by Christian Sahner

The following is an excerpt from “Among the Ruins: Syria Past and Present,” just out from Oxford University Press/ C. Hurst & Co. For further information on the book and the history of Syria, follow me on Facebook and Twitter.

The road from Latakia to Qardaha wound gently along the Mediterranean coast. From here, the blue waters seemed to race to an endless horizon, to a world still wider than crowded Damascus, over one hundred and fifty miles inland. But the beachside view obscured the intimacy of the moment. Plato referred to this sea and the cities perched on its shores as a pond crowded with frogs. In antiquity, as today, these frogs came in a dizzying menagerie of shapes and colors, yet their diversity disguised their essential unity. There was more uniting these far-flung peoples than dividing them. It was a sense of a common heritage held together by the relentless flow of merchants, philosophers, and missionaries across this small pond.

Latakia—ancient Laodicea—is Syria’s principal port. It is located along a narrow coastal strip in the northwest of the country, between the Lebanese and Turkish borders. With its beachside resorts, open-air cafes, and relaxed ambiance, the city was a salutary reminder that Syria—at least in these parts—was very much one of Plato’s frogs, a Mediterranean country with its eyes trained on the sea.

Mountains of northwestern Syria, with Mediterranean Sea in the distance, Tartus Province (photo: author)

Nevertheless, not everyone who basks in the Mediterranean sun enjoys its riches. For just as Syria’s geography and culture are divided between coast and desert, there is an equally pronounced rift between the coasts and mountains, which rise mightily from the waters’ edge. Here, the rugged peaks shelter villages that form the once-destitute heartland of Syria’s ‘Alawi community, a region known as Jabal Ansariyya. One hot day in July 2009, I headed to one of the most important of these mountain villages—Qardaha—to try to understand how a once-marginal group came to control Syria during the course of the twentieth century.

About ten miles south of Latakia, the road began to climb steeply. I was riding in a rickety van that had crawled the streets of Beijing or Seoul in another life, but was now covered with kitschy images of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Asad. The van shook to the songs of a Lebanese chanteuse, but the volume waned as we hit a steep incline. I was the only foreigner in a cabin filled with locals, many of them chain-smoking and forlorn-looking. Between them sat crates of peaches, parsley, and what looked like bottles of arak, that alcoholic nectar of the Levant.

The road leveled off eventually and the electronic rhythms resumed their punishing pace. Amidst the rugged landscape, the Mediterranean became harder and harder to see. She appeared occasionally with a coquettish wink, her sparkling blue eyes disguised between olive groves and mountain wadis. Up here, the sea was only seven miles away, but it felt like hundreds. Qardaha and its people were born of a sense of isolation from Plato’s world, not of belonging to it.

Qardaha enjoyed little notoriety throughout history: it was one of many faceless farming communities that dotted the mountains of Syria’s northwest, whose ‘Alawi inhabitants made meager returns selling tobacco, lemons and other crops to coastal merchants. For centuries, poverty here was endemic. Families were sometimes forced to make ends meet by selling their daughters into servitude in the homes of Sunnis grandees down below. By all reports, Qardaha was not a happy place, or much of a place at all; as Gertrude Stein once remarked of a very different city, Oakland, California: “There is no there there.”

All this would change in the early twentieth century, when contacts between the mountain and the coast began to increase. Among the beneficiaries was a young man named Hafez al-Asad, born in 1930, destined to become Qardaha’s most famous son. He descended the mountain for schooling and never looked back. As an adult, he rose up through the ranks of the Syrian Air Force, Baath Party leadership, and the government, serving as defense minister. In 1970, he seized control of the state in a successful coup, ruling Syria with cruel determination until his death thirty years later. You can tell a lot about a man by where he chooses to be buried, and despite a career forged in the cut-throat government halls of Damascus, Asad wished his body to return here, to the mountain village where he was born.

Tomb of Hafez al-Asad, Qardaha, Latakia Province (photo: author)

After a forty-five minute ride, I stepped out of the bus: Asad’s mausoleum sat on the edge of Qardaha’s still-humble, even derelict looking downtown. The ragged streets improved as I approached his grave, with newly planted trees and flowers lining a wide boulevard. Despite the inviting entrance and luxurious appointments, the mausoleum was strange: an eight-pointed star surmounted by a flat, onion-shaped dome—reminiscent of a spaceship in an old science fiction movie. An intricate Arabic inscription ran along the façade of the building, and on a large wall facing the entrance hung a sepia-toned portrait of the deceased leader. In it, an elderly Asad wore a page-boy cap and a wry smile, with the Syrian flag billowing behind him. It conjured a sense of nostalgia for a bygone world—for your grandfather and mine—for the grandfather of all Syria, this sunny-looking dictator.

The otherworldly ambiance was undiminished inside the mausoleum. Asad’s grave lay in a shallow octagonal depression in the floor, beneath the main dome. The casket, draped in a rich green cloth, was surrounded by a wreath of fresh flowers, and a second band of green satin sheets. To the left was the grave of Basel, the dauphin of the house of Asad who died tragically in 1994 (after crashing his Mercedes on the airport road outside Damascus, for which he is remembered as a shahid, or martyr). There were other empty graves in the building, presumably awaiting the deaths of other Asad family members—including Hafez’s widow Aniseh and their son Bashar, who took over the family business in 2000.

The mausoleum of Hafez al-Asad was more of a cultic site than a grave. Here, ‘Alawi security officers dutifully tended the tomb when not oiling their pistols or sipping tea, and piles of flowers left by dignitaries and pilgrims lay strewn outside. It looked like the mourning had never ended. There was a strange dignity to the place: it was a memorial to a man of ferocious but incredible ambition, as well as to a community that had managed to emancipate itself from its mountain miseries and take center stage in modern Syrian history. The story of Hafez al-Asad—the Alawi peasant who would become king—has no parallel in its particulars across this country. But in its generalities, it sums up the experience of many minorities over the past hundred years. It is the story of the outsider made insider, of the particular who managed to carve out a place for himself by redefining the universal.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Logo of Jabhat Ansar al-Din

Jabhat Ansar al-Din [Supporters/Partisans of the Religion Front] is a coalition of four groups originally set up in July of this year, comprising Harakat Sham al-Islam, Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar, The Green Battalion and Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya. Of these groups, Harakat Sham al-Islam was set up by Moroccan ex-Gitmo detainee Ibrahim bin Shakaran, who died in the Latakia offensive this spring. Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar (JMWA)- under Omar al-Shishani- was once part of what was then the Islamic State State in Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS), but following Shishani and his followers’ break-off to join ISIS in November 2013, the group has effectively become the Caucasus Emirate’s wing in Syria. The Green Battalion was an independent group set up in the summer of last year by Saudi fighters who wanted to stay out of the Jabhat al-Nusra-ISIS dispute but has since pledged allegiance to JMWA, while an amir, Shari’a official and some fighters have joined ISIS’ successor the Islamic State [IS]. Finally, one should note Harakat Fajr al-Sham al-Islamiya is a native Syrian, primarily Aleppo-based faction.

