{"id":26260,"date":"2020-01-10T11:43:41","date_gmt":"2020-01-10T16:43:41","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/?p=26260"},"modified":"2020-01-10T11:43:46","modified_gmt":"2020-01-10T16:43:46","slug":"nikolaos-van-dam-on-syria-assad-the-opposition-refugees-kurds-terrorism-the-future-of-the-middle-east","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/nikolaos-van-dam-on-syria-assad-the-opposition-refugees-kurds-terrorism-the-future-of-the-middle-east\/","title":{"rendered":"Nikolaos van Dam on Syria, Assad, the Opposition, Refugees, Kurds, Terrorism, & the Future of the Middle East"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Nikolaos van Dam\u00a0–\u00a0<\/strong>@nikolaosvandam
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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PREFACE TO THE ARABIC EDITION OF DESTROYING A NATION: THE CIVIL WAR IN SYRIA<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tadmir Watan: al-Harb al-Ahliyah fi Suriya\n(Beirut, Dar Jana Tamer, 2018)<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

As there has\nbeen such a high demand for an Arabic translation of my book Destroying a\nNation: The Civil War in Syria<\/em>, which appeared less than a year ago, I am\nglad that it now appears for the first time in Arabic in an updated and\nextended version. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fact that\nit appears some seven years after the start of revolution and war in Syria provides\nan opportunity to look back at developments in Syria with some more knowledge and\ninsights of what has actually happened. From the very beginning of March 2011,\nthe Syrian Revolution has been a highly controversial subject because of\ncompletely opposing and conflicting views among the warring parties concerned.\nMy aim is to look at the developments with some more distance, instead of\nchoosing sides, and following the motto of Albert Einstein that \u2018you can never\nsolve a problem on the level on which it was created\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Syrian Revolution\nthat started in 2011 did not come out of the blue, but was a result of decades of\ndevelopments under Ba\u2019thist rule since 1963. The year of 2011 has become a very\nimportant turning point in Syrian history because the wall of silence and fear\nwas broken for the first time among large sections of the Syrian population, as\nthey rose massively against the Syrian regime. And even though Syrian history as\na result might be divided into a period before and after 2011, it would be\nbetter to say that modern Syrian history has been marked by various important\nturning points, of which the 2011 revolution is just one, albeit a very important\none which will be described extensively in this book.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There were, of course, more turning points in the period after Syria became independent in 1946, after the French had left the country when their mandatory power ended. I will mention here only three: 1963, 1970, 1976-1982, next to the fourth of 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The first such\nturning point was when the Ba\u2019thist military took over power in 1963. The\nimportance of this turning point lay more in the specific backgrounds of the\nmilitary who have dominated Syria ever since, rather than that the rule by the\nBa\u2019th Party itself was all-decisive. This was because the military rulers and\ntheir supporters as from 1963 originated to a great extent from the Syrian\ncountryside and from the heterodox Islamic minorities that were concentrated in\nthe Syrian rural areas: Alawis, Druzes and Isma\u2019ilis in particular. Before the\nBa\u2019thist revolution of 1963, the Syrian political scene had been mainly\ndominated by urban Sunnis, whereas afterwards the power structure was more or\nless turned upside-down, with people from the Arabic-speaking rural minorities\ndominating the Sunni Syrian urban majority. This implied a radical social\nrevolution, which slowed down, however, once these minority people had achieved\nhigher positions with material interests which they started to defend, just as\nthe Sunni urban upper class had done in the past.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As far as dictatorship is concerned, it would not be correct to divide Syrian history in a pre-Ba\u2019thist period before 1963, and another period after 1963, because Syria has hardly known anything else but dictatorships or authoritarian rule for as long as it has existed during thousands of years. The Syrian free parliamentarian elections of 1954 were perhaps exceptional, but these provided more a valuable gauge of public opinion at a critical moment, in which they gave an indication of the comparative strength of the rival forces on the Syrian political scene,[1]<\/a> rather than that there was really a democracy in Syria. In this epoch, which sometimes is described as \u2018the democratic years\u2019, the military and intelligence (mukhabarat<\/em>) were noticeably present behind the scenes just as well.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The military\ncoup of Alawi General Hafiz al-Asad in 1970 can be considered as a second\nturning point, mainly because afterwards Syria was no longer plagued by\nmilitary coups and rivalries as before. From that year onwards, it was only one\nall-powerful Alawi-dominated military faction that controlled the Syrian scene\nfor almost half a century, until today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A third\nimportant turning point caused the issue of sectarianism to be more important\nthan ever before. In the years of 1976-1982 an extremist offshoot of the Syrian\nMuslim Brotherhood, called al-Tala\u2019i\u2019 al-Muqatilah<\/em> (The Fighting\nVanguards) carried out a whole series of assassinations against Alawis, whether\nBa\u2019thist or not, in an effort to cause a sectarian polarization between the\nAlawi minority and the Sunni majority that would destabilize the\nAlawi-dominated regime and could finally lead to its downfall. The Islamist radicals, however,\nstood no chance against the well-armed and well-organized regime, and their\nactions ended in the well-known bloodbath of Hama in 1982, where not only the\nMuslim Brotherhood organization was ruthlessly eradicated, but also many people\nfrom Hama who had nothing to do with it. It was an irreversible turning point\nin Syrian history as far as the issue of sectarianism was concerned, and the\nHama massacres constituted a ruthless model of suppression which was to be\nrepeated during the Syrian Revolution that started in 2011, this time not in\none city, but all over the country. The earlier bloody events have had a\nprofoundly negative effect on Alawi-Sunni relations, which has only increased\nafter the start of the Syrian Revolution in 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the key\nquestions in this book is whether or not the bloody war in Syria could have\nbeen avoided, and whether it could have been expected. The answer is that it\nwas unavoidable and could have been expected. What could not have been\npredicted, however, were the effects of the so-called Arab Spring and the\nforeign interference in the Syrian War that started in 2011. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There has been\nsome controversy about whether or not one could label the Syrian War as a\n\u2018civil war\u2019. It depends, of course, on the definition one wishes to give to the\nconcept of civil war. And opinions vary widely on it. According to some academic\nliterature, however, the Syrian War can be considered as a civil war, although\none should note that it got the clear additional dimension of a war-by-proxy\ndue to foreign interference and intervention.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Already long before 2011, we have seen how on numerous occasions the\nBa\u2019th regime dealt in a ruthless way with any threats against it, whether these\nwere imagined or real: people opposing the regime were imprisoned, tortured,\nkilled, assassinated, or committed \u2018suicide with more than one bullet\u2019, or were\ndealt with by other repressive means.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A brutal dictatorship with such characteristics and behavior like the\nSyrian Ba\u2019thist regime, could not realistically have been expected to give up\npower voluntarily as a result of peaceful demonstrations, like those that\nstarted with the Syrian Revolution in 2011. Neither could the regime\nrealistically have been expected to voluntarily give up its power as a result\nof a fierce war-by-proxy on Syrian territory, which was encouraged and\nmilitarily and financially supported by regional proxies, like Turkey, Saudi\nArabia and Qatar, or Western countries like the United States, Great Britain\nand France. In my earlier book The Struggle for Power in Syria<\/em>, I\npredicted more than three decades before the start of the Syrian Revolution\u2013\nand it was not that difficult to predict \u2013 that any effort to effectuate regime\nchange was (and is) bound to lead to enormous bloodshed. And this is what we\nhave seen during the years since the start of the Syrian Revolution and are\nstill witnessing today. Those who did not expect such a huge bloodbath, either\ndid not know enough about Syrian history, or they were suffering from an\noverdose of wishful thinking, or both.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As could have\nbeen expected, the Syrian regime seized all possible means to stay in power. Its strategy of\ntemporary alliances with the aim of monopolizing power has been repeated on\nvarious occasions ever since 1963 until today, also during the Syrian War that\nstarted in 2011. It did not always matter to the Ba\u2019thist rulers whether they\nformed alliances with other parties that were not at all ideologically close to\nthem, or even with parties that were in fact their enemies, as long as they\ncould achieve their principal aim, which was staying in power and monopolizing\nit. It was the end that justified whatever means. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

How could so many foreign politicians have naively expected president\nBashar al-Asad to voluntarily step down as president of Syria, after all kinds\nof atrocities the Syrian regime reportedly had committed against the so-called\npeaceful demonstrators and, later on, against military opposition groups? They\nwanted al-Asad to voluntarily sign his own death warrant, because the legal\npresident of Syria, in their view, had lost his legitimacy. It was completely\nunrealistic, however, in the sense that what they wanted to happen \u2013 even\nthough it might have been justified on basis of their views of justice and\nrightfulness \u2013 certainly was not going to happen in reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The alternative was to militarily defeat the Syrian regime, after which\ntalks would not be necessary anymore. But direct military intervention was\nrejected in the Western democracies involved, just as well. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, by way of an alternative, various Western and Arab\ngovernments chose to militarily intervene indirectly, by arming, financing and\npolitically supporting the various Syrian opposition groups. This turned out to\nbe enough to make the regime tremble (tarannah<\/em>) but not enough to topple\nit. And I leave out of consideration here whether an alternative \u2013 for instance\na radical Islamist – regime could have been even worse. Whatever the case, it\nwould have been unrealistic to expect a democracy after the Syrian War.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most foreign governments claimed that they wanted a political solution,\nand this was true in principle. But they only wanted a political solution that\nwould lead to regime change<\/em>, and this turned out to be impossible\nwithout sufficient military means. Such military interventions were actually in\nviolation of international law which bars UN\nmember states from supporting military action to overthrow other members\u2019\ngovernments.[4]<\/a>\nThe results of indirect military intervention have been just as disastrous as\ndirect military intervention would have been: notably almost half a million\ndead, millions of refugees, a country in ruins and a nation destroyed to a\ngreat extent. Foreign military intervention under the United Nations principle\nof The Responsibility to Protect, would have required a multi-year huge\nmilitary operation, for which not any Western country was prepared. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reproaching foreign countries for giving insufficient support to help\ntopple the regime, whereas simultaneously being against any military\nintervention appears to be contradictory. Let me therefore clarify what I mean.\nI am strongly against military interventions in general because there are so\nmany examples which illustrate that such interventions mainly lead to disaster.\nMy point is that the countries that encouraged the military opposition to\nconfront the Syrian regime, without sufficiently arming them or sufficiently\ncoordinating their militarily actions, were in practice leading many of the\nopposition military into the trap of death.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When in May 2011, the Syrian Revolution was not yet two months old, I\nwas asked in an interview, whether it would still be acceptable to have direct\ncontacts with President Bashar al-Asad, because there were already \u2018hundreds of\ndead\u2019 as a result of the regime\u2019s repressive actions and \u2018thousands of people\narrested\u2019. I answered that this would depend on how pragmatic one wanted to be\nand concluded that if one did not want to talk to or communicate with President\nal-Asad, it was not possible either to positively contribute to any solution.[5]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

