I leave for Paris today and will not be blogging until I return Sunday. Here is my latest Foreign Policy article: As quiet returns, Syrians ponder the future. It covers the ground of my last post, but I have changed a number of elements in response to reader criticisms on SC, some of which I have posted below. Here are some thoughts on the reform process that is now taking shape.

President Assad has swung into action meeting with important leaders from different sectors of the Syrian population in an effort to hear their concerns and shore up support for the Baath Party and his presidency.

Sheikh Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Bouti

Most important have been his meetings with the Imams of Syria’s leading cities. These will be the key figures who can help repair his relations with the observant Muslim inhabitants of the cities. Most of the protests have been scheduled for Fridays because that is the day Syrians are allowed to assemble in large numbers. The sermons that are given and the level of criticism that is heard from the minbar can influence the mood of the public. Thus, it is little wonder that President Assad has been fulfilling the principal demands of Syria’s clerics.

Sheikh Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Bouti, Syria’s most respected cleric, stated that the President responded to the suggestions of the religious leaders

to grant freedoms and reform, fight corruption and end one-party rule.” He said during his weekly lesson aired by Syrian Television last night, that the Syrian command responded to many demands presented by a group of clerics, namely the re-employment of women wearing the niqab and the engineers who were distanced from the provinces, the issuance of a decree to found the Sham Higher Institute for Religious Studies and the delivery of instructions to open religious satellite channels that would sponsor “the real Islam that is neither inclined toward the east nor the west.” He added that President Bashar al-Assad told him he would address another speech to the Syrians, after the message of reform appeared to be vague.

President Assad has also accepted to close the country’s only casino and reversed a ban on teachers wearing the Islamic veil – moves seen as an attempt to reach out to conservative Muslims ahead of calls for pro-democracy demonstrations. Syrian activists have urged protesters to take to the streets on Wednesday and the following two days to honor more than 80 people who were killed in a crackdown on demonstrations that erupted nearly three weeks ago.

A number of Kurdish leaders have refused to meet with President Bashar al-Assad because he has refused to address their political concerns, although, he has sent out orders to treat the Kurds who have been refused Syrian nationality as if they were Syrians.

The naming of a Prime Minister who was a past Minister of Agriculture and is from the Southeast of Syria is widely viewed as a move to placate the demands of people from the region of Daraa who have been the worst affected by the protest movement that has swept Syria.

There is some question whether the President will strengthen the presence of the Baath Party in the next government in order to keep his party close as well. One reader worries that this article in al-Watan means that Dardari and the free market liberals in the last government will lose authority to the Regional Command of the Baath Party. The Party hawks believe that cutting socialism and subsidies is a cause of the unrest in Syria.

How these measures will be accepted by the public will depend to a large extent on whether demands for greater civil rights are met by the lifting of the Emergency Law and the new “Anti-Terrorism” law that will be passed by Parliament. If political reforms are given short shrift in favor of concessions to clerics and the Baath Party, many young Syrians will take the view that the country’s leadership is moving backwards and not forwards.

Bouti: President Assad ordered opening of religious channel…” [Thanks to mideastwire.com]
Al-Watan, April 6, 2011

Scholar Sheikh Muhammad Sa’id Ramadan al-Bouti stated that the Syrian command responded to the suggestions of the religious leaders to grant freedoms and reform, fight corruption and end one-party rule. He said during his weekly lesson aired by Syrian Television last night, that the Syrian command responded to many demands presented by a group of clerics, namely the re-employment of women wearing the niqab and the engineers who were distanced from the provinces, the issuance of a decree to found the Sham Higher Institute for Religious Studies and the delivery of instructions to open religious satellite channels that would sponsor “the real Islam that is neither inclined toward the east nor the west.” He added that President Bashar al-Assad told him he would address another speech to the Syrians, after the message of reform appeared to be vague.

“He continued: “The issue is not about decrees. The decrees are coming out but are awaiting implementation by the committees due to legal considerations,” explaining that the country will witness additional freedoms, the ending of the state of emergency and the discontinuation of the rule of one party…, that many steps have already been implemented and that they will soon be announced…

Ziad haidar in as-Safir, Tuesday, April 05, 2011

????? ??? ?? ????? ???? ????????? ??? ??????? ???? ????????. ??? ??? ??????? ??? ??? ????? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ?????? ??????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ????? ?????? ?? ???????? ???????? ??? ????? ????? ????? ????? ??? ?? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ????? ????? ??????? ??? ??? ???. ???? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ?? 1200 ?????. ??? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ????? ???????? ?? ?????? ????? ??????

Friends had the following to say about this sermon by the Imam of the al-Hassan Mosque in the Midan quarter, which is the heart of Damascus.

I watched this sermon three times. This shaikh is brilliant. I have never agreed with a religious man in my life. But this is absolutely superb. The talk about the economic hardship, the mukhabarat, the simple and poor people and the use of his minbar plus his love for Syria is very moving. Is this the same Kuraim family of Aleppo?

His accent is very Shami. He is from Damascus. He is the Imam of the al-Hassan Mosque in Midan in the heart of Damascus.

I loved it how he held the approved paper they gave him for his sermon and kept looking at it disgustedly while ignoring it. Freedom of speech is creeping in everywhere in Syria. Even the Syrian state TV has been transformed. I hope people upstairs all understand the changes, otherwise if they will decide to be stubborn then it’s going to be ugly. People will snap if they feel that they are being tricked and their intelligence is being insulted.

Kurdish leaders refuse to meet with Assad envoys…” [mideastwire.com]
Al-Sarq al-Awsat , April 6, 2011
by Irbil Shirzad Shikhani

A number of prominent Kurdish leaders active on the Syrian political scene decided to boycott the meeting that was held between representatives of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and a number of tribal and political Kurdish leaders. This decision to boycott the meeting came after the Kurdish political council that includes nine different Kurdish parties and organizations announced that it refused to take part in the gathering. In this respect, a prominent Syrian official source was quoted by Asharq al-Awsat as saying: “Both Abdul Rahman Darwish, the secretary general of the Kurdish Democratic Party, and Saleh Kado, the deputy Secretary General of the Leftist Kurdish Party have boycotted the meeting.”

“For his part, Saleh Kado who is present in Syria was quoted by Asharq al-Awsat as saying: “The Kurdish movement has always affirmed its attachment to and its support of dialogue. And although we are not opposed to such a dialogue with the regime, we have decided to boycott the last session that was held with representatives from the regime. We took this decision because we do not want to allow them to claim that the Kurdish cause or demands only have to deal with small services. The governmental delegation came to listen to the Kurdish social and economic demands and not to the Kurdish political demands.”

“Kado added:….. Currently, the Kurdish street is very upset and angry and everybody is carefully watching the developments on the ground. A number of Kurdish movements have called for protests this Friday and I believe that it is time for the regime to talk to us in regard to our national demands. They must cancel the emergency laws, amend the constitution and recognize our presence as an independent entity…””

Ankara: Leaders should be more courageous than their people…”
On April 6,  Asharq al-Awsat, Beirut Thaer Abbas

“Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is expected to arrive to Damascus today. This would be the first visit made by the Turkish foreign minister to the Syrian capital since the incidents that erupted in Syria last month. In this respect, Turkish sources described this visit as being very important. The sources considered that the Turkish leadership decided to deal with the Syrian crisis without any reservations and that this constituted an important development, especially since bilateral relations had improved drastically since the Justice and Equality Party came to power in Turkey.

“Davutoglu’s visit to Damascus comes after days of dispute and accusations in the Turkish media over the best ways to deal with these events. Many media reports had called on the government to keep its distance from the current Syrian regime and to show a willingness to cooperate with any new regime that might be instated in Damascus. Turkish official sources considered that Davutoglu’s visit to Syria signaled the importance that Ankara gave to President Assad, but also reflected its attachment to the strengthening of bilateral relations between the two countries. However, other sources said that Davutoglu was carrying with him a clear message to President Assad, considering that Ankara was very disappointed with the Syrian president following the speech he had delivered before in parliament. The sources added: “Davutoglu will be carrying with him many pieces of advice regarding the best way to deal with the current crisis in Syria.”

Sana: Davutoglu met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus on Wednesday, following visits to Qatar and Bahrain. Davutoglu expressed his country’s support for the reform package adopted by the Syrian authorities,” the official SANA news agency reported, citing a statement from the Syrian presidency.

Samir Aita has a very smart article: “Follow the money” in Le Monde Diplomatique

Those Arab states that have erupted this year – and others that may follow – want freedom and democracy, but also to end the way their countries have been run for the financial benefit of rulers and their friends……

Nabil, a medical doctor in Michigan, sent the following critique of my recent analysis:

I am an Arab-American who has been, like you, following the opposition movements sprouting up throughout the Arab World. I have read your blogs over the years and have been impressed by your intimate knowledge and intelligent analysis of Syria and the broader Middle East.

I would like to comment, however, that a modified analysis of the current situation needs to be applied. That is, instead of looking at things from the traditional perspective of the millet system, I urge that you look at changes from the perspective of human and civil rights.

Recent events in the Arab World are re-calibrating the relationship of peoples with their governments. For the first time, Arabs are looking to their governments are SERVING the people rather than RULING the people. Government is being expected to provide schools, healthcare, roads, security, etc. Government is no longer being permitted to imprison, torture, abuse, steal. The Arabs are demanding- as I see it- the rule of law. They finally are coming to see that they have the right to live like citizens of every other region in the world- with law above all, and with transparency and due process in all aspects of life.

…..A courageous leader would have needed to take on those who control the levers of power. It is NOT an Alawite thing, it is a matter of interests of the “murtaziqa” or the beneficiaries of the regime.

When the Assad regime starts to eliminate abuses of the government, cancels emergency laws, releases all political prisoners, develops a parliamentary system with presidential term limits, then I am sure that Syria will become a far more stable and happy place.

All Arab leaders need to realize that their strength comes from their alignment with their people- not with Iran, the US, Turkey. The people provide legitimacy and stability for government. When Syria’s regime represents all Syrians equally, the sectarianism that is currently prominent will fade, and Syria will become a far more successful and prosperous country.

So, I respectfully disagree with your take on Assad’s speech. Syrians, like all people, NEED a fair, just, and transparent governmental system that will provide a level playing field for all. This is a critical phase of nation-building. The rich and mighty will certainly lose some of their privileges, but in the long run, everyone will be that much better off.

A Commentator’s view:

If the opposition turns sectarian or use violence they will be rejected by most Syrians. The regime has no choice but to change and rebuild alliances,they have lost a lot of support due to corruption and oppression. You will see gradual but steady reform measures that target the poor, the Kurds and the moderate low-middle class religious groups.albaath will have to share power and people should not be arrested for writing an article. By the end of April,a third choice for cellular services may be available to Syrians ,I hope rami stays out of it and keep a low profile,he is a liability now. I was disappointed by the lack of discussion about alawites and other minorities that oppose the regime.

Another Commentator proposes class over sect is at root of protest movement:

Wahabis, Islamists, MB…..That’s all what I read in the comments here.. Seriously people have you checked the state of economy in Syria?

How about the extreme poverty that millions of Syrians suffer from as a result of the Baath ruling…what about repression and maltreatment by police/security? Is that not enough to mobilize many after seeing Egypt and Tunisia?

I’m really surprised to read these comments as in the past couple of weeks, I didn’t talk to any of my Sunni upper-middle class friends in Syria who did not clearly show support for a major change in Syria, especially after the president’s speech. Though they are all worried about the unknown but what is holding them from taking an active role in the demos is simply the fear… If the barrier breaks down completely, we would see huge movements in the streets of Damascus….

Also, nobody seems to note that many Damascene families, who used to be middle class one day, have moved to live in the mentioned suburbs. I know many people who sold their houses in prime locations in Damascus so they can afford to buy two or three houses in Artouz or Harasta and the like so that their boys would be able to get married….

You guys are ignoring the economical side of the whole movement and focusing on Wahabis. Deraa did not rise up because of a Wahabis’ agenda… Teens were arrested and the issue was poorly dealt with by those in charge of security in Deraa!

I have lived in Syria most of life and have been forced to take part in many pro-Assad demonstrations. Everyone in Damascus knows that, except for you guys! I know plenty of people who took part in the pro-Assad demo last week, but none of them participated willingly! So you can’t really use that demo as an evidence of Assad’s popularity! I’m sure many do support and like Assad, less after the speech though, but many more do not but are silent for now!

It’s about class and poverty and not sectarian! The regime and its supporters are the ones focusing on the sectarian aspect in order to curb people’s ambition of a change that Syria dearly needs!

Olaf Andersen writes:

Dear Joshua, We proceeded with our recent trip to Syria (March 25 – April 3) and had a wonderful time. There was no sign of any protest wherever we went (Bosra, Damascus, Homs, Hama, Crak de Chevaliers, Sergilla, Aleppo and Palmyra) and people were extremely friendly. The State Department’s advisory for all Americans to consider leaving Syria seemed paranoid – perhaps a Washington-Damascus power play.

Best regards, Olaf Andersen

Syrian Parliament to Repeal Emergency Law in May, AFP Says
2011-04-06
By Gregory Viscusi

April 6 (Bloomberg) — Syria’s parliament will repeal the country’s five-decade-old emergency law during a special session in early May, Agence France-Presse reported, citing an unidentified official close to President Bashar al-Assad. The special session will sit from May 2 to 6, AFP said.

Saudi ittisalat will probably be licensed to operate a third cell company in Syria. It may bring lower call charges. Syria has among the highest price structure for its cell phones.

Syria: Sectarian War or Class War

Part 2 of short videos on Syria. I discuss the sectarian and class background to the Baath regime and what it means for today’s opposition movement.

Part 1 is here.

Syria experienced its first day of political calm in over two weeks on April 3. The Sunami of protest and youth awakening that swept over Syria as part of the earthquake that hit the Arab World over two months ago has profoundly shaken Syrians. So accustomed to being the “island of stability” in the Middle East, Syrians are now wondering how long the Assad regime can last.

The Baathist regime has presided over Syria for 48 years; Bashar al-Assad has been president for eleven since inheriting power from his father. Both remain in firm control, although badly bruised and shaken. Western accounts of the protest movement in Syria have been exaggerated.  At no time was the regime in peril. No officials resigned or left the country as happened in Libya. The Syrian army remained loyal to the president, unlike the armies of Egypt and Tunisia. And the protest movement that grew large in the Syrian countryside failed to take root in the cities. The number of demonstrators that turned out in Damascus, Aleppo, and Hama, three of Syria’s four largest cities- counted in the hundreds and not the thousands.