As per the ‘manifesto’ of Jabhat Ansar al-Din, the coalition defines itself as ‘independent’ and striving to implement a state-building project with the rule of Shari’a [Islamic law] in its totality, illustrating a broader trend of jihadi groups forming their own state enterprises as IS and the regime increasingly take up territory. As I have mentioned before, one may ask why the members of this coalition have not simply join Jabhat al-Nusra (which strives for the same goal) in line with the precedent of the one-time Saudi-led independent jihadi group Suqur al-Izz: I submit that this is due to power-politics tension in the sense of not wanting to lose autonomy and be subsumed under Jabhat al-Nusra. The case of Harakat Sham al-Islam in particular seems to be one of an al-Qa’ida front project under Ibrahim bin Shakaran’s leadership but a change in direction after his death.

In keeping with the general ‘anti-fitna’ stance of jihadi groups (including al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] and al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula [AQAP]) when it comes to perceived non-Muslim/’apostate’ forces fighting a jihadi group (regardless of the power-struggles), Jabhat Ansar al-Din issued a statement denouncing the U.S.-led coalition against IS as part of a war on Islam and Muslims. The statement cites common grievances such as the U.S.-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the prisons of Begram and Guantánamo with torture therein, “America’s support and aid for the Jews in Palestine…the Jews’ occupation of the al-Aqsa mosque,” crimes committed against Muslims in Burma and the Central African Republic, and supposed U.S. siding with “Arab tyrants” in Libya, Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia.

From these complaints, the statement affirmed that “the target of the Zionist-Crusader-Safavid alliance is Islam and Muslims in general and their mujahideen vanguard in particular.” Denouncing anyone who should enter into the alliance as guilty of apostasy, Jabhat Ansar al-Din concluded with a call for Muslim unity against “this oppressive intervention,” and asked God to “give victory to the mujahideen in Iraq, ash-Sham and every place.”

However, it is notable that unlike AQIM and AQAP (which admittedly tried to avoid the issue of whether al-Qa’ida groups regard IS as a state by simply referring to it as ‘the Islamic State’ rather than ‘the group of the state’ [jamaat ad-dawla]), Jabhat Ansar al-Din does not even refer to IS by name in the statement, which fits a wider pattern of non-al-Qa’ida-affiliated jihadi groups in Syria aiming to stay out of the al-Qa’ida-IS dispute as far as possible.

Indeed, to date, with the exception of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam (which has fought IS in Iraq anyway), none of the global jihadi groups outside of Jabhat al-Nusra- including the few remaining stand-alone ones such as Jaysh Muhammad in Bilad al-Sham and Jund al-Aqsa- is known to have participated in actual fighting against IS. In the case of Jaysh Muhammad in Bilad al-Sham, the refusal to fight against IS sparked tensions with Northern Storm in Azaz and ultimately led to the group’s departure from Azaz. Corroborating the anti-fitna record is the fact that some of the components of Jabhat Ansar al-Din prior to the coalition’s announcement worked with what was then ISIS in early 2014 in besieging Kweiris airbase in Aleppo province under the initiative ‘And Don’t Separate’ (along with Jaysh Muhammad in Bilad al-Sham).

Whether Jabhat Ansar al-Din can truly maintain this ostensibly ‘trouble free’ policy of relations with other jihadis in Syria- particularly IS and Jabhat al-Nusra- remains an open question.

Reflecting Jabhat Ansar al-Din’s state-building ambitions, video of a Shari’a institute run by Harakat Sham al-Islam.

Jabhat Ansar al-Din’s JMWA purportedly conducting anti-aircraft operations in Handarat, Aleppo province.

Harakat Sham al-Islam da’wah efforts reportedly in Latakia countryside.

JMWA da’wah efforts (Qur’an memorization classes) for children reportedly in north Aleppo countryside.

Friday sermon reportedly given by a Green Battalion member in Idlib countryside.

Below is an interview I conducted with a Jabhat Ansar al-Din media activist based in the Aleppo area [Update 30 January 2015: name removed to protect identity], corroborating the points I made above.

Interview

Q: Does Jabhat Ansar al-Din want a Caliphate?

A: Yes. [Among] our goals are the project of an Islamic Caliphate and the rule of God’s law in the land.

Q: But why is Jabhat Ansar al-Din independent and does not join Jabhat al-Nusra which also wants a Caliphate?

A: The problem is with them, not with us: we are prepared to work with all upright factions whose goals are like ours. It is not hidden from anyone that the goals of the majority of factions are like our goals.

Q: In your opinion has Jabhat al-Nusra made mistakes on the ground?

A: In my personal opinion indeed we all make mistakes…and perhaps in Jabhat al-Nusra’s point of view it is not necessary to establish a Caliphate while the gangs of Assad exist in Syria.

Q: In which areas does Jabhat Ansar al-Din operate?

A: We operate in Aleppo, Idlib, Hama, Homs and Latakia. In Aleppo: al-Ramousa, Sheikh Said, Aziza, Air Intelligence, Handarat, Sayfat, and in the southern countryside: the area of Jabal ‘Azzan, al-Wadihi, Mu’amal ad-Difa’. In Idlib: the village of Wadi al-Deif, al-Qarmeed military camp. In Hama: the countryside to the north of the city of Hama. In Homs: the countryside to the north of the city of Homs. In Latakia: Jabal al-Akrad, Jabal al-Turkoman and Kassab.

Q: How are your relations with IS?

A: We have no relation with IS (original: ad-dawla). We don’t fight them and they don’t fight us. But anyone who says that Jabhat Ansar al-Din is affiliated with IS is lying.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Logo of “The White Shroud”

I have previously written on Sunni groups created within Iraq to fight against the Islamic State [IS], but what about in Syria? Some attention has been devoted to the group “Al-Kafn Al-Abyad” (The White Shroud), but on social media I have seen some controversy as to the nature of The White Shroud. For example, people ask: is it Jabhat al-Nusra, or ‘FSA’?

To answer this question, one needs to bear in mind that The White Shroud is an anti-IS outfit originally set up in the Deir az-Zor locality of Albukamal on the border with Iraq (now declared part of IS’ ‘Euphrates Province‘ spanning the borders, including al-Qa’im just over the border with Iraq): indeed describing itself as “the brigades of popular resistance in Albukamal.”

It will be recalled from my prior work that the town of Albukamal originally had six factions, listed below with their wider affiliations where applicable:

– Liwa Allahu Akbar (SMC/Hayat al-Arkan)
– Kata’ib Allahu Akbar (Authenticity and Development Front)
– Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar (independent; one-time pro-Ahrar al-Sham)
– Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya (independent; pro-Caliphate, tied to seeing the Syria and Iraq struggle for Sunnis as one)
– Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna (independent; pro-Caliphate)
– Kata’ib Junud al-Haq (Jabhat al-Nusra; evolved from Katiba Junud al-Haq)

Note that there were other factions in the wider area that emerged over time with influence such as Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin which belonged to the now defunct coalition Euphrates Islamic Liberation Front, which had once played a role in the fight against IS in the northern Euphrates area in Syria.

Of the six main groups of Albukamal, Liwa Allahu Akbar became part of what was then the Islamic State in Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) after the November 2013 defection of leader Saddam al-Jamal (also known as Saddam Rakhaytah), who had clashed with Jabhat al-Nusra in September 2013. The Authenticity and Development Front is a Salafi coalition backed by Saudi Arabia that only conceives of Syria as an Islamic state within a national framework, while Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar did not have a political program beyond the fall of the regime despite the one-time affinity with Ahrar al-Sham that was subsequently disavowed in rejection of fighting ISIS at the end of January 2014. Kata’ib Junud al-Haq had defected to ISIS when ISIS was first announced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, but re-defected to Jabhat al-Nusra after Zawahiri’s call to annul ISIS.

