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Western analysts ( See the three articles excerpted below) argue that the troubles in Iran will cause the weakening of the Islamic Republic and lead to Syria’s loss of trust in Iran. They further argue that this will create an opportunity for the US to “flip” Syria,\u00a0 which means getting it to cut support for Hamas and Hizbullah and sign peace with Israel.<\/p>\n
This argument makes little sense to me. Let me offer two reasons why I fail to be convinced. 1) How will Iran be weakened by cracking down on liberals, reformers, and factional opponents? Is this something the Iranian government has not done many times before? Did Iranians believe that Iran was a liberal republic before the elections, such that everything has now changed, as some Western analysts seem to believe?\u00a0 Will the Iranian government now forswear the development of nuclear power, abandon its support for Syria, or collapse into political chaos? I doubt it.<\/p>\n
2. Will Syria decide to sacrifice claims to the Golan in order to sign a peace agreement with an Israel that refuses to trade land for peace? That is the implication of all these analysts.\u00a0 What will the US or Israel offer Syria that it was not offering prior to Iran’s disputed elections to make Syria abandon its foreign policy priorities of retrieving its occupied land, not abandoning Lebanon to America’s and Israel’s sphere of influence, and supporting Palestinians in their struggle to retain ownership of their land.<\/p>\n
Many Americans and Israelis share a belief that they can solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by breaking the Arabs. The analysts recorded in the following articles seem to be swayed by this conviction. They may turn out to be correct, but it will take many more decades of struggle before we will know. In the mean time, I doubt that the events in Iran will bring a sea change in regional attitudes toward Israel or the balance in power.<\/p>\n
[End]<\/strong><\/p>\n p.s. In reference to the last excellent article copied below by Yigal Schleifer which reports on the growing tensions in Turkey over the revelations that elements of the Turkish military have been hatching a plot to discredit or even topple the government of the AKP. This article underlines that rule that greater democracy in Middle Eastern countries brings greater opposition to Israel and its unjust treatment of Palestinians. Read Basil Hakki’s review<\/a> of Benny Morris, One State, Two State<\/em>,<\/a> Yale University Press, New Haven, 2009. Hakki does an excellent job of getting the zibdeh<\/em>.<\/p>\n In Iran Turmoil, U.S. Sees Chance to Gain Sway in Mideast<\/a> WASHINGTON — The Obama administration and its Middle East allies are looking to capitalize on Iran’s political crisis to reverse strategic gains Tehran has made across the region, said U.S. and Arab officials.<\/p>\n A principal early test case for that evolving U.S. strategy will be Syria, which plays a critical role in helping Tehran arm and fund militant groups Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Hezbollah in Lebanon.<\/p>\n U.S. strategists are assessing whether Iran’s inner turmoil will force its clerical leaders to rein in support for those organizations and focus instead on quelling domestic dissent.<\/p>\n Or, as some U.S. strategists fear, whether Iran’s leaders, feeling weakened at home, will seek to expand Iran’s overseas operations in order to appear strong.<\/p>\n President Barack Obama has long stated his desire to woo Syrian President Bashar Assad away from his military and economic alliance with Iran. That could help stabilize Lebanon and advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, two leading sources of conflict in the region.<\/p>\n The White House decision this week to return an American ambassador to Damascus after a four-year hiatus was made, in part, by heightened hopes in Washington that Iran’s internal instability could force Mr. Assad to rethink his partnership with Tehran, said U.S. officials.<\/p>\n U.S. diplomats and Pentagon officials have visited Damascus in recent months, in an effort to nudge Syria to break with Tehran and cooperate in promoting regional stability.<\/p>\n “If Syria feels the Iranian situation is unraveling, that’s a good thing from our perspective,” said a senior Obama administration official working on the Middle East. He said the U.S. has been pushing Damascus to curtail Hamas’s military activities and to pursue direct peace talks with Israel…..