Damascus was the only one of these three cities to have demonstrations. There were four in all. The two most significant occurred early in the process on March 16 and 17. Dozens of young demonstrators marched through the al-Hamidiyeh and Hariqa souqs on March 16 shouting, “God, Syria, Freedom – is enough,” a chant that became the standard slogan of the movement that spread to other parts of Syria in the following two weeks. The day after, scores of human rights activists and the relatives of political prisoners demonstrated in front of the Interior Ministry. After Deraa flared up, the citizens of Damascus fell quite rather than getting on the bandwagon.

Aleppo, a hotbed of Muslim Brother support in the 1970s, was completely unaffected by the anti-government movement. Instead, Aleppines turned out in sizable numbers to support the government.

Hama was also unaffected. It was the city that the Muslim Brotherhood was able to take over in 1982 before having its old districts destroyed brutally by the regime. A friend from Hama, who was asked, “Why isn’t Hama rising against the regime and taking revenge?” answered, “Syrians demonstrate for their own reasons. Don’t ever think anyone in Daraa will shed a tear for Hama or the other way around.”  He said there is no great Syrian revolution – just locals having internal issues.”

In Homs, by contrast, a sizable protest took place near the old city on Friday. Demonstrators chanted “Allahu Akbar” and called for “Freedom”. It was localized; violence flared up at the end. There were wounded on both sides, including security forces. The protest in Homs indicates that the cities are not immune to the movement. The hallmark of the successful Middle Eastern revolution has been the ability of the protesters to overwhelm security forces in the capital city. Damascus dispatched over a million of its inhabitants to a pro-Assad rally, leading many to conclude that the broad public remains on Bashar’s side.

All the same, many suspect that the protest movement, even if contained and sporadic, may become a nagging problem for the regime. Business will be reluctant to invest. The five year economic plan that was rolled out last year already looks wildly unrealistic. Its centerpiece is the gamble that Syria can attract 10 billion dollars of foreign investment a year. This year foreign investment will probably be less than 2 billion dollars. Economic failure will compound the regime’s problems. Opposition members insist that the barrier of fear in Syria has been punctured and that the long contained waters of liberty will eventually sweep it away. Others argue that the government will hit hard at the opposition to rebuild the wall of fear, making the protest movement a short lived phenomenon.

Deraa has been the site of the greatest demonstrations and the most violence. Tens of thousands took to the streets; some one hundred persons were killed in there and in the neighboring towns; many more were wounded. The protests were sparked for a very local reason.  Fifteen high school kids were arrested for scrawling anti-government graffiti on the walls. But the long-term causes were not entirely local. The slogans chosen by the schoolkids mimicked those used by protesters in Egypt and their call for freedom. A six-year drought has also hit the entire East of Syria hard, devastating agriculture a ruining the wheat crop along with incomes just at the time that the youth bubble generated by decades of an elevated birthrates have brought frustrated and unemployed young onto the streets of Syria’s provincial cities. What is more, Deraa is a tribal region, which some blamed for the severity of the demonstrations. Tribal tradition requires local leaders to protest the incarceration of their children and for the members of the tribes to come out in force. Even today, the tribes can provide a vehicle of resistance to the central state. Arab and Kurdish tribes were some of the last social units in Syria to buckled in the face of central authority and national identity.

Latakia on the coast also saw several days of demonstrations and violence. This was surprising because it is the capital of the Coastal region dominated by Alawites. Twelve were killed. A number were also killed in Duma, a town outside of Damascus. Demonstrations broke out in many provincial cities indicating that opposition demands for curtailing corruption, lifting the emergency law, and greater freedoms and speedy reform have widespread resonance across the country.

What Has Changed?

Even if the government in Damascus remains powerful for the time being and Syrians cling to the stability it promises, there can be little doubt that we are witnessing a profound break from the past. The Arab Street has finally come into its own. Rulers will have to think twice before treating their people like sheep. Economic failure will be punished. The video phone has become the Arab equivalent of the six-shooter in the American West. It is the new “equalizer.” It offers a modicum of equity and justice to the ordinary man who can now hold his phone aloft to capture police brutality and send it to Youtube. Technology has been transformative. The recent unrest could not have been sustained without it.

The Syrian community abroad has been irrevocably reunited with Syrians inside the country. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this change. The young of Syria can no longer be isolated from foreign movements and intellectual trends. Those who go abroad used to become dissociated from Syria. Calling home was prohibitively expensive and returning made difficult by mandatory military service.  Technology has attached the two communities. Skype, Facebook, and email have been all important to this revolution. In the past, the brain drain siphoned off Syria’s best and brightest; opposition leaders were sent into exile. Now they are leading the the charge against the regime, pumping sedition into every Syrian household with Youtube and Twitter updates.

A number of Arab states, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, have earned the right to be called nations. Their people have stood up as one to demand sovereignty.  Although emergency rule has yet to be lifted in Egypt and a stable government has yet to take shape in Tunisia, there is good reason to believe they will. For other Arabs, particularly those of the Levant it is too early to make such bold statements about national integrity. The leading reason Syrians did not take to the streets in larger numbers is fear of communal strife and possible civil war. They do not dislike their government enough to risk going the way of Iraq. Among large segments of Syrian society, Bashar al-Assad remains popular. As a multi-ethnic and religious society, Syria could come unglued.

But in a four or five years, the next generation of Syrian youth will not remember the turmoil in either Lebanon or Iraq. Palestine will be a cause remembered only by grandfathers. Instead of defeat and hopelessness, invoked by Iraq and Palestine, young Arabs may well have the examples of Egypt and Tunisia. They may well be on the road to becoming the Arab World’s first democracies.

This begs the question of how long the Assad regime can last. Syria’s youth are no longer apathetic. They have tasted revolution and their own power. Many commentators have remarked on Bashar al-Assad’s stubbornness. He may be a “modernizer,” but not a “reformer,” is how Volker Pertes recently explained it. This is a polite way to say that he is not preparing the way for a handover of power from Alawites to Sunnis. Assad’s refusal to prepare the present regime for a soft landing spells bad news for Syria. The day that regime-change will come to Syria seems closer today than it did only a short time ago.

[End of article]

A friend has confirmed that the entire Syriatel network is down for the second day.  All 093 numbers are down.  MTN 094 is working.

The Syrian pound deposits saw their first increase in 2 week. 19 money exchange guys were imprisoned.

The Syrian stock market closed at its lowest level for a while. From a previous low of 1450.5 , it rallied to 1539.9 (close to 6%) and then moved right back down to close today at 1449.6. Not a calamity but worth watching and keeping an eye on. Volume was very low today so one cannot tell much. Saghir thinks that everyone is waiting for the economic team in the new government to be announced.

Also the amount of money people could make on the 10,000 dlr limit was amazing. Everyone was able to walk into a bank and buy 10,000 dlrs from a bank at one exchange rate and walk into the next exchange house and sell the dollars to them for a quick profit of 250 dollars. All in 5 minutes. All at the expense of central bank

Assad names new prime minister
April 3, 2011

(JTA) — Syrian President Bashar Assad appointed a new prime minister, former Agriculture Minister Adel Safar, and asked him to form a government. Safar’s appointment on Sunday — less than a week after the previous government resigned — came as thousands attended the mass funeral of at least five protesters who were killed over the weekend in the Damascus suburb of Douma.  Adel Safar is generally regarded as a respectable figure in a government that many had criticized for corruption. ….

At least 2,000 Druse in the Golan Heights demonstrated Saturday in support of Assad.

One Commenter writes: “He is from a village south of Damascus, so perhaps he was chosen to appease the people of rural southern Syria who represent most of the protesters now. This man has no history in economics at all.”

Syria Emergency Law Alternative Ready By Friday
2011-04-04

DAMASCUS (AFP)–The commission charged with replacing Syria’s emergency law with new legislation will conclude its work by Friday, a newspaper close to the government reported. “Sources within the commission tasked with studying the removal of the emergency law said it will, by Friday, finish formulating the necessary legislation to replace the emergency law,” the Al-Watan newspaper said Monday.

Lifting Syria’s emergency law, in place since the end of 1962, has been a central demand of protesters in their three weeks of pro-reform rallies held across the country.

Al-Watan said the commission’s work is inspired by the “experience and legal frameworks of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, while taking into account both the dignity and  safety of all citizens”. “Its conclusions will be publicly discussed and the commission will listen to all views before the government passes the proposed legislation.” The newspaper report was not officially confirmed. President Bashar al-Assad had set April 25 as the deadline for the judicial commission to complete the task of drafting the new legislation to replace the emergency law.

One European friend who works in Damascus writes:

– Friday 25 March demonstrations came as a surprise to many and gave to all a sense of organization behind (regarding before the Friday 25 demons I already wrote to some of you an email).

– On Saturday 26 an Alawi (the minority sect in power, President included ) friend from Lattakia told me that they had to move to the countryside because there were people attacking Alawis. The news circulating in Syria were talking about “foreigners” (Jordanian, Yemeni etc.) going in to minorities neighbors shooting randomly, infiltrating protesters and shooting to police to provoke violent reactions, distributing poisoned food etc. Moreover there were terrorizing sms sent to people of an incoming sectarian violence against them. This became the official version of the Syrian media. Another Alawi friend in Damascus told me similar things witnessed by him. He belongs to a self defense group of Alawis in the Mezzeh Area called 86. The 86 area is an area in Damascus occupied by Alawis emigrants from Lattakia mountains when they took power. Successively the Alawi regime gave them this area, took from Damascene residents and owners. Patrolling this area he witnessed the police being attacked by young and much trained guys (“foreigner” accents even in this case) once their car was stopped. The car seized resulted later filled with weapons.

– Without any doubt and from the amount of witnesses from different sources something strange happened. Forces were trying to destabilize Syria bringing or menacing a sectarian conflict. Proves were given by the Syrian television. These proves were ignored by among others Al Jazeera.

– Now the reality it could be that real external forces (people mention Hariri group of Lebanon with Saudi help backed by USA and Israel) tried to destabilize Syria. Another thesis could be that Syrian secret service did so for the reason below.

– The only strong main legitimacy of this minority (predominantly “Alawi”) regime is the fact that it can assure stability and avoid sectarian violence like Iraq or Lebanon while permitting to a limited elite (predominantly Sunni Muslim but even Christian, Armenian, Drusi etc..) to develop economically and became rich. Once the spectrum or fear of sectarian violence is on the horizons, the majority of the people from all sects and especially all minorities will rally behind the President asking first of all security (at the price of freedom). No one, even most of the protesters (still a very small minority until now), want to become like Iraq or Libya.

– That is what happened and most of the people rallied for the President days after the Friday protests. Around 1,5 million or even more people went on the street in Damascus. Demonstration of support were held in quite all Syria.

– The people here are very upset on how Al Jazeera is covering the Syrian events. Many persons I know, not at all regime’s funs, now believe that the satellite channel has an hidden agenda on this issue. They claim (with proves) that Al Jazeera is showing false videos of demonstrations and that is ignoring other facts the Syrian government and media are reporting on the “foreign” hands behind the events. I can testify living here that the image and info Al Jazeera is giving about Syria events are at least “exaggerate” and not represent the real situation. In any case Al Jazeera is without any doubt contributing to exacerbate the situation and the “etats d’esprit”.

– After the demonstration in support of the President came his speech on the Parliament. I can assure you that except the supporters, very few people were happy. The expectations were high and he disappointed the majority. A lot of old stale smell went on the air. In my opinion the regime, confident after the demonstration in favor, decided to show it will not bow to “foreign” pressure and it will reform when it wants. The day after it was announced that commissions to study the “emergency law” as well as the “Kurdish question” and others issues will be established to study how to change. Many believe they are empty promises but they have no other choice than to believe.

– Then the yesterday protests came. The majority was hoping that things will get calm, it did not. The situation is very tense now. In reality the protests are still very small and even if distributed in many cities do not yet represent the will of the majority. The problem is just that the Syrian regime like all dictatorships are not used to dissent, to contestation and do not know how and want manage it. Europeans and Americans (westerns) have witnessed protests and know how things go smoothly there. You can see millions in the streets contesting the government (in Europe for example) and the government still in power after that. Here I really realized how fragile a dictatorship system is.

– You can rarely find dollars in the market now, I had to go to Lebanon to find some.

– A friend went to the bank to take some money and they give him only small pieces (200 SP equal to 4 dollars). The big pieces (1000 SP, 20 dollars) were not available. Many are taking their money from the bank scared of the future. This morning I had to visit 6 or 7 banks to find one delivering cash from the machine.

– Price of gold is very high, the top of ever.

– All international transfers are on hold for fear of capital flee. Tomorrow they must come back to normal.

– The port of Lattakia (the main entrance of goods in Syria) was closed until yesterday. I have been informed that today opened after around 1 week of closure.

– During the last week shops in Lattakia were closing after door and no clients on the streets.

– In the rest of Syria sales in general are down, people scared, but most of the people are living normally even if with tensions and electricity on the air.

– After the protests the government is giving a kind of general amnesty and asked its bureaucracy to speed all the procedures on hold, I mean: police is not stopping for infractions (I did not see a policemen writing), a friend get his paper approved after 4 years and half waiting for security approval (here everything needs security approval), I have been told about a lot of illegal constructions built during these days of chaos not stopped by the authorities, even Zara could open in the capital after for many years the owner could not get the commercial permission for the location (some voices are saying that it did without permission but exploiting the current situation) . Probably in this case worked a big help from Makhlouf (Syriatel the main mobile company owner as well as The duty free shops and many many more), the president cousin on the USA black list for corruption and 50% (or more) shareholder of the Zara and MD project.

– Why demonstrations on Friday? Because Friday is the day of common prayer for Muslims and is the sole day governments cannot forbid gathering of people. Probably if they could, dictatorships will forbid Friday prayers in many Muslim countries. As you can see, even controlling the Imams speeches and selection cannot guarantee the people avoid to express themselves freely once together.

– Things now (today) seem to get back to calm even if the air is tense. Maybe we have to wait next Friday to see more protests or maybe it will calm down.

– Now I really took too much time from my work. I hope that these notes will give you a better clearer idea of what is happening.

A note of a 19-year old young man’s thoughts (Bassam) about his participation in the Mar 15 demonstration in Hareeqa Damascus. It is being passed around. I cannot testify to it, but it would seem authentic.