It will be noted in the picture of the logo above (taken from The White Shroud’s official Facebook page) that members of three of the factions I have just mentioned are included within The White Shroud: Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar, Authenticity and Development Front, and Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya. Of the other factions, two other sources from Albukamal- one the former spokesman for the defunct Kata’ib Junud al-Haq- have told me that Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna members all became part of IS once the town fell under IS control (undoubtedly ideological overlap played a role), while no members of Kata’ib Junud al-Haq are known to have joined The White Shroud thus far. Some of course will have become part of IS (again something undoubtedly facilitated by ideological overlap), but others will have simply laid arms aside as part of declaring ‘tawba’ (‘repentance’) before IS and then returned to civilian life with acknowledgment of IS’ supremacy. Others too- even of those factions now part of The White Shroud- simply fled the Albukamal area to head to other fronts: this was the case for the leader of a local Albukamal Authenticity and Development battalion- Liwa Basha’ir al-Nasr– who fled to Qalamoun in Damascus province after the fall of Albukamal.

The operations conducted by The White Shroud, like those of the anti-IS Sunni resistance movements in Iraq, have mostly been small-scale claimed assassinations so far, but apparently the group has been trying to expand its activities in Deir az-Zor province, with a contingent supposedly now in Deir az-Zor city in a video released by the Authenticity and Development Front. It will certainly be of interest to see if The White Shroud develops into a broader umbrella front for a variety of former rebel factions in Deir az-Zor province of a variety of orientations.

Update and Further Note

My friend and colleague Alfred Hackensberger, drawing on his own sources, contends that The White Shroud is not a real group. I would disagree with this notion but a more general point needs to be made about real manpower and capabilities. In truth, I do not think The White Shroud at present has any more than a few dozen fighters. Indeed, it has to be remembered that the component battalions of The White Shroud lost significant numbers of members to an ISIS assault on the town of Albukamal in April. Not overstating manpower and capabilities also applies to other anti-IS resistance movements: if, for example, a Kata’ib Mosul component representative gives contingent numbers into the hundreds, it is a safe bet to downgrade the actual manpower by several factors. As far a operations go, nothing suggests the attacks on IS- even if successful- have truly damaged the group’s power base in the areas it controls.

Also in my own experience, though Abu al-Layth of the Dawn of Freedom Brigades affirmed to me that 250 fighters of his coalition had been sent to Kobani to aid the YPG in its fight against IS, he affirmed that this number had declined to 160 in a subsequent conversation. Meanwhile, a representative of the Sun of the North/Northern Sun Battalions- the contingent of Dawn of Freedom Brigades in Kobani- only affirmed the presence of some 70 fighters for the group in a 12 October conversation with me.

Joshua Landis on ISIS, Syria & the “Great Sorting Out” in the Middle East In conversation with Danny Postel of Denver University’s CMES This discussion is an elaboration of a short article, “The Great Sorting Out: Ethnicity & the Future of the Levant,” that Elias Muhanna published on his blog, Qifa Nabki

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Following on from my previous post here at Syria Comment on the National Ideological Resistance in Syria (a ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ militia brand primarily based in Tartous and Hama governorates but also operating militarily at least in Aleppo province as well), below is an interview I recently conducted with the group’s leader: Sayyid Hashim Muhammad Ali.

Sayyid Hashim Muhammad Ali, who is based in Tartous.

Some things to note in particular about this interview:

1. ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ brands at the grassroots level- whether or not actually set up by Hezbollah- with propagation of Iranian-aligned Shi’ism among Syrian Alawites predate the onset of the civil war in Syria, if the Sayyid’s testimony is true.

2. As ever, a contrast exists between what is stated here in this interview and what is propagated as open source social media advertisement. For example, in the case of extent of military operations, little from open source advertisement points to operations in Quneitra or Deraa.

3. It is interesting that the Sayyid says there is no connection with the Muqawama Suriya, even as the latter claims a media office branch in Masyaf (Hama province), for instance. This may indicate tension between the two despite the public advert ‘brotherology’ here (cf. his reference to Ali Kayali as ‘brother’).

Muqawama Suriya: Masyaf Branch

Q: When was the National Ideological Resistance in Syria [NIR] established?

A: In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. The NIR was established in the beginning in mid-2009 before the events in Syria, as a resistance movement from within the components of the Syrian people against the Zionist enemy: nationalist, of the people (ideological), and [established] without intervention or support from any state or any other faction. We began with a small, limited number [of members] and we undertook special training sessions to undertake martyrdom missions against the Zionist soldiers. But [because of] our very weak capabilities…we undertook a number of simple missions…and we continued lying in wait for any opportunity to be offered to us to undertake a mission against the Zionist soldiers, in any case. And before the beginning of the crisis in Syria we perceived the danger and visited some of the oppositionists in a number of provinces and our weapons were the freedom of speech we possessed and we always expressed our opinions even if they were against the government, and we did not fear the truth…

Thus we were before the events and thus we still are, and thanks to God, we managed to connect with some of those who thought that what is happening in Syria is a revolution and a number of them joined our ranks, either transmitting information to us or participating in battle. The resistance was established in the mosque of Sayyida Zahara’ (peace be upon her) in the village of Namriya in the Sheikh Badr region of  Tartous.

Q: How many ‘martyrs’ does NIR have?

A: We have 27 great martyrs of righteousness and men of our Lord the Companion of Time [Imam al-Mahdi] (peace be upon him). We also have, thanks to God, around 70 wounded…and the wounds among them are serious and light, thanks to God.

Q: Does NIR support Ayatollah Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih*?

A: With regards to your question about wilayat al-faqih, allow me to respond to your question with a question: are we able to be in the presence of one knowledgeable in religion to guide us? And why should we become confused in our matter so long as the sayyid and knowledgeable one is present? And we are the ones working for our Lord- the Companion of Time- to accept us in his army,** so as long as our work is pure to the face of God- Exalted is He- so it is obligatory for us to be bound by the program of the Commander of the Faithful and our impeccable imams. And we must embrace the original Islamic religion of Muhammad.

Q: What are your relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon?

A: On the question of our relations with the heroes and mujahideen of Hezbollah, we say with total pride that they are our model, whose manners, commitment, faith and power- which are from trust in God and Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah (may God protect him)- we imitate. Their cooperation with us gives us power, constancy, and faith in the divine victory.

Q: What are your relations with the Muqawama Suriya led by Ali Kayali?

A: On our relations with the brother Ali Kayali, sadly we are not connected by any relation because we work on internal fronts in Aleppo, Hama, Damascus, Deraa and Quneitra, but not in Latakia. So we don’t meet with them but in any case we respect all the honourable ones in this crisis and we are completely ready to cooperate with them within the ethical framework and direction of the Ahl al-Bayt [Muhammad’s family revered by Shi’a in particular] (peace be upon them).

