{"id":25244,"date":"2018-02-10T11:30:36","date_gmt":"2018-02-10T16:30:36","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/?p=25244"},"modified":"2018-02-10T11:32:22","modified_gmt":"2018-02-10T16:32:22","slug":"the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/","title":{"rendered":"The Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Iran

Hashd al-Sha’bi militia fighters parading after the liberation of al-Qaim village, Nov. 3, 2017<\/em><\/p><\/div>\n

By Sylvain Mercadier and Araz Muhamad Arash<\/strong><\/p>\n

The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) or Hashd al-Shaabi<\/em> in Arabic, formed in 2014 following a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, played a major role in countering the expansion of the Islamic State and in bringing about its ultimate demise in Iraq. As the Islamic State was officially defeated in Iraq late last year, the future of the\u00a0PMU\u00a0is subject to many debates. An examination of the genesis of these forces and their relationship with the Iraqi State is essential to foresee what Iraq may look like following the parliamentary elections in May.<\/p>\n

Sectarian divisions<\/a>\u00a0in Iraq have been brazenly instrumentalized by\u00a0Saddam Hussein<\/a>, the\u00a0American administration<\/a>, and today, Iran. This process exacerbated tension between Sunni and Shia Arabs, the two main communities of Iraq, who were caught up in the rivalries between regional and international powers in the Middle East. As their rivalry grew, Iraqi institutions weakened, which led to the advent of an Islamic \u201ccaliphate\u201d occupying more than a third of Iraqi territory. In this context, and following the collapse of Iraqi forces facing the Islamists, the grand ayatollah al-Sistani pronounced his fatwa[1]<\/a>\u00a0on June 13, 2014. This announcement occurred a few days after the fall of Mosul and one day after the Camp Speicher massacre, where more than 1,600 Shiites were executed by jihadists. Consequently, several preexisting Shia militias answered the call, and thousands of volunteers enrolled in related factions simultaneously.<\/p>\n

Among the main units are the Badr Organization (the oldest, founded in Iran in 1982 and currently led by Hadi al-Ameri), Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Khorassan brigades, the Hezbollah al-Nujaba Movement, and the Hezbollah Brigades (the two latter factions unrelated to the Lebanese Hezbollah movement although sharing a similar ideology). These militias are some of the most powerful military forces within the Hashd al-Shaabi and rely on Iran\u2019s military apparatus for their training and funding. They also share a \u201cKhomeinist\u201d ideology due to their allegiance to the Iranian religious authorities and their ambition to impose the Iranian political system in Iraq. In doing so, they draw their inspiration from Twelver Shia jurisprudence and the concept of Velayat e-Faqih<\/em>. Iranian influence is rendered even more obvious due to the involvement of\u00a0Qassem Soleimani<\/a>, senior military officer of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, who directly supervises the military operations of several Shiite militias on the ground in Syria and Iraq in their fight against the Islamic State.<\/p>\n

These forces are followed by organizations such as the Abbas Division and the Ali al-Akhbar Brigade, both of which are affiliated with Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani. They receive funding, arms, and training from Iraqi forces. They are also multi-confessional as they include between 15 to 20 percent Sunni fighters within their ranks. Other units include those close to Imam Muqtada al-Sadr, whose main faction is the Peace Brigade (Saraya al-Salam). The Sadrist movement is characterized by its quietist ideology and its ambition to strengthen central power and Iraqi institutions, as well as including other minorities<\/a> of the country. This has led it to reach out to leaders\u00a0and populations<\/a> in Sunni strongholds of Iraq in a attempt to balance<\/a> the dominant Shi\u2019i political and military forces that follow a more sectarian agenda.<\/p>\n

This range of militias gives us an overview of the ideological variation among different groups that comprise the PMU; from pro-Iranian elements to the Sadrist movement, various PMU factions hold contradictory political visions, which sometimes leads to\u00a0direct confrontation<\/a>.<\/p>\n