During television programs on the occasion of the first anniversary of\nthe Syrian Revolution in March 2012, I argued again that dialogue was key to\nany solution. Syrian opposition representatives, however, strongly rejected any\nsuch an idea. I rhetorically argued that if I had the choice \u2013 although it was\nof course not up to me to make such a choice \u2013 I would prefer a 10,000 dead\n(which was the number at the time) over a 300,000 dead, which might be the\nnumber if the war would continue without any communication and negotiations\nwith the regime, looking for a solution.[6]<\/a>\nIn fact, the number of dead even turned out to be much higher than 300,000, but\nin 2012 this still appeared to be unimaginable to many.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There was, of course, not any guarantee of success with the dialogue I\nsuggested, but rejection of any dialogue was a guarantee for failure, as we\nhave seen over the past seven years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most of the Syrian opposition at the time were not able to accept any\nnegotiations with the regime, not only because of their extremely negative and\nhostile feelings and emotions towards the regime, but also because they still\nexpected to receive strong foreign support, as happened in Libya, which caused\nthe fall and death of Libyan leader al-Qadhafi. The other way around, the\nregime abhorred the thought of having to share power with those who tried to\ntopple them and wanted to bring them before international justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many demonstrators wanted to attract foreign attention via the media in\nthe hope of triggering foreign help, but the support they wanted did not come\nas expected. They also played into the hands of the regime by proclaiming\nslogans like \u2018the people want the toppling of the regime\u2019 (al-sha\u2019b yurid\nisqat al-nizam<\/em>) or \u2018the people want the execution of the president\u2019 (al-sha\u2019b\nyurid i\u2019dam al-ra\u2019is<\/em>). This gave the regime further justification for\ncrushing the demonstrations and revolt. And slogans like these would not even have\nbeen tolerated in Western democracies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With some hindsight, and purely theoretically speaking, many Syrians\nmight not have started the Syrian Revolution, had they been aware of the\ndisastrous consequences beforehand. But in reality, things do not work that\nway. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

When asked seven years onwards whether the Syrian Revolution \u2018was worth\nit\u2019, various opposition authors have argued that \u2018if the same history and conditions were\nrepeated today, most likely people would do the same thing as in 2011\u2019, that\n\u2018it was worth it, at this unique juncture of history more than at any time\nbefore\u2019, and that \u2018there was no way of living a different life under a regime\nthat openly spoke about remaining in power for eternity, as this would have\nmeant a permanent war against the future.\u2019[7]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another\nrevolution might happen again in future, albeit under different circumstances\nfrom those in 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is as if two worlds existed side by side where the Syrian War was\nconcerned. In one of these worlds perceived feelings of justice prevailed and\nwishes were expressed as to what should rightfully happen. The possibilities \u2013\nor impossibilities – of bringing those wishes into reality, however, were not\nalways really fully taken into consideration or accepted. The coveted aim was\nclear, but not the way leading to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the other, second, world, Syria was, and all the time has been, one\nof harsh and cruel, if not the most brutal, realities. In this second world the\nissue of political and physical survival of the regime and staying in power has\nbeen all-decisive, whatever the costs. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Many Western and Arab politicians still live to some extent in the first\nworld of what Syria should ideally be; not what Syria really is or has become\nas the result of the bloody Syrian War. It is a world of principled\ndeclarations of intentions that are not going to be implemented for lack of\nmilitary power or for lack of political will to enforce the principles\ncontained in those declarations, whether they are issued on a national basis,\nby the UN Security Council or other institutions. The declarations and\nresolutions issued on the occasion of the battles for Aleppo (2016) and Eastern\nGhouta (2018) are clear examples of this phenomenon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A well-known Dutch artist who portrayed Syria both before and during the\nwar made the following comment about the destruction of the historic suqs<\/em>\nof Aleppo during the Syrian War:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018The rebels entrenched themselves in the Suqs [of Aleppo] as a protection against the heavy artillery of the Syrian Army. So, who, then, is guilty of their destruction?\u2019[8]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

It is a delicate question, which also\nrequires a delicate answer. [And it is, of course, not only about the material destruction,\nbut much more about the huge human cost in lives, wounded and refugees]. Is the\nparty that pulls the trigger responsible, or the party that provides the other\nparty with the motivation to attack it?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most answers would immediately reveal the supposed sympathies for one of the various warring parties in Syria: either being in favor of the Syrian regime or against it. But there can also be a more neutral answer, which almost by definition will also be considered by the same warring factions as being pro- or against the regime. And that is because many Syrians or foreign observers can hardly abstain from using partisan language. Most of the involved parties expect someone to be either pro- or against the regime, as they would consider it to be shameful if one would not clearly take sides in such a horrendous conflict. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Concerning\nthe destruction of the Suqs<\/em> in Aleppo, the people supporting the\nopposition would most probably suggest the view that the Syrian regime has been\nfully responsible for the destruction in Aleppo, and for that matter of many\nother places all over Syria as well. Those supporting the regime, on the other\nhand, will argue that it is the opposition that is responsible for all the\ndeath and destruction that has taken place since March 2011. Some of them argue\nthat had there been no revolt and massive demonstrations, whether peaceful or\nnot, there would not have been that much killing, destruction and refugee\nmovements on such an enormous scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The armed\nopposition groups were not really invited by \u2018the people of Aleppo\u2019 to\nso-called \u2018liberate\u2019 them from the dictatorship of the regime, even though many\nmay have wanted them to do so, without, however, being able to foresee the\ndisastrous consequences. The people of Aleppo, and for that matter of any other\nSyrian city, are not homogeneous as far as their opinions are concerned.