Notes

*- Iran’s ideological system of governance.
**- Whence NIR’s ‘armed wing’: Jaysh al-Imam al-Mahdi

by Matthew Barber

I first began tweeting about the Islamic State’s campaign to kidnap and enslave Yazidi women when I was in Iraq this past August. Though analysts were skeptical and online jihadists who defend IS vehemently denied my claims, I was communicating with the families of the kidnapped women and with those engaged in rescue efforts. I have even spoken by phone directly with kidnapped Yazidi women in captivity. One month ago, I sounded the alarm regarding the plight of the kidnapped Yazidi women for whom time is running out, detailing how an effective rescue operation would be possible. A number of journalists had written amazing stories, directly interviewing survivors—girls that had been kidnapped and placed into the homes of IS jihadists as slaves. These stories continue to emerge, TV interviews have taken place, and the UN issued a report on the kidnapping issue.

Despite the widespread doubt, I and the team I work with have been able to collect the names of thousands of kidnapped Yazidis—mostly women and girls, but also a number of kidnapped and imprisoned men that have been forced to convert to Islam. A month ago, our estimate of kidnapped Yazidis was below 4,000 individuals, but as we continue to gather data, our number now stands at almost 7,000.

Serious research Q: Is there any evidence available of ISIS female slave markets, mass rape, “jihad al-nikah” etc. in #Iraq and/or #Syria?

— Charles Lister (@Charles_Lister) September 26, 2014

Ongoing efforts to shed light on this crisis notwithstanding, the media hasn’t lingered on the issue. Evidence in the form of firsthand accounts of survivors gathered by credible journalists and academics wasn’t enough; skepticism seemed to reign in the absence of photographic evidence—something nearly-impossible to obtain. How would one snap photos of women distributed through private IS networks and placed into the homes of individual IS jihadists? Even a photograph of a Yazidi woman in an Arab home wouldn’t indicate that she was in fact enslaved as a “concubine.”

But today this controversy can be laid to rest. IS has just released the fourth installment of Dabiq, an official publication that they began to produce in July. This issue, called “The Failed Crusade,” contains an article entitled “The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour,” which details how IS fighters kidnapped and distributed Yazidi women as slave concubines. The article also provides their rationale for reviving slavery, which they root in their interpretation of the practice of the earliest Islamic communities. The Islamic State has now officially disclosed that it engages in the sexual enslavement of women from communities determined to be of “pagan” or “polytheistic” origin.

Several observations on this IS article:

1) The campaign to enslave Yazidi women is genocidal in that it is part of a greater effort to end the existence of the Yazidi people:

The article states that the existence of the Yazidis is something for which God will judge Muslims:

Upon conquering the region of Sinjar in Wil?yat N?naw?, the Islamic State faced a population of Yazidis, a pagan minority existent for ages in regions of Iraq and Sh?m. Their continual existence to this day is a matter that Muslims should question as they will be asked about it on Judgment Day, considering that Allah had revealed ?yat as-Sayf (the verse of the sword) over 1400 years ago.

The Islamic State also see the enslavement project as a means of forcing Yazidis to renounce their identity and convert to Islam:

Many of the mushrik women and children have willingly accepted Islam and now race to practice it with evident sincerity after their exit from the darkness of shirk.

Ras?lull?h (sallall?hu ‘alayhi wa sallam) said, “Allah marvels at a people who enter Jannah in chains” [reported by al-Bukh?r? on the authority of Ab? Hurayrah]. The had?th commentators mentioned that this refers to people entering Islam as slaves and then entering Jannah.

Ab? Hurayrah (radiyall?hu ‘anh) said while commenting on Allah’s words, {You are the best nation produced for mankind} [?li ‘Imr?n: 110], “You are the best people for people. You bring them with chains around their necks, until they enter Islam” [Sah?h al-Bukh?ri].

2) The Islamic State differentiates between a) People of the Book (non-Islamic religions receiving some rights and protection), b) religious groups that were originally Muslim but that have apostatized, and c) religious groups that were “originally polytheistic:”

Prior to the taking of Sinjar, Shar?’ah students in the Islamic State were tasked to research the Yazidis to determine if they should be treated as an originally mushrik group or one that originated as Muslims and then apostatized, due to many of the related Islamic rulings that would apply to the group, its individuals, and their families. Because of the Arabic terminologies used by this group either to describe themselves or their beliefs, some contemporary Muslim scholars have classified them as possibly an apostate sect, not an originally mushrik religion, but upon further research, it was determined that this group is one that existed since the pre-Islamic j?hiliyyah, but became “Islamized” by the surrounding Muslim population, language, and culture, although they never accepted Islam nor claimed to have adopted it. The apparent origin of the religion is found in the Magianism of ancient Persia, but reinterpreted with elements of Sabianism, Judaism, and Christianity, and ultimately expressed in the heretical vocabulary of extreme Sufism.

Accordingly, the Islamic State dealt with this group as the majority of fuqah?’ have indicated how mushrik?n should be dealt with. Unlike the Jews and Christians, there was no room for jizyah payment. Also, their women could be enslaved unlike female apostates who the majority of the fuqah?’ say cannot be enslaved and can only be given an ultimatum to repent or face the sword.

3) The IS article justifies their enslavement of polytheist women through their interpretation of the practice of the early Islamic community:

The article invokes the practice of khums originating with the earliest battles of Islam in which 1/5 of the war booty was set aside for the Prophet Mohammed (i.e. the “state”):

After capture, the Yazidi women and children were then divided according to the Shar?’ah amongst the fighters of the Islamic State who participated in the Sinjar operations, after one fifth of the slaves were transferred to the Islamic State’s authority to be divided as khums.
…
The enslaved Yazidi families are now sold by the Islamic State soldiers as the mushrik?n were sold by the Companions (radiyall?hu ‘anhum) before them. Many well-known rulings are observed, including the prohibition of separating a mother from her young children.

From the Islamic State’s point of view, any Muslim who tries to interpret the practice of the early Islamic community in a different way, in order to condemn the practice of slavery, speaks in direct contradiction to the Qur’an and the Prophet and has therefore left Islam:

Before Shayt?n reveals his doubts to the weak-minded and weak hearted, one should remember that enslaving the families of the kuff?r and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of the Shar?’ah that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of the Qur’?n and the narrations of the Prophet (sallall?hu ‘alayhi wa sallam), and thereby apostatizing from Islam.

4) In the view of the Islamic State, reviving the practice of slavery is actually a desirable goal with tangible spiritual benefits. They believe that slavery helps men avoid sexual sin because it enables them to avoid prohibited forms of extramarital sex. They underscore that it is impermissible to sleep with a hired household maid (a widespread occurrence in some countries where maids who become pregnant are often punished/imprisoned), yet sleeping with one’s concubine (who will have the same duties as the maid) is permissible:

Finally, a number of contemporary scholars have mentioned that the desertion of slavery had led to an increase in f?hishah (adultery, fornication, etc.), because the shar’? alternative to marriage is not available, so a man who cannot afford marriage to a free woman finds himself surrounded by temptation towards sin. In addition, many Muslim families who have hired maids to work at their homes, face the fitnah of prohibited khalwah (seclusion) and resultant zin? occurring between the man and the maid, whereas if she were his concubine, this relationship would be legal. This again is from the consequences of abandoning jih?d and chasing after the duny?, wall?hul-musta’?n.

