River Bend Blog has finally left Baghdad and moved to Damascus. Here is her moving report of her first impressions and first month as a refugee in Syria.
Monday, October 22, 2007 (Thanks Idaf)

Syria is a beautiful country- at least I think it is. I say “I think” because while I perceive it to be beautiful, I sometimes wonder if I mistake safety, security and normalcy for ‘beauty’. In so many ways, Damascus is like Baghdad before the war- bustling streets, occasional traffic jams, markets seemingly always full of shoppers… And in so many ways it’s different. The buildings are higher, the streets are generally narrower and there’s a mountain, Qasiyoun, that looms in the distance.

The mountain distracts me, as it does many Iraqis- especially those from Baghdad. Northern Iraq is full of mountains, but the rest of Iraq is quite flat. At night, Qasiyoun blends into the black sky and the only indication of its presence is a multitude of little, glimmering spots of light- houses and restaurants built right up there on the mountain. Every time I take a picture, I try to work Qasiyoun into it- I try to position the person so that Qasiyoun is in the background.

The first weeks here were something of a cultural shock. It has taken me these last three months to work away certain habits I’d acquired in Iraq after the war. It’s funny how you learn to act a certain way and don’t even know you’re doing strange things- like avoiding people’s eyes in the street or crazily murmuring prayers to yourself when stuck in traffic. It took me at least three weeks to teach myself to walk properly again- with head lifted, not constantly looking behind me.

It is estimated that there are at least 1.5 million Iraqis in Syria today. I believe it. Walking down the streets of Damascus, you can hear the Iraqi accent everywhere. There are areas like Geramana and Qudsiya that are packed full of Iraqi refugees. Syrians are few and far between in these areas. Even the public schools in the areas are full of Iraqi children. A cousin of mine is now attending a school in Qudsiya and his class is composed of 26 Iraqi children, and 5 Syrian children. It’s beyond belief sometimes. Most of the families have nothing to live on beyond their savings which are quickly being depleted with rent and the costs of living.

Within a month of our being here, we began hearing talk about Syria requiring visas from Iraqis, like most other countries. Apparently, our esteemed puppets in power met with Syrian and Jordanian authorities and decided they wanted to take away the last two safe havens remaining for Iraqis- Damascus and Amman. The talk began in late August and was only talk until recently- early October. Iraqis entering Syria now need a visa from the Syrian consulate or embassy in the country they are currently in. In the case of Iraqis still in Iraq, it is said that an approval from the Ministry of Interior is also required (which kind of makes it difficult for people running away from militias OF the Ministry of Interior…). Today, there’s talk of a possible fifty dollar visa at the border.

Iraqis who entered Syria before the visa was implemented were getting a one month visitation visa at the border. As soon as that month was over, you could take your passport and visit the local immigration bureau. If you were lucky, they would give you an additional month or two. When talk about visas from the Syrian embassy began, they stopped giving an extension on the initial border visa. We, as a family, had a brilliant idea. Before the commotion of visas began, and before we started needing a renewal, we decided to go to one of the border crossings, cross into Iraq, and come back into Syria- everyone was doing it. It would buy us some time- at least 2 months.

We chose a hot day in early September and drove the six hours to Kameshli, a border town in northern Syria. My aunt and her son came with us- they also needed an extension on their visa. There is a border crossing in Kameshli called Yaarubiya. It’s one of the simpler crossings because the Iraqi and Syrian borders are only a matter of several meters. You walk out of Syrian territory and then walk into Iraqi territory- simple and safe.

When we got to the Yaarubiya border patrol, it hit us that thousands of Iraqis had had our brilliant idea simultaneously- the lines to the border patrol office were endless. Hundreds of Iraqis stood in a long line waiting to have their passports stamped with an exit visa. We joined the line of people and waited. And waited. And waited…

It took four hours to leave the Syrian border after which came the lines of the Iraqi border post. Those were even longer. We joined one of the lines of weary, impatient Iraqis. “It’s looking like a gasoline line…” My younger cousin joked. That was the beginning of another four hours of waiting under the sun, taking baby steps, moving forward ever so slowly. The line kept getting longer. At one point, we could see neither the beginning of the line, where passports were being stamped to enter Iraq, nor the end. Running up and down the line were little boys selling glasses of water, chewing gum and cigarettes. My aunt caught one of them by the arm as he zipped past us, “How many people are in front of us?” He whistled and took a few steps back to assess the situation, “A hundred! A thousand!”. He was almost gleeful as he ran off to make business.

I had such mixed feelings standing in that line. I was caught between a feeling of yearning, a certain homesickness that sometimes catches me at the oddest moments, and a heavy feeling of dread. What if they didn’t agree to let us out again? It wasn’t really possible, but what if it happened? What if this was the last time I’d see the Iraqi border? What if we were no longer allowed to enter Iraq for some reason? What if we were never allowed to leave?

We spent the four hours standing, crouching, sitting and leaning in the line. The sun beat down on everyone equally- Sunnis, Shia and Kurds alike. E. tried to convince the aunt to faint so it would speed the process up for the family, but she just gave us a withering look and stood straighter. People just stood there, chatting, cursing or silent. It was yet another gathering of Iraqis – the perfect opportunity to swap sad stories and ask about distant relations or acquaintances.

We met two families we knew while waiting for our turn. We greeted each other like long lost friends and exchanged phone numbers and addresses in Damascus, promising to visit. I noticed the 23-year-old son, K., from one of the families was missing. I beat down my curiosity and refused to ask where he was. The mother was looking older than I remembered and the father looked constantly lost in thought, or maybe it was grief. I didn’t want to know if K. was dead or alive. I’d just have to believe he was alive and thriving somewhere, not worrying about borders or visas. Ignorance really is bliss sometimes…

Back at the Syrian border, we waited in a large group, tired and hungry, having handed over our passports for a stamp. The Syrian immigration man sifting through dozens of passports called out names and looked at faces as he handed over the passports patiently, “Stand back please- stand back”. There was a general cry towards the back of the crowded hall where we were standing as someone collapsed- as they lifted him I recognized an old man who was there with his family being chaperoned by his sons, leaning on a walking stick.