\nTherefore, it is not that easy to make such generalizations as \u2018the people of\nAleppo by majority want this or that\u2019. There is bound to be a great diversity\nof opinion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some have\nargued that in the conquering of Aleppo by opposition forces, factors such as\nrural-urban and poor-rich contrasts have played a role. But many people from\nAleppo are themselves of rural origin, and the majority is not rich, but poor,\nalbeit perhaps generally less poor than people from the countryside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Generalizing,\nI speculate that it could be said that most people from Aleppo wanted the war\nto end, and to restart their normal lives, wherever possible. They did not want\nto pay the heavy price that the Syrian War has imposed on them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When\nspeaking about the controversial concept of bearing responsibility or\nco-responsibility for the disastrous situation in Syria, the harsh reality of\nwho has won or who has achieved a certain victory or defeat in the war may also\nhave to be taken into consideration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It might\nperhaps have been perceived differently, had the military and civilian\nopposition forces been able to bring peace, and create a \u2018new Syria\u2019 with the characteristics\nthat were described by the Higher Negotiations Council of the Syrian opposition\nin Riyadh in 2016 as follows:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018A political system based on democracy, plurality and citizenship which provides for equality in rights and duties for all Syrians without discrimination on the basis of color, gender, language, ethnicity, opinion, religion, or ideology\u2019.<\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

This ideal,\nhowever, has not at all been achieved. And it is doubtful whether all the opposition\nsignatories to this Riyadh declaration (2016) would have been prepared to\nreally implement their stated common principles once they would have taken over\npower of the regime. This applied to the Islamist parties in particular. But\nthat is another point. Here I only want to consider the ideal, albeit\ntheoretical, situation that these principles would have been implemented.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In such a\ncase it could have been argued that the opposition war against the regime would\nhave been justified, and would have been \u2018worth it\u2019, because it would have led\nto a substantial improvement in the country\u2019s situation. But in reality, it\ncould not be achieved, because the military opposition \u2013 or I should say the\nnumerous military opposition groups together – were not able to achieve a\nmilitary victory over the regime, and create the \u2018new Syria\u2019, which they\nproclaimed to be aiming for in the mentioned Riyadh Declaration. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a\nresult, it can be argued that the opposition groups and their foreign\nsupporters at least bear a great responsibility, or co-responsibility (together\nwith the regime) for the disastrous consequences of the Syrian War for all\nSyrians, even though statistically, by far most deadly victims and destruction\nhave been caused by the actions of the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover,\neven in case the opposition military would have been able to topple the regime,\nthe situation could hardly have been expected to have improved, taking the lack\nof unity among the numerous opposition groups into account. Even after seven\nyears of war, no effective unity among the military opposition forces had been\nachieved. Various rival opposition groups have been fighting one another as\nmost wanted power for themselves, not being prepared to share it with others\n(just like the regime did not want to share power with others). And I am not\neven taking into consideration here the lack of unity and coordination among\nthe various countries that supported the opposition groups, like the US,\nTurkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UK and France, which all had their own\npolitical and strategic agendas, and their own military client groups and\nfavorites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even after seven\nyears of bloody war, and some 500,000 dead, many Western and Arab politicians\nstill tend to be blinded, to some extent at least, by wishful thinking, as a\nresult of which they officially keep approaching the conflict in Syria from a\nsupposedly moral high ground. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

They have not been\nprepared to accept the basic reality, that with a limited will and limited\nmeans only limited goals can be achieved. Various Western and Arab politicians have\nthereby indirectly helped the war to continue with all its dead, refugees and\ndestruction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The war with the\nregime has failed to achieve the opposition\u2019s proclaimed aims of a pluralistic,\nsecular, democratic and civil new Syrian society, and is apparently going in the\nclear direction of being lost by the opposition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In my view, it would\nhave been better for foreign countries to back off in the Syrian War and stay\noutside of it, rather than to try to impose a solution with insufficient\nmilitary means, with the consequences as we know them today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Isn\u2019t it time to\nadmit that the war against the Syrian regime is in a stage of being lost? And\nif the outcome is already quite clear, what is the use of continuing it, and\nshedding even more blood? Or do the countries that have played a role in the\nwar-by-proxy want the war to be continued with all its dead, refugees and\ndestruction to the detriment of the Syrian people? Would they like the\nopposition to obtain some bargaining chips in future negotiations at a time\nwhen, in practice, there is not much to be negotiated about any longer, taking\nthe military equation into consideration? Or would they want to stay in Syria\nwithin the context of their regional competition for power?