A Must-See Human Rights Watch Report

Coinciding with IS’ own admission of the practice, HRW has just released an excellent report on kidnapped and enslaved Yazidis that should be read in its entirety. A separate page has video footage containing extensive interviews with survivors, available with English and Arabic subtitles.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian civil war in support of the Assad regime is well-known, most notably in the captures of Qusayr in Homs province in May 2013 and Yabroud in Damascus province in March 2014. Considerably less attention has been given though to the emergence of native brands, which, if not actually set up by Hezbollah, are nonetheless identical in ideology and messaging. “The National Ideological Resistance in Syria” (NIR. Arabic: al-muqawama al-wataniya al-‘aqa’idiya fi Souria) is a case-in-point.

One of the logos of NIR.

As becomes immediately apparent from a glance at the above figure, there is clear affinity with Hezbollah and other Iranian proxy militias, with the familiar extended arm and rifle, as well as the featuring of a globe to indicate the worldwide scope of ideological godfather Ayatollah Khomeini’s vision for the ‘Islamic Revolution.’ In this context, the mere use of the term muqawama [‘resistance’]*- popularized by Iran and its proxies- also points to NIR’s alignment, which is further demonstrated with other social media graphics and logos put out in the group’s name.

In the above logo put out by NIR social media, the group demonstrates its ideological vision combining Syrian nationalism and Khomeinism. Beginning from the left of the outer circle, we have Bashar al-Assad, Ayatollah Khomeini, Hafez al-Assad, Sheikh Saleh al-Ali (an Alawite who spearheaded a revolt against the French presence in what is now Syria soon after the First World War), Ayatollah Khamenei (Iran’s current Supreme Leader, who also features prominently on ‘martyrdom’ posters and other social media output for Iranian proxy militias like Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization), and Hassan Nasrallah of Hezbollah.

For a further point of comparison with the previous image: from a video screenshot to accompany Kata’ib Hezbollah’s song “Battalions of Iron and Fire.” Note the familiar shadow-figure fighters at the bottom: cf. this video for the pro-Hezbollah song “It has been written on the earth with blood.”

The inclusion of Hassan Nasrallah alone would not be sufficient to demonstrate NIR’s affinity with the Iranian regime’s ideology: after all, his face can also be found on posters of the Arab Nationalist Guard (see my profile of this pro-Assad militia group here). It is rather the inclusion of Khomeini and Khamenei as well that needs to be considered here. Yet the clearest evidence pointing to NIR as a ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ comes in an NIR graphic below, where the name ‘Hezbollah’ is explicitly used.

Advertising the ‘military wing’ also of NIR (the ‘Army of the Imam al-Mahdi’- Jaysh al-Imam al-Mahdi), with the name Hezbollah below.

Another NIR graphic, this time featuring the logos of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hezbollah (Iraqi proxies of Iran) as well as Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. Main featured slogan here: “Our decision is resistance.”

An NIR media representative advertised the group thus in a conversation with me:

“We are from the land [i.e. Syria], in the land and on the land. We are present in all the land of Syria, all areas of Syria and all sides- resisting Syrian nationalists- resisting ideological nationalists. Our goal is to cleanse the land, preserve honour, and build souls. Our relations are good with all the honourable ones in existence [NB: referring to my question about relations with Hezbollah]. Our creed is one of love and faith. Our men, youth and cub-scouts are embarking on all the fierce battles with arms, good word, love and humanity. Our force follows from our faith, nationalism and creed…”

One may legitimately ask where exactly NIR is based and whether it is a meaningful fighting force in any way. Information indicates that the NIR movement had its beginnings in the Hama locality of Masyaf and has reached out to a recruiting base in Tartous governorate, which has been virtually untouched by the ravages of the civil war. Indeed, the group’s orientation, with potential outreach to a large local Alawite recruiting pool, appears to reflect a strand of ‘Shi’afication’ of Alawite identity that is otherwise multi-faceted, attempting to bring it ever more in line with Twelver Shi’ism and in this case in support of Iran’s system of governance of wilayat al-faqih.

The emphasis on Shi’ism is also made clear in songs used by NIR in its social media: most notably the songs of pro-Hezbollah Lebanese singer Ali Barakat, who has also put out numerous hits in support of Assad. For example, one Barakat song used by NIR includes the lyrics: “It is a finest land: the mother of Khaybar [NB: Khaybar, where Muhammad subjugated his last Jewish opponents, is prominent in Shi’a militia music]. The men of God are not defeated. The Wahhabi-Salafi will not be safe. The expansion of Ali is exploding.” Note the NIR video includes slogans such as “Labbayk ya Ali” and “Labbayk ya Hussein” (at your service Ali/Hussein- typical Shi’a militia sectarian rhetoric).

As for whether NIR is a meaningful fighting force, my answer to this question is in the affirmative. From what can be gathered, fighters of the group have been active not only in the Hama area but also in Aleppo province, assisting along with other militia forces like the Muqawama Suriya the regime’s ongoing offensive in a bid to bring a fatal psychological blow to the rebels. To corroborate this assessment, below are some ‘martyrdom’ announcements from NIR under its ‘Jaysh al-Imam al-Mahdi’:

Aymenn Shawqi Shaheen. Comparison with other data shows he was reported to have been killed on 2 March 2014 in the al-Safira area of Aleppo province. He was originally from Tartous. Note the Muqawama Suriya– another pro-regime Alawite/Twelver Shi’a militia- is present in al-Safira too.

‘Martyrdom’ poster for Aymenn Shawqi Shaheen, featuring NIR’s logo etc.

Ali Abbas: reportedly commander of the “Sheikh al-Wadi” contingent of NIR. His military efforts were said to have been known particularly in Mork, Hama province. He was also hailed as the “martyr of Wadi al-Uyun,” which is part of the Masyaf district of Hama province.

Ghadeer Suleiman Ali: reported by NIR to have been killed in Aleppo.

Ihab Ali Ali, reported to have been killed in Aleppo countryside on 10 December 2013. He was originally from the village of  Tayshour in Tartous governorate. Note the distinct Jaysh al-Imam al-Mahdi headband of NIR.

Omar al-Shayet: originally from Aleppo and reportedly killed in north Aleppo countryside. He apparently moved to Tartous but then decided to return to Aleppo to fight against the rebels. Undoubtedly he came under the influence of NIR while in Tartous. His funeral took place in Tartous on 29 January 2014.

Note further this ‘martyrdom’ announcement for one Muhammad Muhammad Nour al-Shwaykh, who died fighting in Mork and whose burial took place on 27 May 2014 in Wadi al-Uyun.

Other photos besides death announcements attest to NIR’s existence as a fighting force.

NIR fighters advertised by one “Sayyid Hashim Muhammad Ali,” who, based in Tartous, appears to function as secretary general for the group. Photo emerged in May 2013.

NIR member Mohieb Khierbek, who has advertised himself as being present in Aleppo province (specifically, the Mount Simeon district) poses with his NIR headband, together with a Syrian flag, an NIR banner, and a Hezbollah flag, pointing further to the NIR as a ‘Syrian Hezbollah.’

Mohieb Khierbek poses with his gun. Note his NIR headband and armband as well as the Hezbollah flag in the background.

Mohieb Khierbek and fellow fighters pose with a Hezbollah flag.

In conclusion, it can be seen how the NIR- though admittedly a rather minor militia brand- attempts to blend distinct Syrian nationalism (contrasting with the pan-Arab messaging of the Arab Nationalist Guard) with Hezbollah’s imagery and ideology: hence a ‘Syrian Hezbollah’. It will be of interest to see if this brand expands in the future, with the overall effect of strengthening Iranian ideological influence over Alawites and perhaps Syrian Shi’a sects more generally.