THE CHALLENGE OF IRAQ\u2019S NATIONAL UNITY<\/strong><\/p>\n

Aware that the Hashd did not sufficiently represent other communities of the country, Iraqi authorities encouraged several non-Shia militias to join the coalition. Those militias include the Babylon Brigades (a militia of mixed ranks, some of whom are Christian), and several Sunni militias including the Nineveh Guard, the Salaheddin Brigade, and the Tribal Mobilization Forces. We also find factions representing smaller minorities such as Yazidis (several local battalions in Sinjar) and Shabak (Liwa al-Shabak). In total, the PMU are composed of roughly 90,000 active combatants between the different factions.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n

Despite numerous violations of\u00a0human rights<\/a>, and even alleged war crimes<\/a>, the combat efficiency of the Hashd al-Shaabi has prompted the International Coalition, led by the United States (or the Combined Joint Task Force), to train, arm and fund several militias in conjunction with their effort to restructure the Iraqi army. Taking advantage of the political and military vacuum, the PMU soon became the\u00a0strongest force<\/a>\u00a0on the ground opposing the jihadists, which raised some serious questions regarding their relationship to the state. Indeed, according to a\u00a0Weberian perspective<\/a>, the state should maintain a monopoly over the use of force. A paramilitary organization composed of several factions, some of them having transnational ambitions, risks threatening the unity and cohesion of the Iraqi State, which has already been seriously eroded by the instability that has prevailed since the\u00a0U.S.\u00a0invasion. The sectarian identity of these groups, along with their ambiguous relationship with Iran, has raised concerns among experts observing the situation.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the election of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in September 2014 has allowed the country\u2019s institutions to strengthen and has challenged the prognosis of the inevitable implosion of Iraq or redefinition of Middle Eastern borders. By a decree in 2016 that\u00a0integrated<\/a>\u00a0the Hashd al-Shaabi within the army, al-Abadi affirmed his dedication to turn Iraq\u2019s military campaign against\u00a0IS\u00a0into a national struggle, reducing the risk of future inter-confessional war. Despite this official allegiance, some units, including those who collaborate closely with Iran, have shown their intention to remain independent and have tried to emancipate themselves from governmental authority.<\/p>\n

DEMOBILIZING THE MILITIAS<\/strong><\/p>\n

Al-Abadi\u2019s government was fully aware that the militias might try to overstep their mandate once\u00a0IS\u00a0was defeated and he therefore insisted that all groups lay down their weapons once victory was announced. He received support from Shiite religious authorities as well as other leaders, including\u00a0Muqtada al-Sadr<\/a>. Unfortunately, the militia groups have not complied with his order thus far. Indeed, the victory over\u00a0IS,\u00a0officially announced<\/a> on the 9th<\/sup>\u00a0of December\u00a02017, did not soften the ambitions of several militias to continue operating freely on the ground, justifying their activities by pointing at the presence of\u00a0IS\u00a0sleeper cells or referring to the potential rise of new terrorist organizations. A spokesperson of the Hashd al-Shaabi, Mr.\u00a0Abu Mustafa Imami, deputy-commander of the Popular Mobilization Force of the Northern-Iraq frontline, also insisted that only a new fatwa from the Grand Ayatollah could induce the militias to demobilize.[3]<\/a><\/p>\n

Beyond this, prior to rendering their military equipment to the government, many militias would like a guarantee that they will be able to integrate their soldiers into the regular forces or benefit from pensions for veterans if they decide to go back to a civilian lifestyle. It is certain that subsequent compensation as well as a serious integration policy must be implemented to prevent a worst-case scenario like the one that led to the civil war following the American invasion of 2003. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of the militias are the main challenges that beset Iraq\u2019s future. To be more effective, they must be followed by a\u00a0reconciliation policy<\/a>\u00a0as well as judicial mechanisms for serious cases of human rights infringements. In 2004\u20132005, the failure of\u00a0such a process<\/a>\u00a0led to the bloody clashes that have affected Iraq in the last twelve years.<\/p>\n

