"To Israel's undoubted displeasure, France has resumed a dialogue with Syria, which the Quai d'Orsay sees as a necessary part of French efforts to stabilise Lebanon.

The Syrian president's brother-in-law, General Asaf Shawkat, head of military intelligence, has visited Paris for discreet talks, and may indeed still be in the French capital."

A summer of war or peace?
By Patrick Seale,
Gulf News / 15/06/2007

 As Ehud Olmert, Israel's Prime minister, prepares to travel to Washington next week to meet President George W. Bush on June 19, the Middle East is awash with rumours of war – but also of peace. Which will Olmert press for with his American "Big Brother"?

Some observers predict a "hot" summer in the Middle East. They think Olmert will seek Bush's backing for another war in Lebanon, perhaps extending this time to Syria, to finish off their common enemies – Lebanon's Hezbollah and President Bashar Al Assad's regime in Damascus – in preparation for a joint assault on their ultimate nemesis, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Tehran.

Another theory, however, is that neither Israel nor the US is ready for war. The US and Iran have held a preliminary meeting in Baghdad, which might lead to more exchanges, while the Israeli media have reported that Olmert has sent secret messages to Bashar in Damascus responding positively to the Syrian leader's repeated calls for a resumption of negotiations.

The US has so far vetoed any such Israeli-Syrian contacts but, if the reports are accurate, Olmert may ask Bush for a green light to resume talks with Syria, which have been interrupted since 2000.

How should one read these conflicting signals? Which is it to be? War on all fronts or a possible breakthrough towards peace – or if not peace then at least some stabilisation of a region now erupting in violence in all directions?

The war scenario is, unfortunately, the more plausible. The destruction of Hezbollah, and its Palestinian sister Hamas, is still very much on Israel's wish-list, as is the termination, one way or another, of Iran's programme of uranium enrichment. To Israel's way of thinking, Syria, the vital link between Iran and Hezbollah, must also be neutralised – by war if other means fail.

Olmert and his advisers must be anxious to halt and reverse what, from their standpoint, will be seen as some profoundly unfortunate trends.

Pressure is mounting in the United States for an American withdrawal from Iraq. An American withdrawal, even if phased over a year or two, will inevitably result in a loss of influence. This is not good news for Israel.

Meanwhile Iran, undeterred by international sanctions, seems more determined than ever to master the uranium fuel cycle on an industrial scale. Neither the US nor the Europeans, nor the UN Security Council has yet come up with a formula for dealing with what Israel sees as a deadly threat.

Far from being weakened, Hezbollah is now said to be armed with some 25,000 missiles as well as large numbers of Russian-built anti-tank weapons.

Worse still, Israel's diplomatic campaign to persuade the European Union to label Hezbollah a terrorist organisation has failed. France, on which Israel had placed great hopes in this regard, has invited Hezbollah representatives to Paris to take part in a meeting aimed at re-launching a dialogue between Lebanon's warring factions.

Allied move

In an allied move, France's new president, Nicolas Sarkozy, is ending the boycott of Syria which Jacques Chirac, his predecessor, had insisted on ever since the murder of his close friend, the former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri.

To Israel's undoubted displeasure, France has resumed a dialogue with Syria, which the Quai d'Orsay sees as a necessary part of French efforts to stabilise Lebanon.

The Syrian president's brother-in-law, General Asaf Shawkat, head of military intelligence, has visited Paris for discreet talks, and may indeed still be in the French capital.

Another setback for Israel is that the international isolation of the Hamas-dominated Palestinian government is splintering.

Far from Fatah defeating and destroying Hamas – as was planned for, armed and funded by Israel, the US and some Arab countries – the latest savage bout of inter-Palestinian fighting suggests that Hamas may rout Fatah and seize total control of Gaza.

Israel's shortsighted policy of expanding West Bank colonies while seeking to starve into submission the democratically-elected Hamas government has resulted in extremist groups, whether in Lebanon or the occupied territories, creeping ever closer to Israel's borders.

Olmert will urge Bush to boost military aid to Israel to over $2.4 billion a year and halt the sale to Saudi Arabia of a major arms package, including satellite-guided weapons, which Israel sees as threat to its regional supremacy. But the US needs to placate its main Arab ally and Olmert may not succeed.

In view of these negative trends, some Israeli planners are thought to believe that the last months in office of Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney present what might be a last opportunity for Israel to defeat all its enemies in an extended war.

Military strikes

The call for military strikes against Iran has also come from Senator Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and from his namesake, Avigdor Lieberman, Israel's racist and war-mongering Minister for Strategic affairs, that is to say the minister in charge of confronting Iran!

Can this beating of the war drums be dismissed, in the words of Dr Mohammad Al Baradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as the ravings of the "new crazies"? Or must the stoking of war fever inevitably lead to war?

Olmert has hinted that he is ready for a deal with Syria if it severs its links with Iran and Hezbollah and ends its support for Hamas and other Palestinian militants. These are unrealistic preconditions, rather like asking Israel to sever its ties with the US!

If this analysis is correct, Israel and its friends will continue to press the US to make war on Iran and its allies, much as they pressed for war against Iraq in 2003. They will try, but they may not succeed. The world has changed.

In the wake of the Iraqi catastrophe and the erupting violence everywhere, the international mood is to seek a resolution of conflicts, and especially that between Israel and its neighbours, rather than to pile up still more bitterness and hate.

Patrick Seale is a commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs.

The Guardian reports on the manipulation of UN policies dealing with Syria, Israel, Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank. It rests on a highly confidential report by Alvaro de Soto, the UN’s Middle East envoy, which the Guardian secured. They posted the report on their website here.

T_Desco has kindly pulled out all the paragraphs concerning Syria from the 54 page report in the last comment section.

In short, de Soto explains that he was denied permission to visit Syria or speak with Syrians, although this is not official UN policy. He was also denied important information on Lebanon and Syria from other UN offices. He argues that Syria is correct to see the UN as a partial agency whose good offices are manipulated by the US ("by the bidding of one or two permanent members of the Council"). This makes a mockery of international law and the purpose of the UN, he argues.

He concludes:

Does anyone seriously believe that a genuine process between Israel and the Palestinians can progress without Syria being either on board or, at the very least, not opposing it, and without opening some channel for addressing Syria’s grievances? If this should be attempted, we can be sure that a reminder of the Syrian capacity to spoil it wouldn’t be long in arriving.

T_Desco writes: Here are the paragraphs concerning Syria (I hope I didn’t miss anything):

End of Mission Report, May 2007

Alvaro de Soto

4. …
As soon as I was appointed I sought to visit all my interlocutors in their capitals, but I was told by USG/DPA that I should consult before traveling to either Lebanon or Syria. …
Notwithstanding my strenuous efforts, of which there is plenty of evidence in the DPA cables file, I was never authorized to go to Syria. None of my arguments in favour of going were ever refuted, nor was I given any precise reason for denial of the authorization requested.
…

Syria

99. There is an old saying that in the Middle East you can’t make war without Egypt and you can’t make peace without Syria. The first half is no longer valid, but I sense that the second remains true. For the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, keeping Syria at arm’s length is particularly galling. Those who advocate it seem to believe that it is possible to pursue an Israeli-Palestinian track while isolating Damascus. I know that that is the thinking; it has been made perfectly clear by the US Envoy, who reported to his Quartet colleagues that, in discussing the Arab initiative with the “Arab Quartet”, they put to them whether the Arabs would be prepared to reciprocate if Israel reached an agreement only with the Palestinians – as opposed to the comprehensive withdrawal from all occupied territory (including the Syrian Golan provided for in the Beirut agreement of 2002 as the requirement for gaining normalization with Arab countries). The Arab Quartet, we were told, had replied in the affirmative.

100. I am gobsmacked. If indeed they did reply in the affirmative, it must be because of a desire to tell their interlocutors what they want to hear. Such an approach would be highly divisive amongst the Arabs, and it could seriously undermine that Arab unity which is behind the Arab initiative and is one of its main attributes. I don’t believe they can seriously believe that it is possible to neatly compartmentalize the various fronts and deal with them sequentially, bestowing the favour of attention on well-behaving parties first.

101. In much the same way, does anyone seriously believe that a genuine process between Israel and the Palestinians can progress without Syria being either on board or, at the very least, not opposing it, and without opening some channel for addressing Syria’s grievances? If this should be attempted, we can be sure that a reminder of the Syrian capacity to spoil it wouldn’t be long in arriving.

102. The conventional wisdom is that Israel can’t handle more than one negotiation at a time. As recently as 27 April, in a piece in Haaretz titled “Why Syria must wait”, an Israeli ambassador wrote: “Few would dispute the assertion that the Israeli bridge is incapable of supporting two peace processes, a Syrian and a Palestinian one, at the same time.” I understand the political difficulties involved. But I believe it’s just not possible to completely disaggregate the two, or calmly wait for their turn with the occupier (take a number and have a seat in the waiting room until you are called, please), and that is why the Madrid conference was conceived as it was. This can’t be anything but one more layer of excuses not to negotiate. I note further that the Winograd Committee has criticized the Israeli establishment for its lukewarm attitude to trying to make peace with Syria (and Lebanon). Its interim report notes that Israel believed it enjoyed military superiority over its neighbours, and that, “given this analysis, there was no need to prepare for war, nor was there a need to energetically seek paths to stable and long-term agreements with our neighbours“. In the wake of the report, Olmert has declared that he will implement the Winograd recommendations and has mobilized the Cabinet energetically toward that end. There is, of course, an element of staying in power, but a key point to watch is whether implementation of the recommendations will include a change toward Syria and whether the US will allow it.

103. While, as I say, no one ever gave me a cogent reason why I should have shunned Damascus for two years, I sometimes hear on the grapevine the idea that, since the main business with Syria related to its role in Lebanon, and in particular the implementation of SCRs 1559 and, lately, 1701, it would be distracting if anyone from the UN were to talk to Syria about anything else. Let me record that, in two years, I received not one report of the meetings or work of the Special Envoy for SCR 1559, even though I was informed that he regularly received the material I shared with HQ, and I was aware that he had certain contacts with the Syrian government (as well as the Palestinian and Israeli ones, of course – which I usually learned about from them rather than the UN). He had a narrow and confined mandate. I had a broad and over-arching one. Were the UN’s house in order, EOSG and DPA would have ensured that the envoy charged with taking a broad view would have been kept fully abreast of the work of the one working on a narrower front. And it would not have been at all difficult for a well-briefed Special Coordinator, when in Damascus, to ensure that there were no crossed wires, and that nothing he said or did undermined the need to make progress on other fronts, or the vital work of colleagues.

104. Given my constant efforts, opposed by HQ, to ensure that the UN had a good channel to Syria on the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is ironic that on the eve of my departure, the US Secretary of State is meeting the Foreign Minister of Syria, and members of the Quartet are meeting Syria as one of the members of the follow-up committee of the Arab League Initiative, in Sharm el-Sheikh. The UN played little or no role in bringing this about, but I devoutly hope that we will no longer isolate Syria and ensure that whoever deals with the MEPP for the UN maintains a dialogue and relationship with Damascus. Sadly, I wouldn’t augur him/her a privileged relationship. Since we went along with the ostracism docilely when they were out in the cold, we are likely seen not as impartial good officers, but as fair-weather friends.
…

112. Similarly, there is no Security Council resolution prohibiting contact with the Government of Syria. Syria’s territory remains occupied in contravention of international law and Security Council resolutions, and the Security Council advocates a comprehensive settlement to the Middle East conflict – that between Israel and its neighbours – thus making an end to the occupation of Syrian territory part and parcel of such a comprehensive settlement. Given all these circumstances, the Syrian government, in light of the truncation of the exercise of the terms of reference of the UN “Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process”, might be forgiven for wondering whether the Secretary-General’s policy is inspired not by international law including Security Council resolutions but by the bidding of one or two permanent members of the Council. (Indeed, I wonder whether we have failed in our duty to the Council in briefing them every month on the conflict without ever consulting a key State party to it whose territory happens to be occupied.)

113. It almost goes without saying that the impression that both the PA government and that of Syria will have gathered – even though they might tell us the contrary – is not one favourable to their viewing the UN as a trusted interlocutor.
…

133. Israeli rejectionism extends also to Syria on which, echoing the US, Olmert has taken the position that Syria knows what it must do to prove that it is an acceptable negotiating partner, and insists on compliance, prior to any contact or negotiation, with goals that might be achieved precisely as a result of negotiations. Much is made of the fact that visitors to Syria have returned empty-handed. I wonder, do they seriously believe that Syria is going to give up negotiating cards outside of the framework of a negotiation – gratis? If I believed that, I would be insulting their intelligence. Powell’s quote (”You can’t negotiate when you tell the other side, ‘ Give us what a negotiation would produce before the negotiations start’“; §131) applies here as well, in spades. The Israelis wouldn’t do it – why would the Syrians?