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Upon hearing such\nsuggestions about ending the war, some will almost certainly be outraged and\nsay \u2013 or shout with the greatest indignation – that it is treason to give up\nnow, after all the efforts that have been made to help topple the regime.\nOthers may say that the half-hearted foreign support to the military opposition\ncould be seen as a kind of treason, to the detriment of the Syrian people. Yet\nothers may use\nthe slogan Better Death than Humiliation<\/em>[9]<\/a>, but they cannot speak on behalf\nof all Syrians who have been drawn into this war without their approval, or\nagainst their will, and have become the victims of it. Giving up the struggle might mean\nthat it has all been for nothing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fr\u00e9d\u00e9ric Pichon has called his book on the Syrian War \u2018Une Guerre\nPour Rien<\/em>\u2019, or \u2018A war for nothing\u2019[10]<\/strong><\/a><\/em>.\nBut in fact, it is much worse than that: the war has not only been for nothing,\nbecause none of the aims of the opposition have been achieved, but it brought\nSyria also decennia backward in development and caused irreparable losses and\nsocial damages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the beginning of\nthe conflict that erupted in 2011, it might have been less difficult to reach a\npolitical solution than it was later on. Various countries, including Turkey,\nSaudi Arabia, the Arab League and others, indeed made serious efforts to help\nfinding such a solution. But as from August 2011, various foreign leaders,\nincluding President Obama and other political leaders started to call for\nBashar al-Asad to step aside or step down, and have continued to do so ever\nsince, albeit more recently with some variations and changes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

French President Macron, for instance, in December 2017, almost seven\nyears after the start of the Syrian Revolution, once it had become clear that\nthere was no way that al-Asad was to leave voluntarily, if only because he\nturned out to be winning the war, Macron stated: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018We have to talk to everybody … We have to talk to Bashar al-Assad\nand his representatives,\u2019 \u2026 \u2018Afterwards, al-Asad must answer for his crimes\nbefore his people before international justice<\/em>.\u2019[11]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While admitting that talks with al-Asad were inevitable, Macron could\nhave been sure that the Syrian president was rejecting the new French position,\nbecause of Macron\u2019s call for bringing al-Asad before international justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was the same formula, time and again, which constituted a guarantee that\nno real negotiations were going to take place. It was a non-starter,\nirrespective of its merits of justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In a similar change of position, the US administration made it known in\nDecember 2017, that it was now prepared to accept president al-Asad\u2019s rule\nuntil the next scheduled presidential elections in Syria in 2021. At the same\ntime, however, the Trump administration kept proclaiming that it wanted a\npolitical process that held the prospect of al-Asad\u2019s departure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If Bashar al-Asad would from his side have declared that he would accept\npresident Trump to stay on until the next US elections of 2020, it would of\ncourse have sounded ridiculous to many, but similar remarks from president\nTrump were taken seriously, even though the US during seven years had not\nsucceeded in helping topple the al-Asad regime. And depending on the outcome of\nthe US elections of 2020, it should not be excluded that Bashar al-Asad\nsurvives Donald Trump as president in office.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The position of Qatar, which has been one of the key supporters of the\ncivilian and military opposition for a long time, changed as well in October\n2017, particularly after the other states of the Gulf Cooperation Council\nimposed sanctions against it with the accusation that Qatar had been supporting\nterrorist organizations in Syria. Former Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign\nAffairs, Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani, in a reaction, confided that the\nsupport of Qatar for the Syrian opposition had earlier on been fully\ncoordinated with Saudi Arabia, and that all their common support went via\nTurkey, where further arms distributions were coordinated with the United\nStates, together with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Shaykh Hamad denied having\nprovided any support to the Islamic State (Da\u2019ish<\/em>), and that in case it\nwould have ended up in the hands of the al-Qa\u2019ida related Jabhat al-Nusra,\nwhich apparently had been the case, this would have been stopped, because that\nwould, in his words, have been \u2018a mistake\u2019. Saudi Arabia and Qatar had focused\non, what he called \u2018the liberation of Syria\u2019, but when the two countries\nstarted to quarrel over their common \u2018prey\u2019 (by which he meant Bashar al-Asad\nand the Syrian regime), the prey escaped. Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim added that it\nwould be okay if al-Asad would stay on if the Saudis wanted this. After all,\nQatar used to be friends with al-Asad. Shaykh Hamad criticized that there had\nnot been a consequent policy (siyasa istimrariya<\/em>) between Qatar and\nSaudi Arabia but did not mind to change course if past policies turned out to\nhave been a mistake.[13]<\/a>\nThis change in policy happened after more than 450,000 deadly victims had\nfallen and was apparently mainly the result of a dispute between Qatar and\nSaudi Arabia, not because of a spontaneous change of views, or special feelings\nfor the Syrian people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As far as negotiations were concerned, the Syrian opposition has been\ncommunicating with the Syrian regime for several years through the\nsuccessive  United Nations Special Envoys\nfor Syria, but they did so under accompanying statements that made any serious\nnegotiations impossible, because they demanded as a kind of pre-condition that\nPresident al-Asad and those of his regime with blood on their hands should\nleave and should be excluded from playing any role in Syria\u2019s future and should\nbe court martialed. These demands may seem fully understandable, but they were\nunrealistic, because they guaranteed that any compromise or serious\nnegotiations with the regime were excluded. Moreover, the fate of president\nal-Asad is not at all mentioned in the Geneva Communique (2012), which is one\nof the main internationally agreed cornerstones of the intra-Syrian\nnegotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Next to Geneva, intra-Syrian talks took place in Astana, Kazakhstan\n(2017- ), and in Sochi, Russia (2018- ). The meetings in Astana resulted