{"id":18434,"date":"2013-04-04T04:36:17","date_gmt":"2013-04-04T08:36:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/?p=18434"},"modified":"2013-04-13T22:14:05","modified_gmt":"2013-04-14T02:14:05","slug":"the-raqqa-story-rebel-structure-planning-and-possible-war-crimes","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/the-raqqa-story-rebel-structure-planning-and-possible-war-crimes\/","title":{"rendered":"The Raqqa Story: Rebel Structure, Planning, and Possible War Crimes"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"MatthewThe Raqqa Story: Rebel Structure, Planning, and Possible War Crimes
\n<\/strong><\/em><\/h4>\n

Written by Matthew Barber for Syria Comment, with research from the Syria Video team<\/em>
\nApril 3, 2013<\/em><\/p>\n

Syria Comment Sunday<\/a> unveiled Syria Video<\/a>, a web application that maps and aggregates video footage of the Syrian war. This service does not attempt to measure or compare the respective levels of video content uploaded by conflict participants aligned with the regime vs. the opposition. Syria Video functions as an organized archive for the mass of video material that is already available on the web; the interpretive process is left up to the viewer whose experience is made easier through the mapping of uploaded video by geographical location.<\/p>\n

In what follows, we will present our findings on the timeline of events in Raqqa and the organization of the rebel groups operating there, informed by various forms of social media, the most important of which was video material acquired by Syria Video. Aside from any informative value, this report demonstrates the potential of Syria Video as a research tool. Historically unprecedented, information is different<\/i> in the Syrian conflict\u2014in how it is both acquired and used. The war in Syria is the first conflict of its kind to have such extensive documentation of everyday events captured on video, providing us with levels and kinds of information absent in previous conflicts. Syria Video represents an initial attempt to tap into this expansive resource. In our endeavor to form a clearer understanding of how events unfolded in Raqqa, we relied heavily on Syria Video as an information gathering resource that contributed material that could help revise and expand on the leading narrative already being developed and amended by journalists and others.<\/p>\n

The advantages and limitations of relying on uploaded video to construct a picture of events should be considered. The kind of information that can be gathered from uploaded video is different from that gathered by a reporter who has the opportunity to pursue inquiry through direct engagement with actors. However, working with a large quantity of video can facilitate the discovery of emerging patterns and trajectories of events through access to a kind of perspective inaccessible to a journalist on the ground.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The Structure and Relationships of Rebel Groups Operating in al-Raqqa<\/b><\/h5>\n

 <\/p>\n

Syria Video has made it possible to acquire a sense of the number and hierarchical structure of rebel groups who participated in the Raqqa takeover. We have identified over 80 rebel units<\/b> in Raqqa alone that are grouped into larger bodies that cooperate together.<\/p>\n

Figure 1 shows the structure of \u201cJabhat Tahrir al-Raqqa\u201d (\u201cThe Raqqa Liberation Front\u201d), made up of both Free Syrian Army battalions and Islamist battalions. (Click here for .pdf of chart<\/a>)<\/p>\n

\"Fig.<\/a>

Fig. 1<\/p><\/div>\n

The methodology for mapping these militias involved first reviewing announcements released by brigades (who often list each battalion linked to them) and the crosschecking by searching for each battalion and identifying which brigade they say they are linked to. Colors in the chart identify duplicate groups. These could be errors on the part of announcement videos released, multiple groups using the same names or the same group switching teams.<\/p>\n

In this map, all battalions under \u201cMilitary and Revolutionary Council\u201d belong to the FSA, and all the other groups listed are Islamist. But this entire \u201cunited front\u201d was only one piece of the Raqqa takeover, and was not the most important (or even second most important) force in the offensive. The graphic does not include Ahrar al-Sham or Jabhat al-Nusra who operate independently. All three bodies cooperated in coordinating the Raqqa takeover.<\/p>\n

Based on available material reviewed by the Syria Video team, it would appear that Ahrar al-Sham was the real mastermind and spearhead of the Raqqa offensive.<\/b> Jabhat al-Nusra was second in importance in this operation, providing significant support. Also participating was the Raqqa Liberation Front of fig. 1. The participants of the overall offensive could be visualized thus:<\/p>\n

