The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on the Near East held a hearing on Syria and Lebanon on November 8, 2007.

Assistant Secretary David Welch testified on behalf of the Administration.

Rob Malley of the ICG, David Lesch of Trinity University and Emile El-Hokayem served as witnesses.

All written statements are available at:

http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/hearings/2007/hrg071108p.html

The full proceedings, including the lively Q&A session, are available here:

http://www.fednews.com/transcript.htm?id=20071108t3452

Written Testimony of Emile El-Hokayem
Research Fellow
The Henry L. Stimson Center

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Near East and South Asia Subcommittee
November 8, 2007
Syria: Options and Implications for Lebanon and the Region

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

First, let me express my appreciation for the opportunity to testify today on the pressing matter of Syria.

1. Overview of the Syrian challenge

The challenge posed by Syria to regional stability in the Middle East is complex and multifaceted. Until a few years ago Syria was a partner of the United States in the search for peace. Now, thanks to its policy choices, alliances, geographic location and spoiler capacity, Syria is enmeshed in all the current and potential conflicts in the Middle East: Lebanon, Israel-Palestine, Iraq and Iran. Syria is not the ultimate threat to either the region or US interests, nor does it pose the kind of ideological, strategic and political challenge that Iran does. But it has proven intransigent and belligerent on a number of issues of great importance to the international community.

Nowhere has Syrian influence been as visible and disruptive as in Lebanon. After occupying (and stabilizing) Lebanon for 15 years with an international cover, Syrian heavy-handedness and mismanagement of Lebanese politics has created deep resentment against Syria which cuts across sectarian lines. Lebanon’s transition from Syrian domination to full independence, sovereignty and stability has been strenuous for its society and politics. Since 2005, Lebanon has experienced political paralysis, economic regression, a devastating war with Israel, various grave security incidents, including a campaign of political assassination and intimidation and a 3.5 month-long mini-war against Sunni jihadists. Syria’s contribution to this instability is difficult to overstate, even if it is often murky.

The upcoming Lebanese presidential elections will be a momentous test for the future of Syrian-Lebanese relations. Depending on Syrian behavior (i.e. whether Syria will recognize a president acceptable to all Lebanese factions who also upholds Lebanon’s responsibilities toward the international community and protects its full sovereignty or even a president who enjoys the support of a majority of parliamentarians), these elections could open a new phase not only in bilateral relations between Syria and Lebanon but also between Syria and the rest of the world. But the prospects for such a positive outcome are dim, partly because of Syria, which perceives these elections as an opportunity to defeat its Lebanese and foreign opponents with the support of its Lebanese allies and which fears that a victory of its foes will further weaken its hand.

2. Assessing US policy toward Syria and Syria’s regional role

Critics of the current policy of isolation argue that it hasn’t worked, that US interests with regards to Syria go beyond Lebanon and that sidelining Syria invites more interference and destabilization on Syria’s part. The problems with this argument are manifold: high-level delegations from the US and Europe engaged Syria for many years, without reciprocation from Damascus on any of the issues raised; Syria was allowed to set Lebanon’s foreign and domestic policies for 15 years, ultimately overplaying its hand; Syria was given many opportunities to shape more favorable outcomes for itself, but, feeling besieged, chose instead to provoke an escalation in Lebanon that eventually backfired. It is not a lack of engagement but Syria’s maximalist and unresponsive posture that has precipitated the current crisis, driving the US administration and other countries to even consider, then wisely reject regime change as an option.

Critics must also acknowledge that US policy toward Syria is not unilateral or even controversial with America’s allies. It is a mainstream, multilateral policy endorsed by the European Union and key Arab states, and formalized through UN Security Council resolutions.

Critics, however, are right to stress that US interests regarding Syria are not limited to Lebanon. Iraq is the most prominent issue to come to mind. If the United States decides to stabilize Iraq through serious regional cooperation, it will need the help of all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Syria. But if one were to gather all of Iraq’s neighbors around a table, it would be Syria that would have the least to offer in terms of positive incentives. Indeed, Syria’s supposedly good relations with Iraqi factions don’t translate into constructive leverage. In terms of tribal, political or financial power, Syria is not part of the major league. Although it does not have the capacity to deliver what the US needs most in Iraq, it does and will maintain the capacity to derail any domestic or regional consensus it deems contrary to its interests. Syria’s hosting of 1.5 million Iraqi refugees must be commended and that burden acknowledged and shared, but Syria should not be allowed to leverage this crisis to promote more mischief in Iraq. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that Syria is attempting to organize proxies in Iraq, essentially former regime elements who found a base in Syria since 2003. The Iraqi government’s repeated pleas for the extradition of many of these figures have been rejected. But given the fragmented nature of the Iraqi insurgency and its autonomous political calculations, Syria has been less successful than it hoped in determining the political agenda of any of the Iraqi factions and will find it difficult to position itself as a key power broker.