By the time we had reentered the Syrian border and were headed back to the cab ready to take us into Kameshli, I had resigned myself to the fact that we were refugees. I read about refugees on the Internet daily… in the newspapers… hear about them on TV. I hear about the estimated 1.5 million plus Iraqi refugees in Syria and shake my head, never really considering myself or my family as one of them. After all, refugees are people who sleep in tents and have no potable water or plumbing, right? Refugees carry their belongings in bags instead of suitcases and they don’t have cell phones or Internet access, right? Grasping my passport in my hand like my life depended on it, with two extra months in Syria stamped inside, it hit me how wrong I was. We were all refugees. I was suddenly a number. No matter how wealthy or educated or comfortable, a refugee is a refugee. A refugee is someone who isn’t really welcome in any country- including their own… especially their own.

We live in an apartment building where two other Iraqis are renting. The people in the floor above us are a Christian family from northern Iraq who got chased out of their village by Peshmerga and the family on our floor is a Kurdish family who lost their home in Baghdad to militias and were waiting for immigration to Sweden or Switzerland or some such European refugee haven.

The first evening we arrived, exhausted, dragging suitcases behind us, morale a little bit bruised, the Kurdish family sent over their representative – a 9 year old boy missing two front teeth, holding a lopsided cake, “We’re Abu Mohammed’s house- across from you- mama says if you need anything, just ask- this is our number. Abu Dalia’s family live upstairs, this is their number. We’re all Iraqi too… Welcome to the building.”

I cried that night because for the first time in a long time, so far away from home, I felt the unity that had been stolen from us in 2003.

I am off to Brandeis University to speak at the Crown Center as part of a conference entitled:

 “The Middle East Today: New Perspectives on a Changing Landscape”

I will be speaking with Itamar Rabinovich on  a panel called: “Prospects for Israeli-Syrian Talks.” Many other interesting speakers will take part.

Two days ago, Ambassador Imad Moustapha came to the University of Oklahoma to talk. Over 200 showed up and there was a dinner afterward to which some 60 Syrians from Oklahoma showed up. Many of the top oncologists and brain surgeons in the state turn out to be Syrians! Here is the write up of Ambassador Moustapha's talk in our school paper.

Moustapha answered questions about a wide range of topics, including the Sept. 6 Israeli strike on Syria, relations with Turkey, Iraqi refugees and Lebanese politics….

Here is the latest ABC News article on the bombing in Syria:

Israeli officials believed that a target their forces bombed inside Syria last month was a nuclear facility, because they had detailed photographs taken by a possible spy inside the complex, ABC News has learned….

ABC News has learned of the apparent mole and other dramatic and secret details about the events leading up to the airstrike, plus the evidence that supported it. A senior U.S. official told ABC News the Israelis first discovered a suspected Syrian nuclear facility early in the summer, and the Mossad  Israel’s intelligence agency  managed to either co-opt one of the facility’s workers or to insert a spy posing as an employee….

Cheney hand seen behind leaks of 'misleading' stories.

According to current and former intelligence sources, the US intelligence community has seen no evidence of a nuclear facility being hit.

US intelligence “found no radiation signatures after the bombing, so there was no uranium or plutonium present,” said one official, wishing to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the subject.

“We don't have any independent intelligence that it was a nuclear facility — only the assertions by the Israelis and some ambiguous satellite photography from them that shows a building, which the Syrians admitted was a military facility.”

Oct. 19 (Bloomberg) — United Nations nuclear experts are examining satellite imagery of a Syrian site that may have been bombed by Israel last month because it was a possible nuclear facility, according to a diplomat familiar with the investigation. 

France:

Ibrahim Al-Humaydi of Al Hayat, wrote on October 19 Click here for source (Thanks to mideastwire.com for translation)

The Syrian foreign minister Walid Al-Muallem revealed to Al Hayat that he agreed with his French counterpart Bernard Kouchner on the margins of the meeting for the foreign ministers of the “countries neighbouring Iraq” to be held in Istanbul on the 2nd and 3rd of next November and that the success of this meeting might mean that the next step would be Kouchner visiting Damascus. He accused the Lebanese prime minister Fu’ad Al-Sanyurah of “cooperating” with his “partner”, the United Nations envoy to supervise the implementation of UNSCR 1559, Terry Rod Larsen, to “incite” against Syria and to “target the resistance” to serve “the American-Israeli plans” in a signal to Al-Sanyurah’s message to the Security Council and Arab League in which he accused Syria of supporting Fatah Al-Islam.

“Kouchner had talked to Al-Muallem on the phone while he was accompanying president Bashar Al-Assad on his visit to Turkey. The phone call lasted for 15 minutes and it was the first between the foreign ministers of the two countries since the assassination of the ex Lebanese prime minister Rafik Al-Hariri in 2005. This phone call came before Kouchner’s scheduled visit to Beirut along with his Italian and Spanish counterparts Massimo D’Alema and Miguel Angel Moratinos. Al-Muallem announced to Al Hayat that Kouchner informed him of the agenda of his upcoming visit to Lebanon and that the ministers “will meet with their troops working in Lebanon and the representatives of all the Lebanese movements to urge them to elect a compromise president that would help save Lebanon from more divisions”

“Al-Muallem added that the French foreign minister “confirmed the importance of cementing the Syrian-French relations and developing them and the importance of resuming the dialogue between the two countries about all the issues in the region and I welcomed this and confirmed to him that Syria is prepared and willing to resume the dialogue and develop bilateral relations with France”…” – Al Hayat, United Kingdom

Syria has begun dismantling the remains of a site Israel bombed Sept. 6 in what may be an attempt to prevent the location from coming under international scrutiny, said U.S. and foreign officials familiar with the aftermath of the attack. (By Robin Wright and Joby Warrick, The Washington Post)

some weapons experts question why neither Israel nor the United States made any effort before the secret attack — or in the six weeks since — to offer evidence to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a move that would trigger an inspection of Syria by the nuclear watchdog.

"The reason we have an IAEA and a safeguard system is that, if there is evidence of wrongdoing, it can be presented by a neutral body to the international community so that a collective response can be pursued," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. "It seems to me highly risky and premature for another country to bomb such a facility."

But John R. Bolton, the Bush administration's former ambassador to the United Nations, said Syria's secrecy — including its apparent move to clean up the site after the bombing — suggests that Damascus is pursuing a strategy similar to that of Iran, which the Bush administration believes is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.

Since my father currently lives in Turkey, I thought that it would make sense to hear his views about this visit. Set below is his impression:

The real star of this trip is Asma. She is an iconic figure in Turkey.

Every TV channel and newspaper article is memorized by her every move. To a certain extent, she has overshadowed her husband. Her looks, demeanor and attitude were enough to have her being described by the Turkish President as a “virtuous” lady in the official welcoming speech.