A CENTRAL PIECE IN THE IRAQI POLITICAL MILIEU<\/strong><\/p>\n

Pending this outcome, some militias that are supported by powerful political parties keep trying to interfere in the internal politics of the country in order to ensure their survival. This strategy had already been observed earlier, as when in 2014 a\u00a0Minister of Interior was appointed<\/a>\u00a0who served the interests of some militias. Some PMU are now eyeing the coming parliamentary elections to be held on May 12 of this year. Legally speaking, militias cannot present any candidates, hence many military leaders with political ambitions\u00a0have resigned<\/a>\u00a0in order to participate in the elections. Some have united into an\u00a0important coalition<\/a>\u00a0called the \u201cMujahiddin Coalition,\u201d later rebranded the Fatah Alliance. It could play an important role in the elections.\u00a0\u201cPMUs are waiting to see in which direction the wind is going to blow to align themselves with the candidate that has the best chances of representing their interests in parliament,\u201d\u00a0explains Dylan O\u2019Driscoll, expert and researcher at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute.<\/p>\n

The temptation is indeed strong for some actors to\u00a0attempt to interfere<\/a>\u00a0in al-Abadi\u2019s policy of strengthening government institutions. Within the Prime Minister\u2019s own party, the Da\u2019awa movement, former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has the support of the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia against his rivals. Many consider al-Maliki responsible for the\u00a0exacerbation of inter-sect tensions<\/a>\u00a0that led to the disaster of 2014. He also relies on a vast web of patronage relations characterized by its\u00a0corruption and sectarian nature<\/a>. Meanwhile, the Sunnis, disorganized by the fighting that marked the areas where they reside, are calling for a postponement of the elections in order to allow for a return of IDPs to ensure that their votes will be included. Some of their representatives are calling on al-Abadi to split his party in two in order to join him in a truly multi-sectarian coalition.[4]<\/a><\/p>\n

In recent months, political coalitions have formed and fallen at a high rate, sometimes leading to unusual situations: two leaders from the same party are running on\u00a0two different lists<\/a>\u00a0and Shia movements are\u00a0allying<\/a>\u00a0with communists. Recently, Haider al-Abadi\u2019s coalition (having\u00a0engaged his campaign<\/a>\u00a0under the motto of inclusion, strengthening state institutions, fighting for justice, and working against corruption), paradoxically\u00a0struck a bargain<\/a>\u00a0with the Fatah Alliance, producing\u00a0harsh criticism<\/a>\u00a0from Muqtada al-Sadr. But this alliance did not last more than three days, which shed light on the\u00a0limits of al-Abadi\u2019s popularity<\/a>. Beyond intrigue, the main issue is to determine whether alliances between the militias\u2019 pressure groups and the politicians will facilitate the\u00a0PMU\u2019s integration within Iraqi institutions, notably the military, or whether it will have the opposite outcome, generating further instrumentalization of those institutions by actors under foreign influence.<\/p>\n

The PMU are henceforth a central piece in the Iraqi political milieu and even more so within the internal rivalries among various Shiite political figures. The victor of this power struggle will be in position to determine the evolution of post-IS Iraq. The question is whether communitarian fault lines can be eased, sectarian militias be demobilized, and institutions strengthened in an inclusive manner. It seems clear that the cessation of foreign interference would be the first step towards such an outcome.<\/p>\n

_________________________________________________________________________________________<\/p>\n

This is the English version of a French article published<\/a> February 6, 2018 in OrientXXI.<\/em><\/p>\n

Sylvain Mercadier<\/a> is a political Science graduate from St-Joseph University (Beirut, 2014), spent many years in Middle East including Oman, UAE, Lebanon, Palestine and currently resides in Iraqi Kurdistan, frequently writes for OrientXXI<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n