The other set of interests pertains to the perennial Syrian support and hosting of rejectionist Palestinian factions. Little was obtained from Damascus at the height of the peace process in the 1990s, so it is difficult to imagine a dramatic reversal when Syria is under so much pressure. Palestinian politics and progress in the peace process will be the determining factors, not unlikely Syrian cooperation.

Finally, there is Iran, whose alliance with Syria (and Hezbollah) makes it a key player in Levantine politics. The declared hope of many, including Israeli officials, is to drive a wedge between the two countries by restarting the peace process. But the nature and strength of the Syrian-Iranian alliance prevent such a scenario from unfolding. In fact, Syria is not likely to give up an alliance that brings everyone to its doorstep.

In these circumstances, what to obtain from Syria in return for unconditional engagement is unclear. It will take a long and arduous process of dialogue to start seeing the benefits, if any, of such a strategy. A main concern is that all the progress made on the Lebanese front since 2005 could be reversed in the meantime. This will not happen unless a dual process of US engagement of Syria and of Israel-Syria peace talks becomes more important to Washington and Tel Aviv than to Damascus. Even modest Syrian cooperation on Iraq and Israel could then become reason enough not to challenge Syrian behavior in Lebanon.

3. Syrian calculations regarding Lebanon

Is Syria’s interest in Lebanon uniquely motivated by the desire to recover the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights? Or is there a more complex calculation driving Syria’s attempts to reassert its role in Lebanon? While there is no doubt that Syria is legitimately adamant in its desire to recover the Golan, it is my judgment that it also wants a dominant say in all matters Lebanese, which amounts to serious breaches to Lebanon’s sovereignty and a de facto veto right on Lebanese affairs. So long as Syria refuses to normalize relations with Lebanon by delineating the border, exchanging embassies and ending its interference in Lebanese affairs, it will be difficult to overcome Lebanese fears and suspicions over Syria’s real intentions and the substance of a bilateral US-Syrian dialogue. There is still a vivid memory in Lebanon of US acquiescence to Syrian rule that resulted from Syria’s support of the United States against Saddam Hussein in 1990.

The continued importance of Lebanon to Syria has many dimensions. Let’s be clear that much of the daily interaction between Syria and Lebanon is legitimate, the product of strong and old societal ties, and that both countries are bound to have privileged relations in the future. But Syria’s current approach to Lebanon is dictated by regime interests in Damascus rather than a healthy long-term vision of the relationship. Lebanon needs not be a threat to Syria’s stability, but this is Damascus’ call.

Syria sees Lebanon as a convenient battlefield for its conflict with a number of foes, including the United States, France, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Lebanon is also seen as a source of threat to Syria’s regime because it is no longer in Syria’s orbit, now has an autonomous foreign policy, is solidifying relations with Syria’s foes, allows the airing of anti-Syrian views, and has allowed the international community to pose, through the international tribunal looking into the Hariri assassination, a possibly existential threat to the regime. In Lebanon, Syria sees a lost source of economic benefits, critical strategic depth that needs to be regained and secured at all costs, and an important negotiating asset.

Bashar al-Assad repeats to his foreign visitors that Syria is not a charity—should Syria cooperate with the US, he expects full US engagement. But this route could lead to sacrificing a number of important processes: the international tribunal and the Hariri investigation could halt, UN resolution 1701 could be transformed into a conflict management mechanism in which Syria will have a major say, and the UN-led process to normalize relations between the two countries would likely fail, among other casualties of engagement.

In examining whether the US should engage Syria, the Senate should consider why Syria has failed to cooperate with every attempt to obtain Syrian cooperation on Lebanon—some of which have offered attractive incentives. Saudi Arabia and other Arab states offered Syria reintegration into the Arab fold and much-needed investments; France has promised “spectacular returns” in exchange for a hands-off approach to Lebanon; the European Union has offered economic assistance and cooperation; and countless European officials have promised to support re-launching the peace process with Israel. Damascus has rebuffed all offers because it is still hoping for a complete reversal of fortunes in Lebanon. One needs only to look at the delighted reaction of the Syrian leadership following the visits of American congressional delegations and European foreign ministers over the last year, or invitations to participate in Arab League meetings, and the utter lack of Syrian responsiveness afterwards.

Syria continues to await renewed international recognition of or at least acquiescence to its central role in Lebanese affairs. Syria calculates that in due time, international fatigue with the Lebanese crisis, new leaderships in the US and Europe, necessity over Iraq, the capacity of its allies to sustain pressure on the Lebanese government and sheer steadfastness will reward its obstinacy. In the short term, it means that a power vacuum and even instability in Lebanon are seen as more harmful to the governing coalition and its foreign allies than to Syria and its allies in Lebanon.

The logic of unconditional reengagement carries other risks and costs that its proponents dismiss too easily. US engagement without Syrian concessions on Lebanon will hurt further US credibility in the region, jeopardize multilateral processes, alienate Arab allies worried about Syria’s alignment with Iran, and comfort Syria’s image as a tough resister that can force the United States to come to terms on Syrian terms.