There is no question that the Kurdish issue has had a strong influence over this new rapprochement between the two countries. However, this is not the only common issue. This relationship has been on the mend for a number of years now. The free trade agreement is yet to be fully implemented but the framework is there. There is no doubt that more business will take place between the two countries in the near future. This is good for both countries but especially for Syria. Turkey offers an enormous potential for Syrian exports especially out of industries that require cheap labor. Syria will exploit this potential without a doubt once the geopolitical background allows for more investments to pour in. The quicker Syria can ditch socialism and red tape, the quicker the country can benefit from this relationship.

As a Turkish speaker and a person who has frequented that country for years, I am ecstatic that this relationship is on the ascendancy. It is a win-win for both countries. Asma is revered in Turkey. The Syrian first couple has developed a massive following by everyone there. Let us hope that this love affair will translate into more economic growth opportunities for our people.

Ankara's animosity toward the U.S. has its roots in much more than a genocide bill.

By Graham E. Fuller
October 19, 2007

Turkish-American relations are in crisis. But the House resolution declaring the World War I-era killings of Armenians a genocide is only one cause — and that's just a sideshow. Turkish-American relations have been deteriorating for years, and the root explanation is simple and harsh: Washington's policies are broadly and fundamentally incompatible with Turkish foreign policy interests in multiple arenas. No amount of diplomat-speak can conceal or change that reality. Count the ways:

* Kurds. U.S. policies toward Iraq over the last 16 years have been a disaster for Turkey. Since the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi Kurds have gained ever-greater autonomy and are now on the brink of de facto independence. Such a Kurdish entity in Iraq stimulates Kurdish separatism inside Turkey. Furthermore, Washington supports Kurdish terrorists against Iran.

* Terrorism: Turkey has fought domestic political violence and terrorism for more than 30 years — Marxist, socialist, right-wing nationalist, Kurdish, Islamist. U.S. policies in the Middle East have greatly stimulated violence and radicalism across the region and brought Al Qaeda to Turkey's doorstep.

* Iran: Iran is Turkey's most powerful neighbor and a vital source of oil and gas — second only to Russia — in meeting Turkey's energy needs. Washington heavy-handedly pressures Turkey to end its extensive and deepening relations with Iran in order to press a U.S. sanctions regime there. Though there is little affection between Turkey and Iran, there has been virtually no serious armed conflict between the two nations for centuries. Ankara sees U.S. policies as radicalizing and isolating Tehran further, which is undesirable for Turkey.

* Syria: Ankara's relations with Syria have done a 180-degree turn in the last decade, and relations are flourishing. Syrians — as well as many other Arabs — are impressed with Turkey's ability to simultaneously be a member of NATO, seek entry into the European Union, say no to Washington on using Turkish soil to invade Iraq, restore respect for its own Islamic heritage, develop new relations with the Arab world and adopt a genuinely balanced position on the Palestinian conflict. Ankara resists Washington's pressures to marginalize and stifle Damascus.

The first presidential visit to Turkish President GUL was paid by  Kazakhistan President Nursultan NAZABGAYEV on October 1.  (http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=595260), not Bashar al-Assad.

Best regards, Kaan Kutlu ATAC, HAcettepe Univ.

Under the blueprint of the alleged treaty, the United States will provide the Lebanese army with assistance and training and intelligence while Beirut would allow the establishment bases, radar stations and other facilities.

The report added that the Americans wanted the Lebanese army's current doctrine, which describes Syria as a friendly state, Israel an enemy and Hezbollah as the "resistance" to the Israeli occupation, changed.

In his interview, however, Edelman maintained the United States was not putting conditions on Lebanon for assistance, saying it was up to the Lebanese to decide what strategy and military doctrine to adopt.

But in a remark that is certain to anger the opposition, particularly Hezbollah which Washington brands as a terrorist organization, Edelman added: "I don't see any reason why Israel and Lebanon have to be enemies. Israel has peace treaties with two of its neighbors. I think in time there is no reason why there shouldn't be one between Lebanon and Israel as well." [AP]

Syria says U.S. interference in Lebanon threatens country’s stability, AP

Israel

A majority of Israeli lawmakers have signed a petition against any attempt by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to transfer parts of Jerusalem to the Palestinians,

Daniel Levy has written two excellent op-eds on Israel and Iran which appeared in Haaretz and the IHTribune. They can be read on his blog.

Turkey and Syria
This analysis was posted by "Idaf"

Al-Dunia, a private Syrian satellite TV station is reporting from an “informed source” in the Syrian delegation to Turkey that Gul told Bashar that Israeli president tried to pre-empt Bashar’s visit when it was announced with a “self-invitation” to Turkey but the Turks rejected him to give way to the Syrian “state visit” to be the first State visit to the new Turkish president (and Bashar to be the first president to visit the new president).. a symbolic gesture and a privilege that is usually given to the closest ally in the country.

Israel is getting nervous. Earlier this month the AIPAC struggled to stop the “Armenian genocide” law in the US as it will impact Turkey-Israel/US relations. A month ago, Israel violated Turkey’s air space. A couple of weeks ago, the US did not allow Turkey to attack the PKK in Iraq. Now Turkey has decided that Europe, Israel and the US are playing it around. Full alliance with Syria appears to be its answer to them.

It seems that Turkey has decided to form a full alliance with Syria. The press conference today between the 2 presidents clearly displays some sort of strong alliance. Turkey has finally figured out that Syria is its “strategic depth” that needs to be kept in alliance. In return, and as a quick catch, Syria has just gave Turkey the Arab legitimacy to strike Kurdish PKK in north Iraq.

It seems that the Syrian foreign policy is finally becoming pragmatic and interest-oriented rather then ideology-driven. Apparently, Syria decided to cut all support to the Kurds. After decades of supporting Kurdish movements, activists and opposition figures in Iraq and Turkey (who in return turned against Syria with total obedience to the neo-cons on anti-Syria policy), Syria finally and wisely decided that Turkey is much more important. One could argue that Syria’s alliance today with Turkey is more concrete than that with Iran. It is definitely more popular in both countries. Turkish people I met in the last few years could not hide their affection with Syria and -hold your breath- Syrian president (and his wife). They keep going on and on about the “family ties”, “identical culture” and my favorite.. the “shared cuisine”!

The 2 countries just signed an MoU today on oil, water and free trade agreement. Bilateral trade is expected to be around $1.5 billion in 2007, more than triple the figure when the AKP came to power.