The Guardian summarizes the de Soto report: See also this comment by Ian Williams.

The highest ranking UN official in Israel has warned that American pressure has “pummelled into submission” the UN’s role as an impartial Middle East negotiator in a damning confidential report. The 53-page “End of Mission Report” by Alvaro de Soto, the UN’s Middle East envoy, obtained by the Guardian, presents a devastating account of failed diplomacy and condemns the sweeping boycott of the Palestinian government. It is dated May 5 this year, just before Mr de Soto stepped down.

The revelations from inside the UN come after another day of escalating violence in Gaza, when at least 26 Palestinians were killed after Hamas fighters launched a major assault. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, head of the rival Fatah group, warned he was facing an attempted coup.

Mr. de Soto condemns Israel for setting unachievable preconditions for talks and the Palestinians for their violence. Western-led peace negotiations have become largely irrelevant, he says.

Sarkozy Invites Hizbullah and Begins "Engaging" Syria. From Jerusalem Post (Thanks K)

In a significant diplomatic shift, French President Nicolas Sarkozy will invite Hizbullah to take part in a conference on Lebanon scheduled for later this month in Paris, and begin "engaging" Syria, The Jerusalem Post has learned.

New French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner has invited delegates from across Lebanon's political and religious divide to the conference aimed at quelling Lebanon's violence and political strife.

In another sign that France has decided to step up its involvement in the Middle East, Sarkozy is to meet Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas in Paris on Tuesday.

Regarding Syria, diplomatic sources in Jerusalem said France had let Damascus know it was willing to reengage with it, but that it would not in any way back down from its firm support for an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri, or from its demand that Damascus "keep its hands off" of Lebanon.

"The tribunal is established and is behind us," a senior French Foreign Ministry official told the Post from Paris. "There is an understanding between the US and the UN Security Council. The tribunal proposal has passed, in the form of Resolution 1757, so the question will not be raised between us and Hizbullah, or with anyone else."

Hariri and 22 others were killed by a bomb attack in Beirut that many believe was orchestrated by the Syrians. Sources in Jerusalem said there was a great deal of concern among Syrian officials close to President Bashar Assad that they would be implicated by the tribunal, and that Assad was very keen on getting the tribunal squashed.

Hariri was a close friend of then-French president Jacques Chirac, and his assassination put Franco-Syrian relations into a deep freeze.

The view in Jerusalem is that Sarkozy wants to bring about a gradual thaw in the ties, in order to play the "honest broker" and stabilize Lebanon. The conference in Paris, according to this assessment, is part of this effort.
The invitation to Hizbullah largely puts an end to hopes articulated in Jerusalem after Sarkozy's election victory that he might be persuaded to place Hizbullah on Europe's list of terrorist organizations, a position that was opposed by Chirac.

"The objective is to restore confidence between parties. We have the opportunity to end the conflict, and not talking to them [Hizbullah] would mean neglecting the Lebanese political situation, where Hizbullah is an important component," the French Foreign Ministry official said. The official also said that even though the "guest list" had yet to be finalized, Hizbullah would definitely be there and involved in the negotiations.

Asked if the France was concerned about international criticism for inviting Hizbullah, which Israel, the US and a number of other countries consider a terrorist organization, the official said the priority was Lebanon's stability, not France's image.

Diplomatic officials in Jerusalem said they were not surprised by the invitation to Hizbullah, and that it must be seen within the context of Paris's decision to invite all the major players in Lebanon to the conference.

Lebanon has faced a political deadlock since November, when six pro-Syrian ministers quit the cabinet, charging it was violating the power-sharing arrangements drawn up after the 1975-90 civil war. The current wave of violence between Fatah al-Islam, a Palestinian group with suspected al-Qaida and Syrian ties, and the Lebanese army has not let up since it began on May 20.
France's readiness to engage Hizbullah politically was foreshadowed by remarks Sarkozy made to the Post in a pre-election interview, when he said it would be counterproductive to place Hizbullah on the EU's terrorist list, but that if Hizbullah wanted to be treated as "the political party that it claims to be, then they must act us such."

France, along with other EU nations such as Sweden, Greece and Spain, have long argued against placing the Islamist organization on the list, saying that it also has a legitimate political component, and that it would be a mistake to delegitimize a movement that provides political representation for a large and growing segment of Lebanon's population.

"We are for the disarmament of Hizbullah. We were the first to support UN Security Council Resolution 1559, and for years we have been trying to turn them into a purely political entity," the French official added. Resolution 1559 called, among other things, for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of the armed militias there.

Former French ambassador to Syria Jean-Claude Cousseran organized the Paris conference after meeting with several Lebanese political figures in Beirut last week.

Both Lebanon Prime Minister Fuad Saniora's Future Movements party and Hizbullah welcomed the French proposal. Hizbullah MP Hassan Hobballah told the Lebanese press, "We will deal positively with any initiative from any friendly or brotherly state that attempts to help Lebanon out of its crisis," but stressed that the solution to the unrest in the country must be based on the participation of all Lebanese political groups.

Hizbullah has 13 deputies in the Lebanese Parliament, but is widely seen as a rogue faction trying to take over the legislature from within. The Hizbullah lawmakers have blasted Saniora's government for not granting them important cabinet positions, and have accused the government of trying to squeeze them out.

Among those expected to attend the Paris conference will be representatives from pro-Syria Michel Aoun's opposition Free Patriotic Movement, who indicated at a meeting with Kouchner in Paris on May 28 that he would respond favorably to the proposal, as well as a delegation representing pro-Syria Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri.

Ayman Abdel Nour, publisher of the All4Syria Bulletin, announces the launch of a new website, All4Syria (www.all4syria.org), a valuable portal of independent news emanating from inside Syria.

Asma Assad, the British-born wife of Syrian President Bashar al Assad speaks about her project to empower rural communities to BBC's  Lyse Doucet. (5 Minutes)

Counter-terrorism analysts Bilal Y. Saab and Magnus Ranstorp, from the Brookings Institution and the Swedish National Defence College respectively, have just released a study on the threat that al-Qaeda poses to the strengthened United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

T_Desco adds these links:

Reports outline details of alleged terror plot

‘Operation 577′ called for large bombings, assassinations of key political and religious figures

Fatah al-Islam militants were planning a string of terrorist attacks throughout Lebanon, including attacks on UN offices, large-scale bombings and assassinations, in a plot known as “Operation 577″ which was revealed during interrogations of arrested Fatah al-Islam members, London-based Arabic daily Al-Hayat said on Monday.

Citing Lebanese security sources, Al-Hayat said the goal of the plot was to lay the foundation for an “all-Sunni emirate in North Lebanon.”

Sources told the newspaper that Al-Qaeda fighters from Iraq made their way to Lebanon through Syria and vowed to conduct a series of terrorist attacks across Lebanon, while Fatah al-Islam leader Shaker Youssef al-Abssi pursued his expansion plans in the North.
…

The pan-Arab daily said while Abssi counted on Al-Qaeda mercenaries to join the fight on his side, those same members “let down” Abssi, “because they did not show any sort of cooperation during the continuing fighting between the army and Fatah al-Islam.”

Al-Hayat added testimonies of arrested Fatah al-Islam fighters revealed Abssi’s intention to launch more attacks against the army which would have a “larger and more violent scope.”

Testimonies of fighters made available to Al-Hayat showed that Abssi’s plan was “doomed to failure because of several factors on the Lebanese as well as Palestinian levels.”

The same testimonies said groups such as Hizbullah and Amal, in addition to secular Palestinian factions such as Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, “would not tolerate movements such as Fatah al-Islam expanding and invading their territories.”

Local daily Al-Mustaqbal, which is owned by the Hariri family, said Operation 577 aimed “in its preliminary stages” to hit Christian targets.

The group has been blamed for twin bus bombings in Ain Alaq in February which killed three people and wounded more than 20 others.

The operation also plotted the assassinations of Christian political and religious figures such as Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, MP Butros Harb – a candidate for the presidency – and March 14 Forces MP Hadi Hobeish, Al-Mustaqbal said.

The plot also included attacks on the UN headquarters in Beirut, as well as on the defense and interior ministries and the Phoenicia InterContinental Hotel, the daily said.

Al-Mustaqbal also said that the Islamist group “planned to launch attacks on the Chekka tunnel linking Beirut to Tripoli, with the aim of cutting off the North and proclaiming an Islamic state there.”

Later on Monday, judiciary sources told The Daily Star that Military Investigative Magistrate Judge Rasheed Mezher questioned 11 Fatah al-Islam suspects Monday after having interviewed nine last week. During preliminary investigations, suspects said the “mastermind” of the terror operation was a Lebanese citizen who fled to Syria after the Nahr al-Bared clashes erupted.

The Central News Agency reported Monday that various diplomatic missions in Lebanon “likely to constitute easy targets for terrorist attacks,” such as Western embassies and UN centers, “have doubled security measures in their surroundings.”
The Daily Star, Al-Mustaqbal

“Citing ministerial sources, An Nahar said Ahmed Merhi, a Lebanese recently detained in Ashrafiyeh, had confessed that he was a “servant” and that he had been receiving instructions from Syrian officers.

The sources said Merhi had also admitted to “organizing Fatah al-Islam activities” in Lebanon and to recruiting young men from Syria and Iraq to join the terrorist group.

Merhi said the recruits were smuggled overland from Iraq to Lebanon via Syria.”
Naharnet

Al-Mustaqbal reports the same, whereas Al-Akhbar speaks only of ties to al-Qa’ida.

The following is the most detailed account I have seen so far of how Fatah al-Islam came into being:

“Soon after arriving in Lebanon, al-Absi spread out his growing recruits to other Palestinian camps — about 120 in Beirut’s Bourj el-Barajneh, 60 in Beddawi in the north and 150 in Nahr el-Bared.

Abu Mohammed and another Fatah Uprising official, Mahmoud Doulla, told The Associated Press that their leaders were so impressed with al-Absi’s selfless dedication to the Palestinian cause that, at first, they ignored warning signs of other trouble.

“We weren’t of the same ideology,” explained Abu Mohammed. “They followed a more puritan kind of Islam, you can say fanatic Islam. … They were ready to kill disbelievers.”

Their politics also seemed contradictory to Fatah Uprising’s. Abu Mohammed and Doulla said they were concerned when they noticed al-Absi and his men showed hostility toward Syria and its regime as well as toward Lebanon’s Shiites and the militant Shiite group Hezbollah — all allies of Fatah Uprising.
…

When Fatah Uprising officials in Lebanon alerted their superiors in Damascus that al-Absi’s men “were behaving strangely,” they were swiftly dismissed and told the group was in Lebanon for the “struggle” and to fight the “Zionist enemy,” said Abu Mohammed.

He said at the start, only 20 Fatah Islam men were based in the Shatilla camp, but during last summer’s Hezbollah war with Israel, their numbers had risen to about 100.
…

Al-Absi’s relationship with Fatah Uprising showed its first public sign of cracks last Nov. 23, when Palestinian and Lebanese security forces raided an apartment occupied by his gunmen in the Beddawi camp in northern Lebanon.

In the ensuing battles, a Palestinian security man was killed and two of al-Absi’s militants were wounded and handed over to Lebanese security by the camp’s Palestinian security. Al-Absi was angered that Fatah Uprising did not protect the men or protest their handover to Lebanese authorities.

On Dec. 5, Fatah Uprising leader Saeed Moussa ordered al-Absi and his fighters to leave his group’s bases in the Shatilla and Bourj el-Barajneh camps. Al-Absi withdrew to Beddawi.

In a new ultimatum three days later, Abu Moussa gave al-Absi 24 hours to leave Beddawi.

“Where am I going to take 400 men in 24 hours? Throw them in the sea?” Abu Mahmoud quoted al-Absi as telling a Fatah Uprising official. Other Palestinians confirmed the remark.