Unconditionally reengaging Syria is tantamount to subordinating the sovereignty and future of Lebanon to the fortunes of the peace process, Syria’s cooperation on Iraq, or the fluctuations in the Persian Gulf, and this is after more than a million people turned out in the center of Beirut on March 14, 2005 to peacefully demand and obtain the end of Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon.

4. A way forward

Keeping Syria in the cold is not a long-term solution to Lebanon’s or the region’s problems, nor is the threat of further coercion. If Syria still considers peace with Israel and normalization with the West strategic choices because of the tangible political and economic benefits that would then flow, then it could demonstrate its seriousness by putting an end to its disruptive role in Lebanon.

There is a path ahead that involves restarting the peace process between Syria and Israel, and it will require US diplomatic leadership after the Annapolis conference. Simultaneously with a US-Israeli initiative to restart peace negotiations with Israel, Syria should commit to the Quartet to demarcate its border with Lebanon, exchange embassies, and abide by UN resolutions 1559 and 1701. In exchange, the Quartet would endorse the resumption of peace talks, the United States would agree to suspend sanctions under the Syria Accountability Act and send back its ambassador to Damascus, and the European Union would commit to press ahead with economic and trade discussions. Syria's refusal to do so would only be construed as a desire to continue using Lebanon as a negotiating card with Israel, even as Syria today can no longer guarantee the disarmament of Hezbollah as it could in the 1990s. More worryingly, Syrian obstruction could simply reflect a continued desire for hegemony in Lebanon, validating the worst fears of a deeply insecure Lebanese population. This is why dissociating Syria's foreign affairs from its obligations towards Lebanon is a serious mistake. It is ironical but only fair for Lebanon to constrain Syria's policy options after Syria did so for so long.

I will be in NYC from Wednesday to Saturday for a conference at the Council on Foreign Relations, discussing Lebanon and Syria.

I have been asked to answer three questions:

1. Can renewed Civil War in Lebanon be averted?

2. Is an independent Lebanon possible?

3. Can Syria be "flipped."

Let me know what you think before Friday?

U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs

For Immediate Release November 5, 2007
Contact Candice Pratsch, (202) 622-2960

  Treasury Designates Individuals Furthering Syrian Regime’s Efforts to Undermine Lebanese Democracy

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated four individuals affiliated with the Syrian regime’s efforts to reassert Syrian control over the Lebanese political system.

“Syria has used all means at its disposal – from bribery to intimidation to violence – to undermine the legitimate political process in Lebanon,” said Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.  “Today’s action exposes four individuals involved in such activities and serves as a warning to others who would do likewise.”

Syrian troops formally withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005 after a 29-year military presence. The Syrian regime is working through Lebanese proxies to exert control over the Lebanese political system; to weaken the majority pro-government March 14 Coalition; and to undermine Lebanese sovereignty and security.  The regime has used a range of tools to further these objectives, including bribing politicians, intimidation, interference in the selection of a new president, support for violence, and providing arms to militias and terrorist groups.  The four individuals designated today have worked to undermine Lebanese sovereignty and support the Syrian regime’s efforts to interfere in Lebanon’s internal affairs.

Syrian intelligence has assisted Hizballah and other oppositionists in Lebanon to orchestrate protests and demonstrations demanding the resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora's cabinet, which it deems illegitimate.  The protests began in December 2006 in Beirut and continue today.  Additionally, the Syrian regime has provided arms to illicit Lebanese militias and Palestinian terrorist groups.  In addition, the Syrian regime is believed to be intimidating Lebanese who call for the establishment of an international tribunal to try the killers of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. 

Assaad Halim Hardan, Wi’am Wahhab and Hafiz Makhluf were designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13441, signed by President George W. Bush on August 1, 2007.  E.O. 13441 blocks the property of persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes and institutions.

Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik was designated pursuant to E.O. 13338, which is aimed at individuals and entities contributing to the Government of Syria's problematic behavior.  President Bush signed E.O. 13338 on May 11, 2004 in response to the Syrian government's continued support of international terrorism, sustained occupation of Lebanon, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile programs, and undermining of U.S. and international efforts in Iraq. 

Today's designations freeze any assets the designees may have located in the United States, and prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with these individuals.

Identifying Information

Assaad Halim Hardan
AKAs:                   Assad Hardan

As'ad Hardan

DOB:                    July 31, 1951
POB:                    Rashayya al-Fakhar, Lebanon
Profession:             Member of Parliament, Lebanon
Political Affiliation:  Chief of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) Central

Political Bureau

Assaad Hardan is a senior official in the SSNP.  During 2007, the SSNP received arms and military training from Syria and Hizballah.  Hardan works with senior Syrian officials to significantly influence Lebanese politics in furtherance of Syria's efforts to undermine Lebanese sovereignty.

