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Young Hezbollah supporters holding mock ups of Katyusha rockets in front of a portrait of group leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. Photo by: AP <\/p><\/div> ANALYSIS \/ Iran is keeping a tight rein on Nasrallah and Hezbollah<\/a> At an undisclosed site, the Syrians have erected a factory that produces M-600 missiles, capable of hitting almost any target in Israel. According to the French newsletter Intelligence Online, the factory is a joint Iranian-Syrian venture. Iran funded construction of the site, and supplied the assembly line, the technology and the war doctrine. In return, Syria is committed to provide half of the factory’s production – that is, half the missiles – to Hezbollah…..<\/p>\n During [the 2006] war, Israel bombed Lebanon with 7,000 tons of explosives, while the explosives from the approximately 4,000 rockets and missiles Hezbollah fired on Israel added up to “only” 28 tons.<\/p>\n “It is clear that in the next war we will look back and miss the 2006 conflict, in terms of the amount of explosives that will fall on Israel,” says a senior intelligence source. The question is whether this war will take place, when and with whom.<\/p>\n While experts say Hezbollah is preparing itself for war with Israel, there are no signs that it intends to start one any time soon. In fact, the Second Lebanon War limited Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah’s room to maneuver. The political and military leadership in Iran was angered by Hezbollah’s decision to kidnap Israeli soldiers in the ambush that kicked off the war with Israel. The Iranians did not want war at that point, and believed Nasrallah was mistaken in approving the kidnapping without first consulting them. As a result, they took away his right to decide whether to attack Israel in the future.<\/p>\n A more interesting question being debated by Israeli intelligence is just where Syrian President Bashar Assad is heading. This is an issue of intentions, which intelligence – all intelligence services – always wonder about. Assad’s capabilities can be quantified: Exact and up-to-date information can be acquired (Israel does this successfully ) about the number of Syrian soldiers, the structure of the army and its weapons, its theories of war and so on. It is much harder to determine the intentions of the Syrian leader, especially because they are the decisions of one man or no more than a small forum made up of army commanders and advisors.<\/p>\n Israeli intelligence is divided into optimists and pessimists. At the head of the optimist pack is Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, head of the IDF research department, who believes that if Assad receives the Golan Heights back from Israel, he will consent to a peace agreement and everything it implies – including open borders, limited commercial relations and diplomatic ties. Outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi believes there is an opportunity here for a diplomatic process, and that everything must be done to pursue it.<\/p>\n In contrast, retiring Mossad chief Meir Dagan holds that Assad will never agree to peace with Israel, because hostility toward Israel is what justifies his rule. The outgoing director of Military Intelligence, Amos Yadlin, feels Assad is still uncertain about which path to take, although he thinks the Syrian leader’s behavior in recent years shows that he is tending to distance himself from peace, just as Dagan contends. Israeli intelligence describes this as “strengthening self-confidence to the point of insolence.”<\/p>\n ‘Told you so’<\/strong><\/p>\n Before the United Staes invaded Iraq in 2003, Assad’s advisors suggested that he support President George W. Bush, just as his father and predecessor Hafez Assad joined the senior Bush’s coalition during the first Gulf War. Bashar Assad refused. Today he may feel this was a good bet and could tell his advisors, “I told you so.” He did not join the American war, and still he is courted by the U.S. administration.<\/p>\n In contrast with both his father’s stance and his own earlier positions, Assad is stiffening his demands. He is not prepared to forgo an alliance with Hezbollah and Iran, even in return for a peace agreement with Israel. Still, despite everything, he continues to act with great care and tries not to break the rules.<\/p>\n “What does Assad want?” the intelligence community asks. “That’s a tough question,” they answer themselves.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Troops sent to Lebanon’s south<\/strong><\/a> UNITED NATIONS — Lebanon is sending as many as 5,000 additional soldiers to the country’s south after clashes between civilians and United Nations troops and Israel’s warning that Hezbollah is preparing for a new war there.