The following day, al-Absi seized Fatah Uprising positions and weapons in Nahr el-Bared, where he had regrouped his fighters — and he announced the creation of Fatah Islam.”
AP

Captured militant reveals plot against UN, diplomats

Suspect admits fatah al-islam planned attack on downtown beirut hotel hosting top officials

A recently captured Fatah al-Islam militant confessed to Lebanese authorities that his group planned to attack UN officials and foreign diplomatic figures, a security source told The Daily Star on Friday. The militant, Mohammad Merhi, admitted during interrogation that Fatah al-Islam had aspired to attack a downtown Beirut hotel hosting UN officials and other diplomatic figures, added the source.

The source also said that a Saudi national named Abu Talha planned and financed the operation, while adding that Talha had traveled to Lebanon to provide Fatah al-Islam with instruction and funding, before leaving for Iraq through Syria.

Additionally, a judicial source told AFP on Friday that “in the course of interrogations, some members of Fatah al-Islam confessed that one of the principal aims of their group was to militarily attack the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).”

The judicial source said the militants spoke of being “indoctrinated” to oppose Christians, depicted as Crusaders. The militants were also taught to oppose others considered to be “infidels,” a category including Shiites and leading Sunni MPs, ministers and senior officials.

The judicial source added that, in the view of Fatah al-Islam, “Lebanon’s political system, as well as anyone who participates in it, is ungodly. It is just, from a religious point of view, to fight the participants.”
…

Military Investigative Magistrate Rashid Mezher is expected to interrogate Mohammad Merhi’s brother Ahmad next Tuesday. Ahmad Mehri is a key member of Fatah al-Islam.

“Ahmad Merhi’s testimony will be of the highest importance, as he maintains a relationship with Syrian intelligence services,” the security source said.
The Daily Star

Perhaps this is just my impression, but it seems that Mohammad Merhi wasn’t aware of his brother’s alleged links to Syrian intelligence… Some may also remember that according to the first report by An-Nahar (based on a “reliable source”, of course…) Ahmed Merhi had “turned in to the Syrian intelligence a ranking Saudi member of al-Qaida known as Abu Talha” in exchange for being offered a safe heaven before miraculously returning to Lebanon just one week later…

Meanwhile, As-Safir reports that Investigative Magistrate Mezher was unable to question Ahmed Merhi because the latter had to be transferred to a hospital.

Al-Akhbar on the Merhi brothers and alleged links to Syrian intelligence.

Syrian Qaeda-inspired group warns Lebanese government to lift siege of Fatah Islam

A Syrian Al Qaeda-inspired group on Tuesday warned of attacks on Lebanese interests and citizens if the country does not lift its siege of militants barricaded inside a Palestinian refugee camp.

In a Web statement, the group Tawhid and Jihad in Syria promised its support for Fatah Islam, the militant group holed up in the camp. The Tawhid and Jihad leader, Abu Jandal al-Dimashqi, met with representatives from Fatah Islam recently, the statement said.

“We warn the Lebanese government that its vital interests, officials and sons living in Syria (sic; t_d) will be moving targets for us if it does not lift its siege of the camp,” said the statement, posted on a Web forum where militant groups often issue messages.
…

Tawhid and Jihad in Syria first became known in November, when its former leader Omar Abdullah clashed with Syrian security forces and blew himself up on the border with Lebanon.

Al-Dimashqi then issued a May 28 audiotape claiming to be the group’s new leader and calling on Syrians to kill Syrian President Bashar Assad and on other Arabs to topple their leaders as well.

“Tawhid and Jihad” — Arabic for “monotheism and holy war” — is a name used by several groups apparently inspired by Al Qaeda — though their actual links to Osama bin Laden are not clear. Al Qaeda in Iraq formerly went by the name. The most prominent militant group in Syria is known as Jund al-Sham, but it is sometimes called the Jund al-Sham for Jihad and Tawhid. …
AP

See also this report by As-Safir.

Norman adds this article in Arabic. Diyyar writes that a US military delegation composed of Generals and others visited Damascus last week. Plans are being established for a Madrid II conference later this year.

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?????? ??????? ?????? ??? ????? ???????? ?? ????? ?????? ??? 2000 ???? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ????? ???????????? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ????? ??????? ???????? ???? ????? ???? ??? ??????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ?? ??? ???? ?? ??? 2000

(From THE WALL STREET JOURNAL) (Thanks Ehsani)
By Jay Solomon

WASHINGTON — As the Bush administration strives to ward off another summer war in the Middle East, it is being forced to balance the potentially diverging interests of two of its most important allies in the region, Lebanon and Israel. Both countries are locked in standoffs with Syria over its alleged role in arming and funding militias that threaten their borders and internal security. But Lebanese and Israeli leaders are exploring what may be conflicting strategies to counter the Syrian threat, U.S. and Middle Eastern officials say.

In recent months, Beirut, with Washington’s support, has used diplomatic, military and legal means to directly challenge Syria’s influence in the region. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, however, is under growing pressure from his military and intelligence services to embrace recent peace overtures made by Syrian President Bashar Assad.

Any direct Israeli engagement with Damascus would require at least tacit U.S. support, Arab diplomats say. To date, the White House has worked to isolate President Assad internationally because of his government’s support for militant groups like Hamas and Hezbollah and its alleged role in destabilizing Iraq and Lebanon.

Over the weekend, Israeli officials confirmed that Mr. Olmert’s government has put out feelers to Mr. Assad, through third countries, about pursuing the peace track, but has yet to receive a positive response. “The problem is that the Syrians are not ready . . . to negotiate directly with Israel,” Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres told reporters in Jerusalem yesterday. “They want to do it through the United States.”

How Washington navigates the competing interests of its two allies with respect to Syria could have a major impact on its ability to prevent another major regional clash after last summer’s war between Israel and the Lebanese militia Hezbollah.

“If the U.S. decides it’s going to the mat to secure Lebanon, then this will have huge implications on the Syrian-Israeli front,” says Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator who is now a scholar at the New America Foundation, a Washington think tank.

“If something blows up between Syria and Israel,” he added, it will probably be tied to “events inside Lebanon.”

Last summer, the White House was viewed as squarely backing Israel in its weeks-long attacks against Hezbollah, which included extensive bombing of southern Lebanon and parts of Beirut. This summer, Washington is viewed as tilting toward Lebanon and supporting its desire to pressure Damascus to stop exerting influence inside Lebanon.

“The Bush administration has to be firm on Lebanon,” says Emile El-Hokayem, a Middle East expert at the Henry L. Stimson Center, another Washington think tank. It is seen as “its biggest success in the region,” he says.

The Bush administration regards Lebanon as central to its effort to promote democracy in the Middle East. A pro-Western government swept to power there after the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri sparked protests that led to the end of Syria’s long military occupation of Lebanon.

Even so, Washington is likely to continue to face troubles balancing its desire to support both Lebanon and Israel. U.S. lawmakers and independent
policy groups such as the Iraq Study Group, headed by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and former Democratic Rep. Lee Hamilton, have pushed the White House to convene a regional peace conference that includes Syria and Iran to address broader Mideast issues. But while the U.S. has begun engaging in regional talks on Iraq, the discussions haven’t turned toward Lebanon and Syria.

The U.S. also is engaged in a wider initiative with Arab countries to kick-start Palestinian-Israeli peace talks.

U.S. diplomats fear that Damascus could demand that it regain some of its once-strong influence inside Lebanon in return for helping assure peace with Israel.

Lebanon’s security has been inextricably linked to Israel’s over the past five decades. Palestinian militant groups targeting Israel had based themselves inside Lebanon during the 1970s and 1980s, leading to raids and invasions by Israel. More recently, Hezbollah has emerged as a military force on Israel’s northern border, a situation that led to another invasion by Israel last summer.

Washington’s views toward Beirut have also changed, especially after street protests there in 2005 forced Syria to withdraw its remaining forces from Lebanon. The Bush administration seized on the election of Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora months later as a symbol of what it described as a democratization wave sweeping the Middle East. After last summer’s war, the White House made stabilizing the Lebanese government a cornerstone of its Middle East strategy.

This policy has increasingly placed the Bush administration on a collision course with Damascus. Late last month, the U.S. pushed through the United Nations Security Council an international tribunal to try suspects in Mr. Hariri’s assassination. Damascus has denied any involvement in Mr. Hariri’s murder, but has refused to cooperate with U.N. investigators.

In recent weeks, Lebanese and U.S. officials have alleged that Syria is backing Sunni and Palestinian militant groups inside Lebanon in a bid to
undermine Mr. Siniora’s government. Clashes between the Lebanese army and two militias, Fatah Islam and Jund al-Sham, near the cities of Tripoli and Sidon have left hundreds dead. Lebanese and U.S. officials say Syrian-backed militias have also infiltrated near to the Lebanese city of Kozhaya in the Bekaa Valley.

Syria denies it has been supporting the unrest. But the Bush administration is significantly increasing military aid to Lebanon’s army to help it crush the militias, earmarking nearly $250 million for that purpose this year, up from $40 million last year. The U.S. and Lebanon are also in talks to find new ways to secure the porous Syrian-Lebanese border and prevent the infiltration of more militants and arms.

Mr. Assad’s government has said any international-monitoring presence on its border would be viewed as a hostile act, a statement that raises the potential for an escalation of tensions.

The increasingly confrontational stance taken by President Bush and Lebanon toward Syria could have repercussions on Israel and the on-again, off-again Mideast peace talks. In recent weeks, U.S. and Israeli officials said they have detected a growing Syrian military presence along the disputed Golan Heights region, which Israel seized from Syria during the 1967 war.

These officials said they believe Damascus has significantly upgraded its military capabilities in recent months through the purchase of Russian and
Iranian arms.

Israeli and U.S. officials are seeking to reconcile these seemingly aggressive activities with repeated overtures from Mr. Assad to engage in peace
talks with Mr. Olmert’s government. One theory is that Syria’s leader’s saber-rattling is intended to jump-start talks over the future of the Golan
Heights. Another is that Syria is working with Iran to deter moves that aren’t in their interests in Lebanon, and to discourage possible U.S. or Israeli
strikes on Tehran’s nuclear facilities.

A U.S.-Israeli strategic dialogue scheduled for later this month in Washington is expected to focus on Syria’s peace overtures.

Mr. Olmert is expected to come under increasing pressure from elements inside the Israeli Defense Forces and Military Intelligence to engage Damascus in a peace dialogue to diminish the chances of another summer war. Israeli officials say the country needs to reduce the growing threats on its borders, including Hamas in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, Hezbollah on its northern border and now Syria across the Golan Heights. Last summer’s war failed to dismantle Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

Many regional analysts express skepticism that any Israeli-Syrian peace talks would bear long-term dividends. For one, Syria is seen as having significantly less influence over Hezbollah and other militant groups fighting Israel than it did before its 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon, when Damascus in essence ran Beirut. Analysts argue also that Mr. Assad is unlikely to jeopardize his military alliance with Iran in a bid to achieve peace with Israel.

Farid Ghadry Speaks in Israeli

George Ajjan on Ghadry's visit. A must read. Humorous and gives plenty of background.

‘Don’t make peace with despotic Syria’, Sheera Claire Frenkel, THE JERUSALEM POST Jun. 10, 2007

Entering into peace negotiations with Syrian President Bashar Assad would mean condoning dictatorships across the Middle East, Farid Ghadry, the exiled leader of Syria’s opposition Reform Party, said Sunday.

“Peace with Syria is important, but peace with Assad would be a disaster,” said Ghadry during a conference at the Harry Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University. “Don’t make peace with a dictator, or you will send a message to 19 million Syrians that you don’t care about their freedom and their liberties.”

Israel should “be patient and wait for Syria to become democratic” before beginning peace negotiations, said Ghadry…

Israel: War or Peace with Syria
From Anonymous

Dear Prof,

   There is something going on, and I don't know who is behind it. The same rhetoric that appeared in 1996 is showing up again in many places…….

1996:

http://www.jewishsf.com/content/2-0-/module/displaystory/story_id/4798/edition_id/88/format/html/displaystory.html

"The tension has generated much speculation about whether Syria might be considering military action to force the stalled political process forward.

"In recent days, after a series of ominous Syrian troop movements in Lebanon and on the Golan, and after a no less ominous escalation of hostile rhetoric between the two countries, Netanyahu and Assad are both beginning to exercise caution."

———————————–

Of course what started these rumors? A right-wing Mossad embezzler.

http://lists.jammed.com/IWAR/1997/12/0046.html

In August 1996, Gil reportedly told the Mossad that Syria was planning a lightning strike aimed at recapturing part of the Golan Heights from Israel.

———————————–

11 years later:

"Israel is concerned that Syria might initiate a surprise attack in an effort to make rapid but limited gains on the Golan. The goal would be to capture a small piece of territory that could serve as a catalyst for a diplomatic process that would result in an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights."