Gareth Jenkins has a good analysis on the DEEPENING RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND SYRIA
October 17th, 2007, 7:56 pm

Lebanon

I have heard from a good source that when Hariri was in Washington last week and met with Eliott Abrams, Abrams advised him not to allow for a compromise candidate to be accepted as President. The Lebanese opposition is insisting on a compromise candidate for president. Patriarch Sfeir is recommending this solution, believing it preferable to continued crisis.

t_desco posted these articles on Lebanon:

Middle East Peace and a Divided Administration
To the Point:  Host: Warren Olney at KCRW the NPR station of Santa Monica: Tue. Oct 16
Listen here. Advance radio button 1 centimeter to start with Bolton.

Guests:

• John Bolton: former US Ambassador to the United Nations
• Mark Mazzetti: National Security Correspondent, New York Times
• Joshua Landis: Professor of History, University of Oklahoma
• Rami Khouri: editor-at-large of the Daily Star
• Michael Abramowitz: Staff Writer, Washington Post

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has scheduled an Israeli-Palestinian peace conference for sometime next month, but not all the players have agreed to show up. Rice, who says the time has come for a Palestinian state to be founded, is shuttling around the Middle East, but Israel won't promise to address the tough issues, and the Arab states are playing hard to get. Meantime, Israel's still-mysterious midnight bombing raid on Syria last month has created problems for the Secretary of State. Syria will be crucial to regional peace, but hard liners within the Bush Administration want to get tough. Was Syria trying to build a nuclear weapon? How will last month's raid impact plans for next month's peace conference?

Condoleezza Rice says a Palestinian state is at hand, but organizing a peace conference for next month is problematic. We hear about differences between Israel and its neighbors, and within the Bush Administration. Also, Russian President Putin has strong words for the US, and an insider trading case reveals new information about wiretapping in the interests of national defense.

Posted by Alex 

The following letter on the Middle East peace conference scheduled for Annapolis, Maryland in late November, was addressed by its signatories to President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The statement is a joint initiative of the U.S./Middle East Project, Inc., the International Crisis Group, and the New America Foundation/American Strategy Program.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace conference announced by President Bush and scheduled for November presents a genuine opportunity for progress toward a two-state solution. The Middle East remains mired in its worst crisis in years, and a positive outcome of the conference could play a critical role in stemming the rising tide of instability and violence. Because failure risks devastating consequences in the region and beyond, it is critically important that the conference succeed.

Bearing in mind the lessons of the last attempt at Camp David seven years ago at dealing with the fundamental political issues that divide the two sides, we believe that in order to be successful, the outcome of the conference must be substantive, inclusive and relevant to the daily lives of Israelis and Palestinians:

The international conference should deal with the substance of a permanent peace: Because a comprehensive peace accord is unattainable by November, the conference should focus on the endgame and endorse the contours of a permanent peace, which in turn should be enshrined in a Security Council resolution. Israeli and Palestinian leaders should strive to reach such an agreement. If they cannot, the Quartet (US, EU, Russia and UN Secretary General)-under whose aegis the conference ought to be held- should put forward its own outline, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the Clinton parameters of 2000, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and the 2003 Roadmap. It should reflect the following:

Two states, based on the lines of June 4, 1967, with minor, reciprocal, and agreed-upon modifications as expressed in a 1:1 land swap;

Jerusalem as home to two capitals, with Jewish neighborhoods falling under Israeli sovereignty and Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty;Special arrangements for the Old City, providing each side control of its respective holy places and unimpeded access by each community to them;

A solution to the refugee problem that is consistent with the two-state solution, addresses the Palestinian refugees' deep sense of injustice as well as provides them with meaningful financial compensation and resettlement assistance;

Security mechanisms that address Israeli concerns while respecting Palestinian sovereignty.The conference should not be a one-time affair. It should set in motion credible and sustained permanent status negotiations under international supervision and with a timetable for their completion, so that both a two-state solution and the Arab peace initiative's full potential (normal, peaceful relations between Israel and all Arab states) can be realized.

The international conference should be inclusive:

In order to enhance Israel's confidence in the process, Arab states that currently do not enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel should attend the conference.

We commend the administration for its decision to invite Syria to the conference; it should be followed by genuine engagement.A breakthrough on this track could profoundly alter the regional landscape. At a minimum, the conference should launch Israeli-Syrian talks under international auspices.

As to Hamas, we believe that a genuine dialogue with the organization is far preferable to its isolation; it could be conducted, for example, by the UN and Quartet Middle East envoys.

Promoting a cease-fire between Israel and Gaza would be a good starting point.

The international conference should produce results relevant to the daily lives of Israelis and Palestinians: Too often in the past, progress has been stymied by the gap between lofty political statements and dire realities on the ground. The conference therefore should also result in agreement on concrete steps to improve living conditions and security, including a mutual and comprehensive cease-fire in the West Bank and Gaza, an exchange of prisoners, prevention of weapons smuggling, cracking down on militias, greater Palestinian freedom of movement, the removal of unjustified checkpoints, dismantling of Israeli outposts, and other tangible measures to accelerate the process of ending the occupation.

Of utmost importance, if the conference is to have any credibility, it must coincide with a freeze in Israeli settlement expansion.  It is impossible to conduct a serious discussion on ending the occupation
while settlement construction proceeds apace. Efforts also should focus on alleviating the situation in Gaza and allowing the resumption of its economic life.

These three elements are closely interconnected; one cannot occur in the absence of the others. Unless the conference yields substantive results on permanent status, neither side will have the motivation or public support to take difficult steps on the ground. If Syria or Hamas are ostracized, prospects that they will play a spoiler role increase dramatically. This could take the shape of escalating violence from the West Bank or from Gaza, either of which would overwhelm any political achievement, increase the political cost of compromises for both sides and negate Israel's willingness or capacity to relax security restrictions. By the same token, a comprehensive cease-fire or prisoner exchange is not possible without Hamas's cooperation. And unless both sides see concrete improvements in their lives, political agreements are likely to be dismissed as mere rhetoric, further undercutting support for a two-state solution.