Wi'am Wahhab
AKAs:                   Wi'am Wihab

Wiam Wahhab
Wiyam Wihab
Wiyam Wahab

DOB:                    1964
POB:                    Al-Jahiliya, Shouf Mountains, Lebanon

Wi'am Wahhab, a former member of the Lebanese Parliament, works with senior Syrian officials to significantly influence Lebanese politics in furtherance of Syria's efforts to undermine Lebanese sovereignty.

Hafiz Makhluf
AKA: Hafez Makhlouf
Position: General Intelligence Directorate senior official
Military Rank: Colonel
DOB: Circa 1975
POB: Damascus, Syria

Colonel Hafiz Makhluf, a senior official in the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate, has supported the reassertion of Syrian control or otherwise contributed to Syrian interference in Lebanon.

Makhluf is a maternal cousin to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. He is also the brother of Rami Makhluf, Syria’s leading businessman, who has been the subject of persistent allegations of corruption and cronyism.

Muhammad Nasif Khayrbik
AKAs:                   Muhammad Nasif Khayr-Bayk

Mohammed Nassif Khairbek
Mohammad Nasif Kheirbek

Address:                Damascus, Syria
Position:               Deputy Vice President for Security Affairs
Military Rank:         Major General
DOB:                    April 5, 1937

As of early 2007, Khayrbik was one of several key advisors to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. In early 2006, Khayrbik was named Deputy Vice President for Security Affairs.  In this position, Khayrbik has played a central role in Syria's continuing policy of destabilizing Lebanon and Syria's relationship with known designated terrorist organizations, including Hizballah.  In early 2006, Khayrbik coordinated Syrian and Hizballah positions during regular meetings with Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of the Lebanese Hizballah.

Khayrbik has long served the Syrian regime, having served as a close advisor to former President Hafiz al-Asad.  In mid-1999, President Hafiz al-Asad appointed Khayrbik as the deputy director of the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate (GID), a position he served in until February 2006.

Jackson Diehl, deputy editorial editor at the Washington Post, in his article, All Still Quiet on the Syria Bombing, praises the US and Israel for the restraint they have so far shown in not bragging about bombing Syria on Sept 6 that Diehl calls "that remarkable event — which was both an audacious act of preemption and a revelation of an apparent Syrian bomb program."

Diehl's purpose in the article is to support Reps. Peter Hoekstra and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, who demanded in a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed that "every member of Congress be briefed on this incident, and as soon as possible." The two republican House members are ranking minority members on the intelligence and Foreign Affairs committees and famous for their partisan politics.

Beneath all the neocon spin and posturing, however, Diehl is warning that if US politicians don't start spinning now, they may be blind sided by Mohamed ElBaradei of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who Diehl calls "its freelancing director." Diehl warns:

So far the Bush administration has refused to cooperate with ElBaradei, who has all but openly sided with Iran in its attempt to deflect U.N. orders to freeze its uranium enrichment. Having debunked U.S. claims about a reborn Iraqi nuclear program in early 2003, ElBaradei would be certain to seize on any ambiguities in the Israeli and U.S. evidence about the Syrian reactor. If he raised doubts that the project was intended to produce plutonium, both Olmert and the Bush administration would be damaged.

Diehl does not blush or pause before berating Baradei for "dubunking US claims about a reborn Iraqi nuclear program in early 2003."

This one line says it all. Diehl is blind and unable to learn from past mistakes. That is why he tries to discredit Baradei before he visits Syria and before he can "damage the Olmert and Bush administrations" by "raising doubts that the project was intended to produce plutonium." Had Washington been willing to listen to Baradei in 2003, the US would have been spared untold damage to its prestige and soldiers. Diehl is not perturbed by the notion of hurting America; he only worries about hurting the Olmert and Bush administrations.

Here is Blanford's opinion of what the Hizbullah maneuvers are about: preparing for an Israeli incursion.

Is Israel About to Attack Hizballah?
By Nicholas Blanford/Beirut, Time mag
Sunday, Nov. 04, 2007

…. Israel has been looking to restore its threat of deterrence, which was damaged by the inconclusive results of the 2006 war. The mysterious Israeli air strike on Sept. 6th against a suspected nuclear facility in northern Syria is seen as part of a renewed assertiveness. But could Hizballah also be in the Israeli military’s sights?

Last month, this reporter sat on a panel to discuss Hizballah at a conference hosted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. The other panelist was Major General Moshe Kaplinsky, the outgoing deputy chief of staff of the Israeli army. Before discussing Israel’s role, Kaplinsky offered up a series of recommendations that he believed would help neutralize and ultimately disarm Hizballah. They included strengthening the Lebanese army and expanding the mandate of the 13,300-strong United Nations peacekeeping force, known as UNIFIL, to areas beyond the south Lebanon border strip. UNIFIL, he said, should mount patrols in Hizballah’s new stronghold in mountains north of the Litani river, the limit of UNIFIL’s area of operations. He added that UNIFIL must deploy along the border with Syria to check the flow of weapons smuggled into Lebanon by Hizballah.

