling Hariri that he will kill him. Assad's panicky reaction was to meet with Lebanon's Berri and Nasrallah to tell them that they need to help him escape the Mehlis investigation by "setting Lebanon on fire"

The Lebanese Kataeb official site (Amin Gemayel's) quotes this story:

???? ??????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ?? ???? ?????? ?????? ????????? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??????? ??????????? ??????? ??? ????? ????? ????? ?? ?????? ?????? ???? ?? ??? ?????? ?????? ???? ??????? ???? ??????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ?????? ????? ?????? ????? ?? ????? ???????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ?? ??????? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ?? ?????? ???? ????? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ??????? ??????? ???? ?????? ?? ??????? ?? ???? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ?? ?????? .
????? ??????? ?? ????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ????? ???? ?????????? ????? ?????? ?? ???? ?????? ?? ??????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ???? ????? ????. ????? ?????? ????? ???? ???? ???? ??????? ?????? ????? ??????? ??????? ???? ???? ????? ??? ???? .

Abdul Halim Khaddam will be joined by Alawite and Ismaeli commanders of the Syrian army in his new government in exile. Former Syrian chief of staff Hikmat Shihabi will also join.

This Assyrian opposition site says:

?? ??? ??????? ??????? , ???? ?? ????? ????? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ????? ??????????? ??????? ???????? ???????? ???? ???? ?????? ?????? ????? ??????? ????????? , ????? ????????? .. ?? ??? ??????? ??????? ????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ???????? ?? ????? ??????? ??????? ?? ????? ??????? ???????? , ??? ???? ??????? ??? ??????? ???????? , ?????? ??? ???? ????? , ???????? ??? ?? ????? ????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ????? .

Alawite people met Bashar (many on their wheelchairs) to beg him to give his brother and brother in law to the Mehlis investigation to save the Alawite people. But Bashar told Hosni Mubarak that his sister Bushra (Asef Shawkat's wife) did not allow him to do so … and what she decides is final as far as Bashar is concerned… even if it meant the destruction of Syria.

14march.org official site told us:

????? ??????? ??????? ?? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ?? ??? ????? ?????? ??????? ?? ???????? ???????, ??????, ???? ??????, ?? ?????? ?? ?? ?????? ???????, ?????? ?? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ???????? ?? ?????? ?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?? ??? ?? ?????, ??? ????, ????? ???? ?? ??????? ?????? ????? ?????? ?????????? ????????.

That Bashar is telling the Americans he is ready to sell Hizbollah in exchange for establishing relations with him.

From Walid Jumblatt's Party's official site:

?????? ??????? ?? ???????? ??????? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ????? ??? ???? ?? ????? ??????? ?????? ??? ??????? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ??????? ????? ?? ??? ????????? ??? ???? ????? ??????? ????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????? ????? ?????? ??? ?? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ??? ??????? ????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????

Alawites in Bashar's hometown of Qurdaha demonstrated for Rifaat Assad and Bahsar ordered Asef Shawkat to shoot at the demonstrators to teach them a lesson.

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood site:

???? ????? ????? ?????? ???????? ?? "???????" ?? ????? ?"??? ???? " ?? ????? ????? ?? ?????? ????? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ????? ?????????, ?????? ??????? ?? ???? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??????? ???????? ?????????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ????? ?????? ??????? ???? ???? ??????? , ?????? ??? ???? ??? ???? ????? ?????? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ???? ???? ?????? ?????????.

Hezbollah and the Syrian regime are secretly planning to dump Aoun and to appoint General Sleiman as Lebanon's next president (few months ago)

Khaddam's Free-Syria … a very popular opposition site:

??? ?? ??? ?? ????? ?? ?????? ?????????? ? ??? ?????? ?????? ??????? ????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????? ? ???? ???????? ?? ??????? ????????? ????? ? ???? ?? ??? ???? ?????? ????? …??? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?????? ?????????? ? ???? ?????? ????? ?????? ???????? ? ????? ??? ?? ?????? ?????? ?? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ?? ????? ? ?? ??? ? ?? ??? ????? ? ?? ???? ??????? ? ??? ??? ?? ?????? ????? ?? ??????? ?? ??????? ? ??????? ?????? ???? ???? ? ?????? ? ???? ? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ??????? ?????????? …??????? ????? ???? ?? ???? ????? ???? ???? ? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ????? ??????? ????????? ????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????? ?????

After he threw all his weight towards the Iranians, Bashar (like a typical child) hesitated. After he sold Syria to the Shiites thinking that Iran will save his neck, he started to think … then he got arrogant … then when he realized that Iran itself is about to be threatened by the Americans, Bashar realized that Iran is about to sell Syria and Hizbollah to the Americans … so he decided to switch to America.