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/867700.html
————————————–

Of course Peretz is not saying this, he says Syria is in a defensive posture.

"Defense Minister Amir Peretz also spoke at the base Tuesday and said that there is no indication that Syria, Israel's northern neighbor, is interested in engaging in war with Israel, as some recent reports have suggested. Peretz expressed his hopes that the verbal escalation between the two countries will not evolve into an armed conflict. "IDF is continually training and I hope the Syrians won't misinterpret that," he said."

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/867386.html

————————————-

It is amazing how this keeps popping up. There are powerful people that can put in media articles this bogus idea to once again stall any effort for Syria to regain the Golan. And it isn't anyone in the government of Israel that I know of, though there probably are a few of them.

Anyway, that is the number one issue facing Syria/Israel right now. And it has nothing to do with reality. I think the military is too partied out from their haflaat to spring any kind of suprise.

The presidential plebiscite: What does it mean? 

I will begin with my conclusions about the presidential referendum and the many street “hafles” or parties, parades, and festivals that preceded and followed it. I have moved the conclusions to the top because this post is long. 

Conclusions

1. Bashar has completed the process of power consolidation begun with the 10th Baath Party Congress of June 2005.

2. He has gained legitimacy in the eyes of Syria’s elites, who are betting on him and seriously considering bringing their capital back to the country. Many, particularly expatriates have yet to do so and are hedging their bets, but many local capitalists have everything they own here. The “Ehsani” expatriates have invested considerable capital in Syria over the last three years but, I believe, are still holding back. (Ehsani is a contributor to Syria Comment. We will see if he agrees.)

3. Everywhere the posters are of Bashar only. He does not share the ground with Nasser, Nasrallah, Basil al-Assad, or his father any longer. Today, it is all about Bashar, who stands alone.

4. The parades exuded “modernity” and professionalism. This is new for Syria. Syrians like it, even if they think way too much money was spent on them. It is the message Bashar al-Assad has worked hard to convey. It is how he is marketed inside Syria. He is staying on message. He is “Mr. Modernizer,” even though the West is trying to convince Syrians that he doesn’t get it, is not new at all, and is just keeping the Assad family in power.

5. Syrian nationalism has largely replaced the old Arabism. The parades were all about Syria, its long history, and many different civilizations, peoples, and varied culture. They were not about Arabs, militarism, or the Baath Party. (Who knows, Bashar may even try to steal Phoenicianism from the Lebanese. God forbid!)

6. Bashar has not stuck a dagger in the Baath Party’s heart, but he has definitely circumscribed its authority.

7. Democracy: Bashar ran his campaign against Iraq and Bush. Many banners extolled “security, safety, and stability” – “al-`amn wal-istiqrar.”  This was a no brainer for Syrians. The campaign presented Syria’s choice as being one between Bashar and Bush or between Syria and Iraq. For Syrians, American democracy promotion in the Middle East means following the path of Iraq, Lebanon, or the Palestinian Authority, the three countries that have accepted or been forced to follow the US democracy agenda. Carpenter tried to present democracy as a disembodied magic that one can just import by following certain practices, such as free elections. There is no doubt that many Syrians yearn for more democracy, but they are now well aware of its attendant dangers, especially in a region as troubled by sectarian and ethnic differences, identity crises, and a weak sense of national community.

8. Syrians have not completely made up their minds about this regime. They want to see what will happen to the “reform” process, which could easily be reversed or stall. This is the BIG question. Many hope that following the president’s inauguration on the 17th, there will be a new government nominated quickly. They hope that the president’s new power will be used to confirm his reform agenda. These hopes will probably be dashed, as nothing has happened quickly or with resolution in Syria. There are big interests standing in the way of the 5-year plan. Local industrialists do not want Turkish tariffs to come down, for example. Many businesses depend on protected markets and privileges that the 5-year plan will eliminate. I have heard two contradictory predictions about the reform process made by well-informed people. One is that Dardari, on whom economic reform hopes have been pinned, will be out in 2 to 5 months. The other is that he has the backing of the president and will be given an important role in the future government. This is a sign of the nation’s confusion over the reform process. Many foreign investors are still sitting on their land purchases or have yet to enter the market. Unemployment is still way too high. The Iraqi influx has undercut Syrian employment and driven up prices. Inflation is eating away at the standard of living of ordinary Syrians. The floundering state sector and economic subsidies are sucking off state revenues. Only big foreign investment can balance these negatives. To get this, Bashar must make some big decisions. He seems to have the power now, but will he use it to discipline the privileged few, who have their feet on the brakes?
 
The Referendum as Political Theater:

Syria witnessed nearly two weeks of preparations for the presidential plebiscite that was carried out on May 27. The state-sponsored festivities and show of political dominance by the president was ubiquitous. Any analysis of the events surrounding the plebiscite must be understood on the level of pageantry, marketing, and the effectiveness of the message that the palace hoped to convey. Those who confuse the process with democracy will only become apoplectic and indignant. I have yet to speak to a Syrian who misunderstood the process.
 
I cannot say the same for some American observers. Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Carpenter gave a press interview on the 29th, shortly after the presidential referendum, designed to clear up any confusion Americans might have about whether the plebiscite was “pure theater,” and make sure that Americans know that Washington’s democracy agenda for the Middle East is still going strong. Here is one extract from Carpenter’s briefing: 

Q:  Well, about the, as you put it, so-called referendum:  The Syrian ministry has said that the turnout was more than 90 percent, like 12 million.  So that must mean something, or do you think it’s all faked and false statements?
 
DAS CARPENTER:  I think it’s – you know, when you threaten people that if they don’t vote they may lose their job, if you threaten students if they don’t vote they may not be able to take their exams, that this has an impact on people.  Anybody – you know, the Ba’ath Party has probably a million vested members in the country.  You can turn out a million people to go chanting and celebrating at midnight for their great opportunity to go vote in this farce, but as we saw throughout the day, and as pictures indicated and things, again, I’ve seen on the Web, over the course of the day, the number of people showing up at the polling sites was much, much less.  
 
Again, if the regime had confidence in this process, it would have introduced real competition.  If the regime had confidence in this process, it wouldn’t have moved up the date? by two months.  If the regime had confidence in this process, it would have given people the right to vote.  If the regime had confidence in the process, it wouldn’t have had, you know, small children casting symbolic ballots.  They would have taken their own process seriously.  Ten-year-olds do not have the right to vote, I believe, under the Syrian election law, and yet they feature them prominently casting ballots – and not their fathers’ ballots, but specially designed ballots for them to cast.  It’s pure theater, and I think everybody recognizes it as such.

As Carpenter insists, the referendum was about political theater, so let’s evaluate it as such.
 
The “Minhibak Karnaval”

Two days ago, the last of the big celebrations and parades was held at the Umayyad Circle, called the “minhibak Karnival” or “We love you carnival.” It was televised and astounding for the high quality of its artistic production and novelty of its ideological content.  The parade began around 4:00 p.m. It was billed as a pageant of Syrian history and culture or al-turath al-souri.

Roughly 12 large floats representing different aspects and periods of Syrian history and culture divided up the procession. Leading the way were the floats representing ancient cultures, each with a large castle or palace constructed in great detail and representing a different Syrian civilization. First was a large wooden ship surrounded by a blue scrim representing the sea and Ugarit civilization. On top of the ship about twenty beautiful women, dressed in blue diaphanous scarves and wearing golden bands, danced in harmony. At the stern of the ship were large cuneiform tablets representing the Ugaritic alphabet, believed to be the first alphabet in the world. Its thirty letters formed the basis of the Phoenician, Greek, and Latin alphabets. As my little Syrian guidebook trumpets: “It is a most wonderful gift that Syria has offered for the benefit of mankind.” It is hard to argue with that. Perhaps even the most jaundiced Syrian observer would have a bit of pride sparked by these reminders of their illustrious past.

Of course, the present leaders of the state are particularly proud of the Ugarit culture which was centered at the palaces of Ras Shamra 15 k. north of Lattakia, the coastal city where Bashar al-Assad is from.Other floats carried large replicas of the architectural monuments that distinguished them – Aramaic, Roman, and Babylonian, etc. Each float was proceeded by a band dressed in period clothing and playing the instruments particular to the time. It made for quite a sight. The many onlookers seemed to genuinely enjoy themselves.
 
Following the historical section was the economic culture of Syria. Children dressed in gold costumes with high shafts of wheat shafts ascending from their backs swayed to and fro. Another group of children dressed in elaborate white costumes and each sporting a big cotton tufted turban represented cotton fields. The large highway was girded by crowds come to ogle the show and listen to the music. I was new and profession.
 
Once the procession had reached the Umayyad Circle and evening had fallen, a fireworks display began on a par with the Hudson River 4th of July display in New York City lit up the city with colorful plumes?

From an artistic point of view, this parade was second to none. It was clearly planned long in advance. Syria’s most talented artisans, dancers, costume designers and craftsmen were brought into the task. What a difference from the old days of Hafiz al-Assad, when parades were dull and militaristic. There was not a hint of militarism this time around.

The President Separates Himself from the Baath Party
 
Moreover, there was almost no Arabism. The Baath Party was not mentioned. Nor is it referred to in any of the political advertising and banners that festoon the city. Bashar al-Assad’s transformation of the political ethos from Arabism to Syrianism is a process that I have been commenting on for several years. In the parliamentary elections earlier in the month, the Baath Party had a large role. It dominates the Assembly of Deputies. The President is separating himself from the Party within the limits offered by the regime’s structure.
 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Carpenter made a big to-do in his anti-Syrian press conference about the regime squandering 50 million dollars on the “scam” process. “Seeing the government spend upwards of $50 million or more on this process is an indication of how out of touch really the regime is with its people,” he explained.
 
This sort of comment is humorous on several levels. First Scott Carpenter is making up the $50 million from thin air. He is absolutely right that it was very expensive, but it was not the state or people’s taxes that paid for the bulk of the festivities. Carpenter knows this. As in America, large capitalists and private donors sponsored and organized the parades and festivities. They are showing loyalty to the leader who gives them their privileges, protects their wealth, and from whom they expect continuing support.
 
Capitalist Sponsorship of the Regime

This is an entirely new phenomenon in Syria: capitalist rather than Baath Party sponsorship of the regime. We have seen it emerge only in the last five years. It took on a particularly striking form after Syria’s military withdrawal from Lebanon, when Syria began copying the Cedar Revolution’s notions of “hafles” or street parties. Rich Syrians were asked to get out a display of support.
 
Throughout the referendum process, local street parties were sponsored at almost all the major street corners and parks in center city. There were tents, music, and young people dancing. Food and sweets were handed out to passers by. Rich businessmen advertised their sponsorship of the hafles openly in order to get maximum credit. The music blared until the wee hours of the morning. All city residents were delighted when they finally came to an end; they could sleep.  As many said, “Enough already! This is too much. We get it.”  Syrians did not misunderstand the message. They understood that the state was declaring its presence and proclaiming its strength and ability to mobilize the elites.

Many Syrians have explained to me that one of the reasons it went on so long was because the message was directed at the outside world. Assad was telling the West: “Istuflu” or “stick it.” “You think I am ready to collapse or weak? You are wrong.”

Carpenter argues that the pageantry of the referendum is a clear sign of the President’s illegitimacy. To prove this he referred to a Web poll carried out by a small exile group, the results of which indicated 80% of its readers voted against Bashar al-Asad. Presidential referendums in Syria, as in much of the third world, are not about the democratic process, however. They are about a show of “za`ama” or authority and the backing of national elites.

In Syria, the recent referendum demonstrated that the moneyed national elites are willing to back the president, not only with their cash, but also with institutional resources.

Legitimacy in Authoritarian States

Legitimacy is a slippery concept and exceedingly hard to gauge in authoritarian states. Most political scientists agree that in authoritarian states, where democratic polls are unknown, legitimacy is best measured by the ability of the state to retain a consensus among national elites.
 
States fail only when the elites split, fight among themselves, and drag the house down. This is what is happening in Iraq and some fear could happen in Lebanon.

In Syria, the referendum demonstrated rather conclusively that Syria’s elites are on board, willingly or unwillingly. Artists, labor unions, professional associations, businessmen, and industries of all kinds put their shoulders to the wheel and made this the biggest and most professional celebration of national consensus in 40 years. No one dared to speak out publicly against it. Legitimacy in Syria is about acquiescence, not votes. Syria’s elites did their job. That is why the hafles were confined to center city, where the elites live. They were hardly evident in the poorer suburbs. Carpenter can point to opposition web polls in the US as an indication of the illegitimacy of the Syrian regime, but he is missing the point. It is the elites that count, not the people.

