by Matthew Barber<\/p>\n
A new Twitter account that appeared last month is making waves within the jihadi community and rebel groups of Syria. It has not yet been noticed by the international media, but if the author’s claims are legitimate, it may significantly help to shape our understanding of ISIS.<\/p>\n
The author of the @wikibaghdady Twitter account claims to be leaking inside information about the background and activities of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham, the most powerful al-Qaida force fighting in Syria). He started posting on December 10, and continues up to today. He presents a cursory sketch of the history of the Islamic State in Iraq (al-Qaida in Iraq), Jabhat al-Nusra, and the background leading up to ISI’s attempt to subsume Nusra within a larger, unified jihadi command, the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).<\/p>\n
The first question that emerges is whether this posted material is authentic or cleverly-composed fiction. If it is the latter, it is very clever indeed. The author doesn’t give information that would identify himself. Did he belong to ISIS\/Al-Qaida in Iraq and defect? One thing that seems possible is that the account may take a position sympathetic to Jabhat al-Nusra. The author is ready enough to reveal all information about ISIS, but he never frames Nusra in a negative light. In responses to angry accusations by ISIS members on Twitter that the leaks are spurious, some\u00a0connected observers\u00a0have\u00a0asserted that the author’s knowledge is real and\u00a0all the material is true. It waits to be seen whether the account represents internal dissatisfaction with ISIS or part of the recently-deepening rift between ISIS and Nusra.<\/p>\n
Though not highly detailed, the leaks do present us with some interesting insights into the structure of al-Qaida in Iraq, including protective strategies used to insulate key leadership figures, as well as al-Qaida’s\u00a0readiness to embrace thievery and extortion to fund their own operations. What is also interesting is the claim that Nusra was created by al-Qaida in Iraq, not because they were serious about fighting the Syrian front, but merely as a measure to preserve their own powerbase in Iraq, which they feared might erode if too many became enthusiastic about participation\u00a0with the jihad in Syria. Nusra’s fame would then grow to overshadow ISI’s, and the U.S. adding Nusra to the terror list further bolstered their prestige, fueling an\u00a0eventual\u00a0competitive clash between the two factions. The author of the leaks also claims that ISI ordered Nusra to attack FSA commanders.<\/p>\n
One of the most significant insights that the leaks can provide is the alleged role of a previously-unknown figure, Hajji Bakr, who ostensibly acted as al-Baghdadi’s right-hand, but who in reality seems to have been the real power and mastermind of the group. (For background on al-Baghdadi and al-Julani, the leaders of ISI and Nusra, respectively, see these posts by Pieter van Ostaeyen: 1<\/a>, 2<\/a>) Unconfirmed reports have recently claimed that Hajji Bakr has been killed\u00a0in Tel Raf’at, in Aleppo province, in clashes with other rebels. It’s all a bit odd; no one had ever heard of this person before this twitter account went live, and soon after he is reported dead. His death was reported by some Islamic Front rebels. There is still a question about the existence of this individual and we need more information that can confirm these claims. Following reports of Hajji Bakr’s death, a video parody participating in the online “Hitler meme” appeared online<\/a>; all the names used in this parody rely heavily on the @wikibaghdady tweets.<\/p>\n We can’t establish the authenticity of the leaks, but as they do appear reasonably credible and likely true, we are posting selected translations of the leaks, below. (While we were preparing this post, al-Akhbar released an article<\/a> reporting on these leaks.)<\/p>\n ———————————————————————<\/p>\n The author began his twitter feed (December 10) with a series of prefacing\u00a0questions that he planned to answer:<\/p>\n The first account to expose the secrets of the Dawlat al-Iraq wa al-Sham organization [ISIS]\u00a0and who runs it… Who is\u00a0al-Baghdadi? Have you seen\u00a0his picture? The names\u00a0of his council? What are his plans? Wait for us soon…<\/p><\/blockquote>\n He tweeted that message several times, tagging well-known anti-ISIS\/pro-jihadi figures on twitter, then asked more rhetorical questions:<\/p>\n Why did al-Baghdadi come to Syria?! And when?! Who was the first to welcome him?! Who are the sharia’a legislators who\u00a0gave fatwas\u00a0saying bayaa<\/em> should be given\u00a0him?! Who is