Mar 15th., The Morning. I Thought – I am Scared

……Not sure when I actually fell asleep or for how long, but my sisters are getting ready to go to school. … The next few hours were a big blur to me as I don’t exactly recall how I spent them….

I got into a taxi and told him, to Hareeqa please. ……..My heart is beating about a thousand times a minute, my mouth is very dry I couldn’t even cough, and I am soaking with cold sweat. It is not too late Beeso, you can still go home and no one needs to know… No one can say you’re a coward… But wait, if I don’t do it, no one else would. …

A few minutes later, I started hearing some chanting. Allah, Syria, etc. etc. Oh no, I said to myself, the regime lackeys are at it. They must be chanting for Bashar. Wait a minute, I could swear they didn’t say Bashar. I walked a little closer to see what’s going on. There were not more than 5 guys chanting, Allah, Syria, Hourya ou bass. What am I hearing? This is actually happening you guys. This is it, I am witnessing the first demonstration against the regime! This is no longer outside of Syria. We are in Syria, we are doing it and in front of the security guys. I have no idea how it happened next, but from where I was standing, which was about 30 meters from the chanting guys, I started yelling with my cracking voice, Allah, Syria, Hourya (freedom) ou bass… I am telling you, God works in mysterious ways. I have no idea how I was suddenly surrounded by not less than 10 other guys, and they started chanting after me. By God, I am leading a demonstration against Bashar… Some of the guys whom I thought were security guys were among the people chanting with me. That’s it, we are going to be shredded to pieces if they catch us. Yes, I said “us”. I am no longer alone. I am surrounded by nameless people, people whom I have met only minutes ago, yet a unique kind of bond has formed over these short minutes. We ARE the good guys, and we are facing it, whatever it may be, together.

As we went on chanting, I looked around me at the pale-faced shop keepers. They were scared even to look at us. I could swear some of them were reciting verses of Quran, fearing for their lives, just because of what they’re witnessing. Local policemen started talking to us in such a caring way, “come on you guys, don’t do that, please go home”. Wow, funny how even a remote hint of accountability could change the attitude of an oppressor. Under any other circumstance, they would have been breaking in their army-issued boots on our behinds.

The chanting went on for about 15 minutes. Everyone whipped out their camera-equipped mobile phones, thank you Nokia, and started shooting footage of us. At some point, the people shooting videos out-numbered us 10 to 1. But they were not chanting, so they don’t count. Lo and behold, a few minutes later, about 10 minibuses arrived carrying the brave men of some elite unit and they wasted no time in grabbing people. And here comes the highlight of my experience. Those same pale-faced shop keepers started helping out… not helping us of course, but helping the brave men by pointing to them which direction everyone was running to, or what building entrance we escaped to. I thought to myself, am I not risking myself so we can all have a better life, including those loyal shop keepers? An older shop keeper even attacked us with a stick, of course in front of the brave men. I had prepared myself for everything, except for this. I yelled at him, we are risking ourselves for everyone, even for you and your kids. He simply cursed my father for such an outlaw offspring and yelled at me to do “it” away from his shop.

So we did some fancy running… Yes, years of soccer practice at the Jalaa club did pay off, thank you Mom and Dad. A few minutes later, most of us made it back to our merry ways back home (with the exception of the few unlucky ones who got caught and beaten by either shop keepers, security guys, by-passers, or by all). We did deploy some minor strategies afterwards, like not going home directly, not calling each other later, using code words like how was lunch, etc. etc.

Damascus seems different to me ever since that memorable afternoon. It feels like it never did before. Sometimes I go back to the crime scene, and I smile when I look at the fence I had to jump over, and at the street where I almost got run over by a passing car as I was fleeing the scene. It sure feels different. It feels more… “mine”. All in all that day, I did suffer a ripped sweater, a scratch on my hand, and a solid resolve. And by the way, I am not scared anymore.

Crisis in Syria; Holding the fort
President Bashar Assad is under intensifying fire but refuses to retreat
Mar 31st 2011 | DAMASCUS | The Economist

THE protests that started in the southern city of Deraa on March 18th have spread—and the regime of President Bashar Assad has so far been determined to crush them. Since March 25th, when many thousands of Syrians again took to the streets for the second Friday in a row, more than 40 people have been killed, raising the death toll in two weeks to more than 100—and many more than that have been arrested and tortured.

After the most recent bloody round of protests in Deraa, the nearby town of Sanamein erupted too: at least 15 people were shot dead. Protests have also occurred in Homs and at least a dozen other places. Most worrying for Mr Assad, they also broke out on a large scale in the port city of Latakia, leaving another score of people dead. It has long been a stamping-ground for his ruling family and a hub of his own minority Alawite sect, so the unrest has come dangerously close to home.

The regime has set about muzzling the media and issuing its own counter-propaganda. Visas for foreign journalists are hard to come by; entering Deraa, except in rare cases with an official minder, has been impossible. A well-orchestrated demonstration in favour of Mr Assad on March 29th drew tens of thousands of people onto the streets of Damascus, many of them genuinely keen to support him.

Yet the germ of protest has continued to spread. Trouble seems to be popping up in new places. Kurds in the north-east are getting restless. Local grievances have been amplified into national ones. Chants and banners in the crowds are calling for the fall of the regime. Posters and statues of Mr Assad and his father, Hafez Assad, who ruled Syria from 1971 until his son took over after his death in 2000, have been defaced.

Israel still has emergency law in effect, enacted by the Brits in 1945 and never annulled, and that’s the legal basis for the indefinite detentions and blanket gag orders and lack of transparency regarding the nukes and other things.

Many have been arrested.

Turkey will not accept anything that shakes the stability of Syria and supports Assad’s reforms …..

?????: ?? ???? ??? ???? ???? ??? ????? ????????? ?? ????? ????? ?? ???? ?????? ????? ????? ????????? ???????? ??????????? ???????????

Mr. Kerry’s statement could presage a hardening Washington line toward Damascus as political protests are expected to continue in Syria. So far, the White House has taken a cautious approach. The U.S. has criticized the Syrian government’s use of forces against its people. But President Barack Obama’s administration hasn’t indicated it might pursue punitive measures against Syria, such as new economic sanctions, in response.

World Bank To Host Meeting On Middle East Economies April
2011-04-02 By Bob Davis
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)–World Bank officials have invited the leadership of regional development banks to meet here on April 14 to devise economic policies to help Egypt, Tunisia and other Middle Eastern nations trying to make transitions to democracy, according a senior World Bank official. The session comes as officials from the U.S., Europe and the Middle East are working on programs to help Middle Eastern countries make up temporary shortfalls caused by a drop in tourism and other economic turmoil. They are also studying policies to promote employment, especially among college-educated young people who have been the vanguard of some protests sweeping the region.

Where ‘Jasmine’ Means Tea, Not a Revolt
By ANDREW JACOBS
Published: April 2, 2011

BEIJING — Over the nearly four decades since President Richard M. Nixon established diplomatic ties with Red China, American politicians have clung to the idea that the growing ranks of Chinese entrepreneurs and college-educated strivers would one day find electoral democracy irresistible. But a stroll through one of the capital’s upscale malls quickly demolishes such idealistic notions — and instead makes you wonder whether China’s autocrats have struck on a flexible model of long-lasting rule.

At the Oriental Plaza mall, young professionals dressed in Nikes and Abercrombie & Fitch openly profess their admiration for Communist Party governance. ”Any change in the political system would just throw China into disorder,” said Guo Ting, a 30-year-old office assistant. “Our leaders are doing a good job.”

US hedges its bets on Syria: analysts

by Lachlan Carmichael Lachlan Carmichael

Sun Apr 3, 4:52 pm ET

WASHINGTON (AFP) – Although the Assad regime in Syria has long been a thorn in Washington’s side, the Obama administration is not yet ready to throw its lot in with anti-government protesters there, analysts said.

The unrest gripping Syria comes as President Barack Obama pursues a new US policy of engaging with a former foe in a bid to promote a broader Arab-Israeli peace by driving a wedge between Syria and its ally Iran.

His administration may be hedging its bets because it will still have to deal with the regime if President Bashar al-Assad and his powerful security forces end up crushing the unrest.

Ammar Abdulhamid, a Washington-based Syrian dissident and democracy activist who has political contacts in Washington, said some US officials fear a change and prefer to work with Assad, at least for now.

“I think they will get there (to accept a change) in due course of time,” Abdulhamid told AFP.

“But for now… they are afraid that… Assad will not go out gently into that good night and therefore they might try to create trouble, and that will create a civil war type scenario.”

They fear it “will be either civil war or they will have to deal with an even more radicalized and anti-Western regime if the Assads came up in control again,” said Abdulhamid, who heads the Washington-based Tharwa Foundation.

However, the dissident said, such fears are misplaced because the Damascus regime can hardly become more radical than it is with its close ties to Iran and its support for anti-Israeli Hezbollah and Hamas.

Abdulhamid nonetheless welcomed the Obama administration’s decision to avoid showing undue fear that Islamists would emerge from the protest movement and assume power in Syria.

But Middle East analyst Marina Ottaway said such a threat may exist even though the Muslim Brotherhood was crushed after it was massacred in Hama in 1982 on the orders of Bashar’s ruthless father Hafez al-Assad.

“Has it gone underground, how quickly can it be revived, how much sympathy is there still for the Muslim Brotherhood? I have no idea and I don’t think anybody else has an idea on that,” she said.

The Obama administration is struggling to come up with a policy “case by case, country by country,” said Ottaway, who heads the Middle East program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“You cannot say that because the US in the end decided against (former Egyptian president Hosni) Mubarak and (went) on the side of the protesters in Egypt, that it’s going to do the same thing in Syria,” she said.

Ottaway said US officials have more difficulty understanding the protesters and their movement in Syria because there has been a “greater void of political activity” and deeper repression there than in a country like Egypt.

The protests pose a problem for the Obama administration — which she noted is trying to improve ties with Syria to advance US policy — as it will have to assess whether the protest movement will succeed or be crushed.

“If this is something the Syrian government is going to repress quickly, then a policy of trying to find a way to work with the Syrian regime makes sense,” Ottaway said.

“If the protest (movement) is going to continue, and has real potential of bringing about change, then the US had better learn to work with the protesters.”

A senior European diplomat based in Washington said Western powers were concerned about what may replace the Assad regime.

“More than in Libya, you have some extremist networks, connections with Iran, Hezbollah,” the diplomat told reporters on the customary condition of anonymity.

“If it is to have Assad out and a pro-Iranian regime in, that would not be the goal. It’s not an easy task to do for us

US Authorizes voluntary departure of all eligible family members of U.S. government employees.

04/04/2011

WASHINGTON (AFP)–The United States Sunday said it authorized family members of U.S. government employees to leave Syria as it heightened a travel warning for the country being roiled by political unrest.

“The U.S. Department of State warns U.S. citizens of the potential for ongoing political and civil unrest in Syria,” the department said in a statement.

“We urge U.S. citizens to defer non-essential travel to Syria at this time. The Department of State has authorized the voluntary departure of all eligible family members of U.S. government employees. U.S. citizens in Syria should closely examine their security situation in light of this and other recent developments and consider departing Syria.”

The statement updated a warning issued March 31 and reiterated some of the precautions called for at that time.

This is diplomatic retaliation against the arrest of 2 American citizens in Syria (released today). The department also warns of a possible increase in “anti-foreigner sentiment.” “Detained U.S. citizens may find themselves subject to allegations of incitement or espionage,” the statement read. The government said Syrian authorities do not notify the U.S. of the arrest of a U.S. citizen until days or weeks after an arrest, and requests for consular access go unanswered, especially in the case of those detained for “security” reasons.

Middle East crisis: Inside Syria’s ruling family
Telegraph.co.uk

But there is also a lingering belief, one held by Dennis Ross, President Obama’s principal Middle East advisers among others, that Mr Assad would reform if he wasn’t held back by an old guard he inherited from his father and predecessor Hafez. …

Roundtable on Syria Today (Part 3): Is Syria Different?
by Steven Heydemann, Fred Lawson, David Lesch, and Patrick Seale

This is the last installment (Part 3) of the first Jadaliyya Roundtable on Syria, moderated by Bassam Haddad and Joshua Landis, of Syria Comment. It features Steven Heydemann, Fred Lawson, David Lesch, and Patrick Seale. This post will be published on both Jadaliyya and Syria Comment. [See Part 1 here, and Part 2 here.]

Per the original announcement in Part 1, we are still awaiting responses from a number of writers from inside Syria who have understandably hesitated to write so far. Observers of Syria, inside and outside the country, are welcome to take a stab at the questions posed here in. Please send your responses to [email protected]

Roundtable Question #3

3. Is Syria different from its Arab counterparts in terms of the uprisings and the response? If yes, how so?

Steven Heydemann (Q #3). As someone who has long argued for authoritarian learning as a meaningful way to understand processes of regime adaptation to changing circumstances, the responses of the Syrian regime thus far have been deeply disappointing. I see very little evidence of learning in the behavior of the Syrian regime.

Aside from the non-trivial differences between the Syrian case and other Arab cases – some of which I referenced in responses to the first two questions, the regime seems determined to imitate strategies that have been proven in other settings to fail. The combination of limited and largely cosmetic concessions on one hand, and repression on the other, has been tried and failed in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen. The presidential speeches blaming outsiders and alluding to plots against the nation have been tried elsewhere, with no more effect. Repression has a mixed track record. It has worked in Algeria. It has worked in Bahrain, but only when a neighboring state’s army moved in to support the regime. In every other case, however, from Tunisia, to Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, and Jordan, repression has failed to bring protests to an end. It has often been catalytic in mobilizing support for the opposition. So while we can imagine conditions under which repression will be more effective in Syria than in other cases, the general observation is that nothing the Syrian regime has done in response to protests distinguishes it from the approaches taken by its counterparts elsewhere in the region.

On a different level, however, one key argument of the regime has been that its nationalist credentials and association with the “resistance” bloc in the Middle East give it a basis of legitimacy that pro-Western Arab regimes do not enjoy. For all that the current protests underscore how hollow such claims are, they cannot be dismissed entirely. Peace treaties with Israel and close ties to the West, whatever their strategic and economic benefits for countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, and Jordan, remain deeply unpopular with citizens across the region. It may well be the case that on this issue, and in terms of its overall anti-Westernism, the Syria regime has an element of popular legitimacy that its pro-Western counterparts might lack.