However, there is little chance of Kaplinsky’s wishes being fulfilled, analysts say. UNIFIL is under threat from groups inspired by Al-Qaeda — six members of the Spanish battalion were killed in June in a car bomb attack — and the peacekeeping force has no wish to make new enemies by deploying along the border with Syria and inside Hizballah’s military areas.

Given those realities, perhaps it shouldn’t have come as much of a surprise that Kaplinsky also declared that Israel should pre-emptively attack Hizballah targets in Lebanon, such as new positions and arms convoys crossing the border from Syria. “I approve pre-emptive strikes against Hizballah. We have to find the exact time. This is one of the lessons I learned from before,” he said.

Kaplinsky has many years experience fighting Israel’s enemies in Lebanon, from 1982 when the Israeli army invaded to drive out the Palestine Liberation Organization then dominating south Lebanon. In the early 1990s he commanded the elite Golani Brigade at a time when Hizballah was evolving into a formidable guerrilla-fighting force dedicated to ousting the Israeli army from its occupation zone in south Lebanon. Hizballah’s resistance campaign led to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000. Hizballah units moved in to the vacuum and five months later kidnapped three Israeli soldiers from the Shebaa Farms, an Israeli-occupied mountainside running along Lebanon’s south east border over which Lebanon claims sovereignty. Kaplinsky and other senior Israeli officers urged then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to order a swift and punishing response to deter future attacks. Barak, however, refrained from a heavy retaliation, apparently worried about being sucked back into the Lebanese quagmire just five months after leaving it.

That restraint encouraged Hizballah over the next six years to build up an impressive military infrastructure of secret bunkers and rocket firing positions in the hills and valleys of south Lebanon, which was put to good use in last year’s war.

Kaplinsky and other Israeli commanders say they cannot afford to repeat the same mistake. Although Hizballah appears to have rearmed substantially, Kaplinsky believed the organization is not yet ready for another round with Israel because of its internal political battles with the US-backed Lebanese government. That suggests Israel has a window of opportunity to attack Hizballah’s military assets at little cost.

Whether Israel launches pre-emptive raids or not, analysts agree that a second round between Israel and Hizballah is inevitable. And Kaplinsky was confident that Israel would prevail against Hizballah in that event. “I believe that the next round will take us less time, [we will] send [into Lebanon] more quickly our ground forces. We will have to take control of the area for some weeks, some months… to [disarm] Hizballah,” he said. Hardly encouraging words for the war weary residents of south Lebanon.

Hizbullah is declaring that it is back and ready to hurt Israel if Iran is attacked. On the local level, this comes a week before Lebanese presidential elections are supposed to be completed. Both Washington and France have weighed in on the elections, in support of the March 14 parliamentary majority. Rice insisted that March 14 should not compromise with the Lebanese opposition. Hizbullah is letting the West understand that it will not be cowed. If there is no compromise, there will be no stability in Lebanon.

Hezbollah: Maneuvers held near border in 'response to enemy'
By Haaretz Service and The Associated Press
05/11/2007

BEIRUT, Lebanon (AP) – Hezbollah has staged military maneuvers near Israel's border in southern Lebanon to counter last week's Israeli war games, the group said Monday.
The pro-Hezbollah newspaper Al-Akhbar reported thousands of unarmed fighters took part, but the Lebanese government downplayed the drills as likely just a simulation.

Al-Akhbar first broke the story, which was later confirmed by a senior Hezbollah official who would not give further details.

Al-Akhbar said Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah personally supervised the maneuvers, which it said were carried out in the last three days without weapons or uniforms, billing it as the biggest ever staged on Israel's border by the Shiite Muslim militant group.

Monday's report marked the first time Hezbollah, with its highly secretive military wing, revealed such exercises through a close newspaper. The maneuvers could pose a major challenge to a U.N.-brokered cease-fire that ended last year's war with the Jewish state.

Hezbollah officials initially declined to comment, but later Monday, a senior member confirmed the maneuvers, saying they were intended to counter Israeli activity. «In response to what the enemy is doing, this maneuver by the Islamic resistance (Hezbollah) was part of its … work and its commitment to always defend Lebanon, its sovereignty and its people,» said Sheik Hassan Izzedine, a senior Hezbollah official in southern Lebanon. He spoke on local al-Jadeed television.

Prime Minister Fuad Saniora, speaking to Associated Press Television News at government headquarters, noted earlier Monday that Hezbollah has not formally confirmed the maneuvers. He said authorities checked with military and police units as well as U.N. peacekeepers and «they confirmed nothing on the ground really happened.

«It was, let's say, a simulation probably, in an operation room, on the desk, probably they did such a thing,» he said. «This has been confirmed by all the sources.
The maneuvers came a few days after Israel held major military exercises in the north of the country near the Lebanese border. The Israeli action was interpreted by some Lebanese media as preparation by the Jewish state for a possible new war with Hezbollah.