the Iraqi officer that accompanies him?! Soon, here…<\/p>\n Who are the closest people to al-Baghdadi? What are their names?! Who are they who\u00a0support him from outside, especially from\u00a0Saudi Arabia?! Who manages the anonymous twitter handlers that support him?! Soon, here…<\/p>\n Where does al-Baghdadi get his money from?! Is\u00a0[his organization]\u00a0infiltrated?! And How?! Who gives him the fatwas for\u00a0killing?! Soon, here…<\/p>\n Who supports al-Baghdadi in Saudi Arabia: who is the former Saudi officer Bandar al-Shaalan?! What is his role in moving and supporting the Daesh movement in Saudi Arabia?! Soon, here…<\/p><\/blockquote>\n On December 14 he began to provide answers to\u00a0the questions he laid out:<\/p>\n We will now\u00a0start tweeting with Allah’s permission.<\/p>\n Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi\u00a0is a real person but who uses a\u00a0fake name and title, and everyone around him does the same thing. There\u2019s no member of al-Baghdadi’s council [his inner circle] who uses his family name or real title.<\/p>\n Everyone\u00a0of al-Baghdadi’s\u00a0council are 100% \u00a0Iraqi;\u00a0no other nationality is accepted because he doesn’t trust anyone.<\/p>\n The size of al-Baghdadi’s\u00a0military council increases and decreases between 8 and 13 people.<\/p>\n al-Baghdadi’s\u00a0military council is led by 3 people from the former Saddam army who belong to the Ba’ath party.<\/p>\n Those three are led by [the chief of the 3 is]\u00a0Staff Brigadier General Hajji Bakr who was a former officer in the\u00a0Saddam Baathist army.<\/p>\n Who is Hajji Bakr?! And what is his relationship to al-Baghdadi\u00a0and when did it start?! That’s what we\u2019ll talk about\u00a0an hour from now with Allah\u2019s permission.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n ————————————————————<\/p>\n [Briefly in the meantime,]\u00a0Who writes under fake, Daesh names?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Here he gives a list of those twitter accounts supposedly corresponding to members of ISIS:<\/p>\n Who is Abu Doujana @almohajer9225<\/p>\n Who is AlHezbr @Alhezbr_<\/p>\n Who is Haqiqat Al Sororia @hnt1433<\/p>\n Who is Qorin Kalash @K_L7<\/p>\n Who is Gharib @kmkmmmsmsm<\/p>\n Who is Salafi from Iraq @abdalrahmaniraq<\/p>\n Who is Al Sarouria Tabor Khames @bmr8000<\/p>\n And the list goes on. We\u2019ll\u00a0reveal 5 names to you every so often.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n ————————————————————<\/p>\n 1) As we said, al-Baghdadi’s military council is led by 3 [individuals]\u00a0and those 3 are headed by a former officer in the Baath party named Staff Colonel Hajji Bakr.<\/p>\n 2) Colonel Hajji Bakr joined the Islamic State in Iraq when the state was led by\u00a0Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. [former ISI leader]<\/p>\n 3) Hajji\u00a0was a military member who offered his military service along with his experience in the Ba’ath army to al-Baghdadi’s\u00a0organization.<\/p>\n 4) Staff Colonel\u00a0Hajji\u00a0demonstrated his commitment and his repentance from the Ba’ath party and he is considered the most important military commander close to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.<\/p>\n 5) There was no previous acquaintance between the two; he was recommended to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi\u00a0and\u00a0Abu Hafs al-Muhajir by middlemen and he was accepted under the condition that he connect them with leadership [commanders]\u00a0and useful information in the army.<\/p>\n 6) The Staff Colonel was brought close to the leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq as a military\u00a0advisor for Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajer.<\/p>\n 7) The Colonel Hajji\u00a0Bakr provided the leadership with military information and plans and connected them\u00a0with former military commanders from the remnants of the Ba’ath party.<\/p>\n 8) Within a few weeks, Colonel Hajji Bakr\u00a0became closer and closer to the leadership of Dawlat al-Iraq because he was a military treasure and an important commander.<\/p>\n 9) The\u00a0strange thing about Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Da’esh\u00a0today,\u00a0is that he wasn\u2019t present in the command council of\u00a0the previous leader Abu Omar al-Baghdadi\u00a0[he didn’t join the council] until [around the time of]\u00a0the death of the latter.<\/p>\n 10) Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was a member in the organization of Islamic state of Iraq outside of the\u00a0organization’s command.\u00a0He resided in\u00a0western Iraq,\u00a0specifically in Al-Anbar Province,\u00a0specifically in Falujah.