<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Iran and the Syrian Gambit<\/a> …..Our bigger long-term concern is with Iran’s role in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. This week two things were announced. First, the U.S. is sending an ambassador to Damascus. Second, Jimmy Carter — working with Egypt and Syria — may have worked out terms for the release of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier whose capture by Hamas was one of the triggering events of Israel’s invasion of Gaza. HaAretz<\/em> reports<\/a> that Shalit’s release will take place within a few days as part of a prisoner exchange, and that the initial proposal was floated by Carter during a visit to Damascus and Gaza last year.<\/p>\n These stories may very well be connected, and they point to the almost incredible possibility that the U.S. may finally be ready to have a serious foreign policy in the Middle East. For what it’s worth, I have been saying for many years that relations with Syria are the key. Here’s just one reason: if Syria can be brought on board with a peace effort, Iran no longer has direct supply lines into Lebanon. Meanwhile, Syria has itself been supporting Hamas in Gaza (hence its role in negotiating the release of Shalit) as well as meddling in Lebanon. But while Syria has been notoriously difficult to deal with in the past, there is no reason in principle why progress cannot be made. Assad is an opportunist, not a mad ideologue, and certainly not a religious fanatic. (The single stupidest neocon phrase — against some pretty tough competition! — has to be “the Shiite Crescent,” an arc of states comprising Iran, Syria and Lebanon that are supposed to represent the religiously defined threat to American interests. Since Syria is less than 5% Shiite and is ruled by an Alawite minority, it was never terribly clear what this was supposed to mean.)<\/p>\n What Syria wants is simple: they want the Golan Heights back. Which is where the U.S. comes in. There have been repeated points at which Israel and Syria came close to substantive negotiations on the issue of the Golan, only to see those efforts fail. But there has never been a sustained and substantive American presence in the dialogue. If Assad can be persuaded that Syria has more to gain by engagement with the West than by an alliance with Iran, that immediately improves the situation in Lebanon, improves the security of Israel’s northern border, and improves the situation in Western Iraq. Syria’s participation in arranging the release of Shalit — even if that ultimately doesn’t happen — is a powerful and positive sign that Assad is open to the possibility.<\/p>\n Then there is the third U.S. interest and a tantalizing possibility: that Iran might resume its cooperation with U.S. operations in Afghanistan. As this piece from Stratfor nicely explains<\/a>, Iran’s 500-plus mile border with Afghanistan, strong ethnic connections to Afghan Pashtuns, and available ports make it an ideal partner. In other words, at the very same time that the U.S. has a strong interest in limiting Iran’s reach to the West beyond Iraq, we may have another strong interest in encouraging Iranian engagement to the East. The Sunni attacks against Shiites in Iraq are part of the larger conflict between Sunni radicals — think Taliban — and Shiite Iran.<\/p>\n So the Obama administration has had to play a very careful hand: do nothing to repeat the stupidity that helped launch Ahmadinejad to the presidency; develop the opening that Jimmy Carter has helped develop and initiate an engagement with Syria in the hope of isolating Iran to the West; and at the same time look ahead to the role that the version of the Iranian regime that emerges out of a compromise in the Assembly of Experts might play in Afghanistan. This week, Obama and his State Department have done all three brilliantly.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Laura Rosen in the CABLE<\/a><\/p>\n ….Obama’s hand may actually have been strengthened and Iran’s weakened by some overlooked recent events. Among the factors they cite: the outcome of recent elections in Lebanon, in which a pro-western coalition won a majority over a coalition that includes the Iranian-backed Shiite militant group Hezbollah, the eagerness of Iran’s leading regional ally Syria to engage with Washington, Arab states’ generally positive response to the Obama administration’s strong push to negotiate Middle East peace and the creation of a Palestinian state. Beyond the Middle East, Obama’s aggressive non-proliferation initiatives and “reset” with Moscow could also end up increasing pressure on Iran, they said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n “From 2003 to 2009, Iran was on a roll,” one senior administration official said Friday. “Expanding its sphere of influence, benefiting from a changed balance of power in the region, and generally optimistic about its world. Many said it was not possible to engage because Iran was so strong and thus disincented to do so. ….