Araz Muhamad Arash<\/a> is an Iraqi journalist who writes for Iraq Oil Repor<\/a>t and Awena<\/a>, specializing in insurgency movements and paramilitary organizations.<\/em><\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> It should be noted that the training of paramilitary militias, a process that was supported by the Iraqi parliament through a decree introduced by former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is illegitimate according to article 9 of the Iraqi constitution.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> This number was given to us in an interview by Abu Mustafa Imami, deputy-commander of the Popular Mobilization Force of the Northern-Iraq Frontline.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Interestingly enough, this argument is not unanimously shared amongst the Hashd. Another spokesperson that we interviewed, Mr.\u00a0Sayyid Ali Hashim, representative of the Hashd al-Shaabi in Tuz Khurmato, insisted that the parliament is the legal body that must decide the fate of his coalition. This is even more surprising as they are both from the same militia, the Badr Organization. They also differ on the danger that the so-called \u201cWhite Flag<\/a>\u201d organization might represent (a rebel group that appeared recently in the outskirts of Tuz Khurmato). The former sees it as an existential threat to Iraq\u2019s stability, the latter as an inoffensive organization.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Interview with Dylan O\u2019Driscoll.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Sylvain Mercadier and Araz Muhamad Arash The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic, formed in 2014 following a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, played a major role in countering the expansion of the Islamic State and in bringing about its ultimate demise in Iraq. As the Islamic State was officially […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":33,"featured_media":25249,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"sfsi_plus_gutenberg_text_before_share":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_show_text_before_share":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_icon_type":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_icon_alignemt":"","sfsi_plus_gutenburg_max_per_row":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[39,30,31],"tags":[575,550,458,456,597,585,596,595,598],"class_list":["post-25244","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-iran","category-iraq","category-shiites","tag-baghdad","tag-hashd-al-shabi","tag-iran","tag-iraq","tag-muqtada-al-sadr","tag-pmu","tag-qassem-soleimani","tag-shiites","tag-sistani"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"yoast_head":"\nThe Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference - Syria Comment<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference - Syria Comment\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"By Sylvain Mercadier and Araz Muhamad Arash The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic, formed in 2014 following a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, played a major role in countering the expansion of the Islamic State and in bringing about its ultimate demise in Iraq. As the Islamic State was officially […]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Syria Comment\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2018-02-10T16:30:36+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-02-10T16:32:22+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"508\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"410\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Matthew Barber\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@Matthew__Barber\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@joshua_landis\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Matthew Barber\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"10 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/\",\"name\":\"The Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference - Syria Comment\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg\",\"datePublished\":\"2018-02-10T16:30:36+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-02-10T16:32:22+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/2905aac6c55cbf3a9dede19e41b94c7e\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg\",\"width\":508,\"height\":410,\"caption\":\"Hashd al-Sha'bi militia fighters parading after the liberation of al-Qaim village, Nov. 3, 2017\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/\",\"name\":\"Syria Comment\",\"description\":\"Syrian politics, history, and religion\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/2905aac6c55cbf3a9dede19e41b94c7e\",\"name\":\"Matthew Barber\",\"sameAs\":[\"http:\/\/www.joshualandis.com\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/Matthew__Barber\"],\"url\":\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/author\/matt\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference - Syria Comment","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference - Syria Comment","og_description":"By Sylvain Mercadier and Araz Muhamad Arash The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) or Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic, formed in 2014 following a fatwa by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, played a major role in countering the expansion of the Islamic State and in bringing about its ultimate demise in Iraq. As the Islamic State was officially […]","og_url":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/","og_site_name":"Syria Comment","article_published_time":"2018-02-10T16:30:36+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-02-10T16:32:22+00:00","og_image":[{"width":508,"height":410,"url":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Matthew Barber","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@Matthew__Barber","twitter_site":"@joshua_landis","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Matthew Barber","Est. reading time":"10 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/","url":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/","name":"The Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference - Syria Comment","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg","datePublished":"2018-02-10T16:30:36+00:00","dateModified":"2018-02-10T16:32:22+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/2905aac6c55cbf3a9dede19e41b94c7e"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg","width":508,"height":410,"caption":"Hashd al-Sha'bi militia fighters parading after the liberation of al-Qaim village, Nov. 3, 2017"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-militias-in-iraq-from-popular-mobilization-to-political-interference\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The Militias in Iraq, From Popular Mobilization to Political Interference"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/#website","url":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/","name":"Syria Comment","description":"Syrian politics, history, and religion","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/#\/schema\/person\/2905aac6c55cbf3a9dede19e41b94c7e","name":"Matthew Barber","sameAs":["http:\/\/www.joshualandis.com","https:\/\/x.com\/Matthew__Barber"],"url":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/author\/matt\/"}]}},"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/Shii-Shiite-Hashd-al-Shabi-PMU-fighters-militias-Iraq.jpg","jetpack-related-posts":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p38J3A-6za","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25244","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/33"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=25244"}],"version-history":[{"count":8,"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25244\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":25256,"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/25244\/revisions\/25256"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/25249"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=25244"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=25244"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=25244"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}