Yet it would be an enormous mistake to place too much weight on this notion. On one hand, it is not hard for regimes like the Syrian to manufacture legitimacy through staged performances of “spontaneous” mass support. On the other, we have ample evidence over the past two weeks that the regime’s nationalist credentials, such as they are, do not insulate it from the deep anger and resentment that ordinary Syrians feel about issues ranging from corruption and inequality, to the humiliations associated with everyday life under an authoritarian regime that pervades almost every aspect of their existence. Even in this respect therefore, what might appear to be exceptional about Syria begins to look more typical if we dig a little bit beneath the surface of the regime’s claims.

Fred Lawson (Q #3). I would be very surprised if Armenians and other Christians in Syria had changed their general posture toward the Ba’thi regime since the early 1990s. At that time, long after the horrors that drove their parents and grandparents out of Anatolia, shopkeepers and professionals would confide that whatever its shortcomings and injustices, the status quo was better than any situation that might open up the possibility of an Islamist-dominated order. Egypt’s Copts may well share these sentiments, but well-to-do younger members of that religious community nevertheless linked arms with their Muslim counterparts when the moment for collective action arrived. It seems harder to imagine even university-educated Armenian Orthodox marching alongside, say, their Maronite classmates through the streets of al-‘Aziziyyah, one of Aleppo’s more affluent neighborhoods.

On the other hand, Syria is not as deeply riven by sectarianism as Bahrain. No matter how loudly and consistently liberal reformers who hail from Bahrain’s downtrodden Shi’i population proclaim their cause to be nonsectarian, the country’s Sunni citizens will still worry that a fully elected parliament will end up advancing the interests of the local Shi’ah. So perhaps having a relatively large number of distinct religious communities in the general population will preclude the emergence of two mutually antagonistic blocs, neither one of which is willing to make conciliatory overtures to the other.

David Lesch (Q #3). Syria is different from other uprisings in several respects, most of which make Asad’s removal from power less likely. First, Syria is more ethnically and religiously diverse than countries such as Egypt and Tunisia. It has been fraught with political instability in the post-independence period until Hafiz al-Asad came to power in 1970. After that, Syrians seemed to accept—and Asad demanded—the Faustian bargain of less freedom and liberty in return for more political stability.

With chaos and disorder readily apparent on its borders in Lebanon and Iraq, most Syrians are reticent to engage in actions that might lead to instability…and the regime has done everything it can to promote this characterization for its own benefit. Secondly, despite what many in the opposition are saying, it is my impression that Bashar al-Asad is relatively well-liked in Syria—or at least not generally reviled. He lives a relatively humble existence, i.e. there will be no Wikileaks reports detailing an extravagant lifestyle b/c he doesn’t have one.

In addition, he has not given into the American and Israeli projects in the region, which has won him points in the Arab street, as opposed to someone like Egypt’s Husni Mubarak, who was seen as selling out the Palestinians and a lackey of US and Israeli imperialism.

Finally, although I am not as convinced as I was a couple of weeks ago of this, generally speaking, the military and security services are more tied to the fate of the regime than their counterparts in some other Arab states; therefore, they are more likely to stay with Bashar. On the other hand, if Bashar makes the concessions I believe he needs to make, there could be interesting ripples in various pockets of the military and especially the mukhabarat that might cause him problems. This could also be why he took so long to go public. He was making sure the ducks were lined up in a row before doing so. This could also be why his speech came up well short of expectations in terms of outlining reforms with any specificity.

Patrick Seale (Q #3). Syria’s nationalist stance—its support for Hizballah and Hamas, its opposition to Israel and the US—is essentially what makes it different from Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen or Bahrain. This is a source of pride for many Syrians and has given the country some immunity from popular protest. But, as we have seen, it is wearing thin.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, which are more homogeneous societies, Syria is a mosaic of sects, similar to Lebanon if not quite so diverse. This makes for divisions in society, for different social habits, cultural norms and also different loyalties. Hence a permanent sense that the delicate balance could be overturned.

[See Part 1 here, and Part 2 here.]

A note from a friend in Duma, where four protesters were killed today.

Hurrah! I made it! Had the full adventure today: was in Duma, the hardest hit. talked with the shebab, experienced tear gas (found that cats are apparently immune, as they went on as nothing was), got out safe and sound though there was shooting, and got stopped at Al Tall by you know who.

Also saw Damascus’ squares empty, the same that I was told were to be a the heart of the protests. no one there expect you know who.

the shebab exaggerate numbers and news. one in Duma told me there were 20 thousand security. and that they, the rebels, were thousands. they were hundreds. they also said 10 victims. Reuters tonight said 4. the gvt accepted 3, if I recall correctly, blaming snipers. One was caught by the shebab, they said he was gvt, asked me to see him, but the guy was up on the last floor of a building, and tear gas like all gasses ascends, so at the third floor it was impossible to breath. never got to see the guy.

interesting day

the most beautiful part is that I AM BACK! safe and sound in my hotel room, Thanks to God.

don’t think I’ll mix with the shebab again. I believe in the sniper story. People I trust said they are in Latakia. in other cities, according to those same accounts, they mingle with the crowd, shoot at the police, which in turn shoots back at the crowd. If that is true, hopefully the police will change tacticts?

anyway, seen up close, it is rather ugly…………………

???? ????? ?????? ?????????? ??? ??? ???????? ??? ????? ????? ???????? ????? ????? ??? ????? ?????? ???? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?? ????? ????? ?????? ??? 1/8/2011 ??? ????? ????? ????? ????? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ??????????   Syria pushes back cutting government subsidies on fuel oil, scheduled for April 1.

A note from a Syrian Friend (Friday morning):

Both Aljazeera and Erdogan seem to have given up on Bashar after his speech.

Aljazeera is now broadcasting a rerun of a press conference held in Istanbul yesterday for the MB leadership (tayfour, alsheqfeh and others). They are calling for massive demonstrations on Friday and blaming Bashar speech. They are thanking Turkey, AKP and Erdogan for their support. They are praising the Ottoman era and how “we felt as Turks citizens under the amazing Ottoman rule”

This is it. They are now planning to take over the democratic public opinion in Turkey which will be the end. Once the Turkish public opinion goes anti-bashar (soon with his continued stupid PR steps) Erdogan will bow to his people and start publicly supporting the opposition in Syria. Syrian people like Erdogan as much as they like Bashar. They will be split in the middle and it will be sectarian and ugly.

http://www.syria-news.com/readnews.php?sy_seq=130790

This is amazing. If only he said  “tomorrow we’ll start doing 1,2,3”, the people who made up their minds after the speech that there is no hope and decided to take it to the street after Friday prayers would have been sitting satisfied in their homes today. Simply incomprehensible how ever you look at it!!

I hope nothing will happen today, but the preparations online are scary. We’ll see in an hour or so….

…  I agree with …that among the 65 percent I keep referring to as conditional supporters (other than the 25 harcore supporters and 10 hardcore opposition) they are loosing faith fast due to unbelievable stupidity from the regime. The regime has only to blame itself. People want to believe and want to like Bashar but they are being pushed away.

…  Ironically, Al-arabiya is the most balanced one so far on Syria!!

But the I think the only source of info on demonstrations is twitter and Sham News Network on Facebook (which you need to filter heavily as it is full with propaganda). Also on Lattakia, Lattakia News Network on Facebook is credible.

Reuters, BBC journalists and others are using few tweeters are their only source on the demos. They decided that they are credible. This is what happens usually, those few tweeters tweet about a demonstration in daraa let’s say and in 30 minutes reuters issues an alert with the same content exactly.

A note from a reader in response to the ReelNews video (last post) and controversy:

Josh stated clear facts in his interview with a lot of neutrality. Listen, Bashar’s speech was a major let down, for me more than anyone, but it is a fact that the majority of Syrians are pro-Bashar, its just a fact, unfortunately.

The government has instilled enough fear in everyone about civil wars and chaos. In fact, the “Shabiha” that the government called “outside elements,” are very much from the very inside of the government. Scaring neighborhoods that their next neighbor is getting ready to attack is a smart tactic that was used by them to further instill fear. While Mubarak sent them on horses, they Syrian government sent them with messages. Very smart, and extremely smart in the way the media portrayed it. After all the Assads are famous for the “smart gene.” Remember our former Assad?

Why are you so surprised when he talks about a possible civil war? The main reason this has not taken place yet is because of the governments brutality. It is a a gene that most of us Arabs carry around, its called “My religion is right and yours is wrong.”

I grew up in a Druze family in the southern mountains of Syria. My best friend was a Greek orthodox Christian and the society was a Muslim one. I know how people think there. I was actually there in 1999 when a Druze youth was killed by a Baudouin guy. My entire city went marching to neighboring Baudouin cities burning their homes down and beating/killing anyone in the way that was a little darker skinned. I was there in the Souk when a guy’s head was crushed with a brick because they thought he was a Badawi! It later turned out he was a guy from Daraa. The government sent tanks and military personnel to Sweda, Syria. I remember when I would go downstairs to take tea to the soldiers outside our house every night. They were “protecting” us as my grandmother would put it. We are no exception! Syria is an Arab country with tons of problems just like the rest of the Arab world. Our regime is no exception either. It is a ruthless dictatorship that has robbed our country for the past 40 years. Syria is a complicated story. Bashar has a lot of work to do and I hope he does it quickly. There is not a clear alternative for him for the time being.”

A note from an American academic with long experience in Syria and a wonderful book on the Great Revolt in Syria 1925-1927.

Dear Josh, I am addicted to and grateful for your blog in these times. You are providing a wonderful service.

This morning I had occasion to visit the Syrian Embassy in the European capital where I am living. There was a small anti-demonstration in the process of being taken over by a pro-demonstration. The people chanting praise of the president did not seem to be enjoying themselves much. Most of them seemed to be embassy employees and students. I guess employees of Syrianair and their families were there too. Nobody met my eyes as I stood by waiting for them to pass.

The president has argued that Syria is different from other states in the region because of its resistance and the dignity he delivers and symbolizes for his people. But if people are subjected to the kind of things we have seen over the last weeks, including his speech, and then compelled to act out spectacles of obedience, what kind of dignity has been delivered?

I think we saw evidence yesterday that the state has a depressingly limited repertoire of responses to crisis, and a basic inability to adjust course to insure at least grudging consent of its majority.

I remember in 1999 when Hafiz al-Asad won his final referendum. People went to the polls because not going was not worth the risk. The performative requirements of obedience to the system were not that great, and the potential costs of disobedience were significant. A couple friends scheduled doctor appointments, and one friend went to Lebanon for an “appointment” to avoid going to the polls. Most people just went. Socialism meant that everybody ate, and prospects were marginally acceptable for most people. The government spent money in the countryside and places like Deraa had pretty good schools and hospitals and other services.

A few months later Hafiz al-Asad died, and something changed. Once it was clear things would be smooth, people’s anxiety lifted. There was a referendum for the new president, and unlike a few months before, I didn’t know one person of my own age group (20s-30s), who admitted bothering to vote. A bit later, the president addressed parliament and said something like, (I paraphrase from memory) “all these displays (pictures and regime icons) are against our human dignity. From now on, government offices should have a smallish photo of the late president and one of the current president. We don’t need more.”

It was a very popular expression of collective dignity. And even friends who cared nothing for politics were impressed. The giant five story high banner of Hafiz al-Asad’s face on the bank at SahatYusuf al-‘Azmeh came down. Same with the central bank. Mezzeh prison was closed, and a couple new newspapers started. The streets were cleaner. The Barada was cleaned up a bit.

So eleven years later, it seems the late president has returned from the dead. The cult of personality is back with a vengeance. The difference is that there are 6 million more Syrians, proportionately fewer jobs, and major problems with the economy and conditions in rural areas. Rural migration to Damascus, is skyrocketing and the agricultural land surrounding the capital is being consumed for shanty-type housing and golf courses for the newly rich. It is not clear what average Syrians would get now in return for their grudging consent to a system that seems unable to deliver even dignity.

I looked at the list of the dead from Hauran you posted. I recognized many of those family names. People from outside Hauran assumed these were poor peasant youth, but I don’t think so. They looked to me like the sons of the leading families of their region. In other words, sons of the rural and provincial middle classes. There must be millions like them. They were raised in big families with some local prominence, but their generation has very limited career prospects and a lot of frustration. What does the government have to offer them, and how exactly can more time spent “studying” reform help the situation?

Over the years every retired Syrian politician I ever met and talked to said to me, “In Syria we have time.” America doesn’t have time, Israel doesn’t have time, but we have time.” I am sure you have heard the same from people you have interviewed. It is a smart strategy and it’s true until it’s not.

Syrian politics has been a long game since at least the 1970s. Bashar certainly learned the long approach to politics from his father. If you can hang on, through the crisis, and survive, you have won. But one day, maybe tomorrow, maybe next year, or maybe in five years’ time the long game won’t work. The crisis (whatever it is) will demand immediate change of course, and from what we saw yesterday in the speech, the president may not have the insight, or possess the latitude within the system he inhabits, to be able to adjust course. Waiting and surviving will not always be enough.

He has said that reform will take time. But what if eleven years is already too long, and everything important he could have learned and done, has already passed?

Thanks again, ya batal al-huriyya al-‘ilm! Count me one of your many admirers-

Michael Provence

WSJ [Reg]: Sen. Kerry Raps Syria’s Assad,  2011-03-31

By Jay Solomon Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has a new American critic. On Thursday, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry, rapped Mr. Assad for not following through on his recent commitments to initiate political …

Syria Kurds join protests calling for citizenship
(AFP), 1 April 2011

DAMASCUS — Kurds in Syria’s northeast on Friday took to the streets for the first time since pro-reform protests erupted in mid-March, calling for the right to citizenship, an activist said.

“Several hundred people marched peacefully in the streets of Qamishli and Amuda after Friday (Muslim) prayers chanting ‘we don’t only want citizenship but freedom as well,’” Kurdish rights activist Radif Mustafa told AFP.

The protesters also chanted “God, Syria, Freedom.”

There were similar protests in Hassake where up to 200 people emerging before security forces dispersed them, he said.

Qamishli and the adjoining town of Amud are 700 kilometres (435 miles) northeast of Damascus near the border with Turkey, while Hassake is about 600 kilometres from the capital.

“It is the first time since the start of the dissent that protests are being held in this majority Kurdish region,” Mustafa said.

Friday’s rallies come a day after Syrian announced it would look into the plight of some 300,000 Kurds who have been denied Syrian nationality for close to half a century.

“President Bashar al-Assad has ordered the creation of a committee charged with resolving the problem of the 1962 census in the governorate of Hassake,” state-run news agency SANA reported on Thursday.