Al-Akhbar said the Hezbollah maneuvers were carried out south of the Litani River in southern Lebanon and aimed at «deterring the enemy from carrying out any adventure in Lebanon.» The zone has been controlled by a U.N. peacekeeping force and the Lebanese army since last year's war.

There was no immediate comment from officials of the U.N. peacekeeping force, which has 13,500 soldiers who patrol a buffer zone near the border with Israel with the help of 15,000 Lebanese troops.

But As-Safir newspaper quoted Maj. Gen. Claudio Graziano, the commander of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon as warning Lebanese leaders he met in Beirut last week that the tension in the south and a deepening political crisis in the country might prompt European countries «to withdraw from UNIFIL within less than four months. Italy, France, Spain and Germany form the bulk of the reinforced U.N. force that deployed in southern Lebanon after last year's war.

Commenting on the reported Hezbollah maneuvers, a Lebanese security official, speaking on customary condition of anonymity in line with government regulations, said Lebanese forces in south Lebanon «did not register any armed presence south of the Litani.

The official said troops are under orders to prevent any armed presence in accordance with a U.N. Security Council resolution that ended last year's fighting, but pointed out «that civilians have the right to freely move in their villages» and if they do not carry weapons, they are not breaking the law.

Al-Akhbar said Hezbollah's maneuvers were carried out all along the border with Israel «in extreme secrecy without any show of arms. The newspaper quoted Nasrallah as telling the participants that the maneuvers were intended «for foe and friend to make them understand that the resistance (Hezbollah) is fully ready to confront any kinds of Israeli threats.
Nasrallah said last week his guerrilla group has grown stronger since last summer's war as Israel has weakened. He said his guerrillas did not want war but «will not allow anyone to attack our villages, people and country.

The Lebanese army command has in the last few days issued statements noting increased Israeli overflights in southern Lebanon in violation of the cease-fire resolution. Since the fighting with Israel ended, Nasrallah has boasted that his guerrillas have replenished their rocket arsenal and were ready to fight Israel if attacked. The Hezbollah leader has said his group possesses more than 33,000 rockets.

Last week, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued a new report that said Israel claims that Hezbollah has rearmed with new long-range rockets capable of hitting Tel Aviv. Ban's report said Israel claims Hezbollah has tripled its shore-to-sea C-802 missiles and has established an air defense unit armed with ground-to-air missiles

Sarkozy sent his two top advisers to Damascus on a fool's errand.

Claude Gueant, President Nicolas Sarkozy's chief of staff, and Jean-David Levitte, his chief international adviser, met with Bashar al-Assad. They all agreed the Lebanese should elect their next president freely and without any foreign inference, SANA reported.

How France can believe that Syria will help the West elect an anti-Syrian government that will try to disarm Hizbullah before the West gives any guarantees to uphold UN resolutions concerning the return of the Golan Heights is mind boggling. The French know better. This must be posturing before the failure. Everyone is position himself to blame the other when Lebanon fails to elect a president.

Before the Iraq adventure, the skeptics warned, "You break it, you own it." The wisdom on the Lebanon adventure is: "You break it, Syria owns it." That was what happened in 1975; it happened in 1982. Nevertheless, Washington seems determined to push Lebanon to the breaking point by encouraging March 14 not to compromise.

Italy's Prodi advised the United States that if Syria and Iran are not at the Annapolis conference there would be no use in reaching agreements because without the cooperation of Iran and Syria, little could be implemented. 

Rice, Olmert agree to involve Syria into peace summit conditionally say the headlines, but it is not true. The second sentence of the article explains that Syria would be included only to be seen and not heard. Trying to treat Syria as a Victorian child is silliness.

Syria is welcome to join Middle East peace talks set to be held before the end of this year in Annapolis, Md., the U.S. and Israel both said on Sunday.

But such a dramatic diplomatic breakthrough would only happen if the Syrians agreed to focus on Israeli-Palestinian issues and not on Syria's desire to regain the Golan Heights, which Israel conquered during the Six-Day War in 1967.

EIU responded:  Date: November 4, 2007

Hosam, sure there is an issue regarding the social impact of cutting subsidies. But it is undeniable that the impetus for the long overdue structural changes to the Syrian economy is coming from non-Baathists, and these arguments are being at best grudgingly accepted by the party. I would also dispute the cntention that cronyism is not critical to this debate.

On the electricity issue, the government’s case is summarised in a recent EIU report:

The government also faces a considerable financial burden in maintaining electricity supplies, both from subsidising tariffs, which are below the cost of production, and, more importantly, from financing investment in new generating capacity. At the start of September the Ministry of Electricity put into effect a new schedule of electricity tariffs based on a sliding scale, with heavier consumers obliged to pay much higher rates. For domestic consumers there are eight bands, ranging from a nominal charge of S£0.25 (half a US cent) per kwh for those using 100 kwh in the two-monthly billing period to S£4 (8 US cents) for those using 2,001 kwh/y and more. For the highest band the entire electricity supply will be charged at the top rate; users of 2,000 kwh or less will be charged on a staggered basis. According to the electricity minister, Ahmed Khaled Ali, the overall charge for the mean household consuming 800 kwh per billing period will actually come down to S£710 (US$14) from S£810 previously. He did not specify the extent of the increases in charges for higher users. He said that rumours to the effect that bills would henceforth be charged monthly were unfounded. For industrial users, charges will range from S£150 to S£500, depending on the time of day (with the highest charges during domestic peak times—in the evening).