Abdul Halim Khaddam and the Danger of Elite Defections
 
Abdul Halim Khaddam, Syria’s Vice President under Hafiz and under Bashar for the first five years of his rule, left Syria for France in 2005. He established the National Salvation Front in 2006 in order to rally Syrians against the regime. The 22 members of his family were compelled to follow him into exile. At first, it appeared that Khaddam’s defection might threaten Bashar al-Assad. Many believed he might attract other powerful Sunnis to join him in a revolt. This did not happen. On the contrary, Khaddam’s example has chastened Syrian elites, who see in his experience a cautionary tale. In some respects, the outpouring of support by Syria’s rich for Bashar signifies an end to the Khaddam threat.
 
I drove past La Noisette on Mezzeh Autostrad with a friend last night. It is a ritzy restaurant that was owned by Khaddam’s son Jihad. I asked my friend what had become of the many Khaddam businesses. I was told that they are working very well. Rather than take them over directly, authorities handed them over to Khaddam’s erstwhile managers. A government accountant who earns 5,000 pounds a month visits every morning to go over the books. A share of profits goes to the state, but there is little interference in management. My friend explained that one of Khaddam’s old managers is a buddy of his. “He is very happy to run the business alone,” I was told. “It is like he is the owner now. He retained all the employees, they are happy.

My friend followed up by saying:

I don’t understand Khaddam. He was so stupid. He had everything in Syria and was surrounded by family, businesses, and connections. Now he is nothing. Syria will forget about him. He fed off the government trough for 30 years and was rich. It was time for him to step aside and let others have their turn. Look at Tlass and others. They stood aside and let their children take over. Thirty years! It is enough, no? And Khaddam not only ruined his own family, but at least three other families, those married to his sons and daughters. They had to leave and give up their holdings in Syria. Rima Khaddam was married to an Atassi. His sons were married to good families too.” (He named the families, but I cannot remember their names or businesses.)

Then he said, “Look at Hikmet Shihabi. His children are all here. They can come and go. They still own their businesses – the BMW franchise, Fiat and many private businesses.”

Background: The Hariri Threat as Perceived by Damascus
 
It is important to give some background here because the Shihabi experience reinforces my broader argument about legitimacy, elite solidarity, and regime stability.
 
Hikmat Shihabi was Syria’s Chief of Staff under Hafiz al-Assad. He was the military commander of Lebanon for much of Syria’s rule there. He teamed up with Abdul Halim Khaddam, the political commander of Lebanon, and Ghazi Kanaan, the intelligence chief in Lebanon during the 1980s and much of the 1990s. These three men worked as a triumvirate, ruling Lebanon for Hafiz. It was widely believed in Syria that Lebanon’s Prime Minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, had bought these men. Everyone says that Hariri gave Khaddam the apartment in Paris on Rue Foch that he now lives in, just as Saad Hariri has given Jacque Chirac his present apartment in Paris.
 
When Bashar al-Assad took power in 2000, he distrusted the old triumvirate and believed they had been bought. He began a subtle campaign against them. Shihabi was accused of corruption and left for California. Khaddam and Kanaan were kept on in an attempt to re-domesticate them and bring them back into the fold. Khaddam continued to maneuver behind the scenes to re-build his authority and oppose the president.
 
In early 2005, when President Bush and Chirac decided to move aggressively against Bashar al-Assad, insisting that Syria withdraw its troops from Lebanon, give up influence there and allow for free Presidential elections to replace Emile Lahoud with a Hariri loyalist, the Assad regime balked and battle-lines were drawn.
 
Syria understood that the West meant war and that Syria’s regime could be next. In Syria’s ongoing war with Israel over the Golan, Lebanon is the crucial front. Hizbullah is Syria’s main asset in the tug of war over the Golan. Also, Syria feels it cannot afford to permit Lebanon to become a beachhead in the West’s attempt to destabilize Syria, as it was in the 1950s through 1960s and again in the 1980s. In 1956, the CIA trained over 300 Alawite members of the PPS in the mountains of Lebanon. They were to serve as one element in a Western backed coup against the Syrian regime. In 1957, Lebanon was the staging ground for Operation Straggle, another US inspired coup attempt. Syrian opposition groups found a ready base in Lebanon, where western intelligence agencies could help arm and handle them.
 
In the 1980s, following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was backed by Saddam Hussein and others waged a war against the Assad regime. They used Lebanon as a staging ground. Several old CIA hands have written that the US also helped the M.B. at this time. The game of using Islamist groups in Lebanon is not a new one. Today, analysts are arguing over who is secretly backing Fatah al-Islam – Hariri’s people or the Syrians. We don’t know the answer to this. The reason it is so hotly debated is because past history suggests either possibility can not be exluded. It is not the first time that East and West have fought to turn Islamist organizations in Lebanon to their advantage. My sense of Fatah al-Islam is that neither side had or has any real control over the group.  In short, Lebanon has great strategic importance to Syria and to any state or alliance that hopes to destabilize Syria. This is how Syria regards Lebanon.

The Western Attempt to Split the Syrian Elite and Destabilize the State
 
In 2005, Bush, Chirac, and presumably Rafiq al-Hariri believed they could split the Syrian elite, turning Khaddam and his triumvirate of Shihabi and Kanaan against Assad. To eliminate such a possibility, the Syrian regime carried out a mini-purge. Shihabi de-camped to California, Khaddam was fired at the Baath Party Conference in June 2005 and decided to move his family to Paris where he teamed up with the Muslim Brotherhood rather than accept defeat and humiliation. Ghazi Kanaan “committed suicide” in the fall of 2005. Perhaps this was his way of protecting his family, all of whom have remained in Syria. One of Kanaan’s sons has resigned his officer’s commission, but other children are doing well, people say. My Damascene friends do not know much about them. Kanaan was not corrupt, people suggest, and thus his children are not big business owners. Who knows? Many believed in 2005 that Hikmat Shihabi would join Khaddam in Paris and help Bush and Chirac in an effort to destabilize the regime, perhaps by getting Kanaan, who remained in the country to carry out a coup. Shihabi refused. His children still have a life. I suspect they paid for at least one hafle in the recent referendum, as a show of appreciation.
 
The conclusion of this narrative is that the West believed it could split the Syrian elite by using Hariri’s money and connections as a wedge. It sought to exploit Lebanon’s desire for sovereignty and Khaddam’s desire for power. Bashar al-Assad skillfully sidestepped this danger by excising the threat and consolidating his leadership over the Syrian elite. 
 
Economics 

Syria's economic opening is the primary tool to accomplish regime consolidation. It gives the president the means to make Syrian elites stakeholders. Big new holding companies, such as the Sham Holding Company, are perfect vehicles for this consolidation. In the case of Sham Holding, Syria’s richest businessman anteed up hundreds of millions in capital to take advantage of the economic opening. The president’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, stepped in and matched their entire purse, making them all his and the state’s partners in the new order. As one friend explained, “That is why we call him Rambo.”
 
As many have observed here, the funding of the referendum ceremonies by private business was a demonstration by the elites of their loyalty to the regime and willingness to make a public show of their partnership. If Khaddam believed that wealthy Syrian Sunnis would split from the regime to join him in opposing Bashar and bringing down the regime, he sorely miscalculated. He is alone in exile. The other old guard figures have found a way back in.
 
“Failure is an orphan, and success has a hundred fathers,” as the saying goes. Bashar is a success. Big money is betting on him as it never has before, to which the whole country is witness. A good source told me, “businessmen didn’t know that the hafles and activities surrounding the referendum would be so big, so many, and last so long. It wasn’t all planned. A dynamic established itself and the moneybags of Syria felt compelled to jump in and outdo their competition.”
 
Bashar’s ability to navigate the very dangerous obstacles that have been thrown up before him since the US invasion of Iraq is astounding. Almost every Syrian I have met over the last week has reiterated this truth, some with considerable satisfaction, made all the more manifest because I am an American from Bush country. They are impressed with Bashar the politician, even as they express their disapproval of “the system” and its corruption. 

End

I am copying a few comments from my last post that cover the referndum ceremonies.

zenobia wrote:

hi,
ok so some people addressed me about what i said about the convincing spectacle that the regime has pulled off…and also about my perception of people’s feelings.

I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT PEOPLE …REALLY REALLY REALLY FEEL. but this is significant in itself i think…. precisely that i can’t tell….

yes… certain people who are explicit about their negativity for the government or the president… are definitely afraid. i would agree with that.
i have now seen a kind of afraid i have never seen before… the afraid of making sure the windows or the doors to the porch are closed when you talk…even though there isn’t anyone around or you are on the seventh floor. People are fearful in an automatic kind of way to voice any dissention. no question about that.

And of course i didn’t manage to find the only dissentors or persons with negative views..in all of syria in only a couple of weeks…
so, of course there are many many of these people.

but what i really don’t comprehend…unless one admits that a huge percentage of the youth of syria have bought into a myth..or genuinely believe in the goodness of their president… is HOW TO ACCOUNT for that amazing spectacle i saw!
no, i am not kidding. i really don’t know how to interpret it.
i asked many people to explain it to me, as they understand it.

yes, i understand that there are very elaborate complex networks of associations and entities…pressured and paid and persuaded to organize, and produce the celebration. the tents, the banners the huge ads, the lights, the balloons, the ‘chocolates’ and even …. even…. even, George Wassuf..singing in the middle of Omayad circle… to throngs of young men and women..and really they are kids..kids kids…everywhere… (i age myself by clarifying that i mean…20-28 year olds… but that is ‘kids’ to me)

and all of that…is certainly a big SEDUCTION… of course.

Still…still i want to say…it didn’t seem enough to explain… what appeared for the life of me…as spontaneous…participation..

the part i mean.. was the zillion kids… parading in their groups and hanging out of their cars…waving flags.. flooding the streets… singing, chanting, dancing, and generally causing a ruckus for several days… in a fashion that seems – way beyond what would be required if it was all on instruction from on high….

are they brainwashed completely???? i have no idea.
are they stupid…and don’t know what they supporting? maybe.
are they just interested in an excuse for a party?… seems a bit extreme lengths to go… and this doesnt’ really require chanting the ridiculous bashar song does it?…

dear commentors, no i am not kidding…maybe- these activities all seem trite, meaningless, and unimportant. after all , who cares what the 21 year old ignoramous thinks….

but let us not forget… that something like 70 percent of the country is under the age of 25. !!!!!
it is not a hard statistic to believe…babies and little kids everywhere…teens, college students… you feel old…just walking in the street! 30 is over the hill..here…

and these kids, dear friends…are everything coming…they are the dealbreakers, the ones who will decide…the future…

and that big show that went on..was definitely for them..it was a big pseudo rock concert, light show, production, delivered especially for them…
it is very carefully crafted with full understanding of who is important in the long run.

and who is REALLY in the hearts of these young people??????
dear commentors, i cannot accurately say.., but the fact that they were no serious ruptures in the visual fabric… (albeit, my foreign and untrained eyes might have missed it) says something…it must in itself reveal something about what is happening…

these children want desperately to believe in this myth..and to grab onto it. if nothing more than the naive, fickle, adoration of youth… still…it has that passionate essense…and force..the force of pride and stubborness, and need to make the image be true..it can’t easily be dismissed or ignored or rationalized.

i think.

May 30th, 2007, 9:46 pm

bilal wrote:

To Zenobia,
When a dictatorial regime is ideologically bankrupt,economically corrupt and politically unpopular as is the Assad regime it is only a question of times before it collapses

EHSANI2 wrote:

Zenobia,

Those who think that Bashar is unpopular are wrong. I think that it is incorrect to assume that fear of the leadership drives so many people into such a showing of support.

Indeed, compared to the Syria of 1980-2000, it is easy to see why. Those of us who lived/visited the country during the above period can vividly recall how hard it was to find even bananas and toilet paper then. Hafez Assad was feared and respected but not liked. The same cannot be said of Bashar. His youth, looks, wife and kids, education and general demeanor are surely a big hit. Moreover, Bashar’s opening of the economy has allowed more people to drive and own cars and cell phones. Fear of the security services may still exist but nowhere near the levels under Assad senior. During Hafez’s days, once you were picked up, it was highly probable that you would not be heard from again. Now, you may get interrogated for a few days or months but you will be back. The cumulative impact of all this is what you see in the streets. Anyone who denies the level of the man’s support within the people of the country is being disingenuous.