This committee “must complete its work before April 15 and President Assad will then issue an appropriate decree to resolve this problem,” SANA said.

The decision comes as part of a string of reforms launched by Assad’s government, which is facing a rising wave of dissent demanding major reforms.

In 1962, 20% of Syria’s ethnic Kurdish population were deprived of Syrian citizenship following a controversial census, according to human rights groups.

The government at the time argued its decision was based on a 1945 wave of illegal immigration of Kurds from neighboring countries, including Turkey, to Hassake, where they had “fraudulently” registered as Syrian citizens.

The citizenship problem has long poisoned relations between the government and Syria’s Kurds, who are banned from employment in the public sector as they are not citizens and yet cannot emigrate as they do not have Syrian passports.

There were also protests Friday in the flashpoint southern Syrian town of Daraa, which has emerged as the centre of dissent since demonstrations first broke out on March 15 in Damascus with protesters calling for the release of political prisoners.

The “Friday of Martyrs” protests were expected across Syria after weekly Muslim prayers for a third week in succession, spurred by a the popular yet anonymous Facebook group The Syrian Revolution 2011.

Revolution U
BY TINA ROSENBERG | FEBRUARY 16, 2011

There will be many moments during a dictatorship that galvanize public anger: a hike in the price of oil, the assassination of an opposition leader, corrupt indifference to a natural disaster, or simply the confiscation by the police of a produce cart. In most cases, anger is not enough — it simply flares out. Only a prepared opponent will be able to use such moments to bring down a government.

“Revolutions are often seen as spontaneous,” Ivan Marovic, a former CANVAS trainer, told me in Washington a few years ago. “It looks like people just went into the street. But it’s the result of months or years of preparation. It is very boring until you reach a certain point, where you can organize mass demonstrations or strikes. If it is carefully planned, by the time they start, everything is over in a matter of weeks.”……..

The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood ask Assad to quickly fulfill the demands of the Syrian People

??? | ?????? : ??????? ???????? ?? ?????? ??????? ????? ????? ????????? ?????? ????? ??????

Is Assad Capable of Reform?

By VOLKER PERTHES

BERLIN — In a brief address before Syria’s Parliament on Wednesday, President Bashar al-Assad declared that he was still for reform, but insisted that the first priority was to combat a “conspiracy” that was responsible for the bloody protests in his country. The speech came the day after the president dismissed his cabinet.

The speech was bound to disappoint those who had expected Assad to at least lift the emergency status and announce a new law on political parties. Changing the ministers is a meaningless gesture unless it’s followed by real reform. Assad mentioned the emergency law and the party law but insisted that he would not act under pressure — “haste comes at the expense of the quality of reforms.”

It’s a refrain that Syrians have heard too often. The idea of a new party law in particular has come up whenever the regime was under pressure — for example in 2000, after Assad took power, or in 2005, after Syria’s forced withdrawal from Lebanon. But the time has never been right.

I remember a meeting I had five years ago with Faisal Kalthoum, a professor of law and at the time a confidant to Assad, who proudly told me about a draft party law he and other members of a special committee had just finalized. (Kalthoum, who regarded himself as a reformer, later became governor of Dara’a and was in that position until he was fired after the first bloody crackdown.)

The new law, he told me at that time, would allow parties of various tendencies to be established. But there was no intention, he added when I asked, to change the Constitution, particularly Article 8, which states that the Baath Party is the “leading party in the society and the state.” In other words, parties could be freely constituted so long as they did not challenge the Baath’s monopoly on power. It is hardly necessary to add that Assad did not enact the law. The situation, other officials told me in subsequent years, “wasn’t yet considered ripe” for such a reform.

I would be positively astonished if Assad was prepared today not only to enact that law, but also to lift the state of emergency and rescind Article 8. He could make history with such moves, probably setting the stage for a step-by-step political liberalization in Syria — for which, I assume, a small window of time still exists. But I doubt he will do it.

This is mainly because Assad, in contrast to the image of him that some Western leaders have developed, is not a reformer. He can better be described as a modernizer. When he inherited power from his father in 2000 he set out to modernize the system — the economic and technological foundation as well as the political, security and bureaucratic elite on which he bases his power.

He allowed archaic economic and trade regulations to be shelved, private banks to operate, foreign investments to come in, mobile-phone companies to operate. And, starting with regional party leaders and governors, then ministers, and finally the top echelons of the security apparatus, he managed within only a couple of years to remove his father’s old guard and replace it with people loyal to himself.

In doing so, he gave Syria a more modern face and made some things work more efficiently, but he also made sure that the basic system — which relies on the heavy hand of the security services, on personal ties, and on a form of tolerated corruption that allows loyalists to enrich themselves — remained intact.

Initially, after his assumption of power, Assad encouraged a somewhat freer political debate. But in 2001, after a short-lived “Damascus Spring,” the regime cracked down on many of the intellectuals who had thought that it was really the beginning of a political opening. Many have been arrested repeatedly over the past decade.

To be fair, Assad has not relied only on repression and cronies. Unlike Hosni Mubarak or Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, the relatively young Syrian leader did gain some real popularity. The regional situation has helped him, as he quite frankly admitted in a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal. He was extremely critical of the U.S. invasion in Iraq, rightly warned of chaos after an externally enforced regime change there, and gained a reputation for saying no to the United States.

He was compelled to withdraw his forces from Lebanon, but managed to make the best of it by opening up the economy in Syria, thereby reducing the reliance of Syrian businessmen on Lebanon, and gradually rebuilding Syrian political influence in Lebanon.

He denounced American and Israeli policies toward the Palestinians, while making clear that Syria would not block a peace treaty with Israel. All this made him for a time one of the most popular heads of state in the Arab world, and, to the extent that it can be judged, at home.

This apparent popularity may have led him and his advisers to ignore the fact that even in Syria, many people were angry with a repressive regime, bad governance and blatant corruption.

In Syria, as in other Arab countries, there is a widely shared feeling, particularly among those between 20 and 30, that the regime denies them dignity and a fair chance to participate in politics and the economy. Offering cosmetic reforms now is likely to be too little too late.

Assad may find that while it was relatively easy to deal with intellectuals and activists, it is far harder to restrain an entire generation.

Volker Perthes is director of SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and author of several works on Syria and the Arab world.

Roundtable on Syria Today (Part 2):
Mar 31 2011 by Steven Heydemann, Fred Lawson, David Lesch, and Patrick Seale

This is Part 2 of our first Jadaliyya Roundtable on Syria, moderated by Bassam Haddad and Joshua Landis, of Syria Comment. It features Steven Heydemann, Fred Lawson, David Lesch, and Patrick Seale. This post will be published on both Jadaliyya and Syria Comment. See Part 1 here.

Roundtable Question #2

2. What do you consider to be missing or exaggerated in the discussion/writings/policy on the Syrian uprisings?

Heydemann (Q #2). Several elements of the current debate seem to reflect misperceptions or distortions, in my view. Within some policy circles in Washington, protests in Syria have revived the long-held dream of “flipping” Syria through regime change, and re-defining the regional balance of power in ways that would work decisively to America’s advantage. Seen from this perspective, support for the opposition is desirable because of the strategic opportunity it represents for America, rather than the possibilities it offers for Syrians to secure their own freedom.

What this analysis tends to overlook, however, are the gaps that would need to be bridged to get there from here—that is, to move Syria through a difficult, dangerous, and complex transition to a stable post-authoritarian political order—and the very low probability that a Syrian democracy would have the political complexion that advocates of “flipping” seem to take for granted. Misperceptions or distortions of how a process of regime change would play out, or what its likely trajectories might be, have the potential to lead the US down a dangerous and counterproductive path. Far more effective, in my view, would be put in place a long-term strategy to develop the capacity of the Syrian opposition, and exploit the current opening to create a sustained, incremental approach to democratization in Syria, recognizing that we need to be in this game for the long haul.

What has been missing entirely from recent coverage of Syria are references to Syria’s history of republican government and its experience of republican forms of democracy in the 1940s and 1950s. Syria enjoyed universal suffrage before Switzerland. It is the only country in the Arab world in which a Communist Party leader, Khalid Bakdash, was freely and fairly elected to parliament. While deeply if not fatally flawed, these historical moments nonetheless reflect elements of liberal democracy that should not be overlooked. The historical memory of democratic moments in Syria is a potential resource for the opposition. It has contemporary relevance. Yet it has not been touched on at all in the current media coverage of Syria’s uprising.

Lawson (Q #2). At first glance, it seems easy to explain why the initial outbreak of popular disorder occurred in the environs of Dir’a: the history of restiveness and resistance to outside authority that permeates this corner of Syria; long-standing friction between Sunnis based in the towns—particularly in the comparatively new administrative center of Dir’a itself–and Druze in the countryside; covert and perhaps illicit activities carried on by unlicensed traders along the Jordanian border; and so on. But what were the primary dynamics that set off the explosion? An article published in al-Watan newspaper shortly before the demonstrations noted that government officials posted to rural districts of Dir’a province are no longer going to be given automobiles and drivers, even though functionaries in the city will get to keep theirs. Might local grievances like this have provided the impetus for the protests?

Similarly around Latakia. Reports that shadowy groups of armed Sunnis helped to provoke the violence lead one to wonder what exactly precipitated the fighting along the western coast. Are poorer ‘Alawis rallying to the defense of the regime in the face of Sunni incursions from northern Lebanon? Or has dissatisfaction over changes in policy and spending priorities that accompanied the presidential succession alienated disadvantaged ‘Alawis in the provinces from their well-connected co-religionists in the capital?

And more important, what industrial, commercial and agricultural circumstances are present in these two parts of the country, which might have aggravated popular disaffection? Has the drought that is decimating the villages of Syria’s northeastern plains inflicted similar damage on the hard-scrabble grazing lands of the south? Are employment prospects around Latakia markedly dimmer than they are in Aleppo and Damascus?

Lesch (Q #2). There seems to be, as expected in this sound byte world, exclusive coverage of the extremes, either those who are against the Syrian government or those who support it. Each viewpoint has been manipulated by its own sets of supporters to fit political agendas. Ultimately, it will be this silent majority, including the business, religious, and tribal/clan elite who will determine whether or not Asad has done enough.

Seale (Q #3). I think what’s been missing from most of the writing about the crisis has been recognition of the way President Bashar’s mind-set has been shaped by the many crises he has had to deal with in his decade in power – and which he has managed to survive, clearly a source of pride for him. These crises include George W. Bush’s war on terror after 9/11; the Iraq war of 2003, and the knowledge that had America been successful in Iraq, Syria would have been next, as the neocons had planned; the 2005 crisis in Lebanon triggered by the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri, and the “plot” (by the US and France) to unseat him at that time; the Israeli invasions of Lebanon in 2006 and of Gaza in 2008-2009.

What’s been missing in much of the comment is Syria’s sense of vulnerability to attack. Its allies, Iran and Hizballah, have faced Israeli attempts to demonize and destroy them. Repeated efforts have been made to disrupt the Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah axis, seen by many as the main challenge to Israeli and American hegemony.

In his rambling speech, Bashar’s argument was that he now faced a new “conspiracy” similar to that of 2005. This time the aim of the “plotters” was to ignite sectarian strife so as to fragment Syria’s national unity, weaken it and bring it down. In raising this question, he was putting his finger on an enduring concern of the Alawi minority, and indeed of their Christian allies, faced by a resurgence of Sunni Islam.

Regarding much-needed forms, Bashar said something to the effect that he had intended to introduce reforms from the moment he took office in 2000, but that confronting the various crises and dealing with the ravages of the four-year drought had somehow got in the way. It was a sort of apology. His priorities, he affirmed, were stability and seeing to the needs of the citizens.

Those who know President Bashar say that he has a stubborn streak in his character, no doubt inherited from his father. He doesn’t like to be pushed around or be seen to yield to pressure, whether internal or external. That may be why he has left to others the task of elaborating on the planned reforms.

[The third and final set of responses will be posted on Friday] See Part 1 here.

Roundtable on Syria Today (Part 1)
1 Mar 31 2011 by Steven Heydemann, Fred Lawson, David Lesch, and Patrick Seale
[ [“No to Violence, Yes to Freedom.” Image from Static.guim.co.uk]

This is Part 1 of the first Jadaliyya Roundtable on Syria, moderated by Bassam Haddad and Joshua Landis, of Syria Comment. It features Steven Heydemann, Fred Lawson, David Lesch, and Patrick Seale. This post will be published on both Jadaliyya and Syria Comment. [See Part 2 here].

After two weeks of protests in Syria, many still wonder where matters are headed. The Syrian regime is firm in its stance, and so are the protesters. A plurality of Syrians (some say a majority) are not yet certain where to throw their weight. Yesterday’s speech by President Bashar al-Asad was presumed to include wide-ranging reforms that would “reassure everyone,” as Foreign Secretary Farouq al-Shar` affirmed to journalists recently. However, the speech did not include any concrete announcements in the direction of fundamental reforms (example?). It was disappointing to reformers and somewhat reassuring to those who feared the country would descend into sectarian or civil war, however accurate or misplaced that fear might be.

The pattern followed in other Arab states prior to all-out confrontations has been replicated only partially in Syria. It is not just the structural differences across these states (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain) that account for the patterns we see unfolding in the region. Perhaps equally relevant is the degree of political learning on part of both regime and would-be protesters now that the game has been repeated a few times. A relatively weak showing by Zein al-Din Ben Ali and Husni Mubarak in response to escalating protests in which concessions were made seemed to have cost them dearly, or at least this is what observers can readily perceive from the turn of events directly after such speeches. Bashar, known for his tenacity and resolve, coupled with the hard(er)-liners around him, namely his brother Maher and to a lesser extent his brother-in-law `Asef Shawkat, broke the trend and opted for an over-confident speech in which he asserted that the initiative lies with the political leadership and not the protesters. Will this speech serve its intended purpose and dampen the protests or will it reaffirm the protesters’ resolve? We are one day away from that temporal landmark that has come to be associated with the post-Friday prayers protests.

Away from fortune telling, however, we have asked a number of seasoned Syria observers from the United States and the United Kingdom to comment on a number of themes associated with the larger picture and how it relates to developments on the ground and to the portrayals of such developments. [We are trying to get view points from Syria for another roundtable altogether. Understandably, it is taking a bit of time].

We put forth the following three questions. The answers will be published one at a time. This post will include the answers for the first question only. The next post will include the answers to the second question, and so on.