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Obama-Netanyahu Meeting 5: A Victory for Both Sides and New Energy To Move the Peace Process Forward<\/a> Both leaders decided to give up their attempts to intimidate each other and, instead, to cooperate in order to achieve some results while the two men are still in office. Both leaders reached the conclusion that the special relationship between their two countries… must be bolstered…. I expect that direct talks will resume before the 2010 United Nations General Assembly in September. It would be made possible, not only by the economic improvements in Palestinian life engendered by effective Palestinian leadership, but also by an undeclared continuation of the Israeli settlement freeze without further provocations against the Palestinians in Jerusalem.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Obama Says Chances for Peace in the Middle East are Slim<\/strong><\/p>\n “Obama indicated that chances for peace in the Middle East are slim during his interview on Israeli TV 2. He said that Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu understands this.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n ??? ?????? ???????? ????? ?????? ??? ?? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ?????? ?????. ?????? ?? ?????? ?? ?????? ??????????? ??????????? ??????? ?? ???? ??????? ?????????? ??????? ??????? ?? ??? ??? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ???????<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Meeting in 2008<\/p><\/div>\n Jewish senator may mediate Israel-Syria talks<\/a> President Assad asks Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter to mediate new peace negotiations, Jerusalem officials believe move was spurred by severe US sanctions on Iran. Ayalon: Talks must begin without preconditions.<\/p>\n A covert message was conveyed this weekend from Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon to Syrian President Bashar Assad through US Senator Arlen Specter, Ynet learned Saturday. Israeli officials believe the Syrian president’s timing was not accidental, and that the country is altering its position on talks with Israel following new sanctions on Iran.<\/p>\n Ayalon told Specter that Israel wanted peace, but that negotiations must begin with no preconditions. He said Israel would agree to hold the talks “anytime, anywhere”, either public or covert.<\/span><\/span> When asked about a possible military conflict this summer, Ayalon told the senator Israel was not planning to attack its northern neighbors.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Anthony Cordesman gives a bit of ground truth about the Iran fear factory – bless his heart.<\/p>\n The Conventional Military Balance in the Gulf<\/a> The CSIS Middle East Program hosted Dr. Anthony Cordesman on June 24, 2010, for a Gulf Roundtable discussing the military capabilities of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries \u2013 Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman \u2013 in the face of challenges from Iran.<\/p>\n In a conventional war against Iran, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries would almost certainly win, according to Dr. Anthony Cordesman, the Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. Cordesman offered his assessment of Iran\u2019s military capabilities and potential responses to them at a Gulf Roundtable hosted by the CSIS Middle East Program on June 24, 2010.<\/p>\n According to Cordesman, the GCC countries outspend the Islamic Republic on defense by a factor of ten, and they enjoy U.S. military support. The real threat to Iran\u2019s neighbors, and to their unfettered export of oil, lies in Iran\u2019s asymmetric warfare capabilities.<\/p>\n Although Iran boasts a robust military inventory, Cordesman asserted that a large portion of the country\u2019s armor, land-based air defenses, and naval equipment date back to the 1970s and or is no match for the GCC\u2019s superior arsenal. The mix of old equipment and less capable Russian and Chinese weapons not only presents significant logistical problems on the battlefield, but helps negate Iran\u2019s comparative advantage in manpower. Cordesman noted that \u201c40 to 60 percent\u201d of Iranian planes are non-operational and that artillery must be towed from one position to another. Despite the Iranian government\u2019s claim to be developing new weapons \u2013 and its occasional arms deals with Russia and China \u2013 Cordesman judged that, in reality, the Iranian military is modernizing at an \u201cextremely slow\u201d rate.<\/p>\n Regarding Iran\u2019s missile capabilities, he claimed that \u201calmost a cottage industry\u201d exists in exaggerating the Iranian missile threat. Cordesman judged that this threat could become extremely serious over time, but that the accuracy and lethality of Iranian missiles was far worse than many news reports suggest, rendering them useless for most military uses other than as terrorist weapons.