May 30th, 2007, 10:18 pm

Posted by ALEX

About a year ago, the polling site Syriapol was launched, created by George Ajjan, a Syrian-American Republican political strategist who has commented frequently on US-Syria relations here and elsewhere. Below is a press release that includes a summary of the first phase of the project, in which most of the 350 poll takers were expat Syrians. George hopes to get more participation from inside Syria in the second phase. Although online polls are usually not as reliable as properly designed polls which try to ensure that their samples are representative of the broader population, George managed to to get closer to the ideal case by targeting Syrians who held various political views by listing a link to syriapol on most of the popular Syrian blogs and sites. This ensured that the sample of participants was not drawn exclusively from Syrians with any specific political camp.

Here is a graphic that shows typical results for one respondent (in Arabic), syriapol’s press release follows.

Initial syriapol Results Released
Syrians frustrated with regime, but strongly reject foreign invasion, Islamic governance

Clifton, NJ, USA – syriapol, a study of Syrian public opinion, today released the initial indications of the first phase of its data collection, in which an online audience composed primarily of Syrian expatriates bluntly rejected an overthrow of the current Syrian regime through foreign military intervention, and expressed support for a secular form of government.

The survey’s creator, Syrian-American political activist George Ajjan, anticipates the second, more substantial phase of the project, which would entail greater participation from within Syria, thus far limited due to compliance with US sanctions against Syria.  Ajjan, whose family emigrated to the US from the city of Aleppo in the early 20^th century, says he created the project to offer more reliable information about Syrian public opinion to decision makers and activists across the globe than the biased propaganda spouted by political operatives, both pro-regime and pro-opposition.

syriapol, by contrast, uses a market research technique called conjoint analysis to extract the respondents’ preferences on a series of attributes related to regime change, form of government, economic reforms, democratic elections, as well as the Peace Process, and then immediately provides the results confidentially in a graphical format to the individual participant.  According to Ajjan, the survey’s format, in which a participant evaluates a series of 16 hypothetical scenarios, encourages a more honest assessment because it does not ask direct yes/no questions that almost always lead to jaded responses from participants fearful of government spying.

As for the results, Ajjan says that the initial indications are interesting, but far from conclusive because about 75% of the approximately 350 respondents thus far do not live inside Syria.  He further stipulates that online surveys could never provide a truly accurate picture of Syrian society on the whole, given the low rate of Internet penetration, with the caveat that the syriapol project at least provides some quantitative data to balance a political atmosphere currently filled with little more than spin.

Ajjan concludes, “From what I can see thus far, Syrians first and foremost want results:  maintaining a secular culture, promoting economic reforms, establishing democratic elections at administrative levels, and gaining back the Golan Heights.  The participants in general have little taste for violence and therefore still seem willing to offer the regime the chance to deliver on its rhetoric.”  Concerning the overwhelmingly negative attitude expressed by survey respondents towards a foreign invasion of Syria, Ajjan cautions, “President Assad and his Administration should nevertheless be paying close attention because some responses also indicate support for a domestic uprising.”

All Syrians are invited to participate and learn more about the syriapol project by visiting http://www.syriapol.com (English) and http://www.syriapol.org (Arabic).

for more information, contact [email protected] or see http://www.ajjan.com.

I am heading for Syria tomorrow, where I will spend June and July. I hope to continue blogging from Damascus and other Syrian cities.

This news roundup covers mostly the accusations that Syria is behind the Fatah al-Islam disturbances and the articles covering Syria's elections. It also covers diverse stories concerning Syria.

One reader wants to know if I think Syria is behind the Fatah al-Islam Group. I don't know. The two most repeated arguments made by the Lebanese that Syria is giving directives to the Sunni extremist group holed up in the norther Palestinian refugee camp are that its leader, Shaker al-Absi, was held in a Syrian prison before being released two and a half years ago and thus may have been recruited to Syria's cause while in Prison. The Lebanese point to the fact that he was not turned over to Jordan, where he was wanted, but allowed to return to his previous home in Lebanon, where he rejoined a pro-Syrian faction of Palestinians, Fatah Intifada, with whom he had trained in his youth.

The plot becomes truly bizarre and difficult to fathom, when Absi broke away from Fatah Intifada to create his own group, Fatah Islam. Lebanese analysts claim this is presumably because he was directed to "pretend" to do this in order to add an extra layer of deniability and distance himself from Syria before entering on his suicide campaign on Syria's behalf.

The second argument is that the fighting comes only days before the UN Security Council is scheduled to vote on a resolution to establish an international tribunal to try suspects in the murder of Rafiq al-Hariri and has been timed by Syria to frighten Lebanese into calling off the vote.

It is not clear why Abssi would work for Syria, a country that jailed him and which is responsible for killing his son-in-law.

There are a number of reasons why Syria might have neglected to turn Abssi over to Jordan and instead allow him to return to Lebanon.

1. Syria had terrible relations with both the US and Jordan at the time of Abssi's release from prison in Syria, thus Damascus authorities would not have wanted to reward either country. Syria had broken off all cooperation on intelligence sharing with the US on al-Qaida matters by that time.

2. Syria may have been happy to allow al-Qaida elements entrance into Lebanon because of the bad relations existing between the two countries following the Hariri murder and the passage of UN resolution 1559. Neither of these reasons would suggest that Abssi is or was controlled by Syria. It is hard to imagine how Syria could control such a man or such an organization of die hard jihadists. It is also not clear that either Jordan or the US tried to extradite him from Lebanon, despite knowing that he was there and within reach of Lebanese security forces.

The following 3 quotes are from the last comment section 

K said:

Prof Landis,

You do not give justice to the argument that Syria is behind Fatah al-Islam. Please be fair.

How about the fact that the leader of the gang was imprisoned in Syria for terrorism then mysteriously released after a couple of years behind bars. (Nonviolent Islamists, Kurds, and human rights lawyers all receive harsher sentences – but the convicted terrorist walks?) Then he pops up in Lebanon!

The multinational composition of the gang is no argument against Syrian involvement. The al-Qa’ida and Syrian connections are not mutually exclusive. Think of the links between Syria and the Iraqi terror campaign. The individual terrorists themselves are die-hard jihadists, and somewhere up the chain of command, is a Syrian intelligence agent. Syria doesn’t need to give them instructions, all it has to do is control their movement, let them into Lebanon, as it lets them into Iraq. In fact, many of these thugs are veterans of Iraq. They entered Iraq through Syria, and they have now passed from Iraq to Lebanon – through Syria!

Even though they are supposedly anti-Shi’a (”supported by Hariri as a counterweight to Hizballa” goes the lie) they have never attacked a Shi’a target. They attacked March 14 strongholds: Ain Alaq, (Christian), Ashrafieh (Christian), Verdun (Sunni), Aley (Druze).

This is in a larger context. The UNSC is discussing Chapter 7, and Bashar threatened to set the Mideast afire if the resolution passes.

T_desco said: Edit

Sloppy work by Mitchell Prothero:

“After Syria released from prison a former associate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda’s leader in Iraq, a few weeks later (sic) a group calling itself Fatah al-Islam emerged under his leadership … .”
The Observer

(my emphasis)

Now this is what Shaker al-Absi’s brother Abdelrazzaq, “an orthopedic surgeon who lives in Jordan”, told AFP in a telephone interview:

“”I last saw him two and a half years ago when he was released from prison in Syria. We went there to congratulate him,” he said.”
AFP

And we also know that al-Absi arrived in Shatila in June.

idaf said:

Al-Qaida threatens Asad in a new audio tape: “You Nussairi, we will not allow you to complete a second term in office” according to “Abu Jandal Al-Dimashqi”, the leader of Jama’t Al-Tawheed wa el-Jihad fi Bilad el-sham.

T-Desco responded:

A “senior American security source” recently told The Sunday Times that “Al-Qaeda is trying very hard to seize a foothold in Syria”:

Al-Qaeda chief urges Iraqis to export jihad

THE deputy leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has urged supporters in Iraq to extend their “holy war” to other Middle Eastern countries.

In a letter sent to the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq in the past few weeks, Zawahiri claims that it is defeating US forces and urges followers to expand their campaign of terror.

He conjures a vision of an Islamic state comprising Lebanon, Palestine and Syria, where Al-Qaeda has already gained its first footholds.

The goal of an Islamic “greater Syria”, first outlined by Zawahiri two years ago, is detailed in the letter amid growing concern about the activities of new groups under Al-Qaeda’s influence in the countries concerned.
…

A senior American security source said he was aware of the letter and Al-Qaeda’s growing emphasis on spreading jihad through a volatile region.

The source said Zawahiri, a Sunni, was determined to prevent Lebanon falling into the hands of the Shi’ite Hezbollah movement, which has tried to bring down the government.

“Al-Qaeda is trying very hard to seize a foothold in Syria,” the American source added.
The Sunday Times

Note that the information about “Al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Suri” believed to have been arrested “in Syria” is probably wrong. Mustafa Setmariam Nasar was arrested in Pakistan and is now in Guantanamo (but perhaps there are several “Al-Qaeda leader’s” using that name?).

There seems to be a flurry of statements attributed to al-Qa’ida in recent days. This was reported by Ynetnews yesterday:

Al-Qaeda: Help Fatah al-Islam attack Israel
…

A statement attributed to al-Qaeda’s leadership has been released on the internet calling for “every Muslim” to support Fatah al-Islam, the Palestinian Islamist group engaged in a bloody conflict with Lebanese troops.

According to the statement, Fatah al-Islam is under attack in Lebanon because it is seeking “a confrontation” with Israel, and all Muslims are therefore obliged to support the group.

The message was released by the Global Islamic Media Front, an al-Qaeda mouthpiece which distributes statements by the international terror organization’s leaders and field commanders.
Ynetnews

And today the New York Times published this important article detailing the modus operandi of al-Qa’ida linked networks in the region (including inside Syria):

Militants Widen Reach as Terror Seeps Out of Iraq
NYT

The article also shows, in my opinion, how important it would be to return to the kind of close cooperation with Syria in security matters that existed right after 9/11.

The following passage may be of interest for the Hariri case:

“In Somalia and Algeria, for example, recent suicide bombings have been accompanied by the release of taped testimonials by the bombers, a longtime terrorist practice embraced by insurgents in Iraq” (my emphasis).

After the recent suicide bombing in Algiers, the pictures of the three alledged bombers appeared on the Web almost immediately, together with a tape that was played on al-Jazeera.

In light of this, the quick release of the Abu Adass tape doesn’t seem so unusual anymore.

However, a word of caution – at least part of the reason why there are suddenly so many reports about al-Qa’ida in the region could be a deliberate shift in White House rhetorics, as Seymour Hersh noted recently:

“I do know that within the last month, maybe four, four-and-a-half weeks ago, they made a decision that because of the totally dwindling support for the war in Iraq, we go back to the al-Qaeda card, and we start talking about al-Qaeda. And the next thing you know, right after that, Bush went to the Southern Command — this was a month ago — and talked, mentioned al-Qaeda twenty-seven times in his speech. He did so just the other day this week — al-Qaeda this, al-Qaeda that.”
Interview on Democracy Now!, May 24th, 2007

Certainly related to this new PR strategy, yet also interesting:

Bush declassifies intelligence that asserts bin Laden ordered more attacks outside Iraq
AP, May 22, 2007

The New York Times has this: "Shakir al-Abssi, was an associate of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia who was killed last summer. In an interview with The New York Times earlier this month, Mr. Abssi confirmed reports that Syrian government forces had killed his son-in-law as he tried crossing into Iraq to collaborate with insurgents.

Mark Mackinnon, in this good article, brought to our attention by T-Desco, describes Absi and his cause. He writes that Absi is "a fanatically devout former Libyan air force pilot who is almost certain to choose death over surrender in the standoff at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.

Even before he founded Fatah al-Islam last year, Shakir al-Abssi was a well-known militant who grew up fighting in the refugee camps of Jordan and Lebanon and dreaming of "liberating" the Palestinian territories. The last place he lived before he established his base at Nahr al-Bared is testament to that: a grungy three-room building furnished only with bunk beds, uncomfortable chairs and a messy desk in Shatila, a Palestinian refugee camp near Beirut.

Mr. al-Abssi, who returned to Lebanon last summer after a prolonged absence, lived in these Spartan accommodations for several months after being assigned by Fatah Intifada chiefs in Syria to take over the local leadership of the Syrian-backed group dedicated to violent resistance against Israel.