Another symbol of NIR: featuring the logo of the group inside the eagle of Syria’s national emblem, with inscription “Syrian Arab Republic” at the bottom.

Notes

*- In the Iraqi context, ‘muqawama’ is not the exclusive preserve of Iranian proxies and the Shi’a more generally. Non-Islamic State Sunni insurgent brands- such as the Islamic Army in Iraq– also deploy the term as an identity symbol.

The genesis of this article was due to a query put to me about NIR by Syria Conflict Monitor on Twitter.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a Rubin Research Fellow at the Interdisciplinary Centre.

Further Thoughts (11 October 2014)

– In the opening of this piece, I wrote a conditional- ‘if not actually set up by Hezbollah’- but I am more inclined to see this group and any other ‘Syrian Hezbollah’ brands as the creation of Hezbollah. For further note, Syria Conflict Monitor points out to me that much of the reported presence of Hezbollah aiding the regime in Hama- with evidence of Hezbollah insignia and the like- points back to NIR.

– NIR is not the only pro-regime militia brand in Masyaf. The Muqawama Suriya, whose Alawites do not espouse a Shi’a identity aligned ideologically with Iran, also has a branch in Masyaf. In future, it will be of interest to see if these differing brands end up competing for local support and clashing, whatever public ‘brotherology’ may be espoused.

– Secretary General= Commander.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Intro and Analysis

The Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen [more fully, Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen in the Environs of Bayt al-Maqdis], a Gaza-Sinai jihadi group and opponent of the Hamas government in Gaza, had previously come out in support of the Islamic State’s [IS] predecessor ISIS (the Islamic State in Iraq and ash-Sham) in February of this year, defending ISIS’ supposed right to ‘self-defence’ in the face of fighting with rebel groups in Syria. This reflected a wider trend of sympathy for ISIS in the Gaza-Sinai area, which now features an IS network in the form of Jamaat Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al-Maqdis.

However, such sympathy/support [nusra in Arabic] needs to be distinguished from an actual pledge of allegiance [bay’ah] that is now an essential part of IS’ identity. That is, for IS, there are in reality no compromise positions when it comes to alignment with the group’s Caliphate agenda: one must declare bay’ah and subsume oneself under IS. Yet the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen has not declared allegiance to IS and- like Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia and Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis- is aiming for an ultimately incoherent ‘third way’: that is, showing sympathy for IS while not subsuming itself under IS’ formal demand for recognition of its supposed supremacy and authority over Muslims worldwide and eventually the entire world.

Those within the global jihadi community trying to uphold this ‘third way’ are doing so on anti-fitna grounds: namely, the notion that since all jihadis have the same end goal of a worldwide Caliphate, they should put aside differences and unite ranks as ‘brothers’ in creed and manhaj (‘program’), while confronting the common enemies. Indeed, this latest Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen concludes with just such a call to unity in light of the U.S.-led coalition against IS, and invokes the targeting of Jabhat al-Nusra as evidence of a wider war on Islam.

It should be noted though that some others who were to be noted for an anti-fitna position during the period when IS was just ISIS have now declared bay’ah to IS, with the most recent case-in-point being Ansar al-Tawheed in Bilad al-Hind [India], which had released a message in May appealing for help from both Aymenn al-Zawahiri of al-Qa’ida and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISIS. This month, the group declared allegiance to IS.

Below is my translation of the Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen statement.

Translation

Support for the Islamic State in the face of the Crusader attack

[…]

In these days the mill of a new Crusader war is turning against the Ummah of Islam, through a Crusader alliance led by America and standing with it the creeds of disbelief and organizations of apostasy despite their differences, in an attempt to stop the Islamic expansion embodied in the Islamic State’s conquests and their expansion over wide portions of terrain of Iraq and al-Sham, and in light of those developments we say good luck by God.

Indeed the rapid victories of the mujahideen of the Islamic State and their huge successes on the ground, with the defeat of herds of the Rafidites [Shi’a], driving away the remnants of the Peshmerga, and resisting the Sahwa gangs: all this can only be from the preference of God Almighty for our brothers after years of preparation, jihad, spending and giving. For it was not a coincidence or mere spur of the moment, but rather God’s victory that comes down on his faithful, enduring and steadfast worshippers waging jihad. And those victories have made rough the beds of the forces of tyrannical idolatry of the Arabs and non-Arabs.

So they have stood perplexed and baffled before this growing Islamic expansion, which also bears for them in its fold emerging signs of the danger of the beginning of a new historical stage in which the supremacy and leadership of the Ummah of Islam will return, the men of Tawheed and the people of jihad in the path of God will take up the reins of affairs. Further, they have intimated to each other thus: “Come forward to destroy these people [IS] before their soles trample on the thresholds of our capitals and the palms of their hands knock on the doors of our forts!” And they have held their determination to wage war on the Islamic State, have made promises to some of them, and blessed themselves with victory. God Almighty says: “The oppressors have only promised each other delusion” [Qur’an 35:40].

With the growing seriousness of that Crusader alliance (rendered helpless by God’s permission), responsibility and faithfulness on the shoulder of the Muslims in every place as regards what is happening are growing greater and more serious: thus support for the Islamic State is obligatory on every Muslim with any means he has, for God only entrusts to a soul what it is capable of, and it is not necessary for differences here and there to act as an obstacle to the fulfilment of the obligation of support, help and all forms of good will, which is being steadfast in our religion for all who have approached Islam. How can we delay in supporting the Islamic State when the nations of disbelief have gathered against it? God Almighty says: “Those who have disbelieved are helpers of each other: if you do not take action, there will be fitna and great corruption on the earth” [Qur’an 8:73]. And it has come in interpretation of this verse: “Those who have disbelieved are helpers of each other, and if you, oh believers, are not helpers of each other, there will be for the believers in the land strife from God’s religion, and widespread corruption deviating from God’s path and the strengthening of the pillars of disbelief.”

The one looking at the Crusader alliance today finds that it gathers among its components nations fighting each other and peoples hating each other, particularly from countries of the West that modern history witnessed as participants in conflicts and world wars among them during which states were destroyed in their entirety, and in which they spilled each other’s blood by the hundreds of thousands. But they have pretended to have forgotten their upheavals and they have glossed over their differences, and they have gathered their affairs under the banner of the Hubal of the age- America- for the sake of waging war on Islam and Muslims. For the cowardly air-raids that have targeted the bases of a number of fighting factions- among them Jabhat al-Nusra- bear in their interior clear messages that the attack will not be limited to the Islamic State, and that there will be targeting of all who bear arms and call for the application of Shari’a whatever their name or appearance, including and even if they are from among the adversaries of the Dawla itself [IS]! […]

In the shadow of this war, how can we content ourselves with a land that is not the land in which God and His Messenger would like to see us? A land of support for the believers and irritation of the disbelievers, a land of the unity of the Muslims and their solidarity as the single edifice, and their summoning of each other towards the wound of their brothers like the single body, as there is no place to sit on the fence and embrace silence […].