1. What factors do you consider to be pivotal in determining the course of events in Syria? Do you believe that the opposition movement in Syria will be successful?
2. What do you consider to be missing or exaggerated in the discussion/writings/policy on the Syrian uprisings?
3. Is Syria different from its Arab counterparts in terms of the uprisings and the response? If yes, how so?

Roundtable Question #1

1. What factors do you consider to be pivotal in determining the course of events in Syria? Do you believe that the opposition movement in Syria will be successful?

Steven Heydemann (Q #1). The Syrian opposition confronts formidable obstacles. Despite the courage and commitment of protestors, the wall of fear in Syria remains largely intact. It is reinforced not only by the scale of regime repression, but by deep-seated fears among Syrians about the risks of instability. To be sure, fear of instability is in some measure a product of regime efforts to reinforce the sense of Syria as vulnerable to threats, whether of sectarianism or the foreign plots that Bashar al-Asad referred to in his speech of March 30, and to convey the message that the regime alone can protect the people from the chaos and destruction that would, inevitably, follow its demise.

Yet we cannot dismiss the fears of Syrians as entirely the product of regime manipulation. Lebanese and Iraqi experiences are vivid reminders that sectarianism is real, and dangerous. Whatever its sources, however, fear continues to hamper the ability of protest movements to mobilize large numbers of supporters on a national scale, and to sustain collective action at a meaningful level.
In addition, protests in Syria have not yet congealed into a coherent opposition. Actions remain fragmented. No coherent leadership has emerged within the country. Outside of social media, protests have not yet gone viral. Protests have not yet achieved the critical mass needed to pose a fundamental threat to the regime.

The weakness of the opposition—the product of the Syrian regime’s effectiveness over the past fifty years—will no doubt loom large in determining the opposition’s prospects. It is entirely possible that this weakness could be overcome, given enough time. Whether sufficient time will be available, however, is not clear.

None of this leads to the conclusion that the Syrian opposition will not succeed in achieving some measure of political change, or that it will fail to achieve its more ambitious goal of democratization. It does suggest that the obstacles to success will be very difficult for the opposition to overcome.

Fred Lawson (Q #1). It goes without saying that events in Syria will largely be determined by the actions of the armed forces and security services. Senior military officers in Egypt could not bring themselves to rally behind Gamal Mubarak, and so stepped aside as the struggle between the Tahrir protesters and the increasingly unsavory leadership of the National Democratic Party played itself out. Just before Bashshar al-Asad assumed the Syrian presidency, several key military and security commanders found themselves abruptly put out to pasture, and most observers quickly concluded that the individuals who replaced them were actual or prospective allies of the incoming leader. We will now get to see whether or not this is true, and if the current high command is willing to exercise force to protect the president and the system he heads.

In the Egyptian case it made good sense to distinguish between the regular army and the security forces, since substantial differences in corporate interests and behavioral predispositions between the two entities appear to have had a strong impact on events in Cairo. Such divergences seem much less pronounced and salient in Syria, although no one has explored these matters in detail. Quite remarkable is Buthaina Sha’ban’s claim that whoever opened fire on the demonstrators in Dir’a did so without receiving orders to shoot. Does this indicate that senior commanders do not exercise total control over the military-security apparatus?

Just as crucial as the choices made by the armed forces and security services will be the actions of the party-affiliated popular front organizations. Egypt’s NDP boasts nothing like the teachers’, students’ and farm laborers’ federations that have taken root under the auspices of the Ba’th. Furthermore, whereas Egypt’s industrial workers have spent the last few years orchestrating street protests and setting up wildcat labor unions, the rank-and-file of Syria’s trade union federation has exhibited no discernable autonomous activism. If I hear that workers at the big tractor factory outside Aleppo have walked off the job or started to march toward the citadel in sympathy with liberal activists to demand an end to the state of emergency, I will start to think that the regime is in deep trouble.

Somewhere in the wings hovers the Muslim Brothers. The organization’s recently-elected General Supervisor is said to be more open to the possibility of engaging in overt struggle against the authorities than his predecessor. Which does not mean that a resumption of the 1976-82 civil war looms just below the horizon, but does make the Brothers’ expressed commitment to liberal-democratic principles somewhat less credible.

David Lesch (Q #1). For me, the most important single element in determining the course of current events in Syria is President Bashar al-Asad. Before his speech on Wednesday the question was: Where has he been? He has to LEAD. He was conspicuously absent, which is probably a function of the regime being pushed back on its heels and confused as well as the likelihood of profound differences within the ruling circle on how to respond.

I will just add my voice to the chorus and say that I was equally disappointed in his speech. The expectations were high, maybe too high, so he was likely to fall short of what was wanted. But I was very disappointed and concerned that he led off by blaming “conspirators” and “enemies” of the regime. This is a traditional Syrian refrain to avoid responsibility for the problems and not appear weak. But this was tried by Mubarak, Qadhdhafi, Ben Ali and Saleh, and all of them are either out or on their way out. Why repeat the same mistakes? This denies the real socio-economic, political, and personal frustrations of many Syrians who are at the heart of the protests.

In any mass protest movement, there are always going to be “conspirators” of some sort that attempt to exacerbate things for their own personal agenda, whether they be Islamic militants, democracy activists egged on by Syrian exiles, or thuggish gangs, but they are but a minority; unfortunately, this, in addition to the fact that there has, indeed, been foreign intrigue in Syria in the past combined with Syrians penchant for conspiracy theory, has primed the listening audience to Bashar’s exhortations.

Rather Bashar needs to create a critical mass of support behind meaningful reforms rather than wait until a critical mass of opposition makes anything short of his removal impossible. But it doesn’t look as if he will take this more difficult road. If opposition success is measured by real reforms along the lines of lifting the emergency law, the creation of real political parties with free and open elections, the release of political prisoners, etc., then it has a chance of being successful if the pressure continues and ultimately forces Asad’s hand. If measured solely against the elimination of Asad and his associates, then it will not be successful . . . and the result may even be worse. As of now, however, it seems the Syrian government is going to attempt to do what it usually does, i.e. muddle through this.

Patrick Seale (Q #1). The pivotal factor in determining the future will be the cohesion of the regime versus the cohesion of the opposition: two rival groups, each made up of different strands, are engaged in a struggle for power. For the moment at least, the regime looks stronger than the opposition for the following reasons:

(a) it has the backing of the army and the security forces (both largely Alawi-led);
(b) many Syrians are aware that, for all their many shortcomings, the two Asad regimes have at least given the country some security and stability over the past 40 years, compared, say, to the fate suffered by their neighbors Lebanon and Iraq;
(c) the regime is well aware of the need to introduce and implement reforms and is now, at long last, doing so.

President Bashar’s speech on 30 March was followed the next day by news of movement on three fronts:

1. A legal committee is to look into scrapping the emergency law and replacing it by anti-terrorist legislation. It must report by 21 April;
2. Those responsible for shooting protesters are to be held accountable; and
3. The 1962 census, to be reviewed by 15 April, is a decision of great importance for the Kurdish community, some 150,000 of whom are stateless and therefore prevented from owning land, educating their children, etc. These moves could take some of the steam out of the protest movement.

A lot more needs to be done – the population wants greater freedom to speak, publish, and form political parties; it wants a curb on police brutality; and it wants the President to rein in the rich and corrupt businessmen close to the top, including members of his family.

A still more difficult problem is that of youth unemployment and the urgent need to create jobs – a problem confronting almost every Arab country. To be successful, this would require a radical restructuring of the economy, of which there is no real sign. The so-called “social market economy” which the regime has attempted to put in place has not benefited ordinary people, nor relieved pressures on the “new poor” among the hard-pressed middle classes. Resentment has been fuelled by the arrogant display of wealth by a few thousand members of the “new bourgeoisie” in Damascus, Aleppo and other major centers.

[See Part 2 here]

President Bashar al-Assad’s Speech to the Syrian Parliament, Wednesday, March 30, 2011, following the wave of demonstrations, protest, and counter demonstrations that swept the country for the previous two weeks.

Mr. Speaker,
Ladies and gentlemen, members of the People’s Assembly,

It gives me a great pleasure to meet you once again in this distinguished place, to talk to you about the conditions engulfing Syria and the region and to address, through you, all the children of Syria; Syria which is at the heart of everyone of us, the invincible castle, with its glories, with its people in every governorate, city, town, and village.

I speak to you at this exceptional moment when events and developments pose a great test to our unity and self denial. It is a test which is repeated every now and then because of the continued conspiracy against this country. Thanks to our will, solidarity, and the will of God that we succeed in facing it every time in a manner which enhances our strength and pride.

The Syrian people are entitled to hold their heads high. I talk to you from the heart with feelings of pride for belonging to this great people, with gratitude for their love; yet I speak with feelings of sadness and sorrow for the events which claimed the lives of our brothers and children. My responsibility remains that I should protect the security of this country and ensure its stability. This remains the ever-dominant feeling in my heart and mind.

I know that the Syrian people have been waiting for this speech since last week; and I intentionally postponed it until I have a fuller picture in my mind, or at least some of the main features of this picture, so that my speech should depart from the emotional rhetoric which puts people at ease, but does not change anything or make any impact at a time when our enemies work every day in an organized, systematic and scientific manner in order to undermine Syria’s stability. We acknowledge that they had been smart in choosing very sophisticated tools in what they have done; but at the same time we realize that they have been stupid in choosing the country and the people, for such conspiracies do not work with our country or our people.

We tell them that you have only one choice, which is to learn from your failure, while the Syrian people have only the choice of continuing to learn from their successes.

You are fully aware of the great shifts and changes happening in our region for the past few months. They are important changes which will have repercussions throughout the region without exception, including the Arab countries and maybe far beyond. This obviously concerns Syria, because Syria is part of this region.

But if we want to consider what concerns us in Syria in what has happened so far on the larger Arab scene, we can say that what happened vindicates the Syrian perspective, in the sense that it expresses a popular consensus. When there is such a consensus we should be assured, whether we agree or disagree on a number of points. What this means is that this popular Arab condition, which has been marginalized for three or four decades, is now at the heart of developments in our region. This Arab condition has not changed. They tried to domesticate it, but it has not yielded.

As far as we are concerned, you recall that in my speeches I always spoke about the Arab street, the fact that it gives direction, about citizens’ views. Many in the media used it to express cynicism, and many politicians used to reject that and smile slyly, particularly when I used to meet them while Syria was under a lot of pressure. They used to propose ideas which were contrary to our interests and which implied conspiring against the resistance and against other Arabs. When pressures intensified, I used to tell them that even if I accept this the people will not. And if the people do not accept it, they will reject me. And if they do, that means political suicide for me. They used to smile, of course, implying that they did not believe me. Today, after these events, there have been several meetings, and I repeated the same words. Now they were shaking their heads in agreement.

This is very important. On the other hand, and since the Arab peoples refused to be domesticated and have not changed at heart, we have to work harder to heal the rift in the Arab world if changes in the region continue to take the same course, particularly working on the people to achieve certain objectives.

The other thing concerning the Arab peoples’ concern about core Arab issues, particularly the Palestinian cause, we believe – and I hope rightly so – that the changes in the region will change the course that the Palestinian cause has taken at least for the past two or three decades and shift from a process of making concessions to a process of holding to rights. So, we believe that there are indications that what is happening is positive.

Syria is not isolated from what is happening in the Arab world. We are part of this region. We influence and are influenced by it, but at the same time we are not a copy of other countries. No country is exactly like any other country. We in Syria have certain characteristics which might be different internally and externally from others.

On the internal level, our policies had been based on development, opening up, and communicating directly between myself and the Syrian people. I am speaking about principles regardless of certain negative and positive aspects and what has and has not been achieved. In principle, these are the pillars of our internal policy.

Our foreign policy has been based on holding to our national rights, holding to ban-Arab rights, to independence, to supporting Arab resistance when there is occupation. The link between domestic and foreign policies has always been the Syrian citizen. When the Syrian citizen is not the heart of domestic and foreign policies, this is a deviation; and it is the job of the country’s institutions to correct this deviation.

The net outcome of these policies has been an unprecedented case of national unity which has been the real force which has protected Syria during the past years when pressures intensified against Syria. Thanks to this outcome that we have been able to dismantle huge minefields which have faced Syrian policy. We have been able to maintain Syria’s central role and position. But this has not deterred the enemies. Of course I have just started to talk about this conspiracy, and then I will move to the internal situation, so that satellite T.V. stations will not say that the Syrian president considered all that has happened a foreign conspiracy. We have to start with the main elements, and then make the connections.

Maintaining this role or strengthening it, based on principles rejected by others, will make enemies try their best to weaken it through other means. I have always warned against rejoicing when we succeed, because success leads to a feeling of safety and complacency. I say that when you are in a battle, you know your enemy, you know the plan. But after the battle, you do not know what the enemy is preparing for you. So, after every success we should work harder in order to maintain our success and protect ourselves against any conspiracy which might be hatched against us in the outside world. And I am sure you all know that Syria is facing a great conspiracy whose tentacles extend to some nearby countries and far-away countries, with some inside the country. This conspiracy depends, in its timing not in its form, on what is happening in other Arab countries.

Today, there is a new fashion which they call “revolutions”. We do not call them so because we think this is mostly a popular condition. As far as they are concerned, if something happens in Syria, then it has a cover: there is a revolution there so there is a revolution here: there is reform there, so there is reform here. The tools are the same: the slogans and talking about freedom.  Consequently, if there are calls for reform – and I believe we all call for reform – we get along with them without knowing what is really happening. That is why they mixed up, in a very smart manner, three elements. I know that most of the people who are listening to us, and you represent them, know a great deal about these details. Nevertheless, I will discuss them once again in order to harmonize our concepts based on the available information so far. There might be things which will be revealed later. So, they mixed up three elements: sedition, reform, and daily needs. Most of the Syrian people call for reform, and you are all reformers. Most of the Syrian people have unmet needs; and we all discuss, criticize, and have our disagreements because we have not met many of the needs of the Syrian people. But sedition has become part of the issue and started to lead the other two factors and take cover under them. That is why it was easy to mislead many people who demonstrated in the beginning with good intensions. We cannot say that all those who demonstrated are conspirators. This is not true, and we want to be clear and realistic.

The conspirators are few in number, this is natural. Even we, in the government, did not know, like everybody else, and did not understand what was happening until acts of sabotage started to emerge. Things became clearer; for what is the link between reform and sabotage? What is the link between reform and murder? Some satellite T.V. stations actually spoke about attacking certain buildings an hour before they were actually attacked. How did they know that? Do they read the future? This happened more than once. Then, things started to become clearer. They will say that we believe in the conspiracy theory. In fact there is no conspiracy theory. There is a conspiracy.