Household electricity tariffsa
Consumption (kwh) Tariff (S£)
0-100 0.3
101-200 0.4
201-400 0.5
401-600 0.8
601-800 2.0
801-1,000 3.0
1001-2000 3.5
2,001 and above 4.0
a Based on a two-monthly billing period.
Source: Syria-news.com.
Download the numbers in Excel

Mr Ali said that in 2006 Syria’s total electricity consumption rose by 8%, compared with the previous year, to 37.7bn kwh. The system has shown the strain during 2007, with regular power cuts during the summer months, when demand peaks owing to increased use of airconditioners and supply is affected by falling water levels behind the Tabqa and Tishreen dams on the Euphrates river, which account for about 20% of totalled installed capacity of 7,500 mw. Mr Ali said that the situation has improved owing to the recent start-up of a new 150-mw unit at the Nasiriya power station in Damascus; a second 150-mw unit is scheduled to come into service at the same plant in late October. Over the next two years two 750-mw combined cycle plants, at Deir Ali and Deir al-Zour, are also set to come on stream, and a further 2,000 mw of new capacity is planned by 2010. Mr Ali said that the total cost of the ongoing and planned power station projects is about US$6bn. The bulk of the financing for the projects that are now under way is coming from the European Investment Bank and Arab development agencies.

Nukes 

South Korean President’s opinion (Thanks Simo)
Roh says allegations of N.K.-Syria nuclear cooperation not backed by evidence

By Yoo Cheong-mo
SEOUL, Nov. 3 (Yonhap) — South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun said he has never seen evidence of nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Syria, denying U.S. media reports alleging

Aviation Week: New Satellite Surveillance System Was Key Israeli Tool In Syria Raid

Syria’s internal politics might have contributed to the apparent success of the Sept. 6 mission. The target was so highly classified in Damascus that the military wasn’t briefed and, therefore, air defenses were unprepared, says an Israeli official.
…
Israeli and U.S. officials will not reveal operational details or even the actual target under threat of criminal prosecution. Political and military leaders in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem don’t want to humiliate or anger Syria by providing details of the attack.

Lebanon

"Condoleezza Rice speaks about Lebanon as if it is an American state," Tishrin said, referring to comments made by the U.S. secretary of state on her flight to Europe Thursday, in which she laid down strong conditions that she said the U.S. and Lebanon's European backers demand in the upcoming election. 

The French and Syrian foreign ministers on Friday discussed Lebanon on the sidelines of a meeting on Iraq in Turkey. Syria's Walid al-Moallem blamed the U.S. for hindering any agreement on a consensus president.

In comments to the pan-Arab Al Hayat daily published Saturday, al-Moallem blamed the United States. "The problem is not in Damascus but in Washington which opposes any compromise candidate and any dialogue between the Lebanese," he said. [AP]

Rice tells Syria not to meddle in Lebanon (Reuters)

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said on Saturday she delivered a firm message to Syria's foreign minister not to interfere in Lebanon's election process, telling him the world was watching.

Rice held a rare meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem on the sidelines of an Iraq conference and later drew up a statement along with France and others that urged Damascus not to meddle in Lebanon's political process.

"I spoke to him quite firmly about Lebanon. I made very clear that everybody was watching, that it was expected that Syria was going to adhere to its international obligations not to interfere, to allow Lebanon to continue to have a constitutional process for the selection of a president," Rice told reporters traveling with her.

"I warned Syria of the imperative need to allow the presidential election process to go ahead according to the constitution … without any external interference," Kouchner told reporters.

Daoud Khairallah in the Daily Star: America and the ongoing Lebanese crisis

Liberation of the remaining Lebanese territory and detainees in the Israeli prisons, and providing Lebanese, especially those living in the South, with effective protection from Israeli incursions and attacks would go a long way in settling the weapons of Hizbullah issue.

Regardless of how urgent or desirable it is to see Hizbullah disarmed, this is an objective that is more likely to be achieved by efforts of internal parties perceived as trusted friends and respected nationalists than by politically discredited adversaries of Hizbullah.

I believe that national leaders with credible commitment to a sovereign state and effective national security institutions, like General Michel Aoun, are infinitely more effective in obtaining serious concessions from the Hizbullah leadership than any other parties, internal or external.

The US can play a very important role in bringing Lebanese together and putting an end to the crisis. A government of national unity in Lebanon cannot be against the US strategic interests in the area.