<\/p>\n “The chessboard is moving demonstrably in the U.S. direction.” That is the takeaway, said Congressional Research Service Middle East analyst Kenneth Katzman, from recent assessments by administration officials. “What I heard them saying is, \u2018Let’s take advantage of that now, while we have the chessboard, and try to get a nuclear deal and get that resolved, rather than the whole ball of wax.'”<\/p>\n Added Katzman, of the perceived trend: “The strategic picture in the Middle East has moved to the U.S. advantage. The Lebanon elections, reengagement with Syria, stability (?) in Iraq, have added up to a shifting chessboard against Iran.”But he added, while there is some optimism that regional and global trends are working to the U.S.’s advantage on Iran, there is also diminished expectation that near-term engagement is likely to occur. At the earliest, it’s not expected — if at all — until the fall. …<\/p>\n And indeed, not everyone is feeling optimistic. “My understanding is the president has had a much larger vision,” said one Washington Iran analyst on condition of anonymity. “He wanted a strategic dialogue with the Iranians, he gave them a pathway into the western camp that benefits the west, the people of Iran, and the larger picture: peace and stability in the Middle East…..<\/p>\n Byman did think Iran would be feeling uncomfortable about some regional trends, including renewed Washington engagement with Syria, as well as the U.S. drawdown in Iraq. “The Syria thing is real in terms of pressure on Iran. Iran has only one strategic ally in the Middle East: Syria. The U.S. drawdown from Iraq is real. It reduces the vulnerability of America.” …..”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Roger Cohen in the NYTimes<\/a>: “We need President Obama to put engagement [with Iran] \u2014 still the right medium-term objective \u2014 on hold in the name [of Iranian women].”<\/p>\n Iranian Cleric Calls for ‘Ruthless’ Punishment of Protest Leaders<\/a><\/p>\n TEHRAN, June 26 — An influential Iranian cleric on Friday urged “ruthless” punishment, possibly including execution, for leaders of protests against a disputed presidential election, while President Obama intensified his criticism of a crackdown on the Iranian opposition and rejected President…(By Thomas Erdbrink and William Branigin, The Washington Post)<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Lebanon:<\/strong> BBC Cen Asia: Paper Mulls Syrian Leader’s Failure to Visit<\/strong> Text of report by Armenian newspaper Haykakan Zhamanak on 18 June headlined “Unprecedented”<\/p>\n Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s visit stood out because of an unprecedented fact. His agenda did not include a visit to Tsitsernakaberd (Genocide Memorial) although it is one of the required protocol points for official visits.<\/p>\n Yesterday morning the Armenian president’s office announced the Syrian president’s agenda, giving details on his meetings and places of visit, but Tsisternakaberd was not among them.<\/p>\n Let us remind you that a visit to the Genocide Memorial is required during visit by all high level officials (beyond the level of foreign Let us mention that a similar incident happened in 2007 during the visit of Iranian President Ahmadinezhad, although a visit to the Genocide Memorial was on his agenda. Since he left Armenia one day earlier, he did not manage to visit the memorial.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n![\"\"](\"http:\/\/ecx.images-amazon.com\/images\/I\/51CNAHXGaYL._BO2,204,203,200_PIsitb-sticker-arrow-click,TopRight,35,-76_AA240_SH20_OU01_.jpg\"){kind=icon}
<\/a>Western analysts somehow seem to believe that greater democracy in the Middle East will bring greater acceptance of Israel’s expansion beyond its 1967 borders. This logic doesn’t make sense to me.<\/p>\n
\nBy JAY SOLOMON and PETER SPIEGEL in Wall Street Journal<\/p>\n
\nHoward Schweber, Associate Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
\nJune 26, 2009<\/p>\n
\nBBC<\/a>, Saad Hariri has become the country’s new prime-minister.<\/p>\n
\n2009-06-27 08:18:59.933 GMT<\/p>\n
\nminister) arriving in the Republic of Armenia. Actually, Al-Assad is the only visiting head of state for whom the protocol procedures have been breached.<\/p>\n