<\/p>\n By contrast, he said, Iran has devoted extensive resources to developing its asymmetric warfare capabilities to compensate for its depreciating conventional military infrastructure. The government has significantly modernized its 20,000-man-strong International Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) naval branch and given it principal responsibility for operations inside the Gulf. (The regular navy operates principally outside the Gulf). The IRGC has a wide variety of assets at its disposal to threaten shipping lanes, including large-scale mining warfare capability, missile patrol boats, and a fleet of heavily armed attack vessels. Given the world\u2019s dependence on oil imports from the Gulf, Cordesman judged that containing these threats will be a long-term strategic consideration for both the United States and its GCC allies.<\/p>\n Cordesman cited Iran\u2019s ability to wage indirect, proxy warfare as another key component of its asymmetric threat. While the Al Quds force receives much of the credit for running training camps for unconventional warfare and aiding terrorist groups throughout the region, Cordesman noted that Iranian diplomats and intelligence people are also engaged in these activities. Iranian financial and military support has perpetuated the existence of Hamas, Hizbullah, and Iraq-based military groups, thereby complicating U.S. efforts to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and stabilize Iraq.<\/p>\n In addition to increasing its regional clout and influence, Iran has also invested \u201cmassive\u201d resources into strengthening its internal security. The aftermath of the June 2009 elections demonstrated these paramilitary forces\u2019 ability to effectively mobilize and quell internal opposition.<\/p>\n Perhaps the most menacing manifestation of Iran\u2019s desire to tip the regional military balance in its favor is its pursuit of nuclear capability. Cordesman cautioned that the United States should prepare to cope with a nuclear Iran, but questioned how soon Tehran will be able to convert its nuclear program into an operational threat. Given the poor quality and upkeep of Iran\u2019s conventional military equipment and infrastructure, he also suggested that it would take time and extensive testing to make an Iranian-produced nuclear weapon reliable and effective.<\/p>\n Iran\u2019s asymmetric warfare capabilities threaten GCC countries despite their superior conventional weaponry and U.S. military backing. Cordesman contended that this is partially due to structural and coordination problems within the GCC itself. He characterized the Council\u2019s efforts at military interoperability as \u201clittle more than empty rhetoric,\u201d citing its lack of mission focus and poor coordination. In particular, most GCC countries prefer to cooperate with the United States, France, and the United Kingdom instead of each other, which hampers their interoperability. On a tactical level, Cordesman noted that the Gulf countries have flawed training and integration schemes for their forces; he highlighted that they often train their pilots to be \u201cknights of the air\u201d asopposed to \u201cfighters in an air force.\u201d<\/p>\n Despite these flaws, he posited that the United States and its GCC allies have tools at their disposal to contain Iran\u2019s threat. He recommended that the United States continue to promote intra-GCC cooperation through continued advisory missions and high-level delegations. Additionally, he argued, the United States should continue to maintain a strong military presence in the Gulf and provide logistical support and training to GCC forces. This requires maintaining its military bases in the Gulf, upgrading GCC countries\u2019 defense systems, and providing counterterrorism support and intelligence. He maintained that these measures would both act as deterrents against low-level Iranian acts of aggression and also reassure GCC states that they can count on the United States should Iran overstep its bounds.<\/p>\n To cope with Iran\u2019s nuclear program, Cordesman advised that the United States should continue to support sanctions against Iran and closely monitor the development of the country\u2019s nuclear program through intelligence and satellite imagery. Given that Iran has close to seventy nuclear facilities \u2013 many in northwest Iran and many still likely undiscovered \u2013 he cautioned that a U.S.- or Israeli-led military strike is likely to fail to comprehensively destroy Iran\u2019s nuclear weapons program. He said that the best military option would be what the Obama administration called \u201cextended regional deterrence\u201d and strong missile defenses.<\/p>\n A detailed assessment of the Gulf military balance, entitled \u201cThe Gulf Military Balance in 2010: An Overview,\u201d is HERE<\/a>.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nWith aid from Iran, Syria has a factory producing M-600 missiles for Hezbollah. So is Assad really looking for peace?
\nBy Yossi Melman – Haaretz<\/p>\n
\n(By Bill Varner, The Washington Post)<\/p>\n
\nSteven Cohen, Hffington Post<\/p>\n\n
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\nRoni Sofer, Published: \t07.10.10, Ynet<\/p>\n
\nAnthony Cordesman, July 9, 2010<\/p>\n