<\/p>\n 11) He had been in the command as an adviser for al-Baghdadi\u00a0and Al-Muhajer for nearly 50 days when the catastrophe hit the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Baghdadi\u00a0and Abu Hafs were targeted with a shell and they all died.<\/p>\n 12) Colonel Hajji Bakr was not harmed but the top commanders of the Islamic State were all killed at the same time and all the command was vacant [????? ??? ????? ?????? – ?]<\/p>\n 13) There is another Colonel who is a friend of Hajji Bakr named Mazen Nahir and he often visits Hajji Bakr. He went with him to Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi one time as a collaborator with the organization and an unofficial member.<\/p>\n 14) This other colonel Mazen Nahir\u00a0is\u00a0regarded by Hajji Baker as a trustworthy agent who [can be used] to inflitrate the regime;\u00a0[therefore] he doesn\u2019t like to appear in the organization’s leadership or its councils.<\/p>\n 15) After the assassination of the leaders, colonel Hajji Bakr told people close to him and from the leadership that he gave bayaa<\/em> to a new emir to lead the Islamic state of Iraq and that\u00a0being Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.<\/p>\n 16) The news was a surprise to everyone!\u00a0In another meeting soon we\u2019ll talk about the Islamic state of Iraq under the leadership of the new emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi\u00a0and his constant companion Colonel Hajji.<\/p>\n Addendum:\u00a0Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, the companion of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi\u00a0is Egyptian and his name is\u00a0Abd Al-Moneem Izz Al-Din Badawi.\u00a0He had two other nicknames before he joined al-Baghdadi: 1. Abu Ayub 2. Abu Hafs<\/p>\n The next meeting with deal with the new commander of the Iraq State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,\u00a0and the real engine\u00a0behind his state: Colonel Hajji Bakr<\/p><\/blockquote>\n ———————————————— The new era of Dawlat al-Iraq under the command of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Staff Colonel Hajji Bakr – Part 1<\/p>\n 1) When Colonel Hajji Bakr suggested the emirship to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi\u00a0in a private meeting in the first hours after the death of the leader al-Baghdadi (the first) and al-Muhajir, Abu Bakr expressed concerns.<\/p>\n 2) Colonel Hajji Bakr gave assurances and said that he would provide support and assistance from the background;\u00a0this is\u00a0what al-Baghdadi\u00a0has confided to those close to him since the begining of his leadership.<\/p>\n 3) A new era began for the Islamic State in Iraq with two leaders, the leader in the front, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,\u00a0and the leader in the shadow, Staff Colonel Hajji Bakr.<\/p>\n 4)\u00a0ISI began to work amid concerns about the presence of an emergent figure, Haji Bakr, who is very close to and\u00a0the right-hand man\u00a0of Abu Bakr\u00a0al-Baghdadi.<\/p>\n 5) The\u00a0image of the clean-shaven\u00a0Colonel\u00a0next to the leader disturbed the members of the State and both leaders, al-Baghdadi and the Colonel,\u00a0noticed it.<\/p>\n 6) The Colonel started growing his beard and changing his appearance and the way that he talked in the first weeks, and no member was allowed to question anything about the leadership,<\/p>\n 7) because questions\u00a0plant doubts and planting doubts is breaking the ranks which might permit blood and\u00a0assassination in\u00a0one way or another.<\/p>\n 8) Nobody in the Dawlah organisation knew the Colonel 2 months prior to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi taking the leadership.<\/p>\n 9) Colonel Hajji Bakr started meeting privately with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi\u00a0to restructure the new State and the first agreement was to give attention to two apparatuses:<\/p>\n 10) An apparatus that could protect the cohesion of the State and protect it from the\u00a0inside through security units that eliminate any\u00a0threat to the entity and another apparatus that guarantees financial resources.<\/p>\n 11) First, the security apparatus: the first secuirty steps\u00a0were taken\u00a0by the Staff Colonel Hajji Bakr to protect the leader in the front, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, by keeping him from meeting the leadership of the subdivisions,<\/p>\n 12) so as not to affect him with influence or guidance [so that other commanders wouldn’t influence al-Baghdadi].\u00a0And the emir’s orders came through the leaders of the Shura Council, which was formed by the Colonel later.