US officials prevailing on their Lebanese friends, who have become frequent visitors to Washington for guidance and support to agree on electing a president in conformity with constitutional requirements and uninterrupted precedents, a president who has the trust of all major Lebanese communities, would not weaken the US stand in Lebanon or the rest of the Arab world.

The official pronouncements of passive neutrality are neither convincing nor helpful. An active role on the part of the US officials visibly supportive of national unity in Lebanon and an end to the ongoing crisis would serve both US and Lebanese interests.

 

Daoud Khairallah is an adjunct professor of International Law at Georgetown University.

Report: Syria vetoes summit against peace conference

Kurds

Syria police kill pro-PKK demonstrator Africasia

Dear Dr. LANDIS,

.

According to Turkish Daily Milliyet (http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/11/03/son/sondun11.asp ), the Syrian security forces opened fire to the people carrying the PKK flags and banners of  PKK’s imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan, who gathered to protest Turkey’s policy toward PKK and Northern Iraq last Friday Nov 2, in the Hilaliye village of Qamishli district. Abdul Aziz Davi, the secretary general of the Syrian Kurdish Progressive Democratic Party said  at least one killed, injured several and numerous taken to custody in the incident. The party is known as supporting the PKK.  In the meeting, besides live ammunition , as said in Milliyet quoting Peyammer web-site which is affiliated with Mustapha Barzani’s KDP, Syrian forces have used tear gas and water cannon to break the crowd.

.

PKK’s armed front organization, HPG,  whose web site a notice has been delivered, has threatened the Bashar Assad administration and  has  too accused Syrian government of supporting the policies of Turkey.  HPG has in addition claimed that Bashar Assad has been in the influence of Turkish state and this policy only makes a confrontation among nations and will result a war. HPG also threatened Syria unless it change its way of behaving.

.

Best,

Kaan Kutlu ATAC,
Hacettepe Univ. 

MENAFN) The Syrian Oil Minister announced that Syria is seeking to construct a $3 billion oil refinery with a Kuwaiti partner in an effort to increase the country's capacity to over double the current rate, Khaleej Times reported. 

He went on to state that the factory will also process crude oil from neighboring Iraq. The new refineries will allow Syria to import, process and export Iraqi crude, offsetting its own declining supply.

On another note, Venezuela, Iran and Syria and a Malaysian private company have publicized plans to construct a $2.6 billion refinery near Homs, in central Syria, scheduled for completion in four years.

Syria's refining capacity is currently at 220,000 barrels a day. The two Syrian refineries will each have an output of about 140,000 barrels per day (bpd).

Nur al-Cubicle has this to say about the new book everyone is talking about. I have ordered it.

Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon by Bernard Rougier 

Dear Joshua.

I wish I were not so #&*% busy, I'd like to write a proper book review.

Anyway here's what I learned from the book by Bernard Rougier, Le Jihad Quotidien.

It is inconceivable that the "Jihadists" of Nahr el-Bared were in any way sponsored by the Syrians. Indeed, both Nahr el-Bared and Aïn el-Héloué were special Syrian preserves where the Syrians attempted with some success to discredit the PLO and Fatah.

Unlike the others, these two camps were allowed "construction materials and equipment" and portraits of Assad and his father replaced those of Arafat in the souks. The Syrians also launched several anti-Jihadist intelligence initiatives to keep tabs on the SCORES of Palestinians who had gone to Peshawar/Afghanistan and come back. Those camps are, effectively, Peshawar West.

The departure of the Syrians took the lid off the boiling pot. Jumblatt, who rages about Syrian responsibility for the Jihadist mini-uprising is obviously lying IMHO.

Also, I learned that Rafik Hariri was in big trouble with the Islamic community at large for passing a number of laws restricting who could elect the mufti of Lebanon (from hundreds to a handful of persons). He also hanged three young men for the assassination of an Abash figure (the Islamic charity run by Syrian intelligence but _forbidden_ in Syria) much to the displeasure, again, of the Lebanese Islamic community.

I have much much more to cover, including the recruiting bureaus for Jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan (actually the author points out that the Jihadists in fact went combat the impious marxist Afghanis) and the fact radical Islamists (among whom there must have certainly been al-Qaeda operatives) used on hold conferences in_Chicago_ in the 1990's. Heh.

I'll see if in the next couple of weeks I can put together something more coherent. The book's narrative is quite complex. But I wanted to reply to the Nahr el-Bared question, as Jumblatt is waving the bloody rag again.

 I highly recommend the book.

 Regards,  Nur

Book info: "Le Jihad au Quotidien" by Bernard Rougier. Publisher: Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2004 Available from www.amazon.fr

in English: Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestinians in Lebanon by Bernard Rougier. $19 at Amazon. "BTW, the English version is more comprehensive and has a new final chapter," writes T-desco.

Brief bio on the author : Mr. Rougier, who is fluent in Arabic, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and lectured on Political Sociology and International Relations at St. Joseph University, Beirut, from 1996 to 2002, the period during which the research for the book was conducted. He is now a research fellow at the French Intitute for the Middle East in Amman, Jordan.