It was difficult for us to fight against this situation, because people will mix between our fighting sedition and fighting reform. In principle, we support reform and meeting people’s needs. This is the duty of the state. But we cannot be with sedition. When the Syrian people, with their natural and patriotic awareness, realized what was happening, things became easier. And the response actually came from the people more than it came from the state. As you have seen, the state refrained from taking action and left the response to the people. This has provided the sound, safe, and patriotic treatment and restored national unity very quickly to Syria.

What we are seeing today is a stage; and we do not know whether it is a first stage or an advanced stage. But we are concerned with the outcome because the last stage for them is for Syria to get weaker and disintegrate, because this will remove the last obstacle facing the Israel’s plans. This is what concerns us. We are not concerned with the process, because we know that they will continue and will repeat what they had been doing in one form or another. Every experience will be based on the previous one. So if they fail, they will develop this experience. And if we succeed, we need to build on this experience. I have been advised by many people not to talk about details and to stick to generalities, but I will address these details as usual in order to be fully transparent.

In the beginning they started with incitement, many weeks before trouble started in Syria. They used the satellite T.V. stations and the internet but did not achieve anything. And then, using sedition, started to produce fake information, voices, images, etc. they forged everything. Then they started to use the sectarian element. They sent SMSs to members of a certain sect alerting them that another sect will attack them. And in order to be credible, they sent masked people to neighborhoods with different sects living in them, knocking on people’s doors and telling each that that the other sect has already attacked and are on the streets, in order to get a reaction. And it worked for a while. But we were able to nip the sedition in the bud by getting community leaders to meet and diffuse the situation. Then they used weapons. They started killing people at random; because they knew when there is blood it becomes more difficult to solve the problem.

We have not yet discovered the whole structure of this conspiracy. We have discovered part of it but it is highly organized. There are support groups in more than one governorate linked to some countries abroad. There are media groups, forgery groups and groups of “eye-witnesses”.

They started in the governorate of Daraa.  Some say that Daraa is a borderline governorate. I say that if Daraa is on the borders, it is in the heart of every Syrian. And if Darra is not in the middle of Syria, yet it is the throbbing heart of Syria and all the Syrians. This is how it is defined and this is how it is now. Daraa is on the frontline with the Israeli enemy; and it is the first line of defense for the hinterland. Daraa, al-Qunaitira, and part of rural Damascus defend the other parts of Syria which lie behind them. No one can be in a position defending the homeland and at the same time conspiring against it. This is impossible and is unacceptable. The people of Daraa have no responsibility for what happened, but with us, they share the responsibility of putting an end to sedition. In that, we and the whole Syrian population are with Daraa. The people of Daraa are people of genuine patriotism, magnanimity, and dignity. They will get hold of the few people who wanted to stir chaos and destroy the national fabric.

The conspirators took their plan to other governorates. As you know, they moved to Latakia and other cities using the same techniques; murder, intimidation, and incitement. There were clear instructions not to harm any Syrian citizens. But unfortunately, when things move to the street, and dialogue is conducted in the street and outside institutions, things naturally become chaotic and reaction rather than action rules the day. What we might call mistakes of the moment become the dominant mode and people get killed. This is what happened and you all know that.

In any case, the blood that was spilled on the streets is Syrian blood, and we are all concerned because the victims are our brothers and their families are our families. It is important to look for the causes and those behind these events. We need to investigate and bring the people responsible to account. This has happened anyway, but let it be for bringing about national unity rather than disuniting the Syrians. Let it be for strengthening the country rather than weakening it, for putting an end to sedition rather than enflaming it. Let us act as quickly as possible to heal our wounds and restore harmony to our larger family and maintain love as our uniting bond.

Part of what has happened is similar to what happened in 2005. It is a virtual war. I said at the time that they want us to surrender through waging on us a virtual war using the media and the internet, although the internet was not as widespread as it is today. They wanted us to feel that things were over and our only choice was to surrender without putting any fight. Today, the principle is the same. They want us to incur a virtual defeat but using different methods. There is some confusion in the country for different reasons, mainly under the headline of reform. With is chaos, using reform as a cover, using sectarianism, where sects become nervous, they clash with each other, virtual defeat is achieved in another form. In 2005 we warded off this virtual defeat through popular awareness. Today, things are obviously more difficult, because the internet is more widespread, and because the instruments are more modern. But the popular awareness we have seen was sufficient to respond very quickly. Nevertheless, I say that we should not feel complacent with what we have got. We need to strengthen this national patriotic awareness because it is the real force which protects Syria at every juncture.

However, there is an essential question. We are talking about changes in the region in the sense that it is a wave; and whenever we meet someone, they say there is a wave and you have to bow. Despite what we said about the positive aspects of this wave, should we be led by the wave or should we lead? When this wave touched Syria, the issue has become of concern to the Syrians. We have to use it as a wave of energy according to our interests. We should be proactive rather than reactive.

I use this in order to move to what we announced Thursday, after the meeting of the Ba’th Party Regional Command, when we announced a salary increase, and referred to a Party Law and the Emergence Law. I am trying to explain how we think. I am not adding new things, but when you know how we think we harmonize our visions. When something happens and we make a decision, you understand how the state is thinking. There is usually a lack of communication. We have things which we do not know how to market. Sometimes we think they are good things but are misunderstood.

So, did we make these reforms because there is a problem or because there is sedition? If there was no sedition wouldn’t we have done these reforms? If the answer is yes, it means that the state is opportunistic, and this is bad. If we say that these things were made under the pressure of a certain condition or popular pressure, this is weakness. And I believe that if the people get the government to bow under pressure, it will bow to foreign pressure. The principle is wrong. The relationship between the government and the people is not that of pressure or based on pressure. It is based on the needs of society; and these needs are the rights of society. It is the state’s duty to meet these needs. When people demand their rights, it is natural that the government should respond to these demands happily. Even if the government is unable to meet these demands, it should say so. It depends on the type of dialogue. The only pressure that a government official should feel is the lack of people’s confidence in him, the pressure of the responsibility he has towards the people, and the greatest pressure of all is that of the national and patriotic awareness that we have seen. It was unprecedented and it astonished us as it has done every time. All these pressures make us think how to show our gratitude to this people by providing development, reform and prosperity.

The things announced Thursday were not decisions, because those were the decisions of the Ba’th Party Regional Conference in 2005. And there were two reasons for that: one is that the content of the decisions is not related to the crisis, it is related to our need for reform. When we proposed these ideas in 2005 there was no pressure on Syria. One year before, in 2004, in the Tunis Summit, which was the first Arab Summit after the Invasion of Iraq, there was a state of collapse and submission to America. The United States wanted to impose on us reform and democracy. We fought against this project in the Arab Summit and it failed.

In 2005 we proposed the same subjects but for our country and the reforms were home grown and not under pressure. The pressure had nothing to do with this; it had to do with the resistance, with Iraq, and with foreign policy issues.  When I talked about the three elements: sedition, reform, and people’s needs, I think what was needed to put an end to sedition was only popular awareness. As to reform, we already started the reform, there were delays, and this is an indication that it has actually started. The reforms were not intended to fight sedition because the impacts of reform are usually long-term. Some people say that the government made promises to reform but never followed them through. In order to understand this point I will quickly review the reform process since 2000.

It is true that we talked about this at the time but only in headlines. The picture was not very clear about the shape of that reform. Two months after the speech I gave in this magnificent place, the Intifada happened and the conspiracy against the resistance started, and pressures mounted. Then there was 09/11. Islam, Muslims, and Arabs were all accused. There was the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and Syria was supposed to pay a price for its position to invasion.

You know what happened in Lebanon in 2005, and later the war of 2006 and its repercussions, and the war against Gaza at the end of 2008. So, the whole period was that of continued pressure. What added to the problems was that we had four years of drought which damaged our economic program. What happened at that time was a change of priorities, and this is an important point. I spoke about this in more than one interview, but I think I spoke to foreign media. I said that these events made us change our priorities. Of course I am not justifying. I am simply explaining these facts and separating the subjective from the objective. When I say that we had drought, this is beyond our powers. But it does not mean that there aren’t any measures that could be taken in order to improve the economy. Those who were ten-years old in 2000 are now twenty, so generations should know about these conditions.

The top priority became Syria’s stability; and now we are at a stage when we can appreciate this stability. The other top priority was related to living conditions. I meet many people, and ninety nine percent of my conversation with them revolves around living conditions. Obviously there are grievances, but living conditions remain the major element.

This does not justify lagging behind on other issues, but we did not focus much on political issues like the emergency law and the party law. The reason is that when there are human issues at stake, they cannot be postponed. We can postpone a party statement for months or even years, but we cannot postpone providing food for children for breakfast. We can postpone something which is caused by the emergency law or other legal or administrative measures which cause problems for the population, but we cannot postpone something which causes a child to suffer when the child’s parents do not have enough money to treat him or because the government does not have a certain medicine. This is something we face on a daily basis; and I am sure that you as members of the People’s Assembly face.

So the issue was that of priorities. At least in 2009-2010 things were better and it was possible to introduce some of these reforms. As for the party law, the Regional Command has actually drafted a law but we had not discussed it. There might have been some delay but we will leave that to people to judge. But hadn’t we wanted to make these reforms, we would not have made them in 2005. We would have done them under pressure. Things might get delayed because of bureaucracy, negligence, or other things. We all are part of this people and we know how things are. It is important to explain this in order to know where we are and to know the content of the reforms. Now there is a new People’s Assembly in the near future and there will be a new local administration. There will be soon a new government and there will be a regional conference. So 2011 will see new blood and we will move to another stage. We postponed the regional conference because we knew that we need to account for what we have done. We needed to do these things and present them to the conference. We have been thinking of having new blood in all areas.

What I want to say is that reform for us is not a fashion. It is not a reflection of this new wave which is sweeping the region. What I said in my interview with the Wall Street Journal two months ago, when things started unfolding in Egypt. They asked me ‘are you going to introduce reforms?’ I said that, ‘if you had not already started, and if you had not had the intention and the plan, now it is too late and there is no point in wasting our time.’

Many officials, particularly foreign officials, tell me that they think that the president is a reformer but those around him restrain him. I tell them that on the contrary the people around me are pushing me hard to do these reforms. What I want to say is that there are no obstacles, there are simply delays. No one opposes reform because those who oppose it have a vested interest and are corrupt. You all know them they were very few and now they are no longer here. The real challenge is what kind of reform we want. That is why we need to avoid subjecting the reform process to momentary conditions, otherwise it will be counterproductive.

We have been talking about reform for the past ten years, and our reform today should reflect the past ten years and the next ten years. It should not only reflect this stage or this wave whether it is internal or external. This is how we are thinking. Changes might delay or precipitate reform, change its direction, make us build on other countries’ experiences. For instance, Tunisia’s experience was useful for us more than that of Egypt, because in Tunisia there was a model and we used to send experts to learn from that experience. When the revolution started, we realized that the causes lied in the way wealth was distributed, not only in terms of corruption but also in terms of geographical distribution. This is something that we have tried to avoid, and we are calling for a fair distribution of development in Syria.

In principle, we cannot say that we do not want reform because this will be destructive to the whole country, but the main challenge is finding out what kind of reform you want and we need all our skills as Syrians when we start discussing the laws which will be proposed soon. The measures announced last Thursday did not start from square one because as I said the Regional Command already made drafts for the emergency law and the party law more than a year ago.

There are other draft laws which will be debated publically and then they will be discussed by the relevant institutions before they are passed. There are other measures which were not announced on Thursday: some of them are related to strengthening national unity and others related to fighting corruption, the media and creating jobs. These will be announced after they are fully studied. The former government started these studies and they will be a priority for the new government. For instance, the salary increases were discussed in our meeting with the economic team. I headed that meeting and we discussed a package of economic decisions and only the salary decision was taken. There is more to follow.

Talking about this, and about the one thousand five hundred Syrian pounds increase, the government received complaints and they responded.  About an hour ago I received an amendment to their decision to solve this problem. We should give them credit for the work they have done on their own initiative and not responding to instructions. I just wanted to make that clear to the Syrian citizens. I hope that we will be able, during the next month, to identify the measures that need to be taken. And I will ask for a timeframe for every measure. Of course you in the People’s Assembly and in the next assembly will make sure that there are time frames for any measure, because this will help regulate work. Some people ask me to announce a time frame at the People’s Assembly but I think putting a time frame is purely technical. I might put a time frame which is shorter than what is necessary and in that case the pressure of time will affect quality. I think our duty is to provide the Syrian people with the best, not with the fastest. We want to proceed quickly, but we do not want to be hasty.

In any case, I am sure there will be someone on the satellite T.V. stations who will say that this is not enough. What is enough for them will destroy our country and we simply cannot afford that. By the way, do not get angry for what some T.V. stations have done, because they always fall in the same trap when they try to fabricate things for us and for the Syrian people. The fact is that they follow the principle of lie, lie until they believe you. So, they believe their own lie and fall in the trap.

Brothers and sisters, this might be a blessing in disguise. But we are humans and we cannot like what happened. We cannot like sedition, we cannot like killing, we cannot like tension, but crises are a positive condition if we can control them and get out of them victorious. The secret of Syria’s strength lies in the many crises it faced throughout its history, particularly after independence. We have to face the crises with great confidence and with a determination to win. Concern also should be a positive condition because it pushes us to move forward rather than escape forward because when we move forward we move with confidence, while when we escape forward we stumble and then fail. In times of crisis, many people just look for any solution, while it is actually better to stay without any solution if we do not find the right one. This is one of the lessons that we learned from these crises.

Burying sedition is a national, moral, and religious duty; and all those who can contribute to burying it and do not are part of it. The Holy Quran says, “sedition is worse than killing,” so all those involved intentionally or unintentionally in it contribute to destroying their country. So there is no compromise or middle way in this. What is at stake is the homeland and there is a huge conspiracy. We are not seeking battles. The Syrian people are peaceful people, loving people, but we have never hesitated in defending our causes, interests and principles, and if we are forced into a battle, so be it.

I remind you of the “domino effect” term which was used after the invasion of Iraq when the United States assumed then under the former administration that the Arab countries are domino blocks and the American projects will hit just one of these blocks and the others will fall. What happened is the exact opposite when their projects turned into domino blocks, we hit them and they started to fall one after another. This one will fall too.