in\nagreements on a de-escalation of the fighting in specific zones and in\ntemporary local armistices, but the agreements were violated, and appeared to\nbe mainly intended as a pause for further war. The meetings in Sochi under\nRussian auspices were not successful either. The more the regime was on the\nwinning side, the less they were willing to really negotiate with opposition\nparties with whom they never had the intention to share any real power. Winning\nthe war would not mean, however, that a political solution would have been\nachieved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On various occasions, Syrian opposition forces were militarily defeated\nby the regime, to be subsequently deported to the province of Idlib, not with\nany intention to negotiate later on with the defeated military on a political\nsolution, but rather to defeat them later on in Idlib once the time would be\nconsidered to be appropriate to the regime. In Idlib province the deported\nopposition military intermingled with other dominant opposition groups, like\nHay\u2019at Tahir al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham and other radical Islamist opposition\norganizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, the regime had always wanted to reconquer the whole of Syria,\nand the outcome of this depended to a great extent on the support foreign\nparties were willing to supply to their favorite opposition clients.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If, after more than seven years of bloodshed, some Arab and Western\nleaders decide to change course and decide that al-Asad should be accepted as\nstaying in power in Syria and would think it opportune to reestablish relations\nand to reopen embassies in Damascus, they should not expect the Syrian regime\nto welcome them back. On the contrary, such overtures would most probably be\nrejected at first, until political accounts are settled, because the regime\nconsiders foreign interference and support for the armed opposition as one of\nthe principal reasons why the Syrian War has lasted that long. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Any international reconstruction aid could only be channeled to\ngovernment-controlled areas with the approval of the regime. And reconstruction\nefforts in areas not under regime control run the risk of coming under fire in\ncase these areas would be reconquered by the regime. Moreover, it is not\nwithout complications to channel foreign reconstruction aid to areas that are\nunder the shifting control of a mixture of military opposition groups that\ninclude radical Islamist groups like Hay\u2019at Tahrir al-Sham (linked to\nal-Qa\u2019ida), Ahrar al-Sham or the Kurdish People\u2019s Protection Units (YPG).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What might perhaps<\/em> have been achieved through dialogue with the\nregime in the earlier stages of the Syrian Revolution, became more and more\ndifficult later on with all the killing and destruction that has occurred. The\nlonger the war lasted, the more difficult it became to negotiate and reach any\ncompromise. The mutual hate between the conflicting parties is immense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

One might also argue that the regime has never been interested in any\ndialogue whatsoever that could have led to drastic political changes or reform\nbut it has \u2013 in my opinion \u2013 not been tried long enough. The serious efforts in\nthe beginning should have been continued. Sometimes one should even make a\nserious effort if one is not fully convinced of the possibilities of achieving\nsuccess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What have the countries that supported the opposition received in return\nfor their insufficient aid and military interference? Four of the most\nimportant issues are: 1) refugees, d) increased terrorism, 3) a strengthened\ncurrent of Kurdish nationalism and wish for autonomy, 4) a strong increase of\ninstability in the Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Refugees<\/strong><\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Considering the millions of Syrian refugees abroad, one would logically\nspeaking expect that most of them will return to Syria, once the war is over,\nbut realities may turn out to be quite different. In particular those refugees\nwho are suspected of having been active against the regime \u2013 most of them\nSunnis – may not be allowed to return. A short look at the Facebook pages of\nmany Syrians will easily show with which side they sympathize, for instance by\nusing the Syrian flag with three stars, used by the opposition, or the official\nflag with two stars used by the regime.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Syria expert Fabrice Balanche has suggested that President al-Asad even\nmight not want<\/em> the return of millions of refugees, because Syria was\nalready relatively overpopulated before the Syrian War, and suffered from\nsevere economic problems, unemployment, severe draught, water shortages and\nother issues that helped trigger the Syrian Revolution. Refusing the reentry of\nmillions of Syrian refugees might, according to this vision, give the Syrian\nregime the opportunity of a new start\nwith a smaller population which, in the supposed thinking of the regime, might\n\u2018give Syria some air<\/em>\u2019.[14]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, it\ncan be expected that refugees wanting to return to Syria may have to prove that\nthey were loyal to the regime or at least not against it. All this might imply\nrigorous demographic changes to the disadvantage of the Syrian Sunni\npopulation. Fabrice Balanche has convincingly demonstrated that, although\nvarious other factors have played a role as well, the sectarian divide in Syria\ncannot be ignored, because it is a key issue, with the opposition areas being\nmainly Sunni, and the areas numerically dominated by minorities being\npro-regime.[15]<\/a>\nThis divide can have serious implications for the future once the Syrian War\nwould be over. [On the other hand, it should be noted that many Sunnis from\nelsewhere have taken refuge in the coastal provinces of Lattakia and Tartus,\nwith their Alawi majorities, showing that in this case safety prevailed over\nsectarian identity].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Remarkable is also that there has not been any compromise whatsoever\nbetween the Syrian regime and the opposition inside the country. And some\nopposition leaders who were originally operating from inside the country, like\nLu\u2019ayy Husayn, leader of Building the Syrian State, have been sentenced to long\nterm imprisonment in absentia, making it impossible for them to return.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Prominent opposition members abroad who publicly repented their\nopposition to the regime and wanted to come back to Syria were refused entry\ninto their home country, although there have been exceptions.