Shortly afterward, he founded the breakaway Fatah al-Islam, the radical Salafist group now locked in the deadly showdown with government forces at Nahr al-Bared in the north of the country.

The 51-year-old Mr. al-Abssi is remembered on these grimy, narrow streets as a physically fit man with greying hair who wore a mustache and, occasionally, a short beard. He was a popular and respected figure, renowned for his religiosity.

"He is modest and forgiving. You can do anything you want to him and he will forgive you, but if someone insulted God in his presence, he might kill them," said Ibrahim Abu Mohammed, the security chief for Fatah Intifada in Shatila.

He said that when Mr. al-Abssi arrived last June to take over command, he brought with him 200 battle-hardened veterans of the Iraq war hailing from countries around the region. There were some Palestinians and Lebanese among them, but locals – judging primarily by the men's appearance and accents – say others were from Jordan, Syria, North Africa and the Persian Gulf states.

The new men trained separately from the rest of Fatah Intifada, an arrangement that none could question because of Mr. al-Abssi's status as a senior commander. Then late last year, Mr. al-Abssi and his men made their move, heading north to take over Fatah Intifada's headquarters in Nahr al-Bared and seizing the guns and ammunition stored there.

Mr. Abu Mohammed says the arsenal that Fatah al-Islam acquired from Fatah Intifada included a store of 120-millimetre mortars and multibarrelled rocket launchers, as well as an "uncountable" number of Kalashnikov rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. The militant group has bragged that it has enough weaponry to hold out for nine months in its standoff with the Lebanese army.

"They will fight to the last drop of blood," Mr. Abu Mohammed said. "They are religious people. They want to meet God, to die as martyrs in Islam."

The seizure of the weapons and infrastructure was a grand, carefully planned heist. "Because he was the leader of Fatah Intifada in Beirut and the north, he was able to move his people from Beirut to [Nahr al-Bared] without people suspecting anything," said Abu Ayed al-Shalan, the Palestinian Liberation Organization co-ordinator in Shatila.

He said he knew Mr. al-Abssi as a "calm, religious man" who had helped prepare the camps defences for a potential assault during Israel's attack on Lebanon last summer.

He shook his head like a man who had been fooled. "We can't believe that all the things that happened this week are linked to him."

With Nahr al-Bared already under its effective control, Fatah al-Islam made its presence known to the rest of the country in February when it allegedly bombed two buses near Beirut, killing three people. The group's spokesman, Abu Salim Taha, says Fatah al-Islam still seeks to eventually liberate the Palestinian territories from Israeli control, but the group's first target is the pro-Western government of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora. The country, he said, should be ruled by Islamic sharia law, not "atheist courts."

Mr. al-Abssi's new group has more in common with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda network and its global jihad than with the traditional Palestinian "resistance" movements he previously served. In an interview earlier this year with The New York Times, he said that his dream was to create a global Islamic government. He said that the U.S. invasion of Iraq made American citizens anywhere legitimate targets.

"It is our right to hit them in their homes as they hit us in our homes," he was quoted as saying. "We are not afraid of being named terrorists."

Mr. al-Abssi's journey to Nahr al-Bared was a long and circuitous one. Born in the Palestinian city of Jericho, he fled as a child with his family to Jordan after Israel seized the West Bank in 1967.

The family later relocated to Lebanon and Mr. al-Abssi grew up in Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement, which plucked him from medical school and trained him as a pilot. He joined the Syrian-backed Fatah Intifada when it broke away from the mainstream movement in 1983 and rose to become an officer in a special unit charged with planning attacks on mainland Israel.

In the late 1980s, he travelled to Libya, another backer of Palestinian militant groups, and served in the country's air force during the latter years of its prolonged war with neighbouring Chad. Afterward, he moved to Syria where he lived relatively quietly while making frequent trips to Jordan, where he reportedly met Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born militant who was later to become one of the world's most notorious people as the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, where he was killed last year.

Mr. al-Zarqawi and Mr. al-Abssi apparently found common cause. They were jointly charged and sentenced to death in absentia by a Jordanian court for the 2002 killing of American diplomat Lawrence Foley in Amman. After the killing, Mr. al-Abssi was arrested by the Syrian authorities, but never handed over to Jordan. Instead, he was jailed for three years for membership in a banned Islamist group, and released last year.

While Lebanon's Western-backed government has alleged that Syria is behind Fatah al-Islam, Mr. Abu Mohammed said that Damascus was furious at the creation of Mr. al-Abssi's group. He said Fatah Intifada had been preparing an attack to retake their headquarters in Nahr al-Bared by force, but was asked by residents not to use force in the densely populated refugee camp.

Some Lebanese analysts, however, poured scorn on the idea that Fatah al-Islam had been able to enter the country from Syria and to secure the weapons and headquarters of a Syrian-backed Palestinian faction without the tacit approval of Damascus.

"I'm not saying this is a group financed and armed by the Syrians, it's more subtle than that, but clearly this was something the Syrians set up and appear to have been preparing for some time," said Michael Young, opinion page editor of The Daily Star an English-language newspaper in Beirut.

Other Palestinian groups say they have no knowledge one way or the other about Syria's alleged involvement with Mr. al-Abssi and Fatah al-Islam, but say the group's battle with the Lebanese army is damaging the reputation of Palestinians and doing little to help their cause of liberating the territories occupied by Israel.

"The members of this group are Islamic terrorists, not Palestinians," Mr. al-Shalan, the PLO man, said in his office in Shatila, a place still scarred by the 1982 massacre of refugees by Christian militiamen allied with Israel. It's a dark episode in the history of both Lebanon and the Palestinians who live here that many are recalling as the standoff in the Nahr al-Bared camp appears headed toward a bloody end.

Faced with a surrender-or-die ultimatum from the Lebanese army, Mr. Taha said yesterday that Fatah al-Islam was planning to go out shooting.

Jonathan Nassim of Bilad ash-Sham blog gives these two perspectives from Lebanon. He begins:

I spoke today with two well informed sources in Beirut, who had different points of view on the situation in Lebanon.

The first source held that though Fatah al-Islam were given the go-ahead by Syria to enter Lebanon, thus serving Syrian strategic interests, they are not Syrian puppets. Syria are no longer in control of the Palestinian camps, and once inside, Fatah al-Islam developed its own strategy, which can broadly be described as Jihadist.

The Lebanese authorities knew of their existence and tolerated them. Furthermore, as Hezbullah's (perceived and actual) strength increased in the south, Sunnis in the north were made to become aware of the threat they posed, and were happy to have well armed Sunnis nearby, and this fact was accepted and exploited by the Hariri’s – whether this meant funding or playing on their presence in election time, as the Hezbullah threat was played up. What we are seeing now is the failure of this accommodation, that has ‘blown up in their face’. Partial evidence for this theory, the source said, is that the Ain Alaq bus bombing suspects were known to the Lebanese authorities, but at no point did they co-ordinate with Fatah (proper) and arrest them….

Robert Fisk in "The Road to Jerusalem (via Lebanon)," sheds a bit more light on the group. Unlike Michael Young, Fisk is not enammored of the March 14 Coalition and is suspicious of claims that the group is controlled by Syria. Fisk writes:

Chaker al-Absi told Lebanese journalists last year that his movement "was founded on the Koran and holy law" and that it was a "reformist movement created to bring an end to corruption and to brandish in the sky over Jerusalem the banner which says 'There is only one God but God'."

And he added that "we are neither allied to a regime or any group existing on this earth."

It is too simple to claim that this is Syria's work. Syria may have an interest is watching this destabilisation, even – through its security networks – assisting these groups with logistics. But other organisations might have found common interest; the Iraqi insurgents, for example, even the Taliban, perhaps equally small groups in the Palestinian occupied territories. That's how these things work in the Middle East, where there is no such thing as responsibility – only a commonality of interests. Perhaps the Americans might have learnt something about this if they had not two years ago insulted the Syrians for allowing fighters into Iraq – at which point, the Syrians halted all military and intelligence co-operation with the US.

Anthony Shadid's article on militants in Tripoli of last year was precient. It is worth rereading it in the light of recent fighting. "Smoke of Iraq War 'Drifting Over Lebanon': In Political and Social Life, Returned Fighters Inspire Climate of Militancy."

Farah Stockman, "US unit created to pressure Iran, Syria disbanded," Boston Globe |  May 26, 2007

WASHINGTON — The Bush administration has dismantled a special committee that was established last year to coordinate aggressive actions against Iran and Syria, State Department officials said this week.

The interagency group, known as the Iran Syria Policy and Operations Group, met weekly throughout much of 2006 to coordinate actions such as curtailing Iran's access to credit and banking institutions, organizing the sale of military equipment to Iran's neighbors, and supporting democratic forces that oppose the two regimes.

State Department and White House officials said the dissolution of the group was simply a bureaucratic reorganization, but many analysts saw it as evidence of a softening in the US strategy toward the two countries. It comes as the Bush administration has embarked on a significant new effort to hold high-level meetings with Iran and Syria.

Khaddam hired the good offices of Sandra Charles (C & O Resources) to lobby for him and obtain access for a high profile visit he'd like to make to Washington. Also see other details at Friday-Lunch-Club.

New French FM says Paris will continue to snub Syria, Ha'aretz – Tel Aviv, Israel
PARIS – France's new foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, said Friday that Paris would continue to snub Syria because it did not believe Damascus respected …

Assad re-elected

Nothing much new here. The only suspence is waiting to see what the percentage given will be.

Ammar Abdul Hamid's Tharwa Community writes that

Close to 75 protestors representing various opposition currents held a protest rally in front of the Syria Embassy in Washington, D.C. on Saturday, May 26. Protestors called for a popular boycott of the presidential referendum scheduled to be held on the following day.

Here are photos of the demonstration taken by Seth Wikas of WINEP.

DAMASCUS, Syria — Inside the tent, the trappings of a modern election campaign were on display: jingles playing, flags waving, confetti coating the floor, and posters of President Bashar al-Assad hanging near the stage.

Outside, however, Syria's realities were evident. Government security officers manhandled anyone trying to come in and blocked reporters from covering the rally, which was financed by one of Syria's most powerful oligarchs. The sparseness of the crowd at the start of the campaign on May 11 hinted at growing fear of the future and apathy about Syrian politics.

Only a year ago, Mr. Assad faced so many troubles that some Syrians began questioning his political survival. His troops had been forced out of Lebanon, his government faced accusations of collusion in the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri, and the Bush administration had imposed sanctions that affected everything from the fleet of Boeings in Syria's national airline to medical equipment. Waning oil reserves hinted at economic collapse, and the European Union delayed signing a much-needed trade agreement.

But as he prepares for a so-called national referendum in which he is certain to be overwhelmingly re-elected for a second seven-year term, Mr. Assad seems very much in control, with his rivals isolated, his critics increasingly in prison or fearing retribution, and international pressure eased. He has consolidated power around his immediate family and rewarded loyalists. And he has continued to reap the benefits of Washington's troubles in the region. In Lebanon, the anti-Syrian March 14 movement, which helped force Syria out, has seen its political fortunes plummet, mired in unrest…..

"Assad’s rule has brought small changes to Syria, but critics say shortcomings remain," By ZEINA KARAM (Thanks to

DAMASCUS, Syria (AP) — On the surface, Syria looks starkly different than it did a few years ago: Cafes and restaurants, private universities and banks have sprung up, with large construction sites signaling even more development to come.

But as the c …

Farid Ghadry will address the Israeli Knesset.

"Iraqi Refugees Turn to the Sex Trade in Syria," by Katherine Zoepf – a sad story that we will hear more of.

A new Guide to Syria on the web in French by Sylvia Chiffoleau: Guide de Syrie-sur-Web: Réalisé par Sylvia Chiffoleau (GREMMO-UMR 5195), ce guide vise à introduire aux ressources d’Internet concernant l’actualité de la Syrie.

Yves Gonzalez Quijano has a wonderful blog, "Culture & Politique arabes." His latest post is on Syrian art and well worth the read. (In French)

Jay Solomon of the WSJ writes:

A U.N. Security Council vote on establishing an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is expected as early as May 29.

The U.S., France and U.K. are initiating discussions inside the Security Council on the resolution Thursday, according to U.S. diplomats, and the actual vote is expected next Tuesday. Permanent Security Council members China and Russia, and non-permanent members South Africa and Qatar, are among the countries that might oppose the Hariri court, according to U.S. and Lebanese officials. Many Lebanese fear even more violence could engulf Lebanon should the tribunal move forward.