And it was from God’s preference that the new Crusader attack- and the last by God’s permission- revealed many of the dark faces that have been made to drink hypocrisy for some time, and the day has come on which the veil will be removed from in front of the disbelievers and their hatred for Islam and its people. By that we mean without the turban of the age of the sheikhs of the authorities and the scholars of the Marines who are not ashamed to express frankly their hostility to the Islamic State and publicly support the Crusader attack on it, showing no regard for the fact that supporting the disbelievers over the believers constitutes recalcitrant apostasy…They have persisted in their transgression even after many women, children and elderly from the Muslims fell on account of coalition bombing. And God willed to expose all the conspirators and participants- even in word- in this project to fight the Islamic State. So there has appeared for us the malignant nature of their consciences as well as the corruption of their creeds, so that what is happening today is an ample opportunity that must be seized to warn the general populace of Muslims about these snake-oil salesmen in religion who pick a quarrel with knowledge: religion and knowledge have nothing to do with them.

As for the organizations of apostasy and collaboration- particularly in the Arabian Peninsula- the striking hand for the Crusaders has remained, and it will make most of those besides it aware that the light of Islam has begun to emit rays and become visible for everyone who sees, so they have mobilized with the incentive of submissiveness to the supremacy of the disbelievers, and with incentives to preserve their thrones and flimsy power-bases.

And it is amazing that they with the rest of the states of the alliance are standing today- from where they have not taken into account- in a land of defence, not attack, for this one defends its chair, that one its interests, and another the stability of its land after their corners were shaken by the victories of the Islamic State- whose mujahideen have continued to take up the reins of initiative, attack the dens of the forces of idolatrous tyranny, and expose their edifice, in parallel with the efforts of their brothers who are carrying the banner and striving towards the goal in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chechnya, Somalia, the Islamic Maghreb, the environs of Bayt al-Maqdis [Jerusalem], the Arabian Peninsula and India. We ask God Almighty to gather the word of the mujahideen on righteousness, unite their ranks, remove the shackle from their chests and raise the banner of Islam on their hands […]

Finally we say to our brothers in the Islamic State: Be patient, endure, remain steadfast, and be aware of God: perhaps you will prosper, and know that this is a new cycle from the cycles of tribulation that God promised His worshippers when he said: “We will surely test you with an element of fear, hunger, and loss of wealth, lives and fruits, but give good tidings to those who endure” [Qur’an 2:155]. So accept the escort of God, His protection and His fortified victory. Know that your enemy is an alliance of people quarrelsome with each other whom God is on the verge of confounding to failure and turning their strategy on them to destroy them by the Almighty’s permission […]

Oh God, give victory to Islam, strengthen the Muslims, and preserve the God-fearing mujahideen…oh God, defeat America, and whoever has allied, cooperated with or supported it.

[…]

Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen
Environs of Bayt al-Maqdis

Wednesday, 7 Dhu al-Hijjah 1435 AH, corresponding to 1 October 2014.

What’s at Stake in Kobani: Islamic State and Kurdish Calculations
By Carl Drott (freelance journalist, visited Kobani in August-September)
for Syria Comment – October 9, 2014

The situation currently looks grim for the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and others defending Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) from the Islamic State (IS). Still, it is conceivable that air strikes together with reinforcements and armaments could enable YPG to not only prevail, but go on the offensive again. While both IS and YPG would ideally want to see the other side utterly defeated, there are also more local goals. In the wider area around Kobani, the conflict dynamics and prospects for successful rule are also affected by the role of Arab civilians and anti-IS rebels.

Why Did IS Attack Kobani?

IS’ decision to attack Kobani in mid-September appears rational in the light of its somewhat crippled capabilities in Iraq and recent defeats against YPG in the Jazira area. Not only was Kobani the low hanging fruit, but it could be plucked quickly. IS understood that time was short before the coalition air campaign was extended into Syria.

Local Kurdish volunteers in Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) gather in a ceremony to form new units. They will assist in the defence of the town against Islamic State (IS) attacks. (Taken by the author)

The Strategic Prize

Before the attack started, YPG controlled some territory between Shiukh bridge and Qara Quzak bridge along the eastern shore of the Euphrates. Even more importantly, YPG controlled a stretch of the main motorway east of Qara Quzak bridge. This territory has now been captured, which means significantly improved communications within the northern parts of the “caliphate.” Kobani town itself is relatively insignificant, but the survival of a YPG-controlled enclave would tie up military resources and constitute a security problem for IS in the longer term.

If the tables are turned at some point in the future, YPG will certainly look east towards Tel Abyad. The capture of this town would enable the isolated Kobani enclave to be connected with the much larger Jazira area that also borders the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (a successful attack would most likely come from this side). For IS, on the other hand, getting expelled from this area would mean losing all access to Turkey east of Jarabulus.

Another goal for YPG would be to capture the eastern shore of the Euphrates. Not only would this mean a huge security improvement, but it would also give much-needed access to water. A station near Shiukh used to pump water to Kobani, but IS cut the supply completely when it took over the area early this year. The Kurdish administration then connected deep new-dug wells to the water treatment plant in Qaraqoy. These facilities have now also been captured by IS, which means that Kobani’s only water supply comes from smaller wells inside the town itself.

Electricity from the Tishrin dam used to reach Kobani through a sub-station near Sarrin, which also supplies IS-controlled towns like Shiukh and Jarabulus. IS cut the supply to Kobani when the sub-station was captured in March, forcing the town’s population to rely solely on generators. Recapturing the sub-station might be a worthwhile objective for YPG, unless IS is prepared to cut off electricity to its own towns as well.

The Ethnic Map

With regards to the human geography, Kobani town and its environs are nearly completely Kurdish, and staunchly pro-YPG. Kurdish civilians fled their villages in anticipation of IS’ advance – and so will the remaining inhabitants of Kobani town if defeat appears imminent. IS will then be in control of substantial resources in the form of houses, businesses and farm lands, which can be distributed as “war spoils” to fighters and local collaborators.

There used to be a large Kurdish minority in Tel Abyad, but as a result of the ethnic cleansing campaign that was initiated last summer and lasted until the spring, the town is now entirely Arab-populated. The main Baggara tribe as well as smaller tribes like Assafah and Naem all support IS, according to a Kurdish former resident.

Tribal Divisions

Between Tel Abyad and Kobani as well as along the eastern shore of the Euphrates sit a number of Arab villages, interspersed among Kurdish and mixed ones. According to an Arab source within the Kurdish administration, there are no clear political divisions between the tribes along the Euphrates, although there are some general tendencies. Jawader, Jubanat and Awn are largely on YPG’s side; meanwhile Degarat, Jeth and Serezat tend to support IS. An official from the Asayish police force stated that the largest of these are Awn and Serezat.

According to a group of Awn tribesmen in Jadah, located by the Euphrates, the tribal leaders have little influence over the political allegiance of their members. As frontlines have moved back and forth and various groups have come and gone, local Arabs appear to have turned to “fence-sitting” (supporting no one), “hedging” (supporting both sides) and “coat-turning” (supporting the group currently in power). More substantial support will probably only emerge when either IS or YPG proves its ability to hold onto territory.

Local Calculations

According to several commanders, YPG never capture Arab villages unless requested by a local delegation. While there are also military needs and ambitions for territorial contiguity to take into account, YPG obviously holds no desire to rule over a wary or even hostile Arab population. There are some Arabs in YPG and the Asayish police force, but probably too few to successfully rule larger Arab population centres.