[16]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Terrorism<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Terrorism and terrorist attacks in Europe are of course much older than\nthe Syrian Revolution that started in 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Al-Qa\u2019ida, for instance, had its origins in the Mujahidin<\/em> in\nAfghanistan who, at the time were supported by the United States, Saudi Arabia and\nothers in their struggle against the Soviet occupation. These Mujahidin<\/em>\nlater on turned themselves against their former Western supporters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Iraq of President Saddam Hussein used to be a bulwark against the\nIranian Islamic Revolution, which was the main reason for Western countries to\nsupport Iraq in order to contain the expansion or export of the Iranian Islamic\nRevolution. The US-British invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, gave rise to a\nnumber of subsequent disastrous developments. In the first place, it led to a destabilizing\nwar, the end of which after 15 years is by far not in sight. The number of\ndeadly victims has, according to some estimates, risen far over the million.[17]<\/a>\nUnder President Saddam Hussein, al-Qa\u2019ida did not have the slightest chance to\nbe active inside Iraq. By removing the Iraqi president, however, al-Qa\u2019ida\nobtained the chance to become very active inside the country and elsewhere. The\nUS-British occupation created the fertile soil for the Islamic State to gain a\nfoothold in Iraq first, so as to later become active from there in Syria and\nelsewhere. In fact, the removal of Saddam meant that the United States and\nGreat Britain laid out a red carpet for Iran to expand its influence in Iraq,\nSyria, Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strengthening Kurdish nationalism and the wish for autonomy,<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

Turkey probably never expected that its ferocious efforts to topple the\nSyrian regime in Damascus would lead to a strengthening of the position of the\nKurds in northern Syria, and notably of the YPG, the Kurdish People\u2019s\nProtection Units that are at least a likeminded organization, if not the counterpart\nof the Turkish Kurdish PKK, which already has fought for decades for Kurdish\nautonomy in Turkey, if not more. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a result of the Syrian War, the YPG emanated strengthened from the\nbattle, thanks to its well-organized military apparatus that could be\nefficiently mobilized by the involved Western alliance in the battle against\nthe Islamic State in northern Syria. A complicating factor for Turkey was that\nthe YPG was supported by its NATO ally the United States, also after the\nIslamic State had been militarily defeated in the area. One of the motives of\nthe United States to prolong its military presence in northern Syria could be\nto contain Iranian influence in the area, but there is already a strong Iranian\npresence elsewhere in Syria, and in order to supply Hizballah in Lebanon a land\nbridge is not really necessary like in the past, although it would make it\neasier for Iran to extend its influence in both Syria and Lebanon, also\nvis-\u00e0-vis Israel. It is questionable, however, whether the United States could\neasily withdraw from such a delicate situation without difficulties. Logically\nspeaking, one would expect the United States to give priority to its NATO ally\nTurkey over the Kurdish YPG, but it has not done so yet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under this situation, the Syrian regime could use the PYD\/YPG in an\neffort to make their presence in northern Syria as difficult as possible for\nTurkey, the United States and other Syrian opposition groups in order to weaken\ntheir positions. It is yet another example of a strategic alliance between the\nregime and the PYD\/YPG from which both can profit temporarily, as long as it\nsuits them. Actually, the PYD\/YPG could be considered as an enemy of the Syrian\nregime, because of its aims of Kurdish political autonomy, but the Syrian War\nhas temporarily changed the traditional parameters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It should be noted that the PYD\/YPG is a strongly authoritarian party,\nwhich does not tolerate most of the other some fifteen Syrian Kurdish parties. The\nUnited States originally proclaimed that they supported the rise of a more\ndemocratic Syria, but in this case, they prefer to cooperate with an\nauthoritarian, Marxist oriented Kurdish party, the Turkish Kurdish counterpart\nof which is listed as a terrorist organization in both the United States and Europe.\nIn this case, strategic interests apparently have clear priority. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whatever the case, Kurdish nationalism and the wish for Kurdish autonomy\nhave obtained an enormous boost as a result of the war, not only in Syria, but\nin the whole region. Efforts to suppress the Kurdish identity are bound to fail,\nand may rather encourage Kurdish nationalism even further. Nevertheless, the\nKurds in Syria have a lot to do to put their own political house in order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Increased instability in the Middle East<\/em><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

As a result of the bloody Arab Spring, the brute suppression of the\nrevolutions that emanated from it, and the foreign interferences in the\ninternal affairs of the countries involved, a greater part of the Middle East\nhas been seriously destabilized and radicalized. Hardly anyone has profited\nfrom it, [Russia and Iran being the exceptions]. Rather, the situation of\nalmost everyone and every country involved has been seriously damaged and\ndestabilized. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Had the Western and Arab countries not interfered with their arms\nshipments and support against the Syrian regime, there would, of course, also\nhave been serious efforts of the Syrian opposition to topple the regime,\ninspired as they were by the developments in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. After\nall, the leaders of these three countries had been toppled after massive\ndemonstrations, and, in the case of Libya, after direct military intervention. Without\nforeign interference, however, the opposition insurrection would most probably have\nbeen violently suppressed much sooner, as a result of which much fewer deadly\nvictims would have fallen; there would not have been as many millions of\nrefugees as there are now, and the country would be less in ruble. Yes, the\nSyrian dictatorship would have continued relentlessly just as well, but is also\ncontinued now, albeit it under circumstances that are much worse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, the war was initiated (in reaction to the atrocities