French FM says Hariri tribunal will happen, Date : May 24, 2007

France said on Thursday that the international community was determined to set up an international tribunal to try suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri. Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, on his first trip abroad since being appointed less than a week ago, told a Beirut news conference "France and the international community are determined to establish the tribunal to try the assassins."

What is the case for a Syrian connection to Fath al-Islam?

Paul Salem says: "A lot of it is conjecture, but the timing is kind of suggestive," Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, said of the events this week and the accusations that ensued.

"It's worrisome that in pretty much 48 hours, we went to basically a war and two bombs," Salem said in a telephone interview in Beirut, before Wednesday's blast.

White House spokesman Tony Snow charged Tuesday that Syria was trying, through the violence, to influence the Security Council's decision on a tribunal, as well as disrupt security in Lebanon.

What is the Case Against?

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem has denied that his country played any role. Syria's ambassador to the United Nations, Bashar Jaafari, also saw a pattern in the violence, just as Lebanese do, but suggested that the culprits were Lebanon or its allies.

"This is not a coincidence," the Syrian ambassador said. "Some people are trying to influence the Security Council and to make pressure on the council so they can go ahead with the adoption of the draft resolution on the tribunal."

Sami Moubayed argues that Syria has nothing to do with Fath al-Islam: Lebanon battles a new demon

Read the "Friday Lunch Club" for more interesting articles.

One commentator writes:

Any analogy between the events in Nahr el-Bared camp & Hama?

Islamic extremists, innocent civilians caught in the middle, a military siege, etc. etc… The only difference: publicity. The US was praising the Lebanese military for the "tough battle" yesterday..

Just a quick reflection on the notion of good vs evil. Sounds like history repeats itself, with different names… Don't forget the battle of Falluja to destroy the insurgency, and the number of civilian casualties.

t_desco said: 

"The truly international character of the Fatah al-Islam membership is a good argument against it being a creation of (or receiving orders from) Syrian intelligence. Frankly, it looks more like al-Qa’ida proper: so far we have seen reports of its members being

– Algerians
– Tunisians
– Egyptians
– Sudanese
– Somalis
– Lebanese
– Syrians
– Palestinians
– Jordanians
– Saudis
– Yemenis
– Afghans
– Pakistanis
– Bangladeshis

Many interesting articles today, e.g.:

A Newsweek interview with Bernard Rougier (note that he is much more cautious in his assessments than the reporter) – Lebanon’s New War(s)
Newsweek

A good summary by Robert Fisk who poses interesting questions about the relationship between Fatah al-Islam and Jund al-Sham –

Robert Fisk: The road to Jerusalem (via Lebanon)
Independent

Fatah al-Islam has a direct organizational link to al-Qa’ida via Mohammad Ali Omar (Abu Hattab/Abu Azzam) and Abu Rushd al-Miqati, according to Hazim al-Amin:

Lebanon’s Fatah al-Islam leadership & organization

Beirut- According to alarabiya.net the group’s leader is not Shaker al-Absi. Absi belongs in the second tier of the leadership… His role is to execute the orders of the top leadership.

The top Leadership of the organization or what is known as first tier is a group of 3 who are the following:

1-Mohammad Ali Omar known as Abu Hattab who heads the leadership group.

Abu Hattab was born in Syria but travels with a Lebanese passport . He lives in Tripoli and is well known in this city and some call him Abu Azzam . He is 30 + years old. He has reportedly lived in Afghanistan and Chechnya.

2- Marwan , who is a a Palestinian is the Financial chief of the group. He lives in the Ein Helwe Palestinian refugee camp and travels regularly to Baghdad , Iraq . Unconfirmed reports say he is also known as Abd Alkarim Alsaadi or Abu Muhjin and has known Abu Hattab for a long time .

According to reports , the US FBI had sent an investigating team to Lebanon in 2002 to investigate the relations between Abu Hattab , Abu Muhjin and Mohammad Atta , the leader of the September 11 bombing .

3- Mohammad H. who is a Syrian citizen is the coordinator . His role is to inform the 2nd tier leadership of the decisions made by the first tier leadership.

According to Alarabiya, Alqaida is no longer an organization, but it is an ideology . Hence Fatah al-Islam is not a member of al Qaida , but it is an alQaida type organization and its leadership is organized in the same way as al Qaida.

Al Qaida Cell in Lebanon has a leader whose name is Abu Rushd el Mikati ( no relationship with the Mikati family of Lebnaon ). Mikati travels regularly to Peshawar in Pakistan . He is Abu Hattab’s boss.

Most of the Fatah al-Islam militants have returned from Iraq via Syria.

All those that were killed or wounded by the Lebanese army are from the second tier of leadership of the organization.

Alarabiya.net information came from an expert on Islamic extremists including al Qaida, Arab Journalist Hazim al Amin. Amin told Alarabiya, Fatah al-Islam is finished as a coherent organization, but he is concerned that once shattered this organization could become very dangerous in Lebanon and individual terrorists could do could do much harm to the country.

Ya Libnan, Al-Arabiya

The Middle East Monitor has a number of good articles. The first by Gary Gambill article by Moubayed are particularly interesting.

The Islamic Revival in Syria by Moubayed
In response to growing Islamist militancy in Syria, the Assad regime has incrementally abandoned the ruling Baath Party's longstanding secularizing mission and encouraged the growth of Islamist civil society loyal to the state.  

One the subject of the regime and Islam, also read Marc Perelman in the Forward: With Islamic Militancy Rising, Syria’s Baath Regime Finds Religion

Juliette Terzieff of the World Politics Review Exclusive puts Syria's recent arrests of political activists in context in "Whither the Damascus Spring? Syria Steps Up Crackdown on Reformers."."

I will be off-line for the next several days, while at the shore.

The Kurdish National Assembly sent me the following information about amendments it seeks to get accepted to the Syrian Accountability Act and other information about the role it hopes to play in bringing down the Assad regime and promoting a loose federal democracy to Syria. As they explained: "Kurds are the key to democratization of the Middle East," and "the glue that keeps Syria together."

Here is the note I received from the Kurdish National Assembly leadership in Michigan

Dear Mr. Landis,

I would like to thank you for showing an interest in Syria and Syrian people; however, I am disappointed with your information or reports about Syria and Syrian people because it is very weak regarding the Kurds or the Kurdish question in Syria.   Moreover, your information is biased, may be because of your relationship to your Syrian family.  In our views – Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria, the only real opposition to the Syrian doctorial regime is Kurds and we proved it on March 12, 2004 when for first time in Baath and / or Assad's history people stood to them and destroyed anything resembled them.

Kurds are the key to democratization of the Middle East, they part of the solution not part of the problem, especially for Syria; they can be the glue that keeps Syria together as Iraqi Kurds did in Iraq.

 

For Kurds, the real issue is matter of survival.  Therefore, Kurds have no choice but to bring democracy to Syria one way or another unlike other non-Kurds who suffered or suffering for some human and / or economic.   Kurds are fighting against ethnic cleansing and have one choice and that is to survive because they do not want to be a buried-a-live nation, as Refugees International called them.

Amendment to Syria Accountability Act

Kurdistan National Assembly – Syria met Last week with Rep Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R), Foreign Affairs Committee (D), Committee on Foreign Relations (D), and other US officials to amend the Syrian Accountability Act in the following manners:

Whereas the Syrian Baathist regime of Bashar Assad has denied regional, ethnic and religious rights to the majority of the Syria's population; whereas the Kurds in Northeastern Syria have been ethnically cleansed and forcibly replaced by Arabs and deliberately undercounted in national census and thus become undocumented…

Be It Resolved that the USA supports a democratic change in Syria and the granting of equal rights to
ethnic and religious minorities in Syria, and supports moreover, the establishment of regional governments elected democratically and without interference from the Damascus regime.

The following are excerpts from a Jerusalem Post article by Caroline Glick sent to me by the KNA, explaining how the Kurds can help promote democracy by assisting America's allies.

Friday, April 20: Fighting the Next War

Israel's strategic aims should be to degrade Syria's capacity to harm it and to change the Syrian regime's assessment of the attractiveness of attacking Israel…

Syria's economic weakness undermines the regime's political stability. Another factor undermining that stability is the restive Kurdish minority in northeast Syria. The Kurds, who comprise twenty percent of Syria's overall population, already staged an uprising against the regime in May 2004.

Today, Syria's Kurds are inspired by their brethren in Iraq to work to achieve their rights. Like the Iraqi Kurds, the Syrian Kurds, who have good relations with their Arab compatriots, do not demand independence. Rather they seek to transform Syria from a centralized totalitarian state into a federated democracy.

Two weeks ago a conference of Iraqi, Syrian, Turkish and Iranian Kurds took place in Irbil, Iraq. Massoud Barzani, the President of Iraqi Kurdistan, spelled out the Kurdish view of Israel in an interview with Al Arabiya.

In his words, "If [Iraq] establish[es] relations [with Israel] we will do so publicly. There is no reason for these relations to be kept secret, because we are neither afraid nor ashamed of such relations."

Barzani attacked the Iranians, Hizbullah and Palestinians for supporting Israel's destruction, explaining, "I am against driving Israel into the sea…. This policy is wrong, illogical, and unreasonable. Why annihilate a people?"

Sherkoh Abbas, who heads the Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria from his home in the US, participated in the conference. In a recent conversation he explained, "Most Syrian Kurds…have views similar to President Barzani. As Kurds we can say that we have no issues with Israel; in fact we are against the desire of the Ba'ath party, the Muslim Brotherhood or terrorists to destroy Israel…

"The Kurds did not suffer by the hands of Israelis or Jews. All or most of their sufferings were caused by Arabs, Persians and Turks. In Syria, the Ba'ath regime Arabized the Kurdish region, stripped 300,000 Kurds of Syrian citizenship, and killed many Kurds….. We do not want to fight for the Syrian regime."

The Kurds' desire to replace the current regime with a democratic federal government is backed by the Syrian Reform Party, an exile group with strong ties to the population in Syria. Farid Ghadry, a Washington-based Syrian exile who heads the party, believes that the Kurdish federal plan is the best way to bring freedom to Syria.

The interests of the Kurds and the other regime opponents align with Israel's interests in many ways. First, Israel will benefit greatly if they achieve their aim of democratizing Syria and protecting minority rights by decentralizing authority while maintaining the territorial integrity of the country.

Centralized governments throughout the Arab world are the primary fulminators of Arab hatred of Israel. These regimes require a constant drumbeat of incitement against Israel to deflect their people's attention from their failure to provide basic services. Decentralized governments would have difficulty blaming the Jews for their failures.

There is widespread fear in Israel that if Assad's regime is overthrown, it will be replaced by the Muslim Brotherhood. This makes sense given that for the past 30 years, the Ba'athists ensured that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only other force in the country with organizational and financial means. But even so, strengthening the Kurds – who oppose jihad – will counterbalance the Muslim Brotherhood, whether or not the regime falls.

Turkey, too, fears Kurdish separatism. But Israeli support for the advancement of legitimate Syrian Kurdish rights through the cultivation of democratic federalism rather than secession, should not concern Ankara.

One of the reasons the Olmert-Livni-Peretz government is taking the Arab "peace plan" seriously in spite of the fact that it is inherently hostile to Israel is because the government is desperate to find allies against the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah axis. The trouble with this gambit is that the Sunni countries involved in the initiative act as the Iranian-Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian axis's support network against Israel. The Saudis and their colleagues have no interest in helping Israel.

In contrast, the Kurds are natural allies for Israel with overlapping interests and values. They would be happy to receive Israeli media and financial support. And, if at the same time as Israel helped broadcast Kurdish language television and radio into Syria, it also provided the Kurds with arms to defend themselves against Syrian aggression, the move could potentially alter Syria's cost-benefit analysis of war with Israel.

Even if the Syrians open hostilities, arming the Kurds would likely muddy the waters in a manner that would cause serious harm to Syria's war-making capacity. How well would Syria contend with the IDF if it were simultaneously trying to put down a popular rebellion? And how long would the regime survive in the aftermath of such a war?

Studying past wars is always worthwhile. But today we must prepare for the next one.

There is an Israeli strategy for victory. If we conduct a military strike that degrades Syria's ability to harm us while economically weakening the regime still further and politically supporting an oppressed, large, pro-Israel minority, perhaps we could avert war altogether.

At the very least, if war comes, we would win.