The fact that the parties and the international community appear-after a long, costly seven-year hiatus-to be thinking of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is welcome news. Because the stakes are so important, it is crucial to get it right. That means having the ambition as well as the courage to chart new ground and take bold steps.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter
Lee H. Hamilton, former Congressman and Co-chair of the Iraq Study Group
Carla Hills, former U.S. Trade Representative under President George H.W. Bush
Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, former Senator
Thomas R. Pickering, former Under-Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor to President Gerald Ford and President George H.W. Bush
Theodore C. Sorensen, former Special Counsel and Adviser to President John F. Kennedy
Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System

Is Rice or Cheney on first base? It is hard to tell. I had given up on the MEPP (Middle East Peace Process). The Sept. 6 strike on Syria seemed to be confirmation to me that the Washington hawks had won the struggle over how to deal with Syria – a key player if any real peace process is to emerge. Rice reportedly did not want it bombed. The fellows at the National Security Council did. The bombing has set back the chances of the MEPP developing any momentum.

Eliott Abrams and Hadley have been insisting that the MEPP is all process, meant only to provide cover for Saudi Arabia and "moderate" Arab states to back US policy toward Iraq and Iran. This summer, Cheney had been telling Arab leaders not to take Rice's MEPP seriously. We were also told that the Israeli intelligence on Syria's alleged nuclear plant was not shared with the State Department but was held by the NSC. This makes one wonder if the raid was meant to scuttle Rice's MEPP as much as it was meant to scuttle the North Korean deal that President Bush was signing onto, but which upset his hawkish advisers.

Here is what Abrams told Republican Jews not long ago:

Eliott Abrams Says Rice’s Push For Mideast Peace Is ‘Just Process’. 
Nathan Guttman | Forward, Fri. May 11, 2007

At a regular gathering of Jewish Republicans, sources said, Abrams described President Bush as an “emergency brake” who would prevent Israel from being pressed into a deal; during the breakfast gathering, the White House official also said that a lot of what is done during Rice’s frequent trips to the region is “just process” — steps needed in order to keep the Europeans and moderate Arab countries “on the team” and to make sure they feel that the United States is promoting peace in the Middle East…

Nationally syndicated columnist Robert Novak accused Abrams of preventing the administration from having a “coherent Middle East policy” which would engage Iran and Syria in an attempt to stabilize Iraq. “I do know that there are a number of Israelis who would like to engage Syria,” Hagel told Novak. “They have said that Elliott Abrams keeps pushing them back.”

Foreign ministers, ambassadors and former Americans officials as saying they believe Abrams “is making policy in the Middle East.” Israel, according to sources close to decision-makers in Jerusalem, also sees Abrams as the leading policy figure in the administration on Middle East issues, a status that has led Olmert to keep an open channel of communications with Bush’s senior adviser. According to the sources, Abrams is also a leading voice in trying to convince American Jews to be more supportive of the war in Iraq….

But this morning I was given a boost by Rice's statement that President Bush is fully behind her drive to make something real out of the MEPP.

Ms Rice said President Bush planned to focus his efforts on achieving a resolution to the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a news conference with Mr Abbas,

"The president has decided to make this one of the highest priorities of his administration and of his time in office," she said. "It means he is absolutely serious about moving this issue forward and moving it as rapidly as possible to conclusion."

She said the peace conference planned to be held in Annapolis, Maryland, should be "serious and substantive". (BBC)

WASHINGTON, Oct. 14 — It was President Bush who, a year after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, rewrote America’s national security strategy to warn any nation that might be thinking of trying to develop atomic weapons that it could find itself the target of a pre-emptive military strike.

But that was the fall of 2002, when the world looked very different from how it does in the fall of 2007. Now, the case of Syria, which Israeli and American analysts suspect was trying to build a nuclear reactor, has become a prime example of what can happen when Mr. Bush’s first-term instincts run headlong into second-term realities.

Five years later, dealing with nations that may have nuclear weapons ambitions — but are also staying within the letter of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — looks a lot more complicated than it once did.

This time it was the Israelis who invoked Mr. Bush’s doctrine, determining that what they believed was a nascent Syrian effort to build a nuclear reactor could not be tolerated.

In a curious role reversal, some of Mr. Bush’s own top advisers were urging restraint before Israel bombed the site on Sept. 6, raising questions about whether the threat was too murky and too distant to warrant military action. Those are precisely the kinds of questions Mr. Bush’s critics say should have been raised about Iraq.

It may be months or years before all the mysteries surrounding the attack on Syria become clear. The silence of the Middle Eastern countries that would normally condemn an Israeli attack suggested that they, too, were worried about what was happening in the Syrian desert. Then there is the question of whether, and how, North Korea may have been involved, since the reactor project seemed similar to the one Kim Jong-il’s government had designed to generate plutonium for a small but potent nuclear arsenal.

What has become clear is that the risks of taking pre-emptive action now look a lot greater to Mr. Bush than they did in 2003, when he declared that Iraq’s efforts to build weapons of mass destruction — weapons that famously turned out not to exist — justified military action. In the Syrian case he has steadfastly refused to say anything. In the case of Iran, which has defied the United Nations for a year while it builds a nuclear infrastructure that Washington believes is designed to give it the ability to make bomb fuel, Mr. Bush publicly insists there is still plenty of time for diplomacy.

Michael Green, a former director for Asia at the National Security Council and now a professor at Georgetown University, suggested that Mr. Bush was acutely conscious that he had 15 months left, little time for accomplishments that could counterbalance Iraq. Israel’s pre-emptive strike, he said, “could get in the way of his two biggest projects — getting on a path to stabilizing the Middle East, and getting North Korea to give up its weapons.”

By contrast, Mr. Green said, the Israelis are thinking five or 10 years ahead. They saw a chance to thwart the Syrians and to fire a warning shot that the Iranians could not fail to notice.

“If you are Israel and you are looking at this, the value of striking Syria is that it sends a signal, including to the Iranians,” Mr. Green said. “This follows the Chinese proverb that sometimes you have to kill the chicken to scare the monkey.”

That, of course, was part of the logic of Iraq in early 2003. In those days, Mr. Bush’s aides talked about how 9/11 had reduced America’s willingness to tolerate the risk that a hostile state would gain weapons of mass destruction. They spoke of the “demonstration effect” that toppling Saddam Hussein would have around the world. Under this theory, the North Koreans and the Iranians, among others, would see what happened in Iraq and reconsider their nuclear ambitions.

It did not turn out that way. North Korea evicted international inspectors after the Bush administration charged Mr. Kim’s government with cheating on a Clinton-era nuclear accord, and then raced to produce enough fuel for eight to a dozen nuclear weapons. The North Koreans conducted a nuclear test, with limited success, a year ago. Whether they also sold designs or parts of their nuclear infrastructure remains the subject of investigation and debate because of the Syria project.