of the\nregime) without, however, sufficient means and planning that this war against\nthe regime could also really be won. Before engaging in the war, interfering\nforeign countries should have sufficiently studied the military situation in\norder to be sure that their Syrian allies had a realistic chance of winning it;\nbut they apparently did not. In order to be able to defeat and kill a lion, one\nshould be sure beforehand to be the stronger and the better armed party, so as to\nprevent being defeated and killed oneself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The development of a war is generally not a linear and predictable\nprocess. Neither can it be predicted with some certainty who will be the party\nthat takes over power successfully, as has been demonstrated by various earlier\nmilitary interventions, like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Yemen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The defected military of the Syrian Arab Army, who later organized\nthemselves as the Free Syrian Army and other organizations, did not have the\nluxury of comprehensive planning, because their opposition organizations\ndeveloped only gradually. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The \u2013 direct or indirect \u2013 foreign military interventions in Syria have\ncaused the position of Russia to be strengthened considerably. The main reason\nfor Russia to intervene was to keep its only remaining regional ally, the Syrian\nregime, in power. Without other foreign interventions in Syria trying to\neffectuate regime change, Russia would have had no reason to intervene the way\nit did since 2015.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What is in it for the regime to have a political solution instead of a\nmilitary one? It cannot stay in power forever (even though its slogans maintain\nthat it will) and therefore it is in its interest to help establish a new Syria\nthat is inclusive for all Syrians in such a way that a new revolution or\nsettlement of accounts in the form of revenge is avoided. The regime should\nhave done so long before the revolution started, or directly afterwards, but\nBashar al-Asad and his supporters choose the path of violent suppression. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It has been suggested that al-Asad hesitated in the beginning of the\nRevolution between a more lenient approach and a violent crackdown by\ngovernment forces. It was supposedly a \u2018fateful decision\u2019 not to have seriously\nexplored the road of reform and reconciliation in the beginning, certainly when\nthe disastrous aftermath is being taken into account.[18]<\/a>\nNevertheless, it is far from certain whether an announcement in the beginning\nby the president of reform measures would really have satisfied the\ndemonstrators as long as the Syrian dictatorship persisted. After all, the\ndemonstrators were overwhelmed by enthusiasm as a result of the so-called Arab\nSpring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya where the presidents had fallen. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Now it has become much more difficult to effectuate drastic reform\nmeasures. But this in itself is no reason not to seriously try to achieve it. And\nit is doubtful whether the regime will make serious efforts in this direction\nbecause this could, in its own perception, imply undermining its own position,\nas could have been the case in the beginning of the Syrian Revolution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nevertheless, President Bashar al-Asad could begin with drastic economic\nreform measures, suppressing corruption and giving political space to others, non-Ba\u2019thists\nin particular, to participate in his government, even though it might not be\nthat easy to find relevant candidates willing to do so after all the bloodshed\nthat has taken place. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As long as the regime would keep\ncontrol over the armed forces and the intelligence services (mukhabarat<\/em>),\nthe president\u2019s power would be ensured, and it would be relatively easy to\nshare half or more of the ministerial posts with others, and to get used to a\ntype of wider based regime. Various kinds of confidence building measures should\nbe taken, and relevant UN Security Council resolutions should be implemented,\nincluding the release of prisoners, and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Reconciliation appears\nto be an impossibility under the present circumstances because of the prevalent\nmutual hate and blaming the other side for the disaster that has happened in\nSyria. Nevertheless, serious efforts should be made by the various sides to the\nconflict to at least reach a modus vivendi<\/em>. If no serious efforts are made,\nit may take generations to really solve the present conflict, and another\nrevolution may be in the making.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

[1]<\/a> Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A\nStudy of Post-War Arab Politics (1948-1958)<\/em>, London, 1965, p. 164.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2]<\/a> Colonel\n\u2018Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, who was Head of Syrian Intelligence (Ra\u2019is\nal-Mukhabarat<\/em>) at the time is a well-known name in this respect.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3]<\/a> Nicholas\nSambanis, \u2018What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an\nOperational Definition\u2019, The Journal of Conflict Resolution<\/em>, Vol. 48,\nNo. 6 (Dec., 2004), pp. 814-858. Sambanis studied over 100 conflicts in order\nto come to his operational definition of civil war, and the Syrian War that\nstarted in 2011 fits into his criteria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4]<\/a> Jeffrey D. Sachs, \u2018Ending America\u2019s\ndisastrous role in Syria\u2019, Project Syndicate, The World\u2019s Opinion Page<\/em>,\n16 February 2018.\nhttps:\/\/www.project-syndicate.org\/commentary\/ending-disastrous-american-role-in-syria-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2018-02<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5]<\/a> \u2018Dictatoriaal glamourechtpaar\u2019, Vrij\nNederland<\/em>, 21 May 2011\u2019. Interview with Harm Botje.\nhttps:\/\/www.vn.nl\/dictatoriaal-glamourechtpaar\/<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6]<\/a> https:\/\/programma.bnnvara.nl\/pauwenwitteman\/media\/88810<\/a>, Pauw & Witteman<\/em>, 7 March 2012.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u2018One Year Syrian Revolution, Discussions with\nRobert Fisk, Nikolaos van Dam, Haytham al-Malih, Anas Abdah, and others\u2019, with Aljazeera\nArabic<\/em>, 15 March 2012, presented by Ali al-Dafiri and Ghada Aoways https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=3TYv0IU6ZAo<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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