Since some people have short memory, I will refresh their memory once again by saying that not all of what is happening is a conspiracy, because I know that they are on the ready in their studios to comment.

As for you, children of this great nation, your love for your country which you express day after day and which is clearer than ever at times of crisis, and which you particularly expressed yesterday through your unprecedented mass demonstrations throughout the country gives me more confidence and determination. Your solidarity and unity in fighting sedition assures me about the future and if you, in the slogans you chanted, expressed willingness to sacrifice yourselves for your president, the more natural thing is for the president to sacrifice himself for his people and homeland. I shall remain the faithful brother and comrade who will walk with his people and lead them to build the Syria we love, the Syria we are proud of, the Syria which is invincible to its enemies.

Thank you very much.

Brian Whitaker has the best commentary on the Assad speech that I have read so far – and not just because he quotes from Syria Comment – although it helps.

Syria: the boldness of Bashar al-Assad
Brian Whitaker, Guardian, Thursday 31 March 2011

Bashar al-Assad’s seemingly relaxed attitude to reform is either supreme confidence or extreme recklessness

Syria president al-Assad Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad insists they’ll be no hasty concessions to protesters, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt. Photograph: Khaled al-Hariri/Reuters

Bashar al-Assad doesn’t really look like an Arab president. Or a dictator, come to that. He doesn’t have the arrogant grandeur of a Ben Ali or the self-centred pomposity of a Mubarak. Seeing him reminds me of some gangly scoutmaster: the sort who gets very dogmatic about granny knots and clove hitches but still has trouble keeping tents up in a strong wind.

Considering the public mood in the Middle East this may even give Assad an advantage. The less any leader resembles Ben Ali or Mubarak at the moment, the better, and his pep talk on Wednesday to the Damascus scout troop – sorry, parliament – seemed to be much appreciated. “Dyb dyb dyb dob dob dob,” they chanted at every opportunity. Well, not exactly, but they might just as well have done. They clapped a lot, interrupted him with loyal declarations of support and even lauded him with poems.

Assad, for his part, looked comfortable and relaxed (he was, after all, among friends) and seldom referred to his notes. He smiled from time to time and chuckled at his own jokes. It’s easy to see why many Syrians prefer him to his dad though, to be honest, it’s very hard not to be more likeable than Hafez al-Assad.

It was when Assad came to the now-obligatory section of his speech where embattled presidents blame foreign conspiracies for the demonstrations that I started to feel confused. Surely he had got it the wrong way round. Others have been saying that the aim of the “foreign conspiracy”, if such it is, is to keep Assad in power, not to remove him. What about that article in Haaretz the other day describing Assad as “Israel’s favourite Arab dictator”? Or Hillary Clinton praising him as a “reformer”?

Contrary to the impression given in some of the news reports, Assad did talk about reform, and talked about it rather a lot. Syria is already reforming, he said, and will continue to do so. But just when it seemed that he might be on the point of announcing some specific new reforms, he stopped speaking and the parliament gave him a final round of applause.

To understand why, we have to look at an interview Assad gave to the Wall Street Journal at the end of January – which he also mentioned in his speech on Wednesday. Interviewed shortly after Ben Ali had been ousted from Tunisia and when the Egyptian uprising was just a few days old, he said:

“If you did not see the need for reform before what happened in Egypt and in Tunisia, it is too late to do any reform. This is first. Second, if you do it just because of what happened in Tunisia and Egypt, then it is going to be a reaction, not an action; and as long as what you are doing is a reaction you are going to fail.”

So Assad is trying a different tack. Reform, yes, but all in good time. There will be no hasty concessions to protesters as happened in Tunisia and Egypt; that would be a sign of weakness and would only encourage further demands. Instead, the relevant ministries will announce their plans in due course, after full and careful consideration, etc, etc.

That is certainly a bold strategy, but in the midst of growing turmoil it’s either a sign of supreme confidence or extreme recklessness.

So how will it play out in Syria? For hardcore regime supporters, it’s an attitude they can understand and admire. One of them, quoted in Joshua Landis’s Syria Comment blog, said:

“Finally, I respect Bashar. He has showed that he is a real man. He has spared the country bloodshed. Any sign of weakness, it would have been the start of the end …
“All the modern and reform-minded people are dreamers. They live abroad and think that Syria can become a London/Paris/NY if we just reform. It is either civil war or the status quo …

“Kentucky Fried Chicken? We can do without it. Those that don’t like it can leave to their fancy foreign capitals or Beirut. They are welcome [to visit Syria] in the summer to enjoy the food and arghile and go back to their democracy.”

But what of the others, almost certainly the majority, who are not hard core? What faith can they place in the assurances of steady reform? Since Assad came to power 11 years ago, a few reforms – very modest ones in comparison with what needs to be done – have been accomplished, perhaps not at a snail’s pace but certainly at a speed that could be overtaken by a tortoise. Even Assad conceded in his speech: “The state has made promises of reform and they have not been carried out.”

There is no guarantee, though, that reforms promised for the future will be any more radical than those of the past. In the words of another Syrian quoted by Landis:

“Somebody has decided that either all Syrians are dumb and [the regime] can continue to trick them for ever or that civil war is much better than giving the people more power.”

One of the most telling parts of Wednesday’s performance was not Assad’s speech itself but what it revealed about the sycophancy of Syria’s parliament. This is clearly not a place for hammering out laws and policies through the cut and thrust of debate. It is a temple for the Assad cult and changing that will take more than reform. It will take a revolution.

Syria moves to scrap emergency law, Al-Jazeera

State media says committee set up by president to study abolition of decades-old law will finish work by April 25.

“Friday is going to be a real … precipitating moment here: how people will protest. Will they continue to protest for just reforms or could we see something more drastic perhaps – people protesting to the end of his rule?” he said.

During his speech, which lasted almost one hour, Assad hit out at social networking websites and pan-Arabic satellite television news channels for stoking and reporting the protests.

He said he supported reforms but offered no new commitment to change Syria’s rigid, one-party political system.

“I know that the Syrian people have been awaiting this speech since last week, but I was waiting to get the full picture … to avoid giving an emotional address that would put the people at ease but have no real effect, at a time when our enemies are targeting Syria,” said Assad.

Patrick Seale, a Middle East expert and a biographer of Assad’s father, said the speech was a “missed opportunity”.

“Syria does need reform on many fronts. We have to try to understand his situation … [but] we don’t know the extent of domestic pressures on him,” Seale told Al Jazeera.

“He is, of course, surrounded by a lot of people – several thousand people perhaps – who have a stake in the stability of the regime.

Click here for more on our special coverage

“He has to think of them too. The intresting thing about the speech, I think, is what it reveals about him. There’s obviously a stubborn streak in his character, which we know he inherited from his father.

“He doesn’t like to be pushed around. If you look at the last 10 years of his rule, he has been pushed a great deal; he has survived a whole series of crises, which have obviously shaped his present character.”

Protesters emboldened by uprisings in the Arab worldare pushing for reforms in a country where power is concentrated in the hands of Assad, his family and the security apparatus.

The president’s speech came a day after the cabinet resigned, but Assad appointed Naji al-Otari, the resigning premier, as a caretaker prime minister. Otari has been prime minister since 2003.

The 32-member cabinet will continue running the country”s affairs until the formation of a new government.

The new cabinet, which is expected to be announced by the end of the week, will face the task of implementing the reforms.

ASSAD’S JUGGLING ACT AMID THE TURMOIL
JONATHAN CHENG, 1 April 2011, The Australian

SYRIA, in contrast to many other regional dictatorial states, is unlikely to fall further into a crisis of revolution or civil conflict.

Even though demonstrations and protests against the Assad regime have dominated the headlines as of late, internal and external factors strongly favour Bashar al-Assad, the current President, staying at the helm.

The dynamic duo of popular respect and fear for the regime ensures the support of a large majority of the populace. The current regime’s pragmatic foreign policy orientation dictates acquiescence of neighbours and the wider international community towards whatever action Assad deems necessary.

If anything, one might even argue that the recent Middle East turmoil may be giving Assad the leeway he needs to pursue economic and infrastructural reform, at the expense of Syrian hardliners who have sought to prevent the country from moving in a liberalising direction.

Even though the minority Alawite sect (8 to 10 per cent) is considered the strongest pillar of his regime, both Assad and his predecessor and father, Hafiz al-Assad, succeeded in building a support base among the majority Sunnis.

By granting Sunni urbanites significant leeway in the economic sphere, and also avenues for advancement in the state structure, a tacit Alawite-Sunni contract was formed. In addition, as a secular Baathist regime, the Assad regime has avoided playing the “religion card” too much.

This, combined with its co-opting of other religious groups into the military and economic elite, has allowed Assad’s regime to be much more resistant to inter-religious tension than some other regional countries.

In Bahrain, for instance, the Sunni al-Khalifa family subjected the Shi’ite majority to discrimination, by actively favouring the minority Sunni segments of society. The repercussions there, as we see today, have been a large uprising against the state.

However, such support for the regime is intermingled with fear of the security apparatus. Unlike in Egypt or Tunisia, Syrians can pointedly remember a time and place where the Assads turned the army against the populace: Hama.

In 1982, Hafiz al-Assad ordered the Syrian army to bombard this city indiscriminately, resulting in a victory over the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood but also the deaths of 10,000-30,000 Syrian nationals. This fear will make any mass uprising unlikely.

With foreign policy, Assad’s Syria has continued to act in a pragmatic and informed fashion, ensuring both domestic and external support for its position. Unlike Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, it maintained its position as part of the “resistance” axis against Israeli and American aggression, justifying its so-called leadership in the pan-Arab struggle against international Zionism. Syrian nationals, as such, are generally satisfied with the regime’s foreign orientation.

On the flip side, Syria has also acted cautiously enough to garner sufficient respect and understanding even from its foes. The US and Israel, while often critical of Syria’s support for resistance (or “terrorist”) groups, see “ideological” Iran as a much greater threat.

Even if Assad’s base is to weaken, we will not see an intervention similar to that of Libya, where both conservative Arab and Western actors have taken their chance to try to get rid of Muammar Gaddafi.

There is also the question: “If not Assad, then who?” It is generally understood that within Syrian politics, Assad stands as a moderate, if not a liberal. Since his ascension to the “throne” in 2000, his actions have generally been limited by two concerns.

First, he had to consolidate his rule at the centre against potential opponents, most notably some of his father’s key advisers and hardline family members. Secondly, and in tandem with this, he had to react to two national security threats; the American entrenchment in his backyard, Iraq, and the Israeli war against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

In this context, Assad was pushed to a more extreme position than he would have liked, in order to appease the hardliners back home in Damascus. Since 2008, with a fading and weakening American presence and an empowered Hezbollah in Lebanon, we have seen what Assad’s true intentions are.

He does seem to be pushing for a gradual liberalisation of the economy, warmer ties with neighbours, and even negotiations with Israel. Domestically, these protests might therefore be the plank on which Assad can push reforms across.

With all these issues in mind, it is clear that there is neither the international impetus nor domestic will to push for a change in government.

Protest marches and demonstrations will not match the scale or mass achieved in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain and Yemen. Some reforms seem to be forthcoming, and considering the alternatives, it would be best for the limited opposition to accept what they can get.

The proposed changes in Assad’s government, while in effect minor, considering the concentration of power in the presidency and security services, is still a step forward. Whether or not one believes Bashar al-Assad is a reformer, it is clear there are hardliners in the Syrian ruling establishment willing to use force.

If they win out, due to “unreasonable” demands or the increasing use of violence by protesters, one might see a bloodbath in Syria, with no international assistance to save them.

Jonathan Cheng is based at the Centre for Arab & Islamic Studies, Australian National University and the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Israel fears the alternative if Syria’s Assad falls
LA Times

As popular unrest threatens to topple another Arab neighbor, Israel finds itself again quietly rooting for the survival of an autocratic yet predictable regime, rather than face an untested new government in its place.

Syrian President Bashar Assad’s race to tamp down public unrest is stirring anxiety in Israel that is even higher than its hand-wringing over Egypt’s recent regime change. Unlike Israel and Egypt, Israel and Syria have no peace agreement, and Syria, with a large arsenal of sophisticated weapons, is one of Israel’s strongest enemies.

Though Israel has frequently criticized Assad for cozying up to Iran, arming Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement and sheltering leaders of the Palestinian militant group Hamas, many in Israel think their country might be better off if Assad keeps the reins of power.

“You want to work with the devil you know,” said Moshe Maoz, a former government advisor and Syria expert at Hebrew University’s Harry S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace.

Several Israeli government and military officials declined to speak in depth about Assad, fearing any comments could backfire given the strong anti-Israel sentiments in the Arab world. That’s what happened when some Israeli officials attempted to bolster Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak before he resigned Feb. 11.

“Officially it’s better to avoid any reaction and watch the situation,” said Maj. Gen. Amos Gilad, the Defense Ministry’s policy director. He predicted Assad’s regime would survive the unrest.

Privately, Israeli officials confirmed that although Assad is no friend, he’s probably better than the immediate alternatives, which could include civil war, an Iraq-style insurgency or an Islamist takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood…..

Syria must change or be changed
Haytham Manna – Guardian

The young protesters in Syria will not be put off by President Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to listen…….This tide of democratic change had become irreversible.

The resignation of the government led by Naji Atari will not suffice in quelling the popular demand for change. Neither would the ending of the state of emergency, which President Bashar al-Assad unexpectedly kept in place yesterday. Although these would be steps in the right direction, they don’t go far enough. The previous Tunisian and Egyptian governments offered similar changes and they too were spurned. The Syrian regime needs to understand that the youth are demanding a new politics that ushers in a genuine democracy.

The Syrian authorities have lost all political legitimacy. The government’s opposition to the Iraq war and its support for Palestinian resistance can no longer be used as an excuse to obstruct internal changebecause the non-governmental political community shares these exact positions..

The youth who marched in Deraa are the same young people who welcomed the Lebanese refugees during the Israeli bombardment in 2006, and who raised funds for the Palestinian people in Gaza. They followed the struggle of the Egyptian youth in Tahrir Square. They regard themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Arab revolution, rejecting all forms of sectarianism and violence because they have for too long been the victims of authoritarian violence. They are building a model capable of restoring hope……

Despite all that has occured in the region, the Syrian authorities are determined to go on regardless. The best answer to their actions is that put forward by the Youth Movement for Democratic Change: “If you do not change, you are going to be changed.”