Iran raced ahead, too, building centrifuges that can enrich uranium, even though the United Nations Security Council has imposed some sanctions and threatened more.

While those sanctions have failed, any rumors in Washington about a strike against Tehran’s nuclear facilities are greeted by senior administration officials with some version of the question, “Then what?” Iran, they say, has too many ways to strike back at American interests — in Iraq, in the oil markets and throughout the Middle East.

With the American military stretched in Iraq, the credibility of any American threat to take pre-emptive action elsewhere in the Middle East — and to deal with the consequences — is questionable. Moreover, Mr. Bush has made no secret of his desire to leave office with some diplomatic victories.

Already, that has muted the talk about pre-emptive strikes; the president who five years ago talked constantly about the dangers of “the world’s worst weapons” in Saddam Hussein’s hands has been far more measured about Iran and Syria.

Getting a deal with North Korea to disgorge its own nuclear fuel and weapons may require looking past whatever North Korea might have sold to another country. And it may mean engaging the Syrians, even before they answer the question of what, exactly, they were building in the desert.

Ken Ellingwood, Los Angeles Times, October 15, 2007

On Sunday, some Israeli analysts expressed skepticism that the target was a nuclear reactor. The reported site of the strike, far from the center of Syria near the borders with Turkey and Iraq, would seem an unlikely venue for a project of such significance, said Efraim Inbar, a weapons expert who directs the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv.

"The location of such a site I don't think would be the best place. It's too close to Turkey and Iraq," Inbar said. "I have my doubts."

Syria has carried out an ambitious chemical weapons program, but Inbar said Syria was not known to have pursued nuclear capabilities.

"They have wanted strategic parity for years with Israel," Inbar said. "But so far, they went with the cheapest and easiest way, which was chemical weapons."

Eyal Zisser, a Syria expert who directs the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, agreed it would be surprising if Syria had made progress on a nuclear program.

But he said Syrian President Bashar Assad feels isolated and threatened by the Bush administration and may have sought a measure of security by trying to develop a nuclear program with the help of North Korea, with which Syria has forged ties.

"It was not on the agenda before these reports, but this is very logical from the point of view of Syria," Zisser said.

VIENNA (Reuters) – The U.N. nuclear watchdog did not know about any undeclared atomic plant in Syria and has asked Damascus about information that such a site was targeted by an Israeli air strike, a spokeswoman said on Monday.

Citing unidentified U.S. and foreign officials with access to intelligence reports, the New York Times said on Sunday the nuclear reactor was partially built and apparently modeled on one in North Korea used for stockpiling atomic bomb fuel. Israel confirmed earlier this month that it had carried out a September 6 air strike on Syria but has not described the target. Syrian president Bashar al-Assad said the target was an unused military building.

"The International Atomic Energy Agency is in contact with the Syrian authorities to verify the authenticity of these reports," said IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming.

"The IAEA has no information about any undeclared nuclear facility in Syria and no information about recent reports," she said in a statement issued from the IAEA's Vienna headquarters.

Analysis: Iran, Syria in gas deal

By DEREK SANDS
UPI Energy Correspondent
WASHINGTON, Oct. 15 (UPI) — A $1 billion deal to pipe natural gas to Syria from Iran announced in early October signals increasing ties between the two foes of the United States, and its path through Turkey could inflame tensions at a time when U.S.-Turkish relations are strained.

Iran plans to export about 100 billion cubic feet of natural gas to Syria every year, according to Iranian state-run media. The deal would require the gas to be transported through Turkey by pipeline, a situation that could hurt U.S. efforts to isolate the energy economy of Iran.

But Iran's ability to supply Syria with that much natural gas remains unclear. In the winter of 2006, domestic shortages forced Iran to stop major natural gas shipments to Turkey, causing Ankara to turn to Moscow for supplies. Turkey, which faces its own increasing natural gas demand, has shown interest in investing in Iran's massive South Pars field and has been importing between 100 billion and 150 billion cubic feet of natural gas from Iran since the Iran-Turkey pipeline was built in 2001.

Iran is desperate for investment needed to develop its natural gas reserves, especially the South Pars field in the Persian Gulf, estimated to be home to about 280 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Under pressure from the United States, and more recently France, many international petroleum companies are hesitant to invest in South Pars development.

Syria holds 8.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and while it is hoping to increase its production, for the time being it uses all of the roughly 250 billion cubic feet it produces annually, according to the Energy Information Administration, the data arm of the U.S. Department of Energy.

Iran sits on the world's second-largest natural gas deposits after Russia, 974 trillion cubic feet, but has the lowest production in the Persian Gulf.

Washington has been unambiguous that it does not support any investment that helps Iran, especially when it comes from allies such as Turkey.

“Undersecretary Burns made clear in his recent visit there, we certainly don't think it's an appropriate moment for any country to be expanding its economic activities in Iran. The international community needs to have full support from all its members to be able to convince Iran to comply with U.N. Security Council resolutions, and we'd certainly like to see Turkey fully cooperating in that regard,” U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Tom Casey said after Nicolas Burns, number two at the State Department, visited Turkey in September.

U.S. relations with Turkey have been under increasing stress in the past week after the Armenian Genocide Resolution, H.R. 116, was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. ….

Syria: Economic Overviews
2007-10-15 (New York)
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

The president, Bashar al-Assad, is expected to remain in power in 2008-09. He will continue to rely on the strength and ruthlessness of the loyal security services, which will keep opposition forces weak and ineffective. Mr Assad has devoted considerable effort to ending Syria's political isolation, but with only limited returns. Numerous issues of contention remain in Syria's relations with the EU, the US and the leading Arab states. Economic policy in 2008-09 will focus on the need to diversify the economy and on encouraging investment, but structural fiscal reform will be constrained by the fear of alienating public opinion. Declining oil output will curb economic growth and inflation will stay relatively high, at an annual average of 6.7% in 2008-09. The current account will record deficits over the outlook period, as strong growth in non-oil exports and workers' remittances fails to offset the expected decline in the volume of oil exports and relatively strong import growth.

Domestic politics: Mr Assad, who is supported by key elements in the security services and by the Baath party, remains firmly in power. In May a referendum was held to give the public the opportunity to endorse parliament's selection of Mr Assad as the sole candidate in this year's presidential election. In the event, the official results showed that the choice of Mr Assad was supported by 98% of those who voted (or 11.2m people), with turnout reported at 96% of the 11.7m eligible voters (up from a turnout of just 8.7m in the 2000 referendum). The higher turnout reported by government officials lends support to the argument they put forward that conditions in Syria have improved since Mr Assad took over.