Ismet Hesen, the Defence Minister of the Kobani canton government, stated in late August that YPG forces were about to go on the offensive – and he appeared confident that local Arabs would welcome them. Two weeks later, the establishment of a joint YPG-rebel command centre was declared in an on-line video. Some of these rebels had previously fought against YPG, and only switched sides after they were driven out from nearby towns by IS. Despite such concerns, the new alliance probably raised the perceived legitimacy of YPG among local Arabs, and concerns about this might even have urged IS to strike first.

To conclude: If IS forces capture Kobani, their victory will be definite and irrevocable. If YPG manages to hold IS at bay, its forces will eventually have to take back enough territory to create sustainable living conditions. The scale of their ambitions will depend on what is feasible. In their very different ways, IS and YPG both have the capacity to govern these areas over time.

* Carl Drott’s previous work can be found on his homepage: http://carldrott.wordpress.com

The Yazidis Are Not Getting Support

by Matthew Barber

with a translated statement from the Yazidi Prince, Mir Tahsin Beg

When the Islamic State attacked Iraq’s Sinjar Mountain range—home to the largest population of the Yazidi minority—on August 3, they arrived in only a few convoys, estimated to be carrying around 1,000 jihadist fighters. According to a new, private report by an Iraqi with military knowledge (yes, it will become public, hopefully soon), the mountain had a defense force consisting of 16,000 Kurdish Peshmerga and the 11^th brigade of the 3^rd division of the Iraqi army—led by a Kurdish general. None of the military leaders responsible for defending Sinjar were Yazidis, despite the mountain having a Yazidi majority population estimated at over 84%.

A Yazidi member of the Sinjar Protection Forces poses with a child whose family never left Sinjar. The family hid until local Yazidi defenders reached them and now remain under their protection.

Though vastly outnumbering the attacking jihadists—and maintaining the high-ground advantage—the Peshmerga defenders fled the IS attack without a fight. In mid-August, Christine van den Toorn documented this ignoble abandonment of perhaps the Middle East’s most vulnerable minority group, but only now are we getting a sense of the numbers of Peshmerga who could have successfully defended them and prevented the displacement of several hundred thousand people.

Though as many as 16,000 Peshmerga fled the IS attack on Sinjar—supposedly for not having adequate defenses against the more up-to-date weaponry of the vastly smaller IS force—a group of just 3,000-4,000 local Yazidis with no support has continued to defend a few parts of Sinjar until this very day—embattled but remaining unconquered by the jihadists.

Theories that verge on the conspiratorial circulate among Yazidis who believe the KRG (Kurdistan Regional Government) threw them under the bus in order to elicit greater US military support. Yazidis see Sinjar—an outlying area not contiguous with the three governorates that make up Kurdistan Province—as a sacrifice made by the KRG for longer-term political goals. Perhaps simple cowardice is a better explanation, though one that runs against the grain of the lionized Peshmerga’s popular reputation.

Regardless of why the Peshmerga forces didn’t remain to defend Sinjar against IS for even one day, all of the claims—by Kurds and Iraqis alike—that it would be soon retaken have failed to materialize. Even after two months of US airstrikes in Iraq, IS still maintains control of almost every area that they took from Iraq and Kurdistan, including Sinjar, Tel Afar, and the Yazidi and Christian towns of the Nineveh Plain near Mosul.

Kurds finally captured Rabia from IS this past week, but were unable to continue to Sinjar, and their offensive prompted severe retaliatory attacks from IS that continue today—against Yazidi targets in Sinjar.

One would expect that the US airstrikes would be conducted in coordination with Kurdish ground forces in order to retake important Yazidi homelands—especially since the refugee crisis is choking the Dohuk governorate so badly that schools cannot open, their classroom floors being the new homes for thousands of expelled Yazidi families. But the particular IS bases on and near Sinjar that Yazidis have repeatedly requested be targeted by US airstrikes remain untouched.

Yazidis have given up all confidence in the KRG, most now self-referring as “Yazidi, not Kurdish.” With almost no arms/munitions support from the Iraqi or Kurdish governments, local Yazidi defenders in Sinjar (calling themselves the Sinjar Protection Forces) are trying to stave off IS attacks into the few areas unconquered by the jihadis. Thousands of kidnapped women being held in locations near the mountain—whose presence is confirmed by the UN and whom Yazidi volunteers are keeping track of—could be liberated by the Yazidi Sinjar Protection Forces, if they could just get US airstrikes to hit the IS bases and provide cover for the fleeing women.

I’ve written and spoken on international media about this problem as have many journalists and others (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15). Yazidi representatives have begged the State Department and Department of Defense to work directly with local Yazidi defenders in Sinjar. Instead, a pattern of sporadic and occasional US airstrikes continues in Iraq, more than two months since IS began a genocidal campaign of forced conversions, massacres, and sexual enslavement.

Less than one airstrike per day is occurring on IS targets in Sinjar.

A statement from the Prince—the highest figure of Yazidi leadership

The Yazidi plight has become so dire that it has shaken the Yazidi Mir, or Prince—the spiritual leader of the community—from his usual sleepy state of towing the Kurdish political line. Mir Tahsin Beg has issued the following statement in Arabic, which we have translated into English, below:

An Urgent Call to the Iraqi Government of Baghdad and the Kurdish Government of Erbil

Since the 3^rd of August our Yazidi people have been exposed to the fiercest campaign of genocide [that they’ve experienced] in this century which has taken the lives of more than 5,000 innocent people through the violence of the Da’esh [Islamic State] terrorist organization. More than 7,000 have been kidnapped—mostly women & children—and around 350,000 are now displaced and expelled into the Kurdistan Region, Syria, Turkey, and other countries, and living in very poor conditions, without access to the minimum requirements for basic human needs.

Despite the passing of more than two months of the Yazidi tragedy, and the IS occupation of Sinjar and other Yazidi areas such as Ba’shiqa and Bahzany, and the presence of a Yazidi resistance defending with a patriotic spirit the very existence of the Yazidis—which is simultaneously a defense of the existence of Iraq, of an integral part of Iraq, and its people, honor, and dignity—until now we haven’t seen any serious attempt to support this resistance in order to free Sinjar and other Yazidi areas, and to save those that can be saved from among the kidnapped and expelled Yazidis who are headed for an unknown destination, without the slightest concern of the central [Iraqi] and regional [Kurdistan] governments, as though the Yazidis were part of neither Iraq nor Kurdistan.

In the face of this horrific and catastrophic situation, we are filled with surprise at the Iraqi and Kurdish Regional Governments’ ignoring of our Yazidi tragedy as though this tragedy is not an Iraqi one.

A few days ago, the Kurdish Peshmerga forces announced the beginning of a battle liberate Sinjar via Rabia in coordination with Iraqi forces and with the support of coalition airstrikes led by the U.S., but these forces have not achieved as great an advance as had been expected. This has prompted the IS forces to start fierce attacks on more than one front in Sinjar to tighten the noose on the Sinjar Protection Forces [local Yazidi volunteer defenders] by closing in on them from all sides.

We call on officials of the central and regional governments to bear responsibility—national, political, humanitarian, and moral—for the deterioration of the Sinjar situation and the consequences of it. We urge them to carry out their national duties to our besieged people in the Sinjar mountains, ask them to support the Sinjar Protection Forces logistically and militarily, and to facilitate the prompt delivery of weapons, equipment, and supplies—immediately.

—Prince Tahsin Sa’eed Ali, Head of the Yazidi High Spiritual Council of Iraq and the World