<\/p>\n 13) Colonel Hajji Bakr became a permanant fixture next to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and doesn\u2019t leave his side anywhere, like a personal minister, but in reality he is the leader in the shadow.<\/p>\n 14) The second step in creating the security apparatus was to set up security detachments that carry out eliminations and secret assassinations. It was created by the\u00a0Colonel with 20 people in the beginning.<\/p>\n 15) It then reached 100 people;\u00a0these detachments take their orders directly from the leadership and do not follow any regional emir.<\/p>\n 16) These people were selected by the Colonel.\u00a0Most of them\u00a0come from his\u00a0former occupation\u00a0within the desolved Iraqi Baathist regime and are highly trustworthy.<\/p>\n 17) Their mission is to secretly\u00a0eliminate anybody showing signs of dissent or disobedience: whether\u00a0members of\u00a0ISI or even field commanders or\u00a0sharia legislators.<\/p>\n 18 ) So that assassination orders don\u2019t go through the chain of\u00a0command of the men of ISI and then\u00a0become leaked, the Colonel appointed these detatchements to an officer and a former colleague of his named Abu Safwan Rifai.<\/p>\n 19) Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi started to feel very safe and was grateful to Colonel Hajji Bakr and he started seeing him an as indispensable man,<\/p>\n 20)\u00a0to the point that\u00a0Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi felt that he couldn\u2019t remain in control without Colonel Hajji Bakr because, with his military background, he\u00a0plays the role of both the defense\u00a0and intelligence\u00a0ministries.<\/p>\n 21) Second, the financial resources: the State of Iraq with the leadership of the former commander Abu Omar al-Baghdadi made great strides in bringing in high financial resources based on the following:<\/p>\n 22) First: Confiscating the money of all Shi’a, Christian, and Druze minorities, and all regime agents, even if they were Sunnis.<\/p>\n 23) Second: The takeover of oil resources and generation, power and oil stations,\u00a0government factories, and any governmental financial resources because [they consider] its money as owned by Dawlat al-Iraq.<\/p>\n 24) Third: Any companies that have contracts with the al-Maliki regime are agents [of the regime],\u00a0whether\u00a0a maintenance\u00a0or cleaning company, or fuel stations, or telecommunications companies.<\/p>\n 25) And if something can\u2019t be seized completely, the owner receives a death threat or a threat to blow up the company or the store, if monthly taxes are not paid and the money gets paid in fear for his [the owner’s] property.<\/p>\n 26) Fourth: Placing checkpoints on long roads to take money from commerical trucks, as high as $200 in some cases<\/p>\n 27) Under the leadership of Abu Bakr and the Colonel, Dawlat al-Iraq came to possess very large and very alluring amounts of money that increased salaries and rewards and military operations.<\/p>\n 28) With the increase in financial stature and a large income, the love of joining al-Dawla grew\u00a0and the Iraqis were the most loyal.<\/p>\n 29) A financial command was put in place for Dawlat al-Iraq and oddly, this command was handled by Colonel Hajji Bakr himself along with his military command, and he positioned 5 other managers with him.<\/p>\n 30) During this period, the colonel put together advisers and called them the Shura council of Dawlat al-Iraq. They were\u00a0between 7 to 13 [members]\u00a0with no non-Iraqi among them, out of fear of a breach.<\/p>\n 31) I will\u00a0leave Dawlat al-Iraq for now and move to:<\/p>\n 32) What\u00a0is the origin of the idea for Dawlat al-Iraq wa al-Sham;\u00a0who made the suggestion;\u00a0al-Baghdadi’s entry to Syria 3 weeks before its announcement; and where did he live<\/p>\n 33) Why was the announcement rushed? [This is in reference to the public declaration of an Islamic state in April of last year that involved Ayman al-Zawahiri and which Nusra felt was premature,\u00a0earlier post here<\/a>]\u00a0And why did he chose to live by the Turkish borders before the announcement?! And why did he choose to live in a\u00a0portable room made of steel not too far from refugees?!<\/p>\n 34) And what is the threat that he sent to Abu Mohammed al-Joulani [leader of Jabhat al-Nusra]\u00a0before the\u00a0al-Dawla announcement? What did he ask of al-Joulani to do, either nullify Jabhat al-Nusra or dissolve\u00a0it?!<\/p>\n 35) There\u2019s a picture of al-Baghdadi with his advisers taken at the Turkish borders a week before the announcement of Dawlat al-Iraq wa al-Sham and the dissolution of Jabhat al-Nusra that we will publish later if it helps you.<\/p>\n We\u2019ll answer all these questions in a coming meeting\u2026.<\/p>\n
\nDecember 15<\/p>\n