International relations: Mr Assad may have secured his domestic position, but he faces a number of challenges in the international arena (which will have a profound bearing on his popularity at home). In recent months both Israeli and Syrian officials have sent out mixed signals about their desire for a resumption of bilateral peace talks, but at the same time there have been mutterings about their readiness for war. An air strike by Israel on Syria in early September has added to the confusion about the two countries' intentions, but on balance appears to have strengthened Israel's hand. Syria's lack of a military response perhaps highlights its military weakness relative to Israel, but, more noteworthy was the absence of any significant objections from other Arab governments, most notably Saudi Arabia. This underscores the relative isolation of the Syrian government within the Arab world and would undermine its credibility in negotiations. Shortly after the raid, the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, declared his willingness to open peace talks with Syria, but the Israeli strike will make it more difficult for Mr Assad to engage openly in talks for fear of appearing weak in the eyes of his domestic audience. The air strike may also have been designed to strengthen Israel's deterrence in the region more generally, perhaps using Syria as a (weaker) proxy for a show of force against Iran.

Policy trends: The soaring cost of the fuel subsidy bill, which is placing an unsustainable burden on the fiscal accounts, has led to heated economic debate between the government's more reformist, technocratic elements, led by the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, Abdullah al-Dardari, and the more conservative Baath party members. Mr Dardari has been pushing for structural reform of the fiscal accounts, including cuts in fuel subsidies and the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT). In recent years there has been some reform on the tax front with the introduction of lower tax rates for business and individuals (in a bid to raise compliance), a simplification of the tax collection system and cuts in import tariffs, but the next step in the reform process is less politically palatable. At a time when Syria appears to be largely ostracised by its Arab neighbours, with the ever-present threat of conflict with Israel and/or more severe international sanctions, the establishment appears increasingly reluctant to foist painful economic reform upon the population. The proposed introduction of VAT has now been delayed until 2009 at the earliest, and there is currently a suggestion that some form of fuel rationing might be more acceptable to the public than an outright price increase. The Economist Intelligence Unit's economic forecasts assume that there will be no cut in fuel subsidies during the outlook period. Furthermore, even if the government were to cut fuel subsidies, the compensatory payments to low-income households would offset much of the positive impact on the fiscal account.

International assumptions: We forecast that world GDP growth will average 4.7% in 2008-09 (at purchasing power parity exchange rates), down from an estimated 5% in 2007, largely as a result of a sharp slowdown in the US economy in 2008. International oil prices (based on the benchmark dated Brent Blend) are expected to remain high, however, as buoyant demand in emerging markets offsets any slowdown in OECD oil demand. Prices are expected to remain at an average of nearly US$70/barrel in 2008, before easing slightly to US$63.8/b in 2009 as increased oil supply, particularly from Saudi Arabia, brings the market somewhat closer to balance.

Economic growth: Real GDP growth in Syria is expected to remain relatively weak in 2008-09, at an annual average of 3.3%, largely owing to falling oil production, which will lead to a sustained contraction of exports in and limit the government's ability to increase spending. Furthermore, the hostile regional political environment is also likely to affect investor confidence, undermining efforts to draw urgently needed foreign finance into the oil and gas sector, although Russia, Iran and some of the Gulf Arab countries will remain sources of capital. Our growth forecast is underpinned, however, by the expected recovery in the agricultural sector (after growth was depressed in 2007 by drought conditions in parts of the country). The services sector is expected to record relatively strong growth in the outlook period as a result of persistent demand for goods and services from the large Iraqi refugee population.

Inflation: According to the Central Bank, the official inflation rate stood at 9.2% year on year in September 2006, having risen steadily over the year, and we estimate that the full-year average was 10%. Inflation is expected to fall modestly over the outlook period to an annual average of just under 7%, partly as a result of the abandonment of the pound's peg to the dollar, which will help to contain imported inflationary pressure. Non-oil commodity prices are also expected to ease in 2008-09. Furthermore, there were clear signs in 2006 of an ongoing slowdown in credit growth–according to the IMF's Article IV report, published in May 2007, domestic credit to the private sector expanded by 4.6% in 2006, down from 8.9% in 2005. (This can perhaps be attributed in part to Central Bank measures to tighten the limits on credit extension.) However, if the government were to enact phased cuts in fuel price subsidies in 2008-09, this would lead to a significant upward revision to our inflation forecast. (It is worth noting that anecdotal evidence suggests that inflation is running at higher levels than indicated by the official data; there has been much grumbling about the influx of Iraqi nationals, who are blamed for generating demand-pull inflation, especially in the housing market.)

Exchange rates: Since the beginning of October 2007 there has been a marked appreciation of the pound against the US dollar, suggesting that the new exchange-rate regime–a peg to a basket of currencies based on the IMF's special drawing rights–has finally been implemented. In 2005-06 the composition of the country's foreign-exchange reserves was gradually altered, so that by the beginning of 2007 half of the stock of reserves was denominated in the euro. From 2007 all transactions in the public and mixed sectors will be euro-denominated. (The latter step is partly to avoid the negative impact of the US embargo.) In May the Credit and Monetary Council awarded its first operating licences to moneychangers–the companies are permitted to have multiple branches and to transfer sums abroad. Despite these initiatives, the currency will not be allowed to float freely, with the government continuing to prioritise stability. The regime is well-placed to protect the value of the pound, because of the dominant position of the state-owned banks and the control that the Central Bank retains over foreign-currency transactions, even as some laws are relaxed. Consequently, we forecast a relatively stable pound in 2008 (partly as a result of dollar weakness), before a modest depreciation in 2009 owing to concerns about the competitiveness of Syria's non-oil exports (and some strengthening of the dollar against the euro).

External sector: We estimate that the value of merchandise exports will have risen in 2007 as strong growth in non-oil exports more than offsets the decline in the value of oil exports. The estimated fall in oil export revenue is the result of lower Syrian oil production. Non-oil exports are continuing to benefit from the relaxation of foreign-exchange controls, which has led to more exports being officially recorded. Regional demand has also been strong, and Syria has been benefiting from its membership of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area. Although non-oil export revenue is expected to continue to rise robustly next year, we forecast that export earnings will increase by less than 3% because of the projected fall in crude oil production (and thus export volumes). Import spending growth will remain strong in 2008-09, partly as a result of the ongoing process of tariff liberalisation. As a result of these trends, the trade deficit is expected to widen from an estimated US$2.2bn in 2007 to US$3.1bn in 2009.

Oct/15/2007 22:16 GMT

Ray Close, who was CIA Station Chief in Saudia Arabia for many years, sent around these musings on the Israeli raid on Syria. He gave me permission to post, but did warn me that Juan Cole has also posted it.

Here is Ray Close's analysis.

This is my Monday morning (speculative) analysis of the mysterious Israeli air attack on Syria on September 6, 2007 (with due thanks to others who have contributed their wise perspectives):

1.  The Israelis offered us intelligence that Syria is beginning to develop a nuclear capability based on North Korean technology.  They urged the US to cooperate with them in mounting a military attack to destroy the Syrian site.  The advantages of this action, as presented to the Bush administration with great urgency by the Israelis, would be:

     a. To preempt a new and dangerous violation of Israeli and American proliferation red lines before the Syrian program gets too far along (citing the Iranian experience for justification);

     b. To intimidate and embarrass Syria; throw a scare into Iran; and restore Israel's deterrence credibility.  (The historic examples of dramatically successful and awe-inspiring Israeli operations at Entebbe and Osirak, among others, still have great psychological and emotional impact.)

2. The more cautious and thoughtful members of the Bush administration opposed offering Israel the full participatory collaboration of the United States on the grounds that:

     a. The Israeli intelligence in this case was not entirely persuasive, recalling instances of flawed intelligence of similar origin that misinformed some key US actions before and during the Iraq war;

     b. If covert US-Israeli collaboration in this operation (technically an act of war) were actually proffered, this would eventually become known. The accuracy and authenticity of the Israeli intelligence on which the operational decision was justified would (in the absence of more credible supporting evidence from independent US sources), become the subject of heated public debate all over the world, and opponents of the Bush administration would argue with potentially devastating effect that this was final proof that Bush neocons have continually (in fact, going back many years) been duped by deliberate Israeli disinformation operations aimed at scaring America into adopting a policy of more overt and aggressive military cooperation with Israel;
    
     c. Even if the Israeli intelligence were finally revealed to contain some credible evidence of Syria's long-range ambitions to obtain nuclear weapons and of North Korea's culpability in abetting those plans, the revelation of US-Israeli covert military collaboration against Syria at this critical time would, over the short term, endanger George W. Bush’s desperate hopes of achieving some dramatic diplomatic successes before the end of his administration —-  most importantly with respect to North Korea and next month's planned Middle East Peace talks here in the US.

3.  Ongoing heated arguments within the administration over whether or not to coordinate US and Israeli actions and reactions in this instance have been won, at least temporarily, by the side that gives higher priority to preserving and sustaining the diplomatic efforts, on the grounds that short-term progress in both the North Korean and Israeli-Palestinian situations should trump, at least for the time being, the acknowledged high value also attached to the more aggressive alternative measures  urgently and vigorously advocated by the Olmert government in Israel and by Israel’s supporters here in the United States.

4.  There are undoubtedly some Democratic notables, in key Congressional positions of leadership and on the electoral hustings, who have been officially briefed (or who have been independently informed by interested third parties) of the whole set of considerations outlined above, and who have, for reasons best known to themselves, decided to support the more cautious objective of  keeping this potentially explosive issue under wraps for as long as possible.  (I don't discount at all the possibility that some support, probably in the form of technical intelligence, was nevertheless indeed provided to the Israeli planners by the US before or during the bombing operation. That just qualifies as a small skeleton in the closet compared to the backlash we would suffer for active operational collaboration in such an undertaking.)

Personally, I believe that the most persuasive reason for studied silence on this subject, on the part of both Republicans and Democrats, is the reluctance (call it fear) of individual politicians that they might be put in a position of appearing to criticize Israel for poor judgment (or even deliberate deception), and thereby appearing to oppose intimate collaboration with Israel  (yes, even in acts of illegitimate preemptive military action) against "supporters of terrorism".

I iwould add the following personal comments to my analysis of the situation:

Having dealt with Arabs for more than fifty years now, often in situations very similar to this one,
I have no trouble understanding why the Syrian reaction to the Israeli bombing attack last month has been carefully muted.  Asad cannot afford a military confrontation with Israel at this time.  His air force and army could be effectively wiped out by the IDF in a few hours.  And he has no desire to broadcast the fact that his air defense forces (some of which, I am told, consist of very expensive new ground-to-air rocketry purchased from Russia but not yet operational) were impotent to respond in the face of such a deep and brazen Israeli penetration of the Syrian motherland. It would be plainly foolhardy for the Syrians to attempt confrontation with the IDF when their military establishment is in such a parlous state as it is today.  I therefore find it perfectly understandable that Asad has chosen not to fly off the handle over this incident, and why his Arab neighbors and supposed brothers in arms have likewise decided that the better part of valor is to pretend they haven't noticed.

I recall in the period right after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when I was in liaison with the Saudis, that the Israeli Air Force used to make frequent very low level runs over the Saudi airbase at Tobuk, in the northern part of the country.  As they skimmed the "deck", they would drop empty fuel tanks on the runways, near where the Saudi fighter planes were lined up, just to remind those on the ground that the empty tanks could very easily have been 500-pound bombs.  It was nothing more than an arrogant demonstration of contempt for Saudi impotence.  It worked.  The RSAF never fired a shot, and never scrambled a single interceptor.  They would complain to me, and I would duly forward their protests to CIA HQS. We never got even a polite acknowledgement back from the Israelis, who, in their arrogance, were no doubt cynically amused.  So I can easily imagine Bashar al-Asad's decision to play this current incident in a very low key!  It is not a mark of cowardice, but of realism and prudence.

Similarly, I recall when Prince Fahd bin Abdal Aziz called me to a meeting very late one evening in the early days of the 1973 war and asked me to send an urgent personal message from him to Richard Nixon informing the president that he had felt obliged to contribute a brigade of Saudi troops to the Golan front to support the Syrian offensive there, but that he had personally instructed the commander of the unit not to fire a single shot.  That, Fahd told me with considerable emotion and obvious sincerity, was his solemn promise to his American friend. Again, prudence, wisdom, and desire to maintain a traditional and mutually valuable relationship —  motives that were not, I regret to say, received in Washington with the respect and appreciation that they deserved.

Ray Close