\"\"

Fig. 2<\/p><\/div>\n

It will be helpful to continue the discussion of this coalition within a timeline that places the development of these rebel groups with events in Raqqa.<\/p>\n

Raqqa Timeline<\/b><\/h5>\n

 <\/p>\n

The following are some of the major events since last summer that led up to the current capture of al-Raqqa.<\/p>\n

August 2, 2012<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Raqqa Military Council (a union of multiple rebel brigades) is created. This partnership identifies with the Free Syrian Army.<\/p>\n

September 19, 2012<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Tel Abyad is captured by the forces of the FSA Military Council, about a month and a half after that group\u2019s formation.<\/p>\n

December 20, 2012<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Military Council is restructured, with some groups being expelled and others being admitted.<\/p>\n

December 25, 2012\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/b>Five days after the Military Council is restructured, it joins with a significant number of Islamist groups fighting in the province to form the larger Raqqa Liberation Front (Jabhat Tahrir al-Raqqa). This is the larger body represented in Fig. 1.<\/p>\n

January 12, 2012<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Raqqa Liberation Front and Jabhat al-Nusra work together to take the Raqqa\u2013Deir Ezzor highway.<\/p>\n

February 11, 2013<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 The Raqqa Liberation Front and Jabhat al-Nusra are joined by Ahrar al-Sham for the offensive in Tabqah (also called Thawra), a town near the city of Raqqa. Another group, Liwa al-Tawhid (primarily active in Aleppo) comes to aid in the overthrow of Tabqah which happens on the 11th<\/sup>. A statue of Hafez al-Assad is burnt<\/a> in Tabqah, 20 days before the one toppled in Raqqa city. The victory<\/a> of this offensive resulted in the rebels capturing a large amount of weapons and ammunition, likely used later in taking Raqqa city. See Jabhat al-Nusra with captured weapons<\/a> and Ahrar al-Sham with captured weapons<\/a>.<\/i><\/p>\n

February 17, 2013<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ceasefire<\/a> between Kurds and Syrian rebels is brokered in Ras al-Ain<\/a> (east of Tel Abyad in nearby muhafiza<\/i> of Hasake) by Michel Kilo<\/a> and others<\/a>. Jabhat al-Nusra refuses to sign the agreement, but stops fighting after the other rebels sign<\/a>. On the same day, the rebels in Raqqa muhafiza<\/i> elect new local council<\/a> to preside over the province and designate Tel Abyad the new headquarters until the city of Raqqa could be overthrown.<\/p>\n

February 20, 2013<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ahrar al-Sham carefully plans for the offensive on the city of Raqqa during this period, and it is around this time that we have the first glimpse of another emerging Islamist rebel group, Liwa Umanaa\u2019 al-Raqqa. Since the takeover of Raqqa would be largely conducted by outsiders (rebels not from the Raqqa muhafiza<\/i>), Ahrar al-Sham cleverly fashioned a sub-group (whose name means \u201cBrigade of the Trustees of Raqqa\u201d) consisting of fighters from Raqqa, to legitimize the offensive and serve as the \u201clocal face\u201d for Ahrar al-Sham. Liwa Umana al-Raqqa<\/a> will later become the primary instrument for maintaining order and implementing Islamic\u00a0law in the city.<\/p>\n

\"\"

Fig. 3<\/p><\/div>\n

March 2, 2013<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Ahrar al-Sham leads the alliance shown in Fig. 3 in a large-scale attack on the city of Raqqa. This is a well-organized, well-planned military operation, dubbed Gharat al-Jabbaar<\/i> (“The Raid of the Almighty”). The offensive is announced by both Ahrar al-Sham<\/a> and Jabhat al-Nusra<\/a>. The muhafiz<\/i> (governor) of Raqqa and the head of the Ba\u2019ath party are captured and seen in a video speaking about the takeover alongside their captor, the \u201cEmir\u201d (who in later\u00a0videos becomes known as “Dr. Samer”).\u00a0Consistent with Ahrar al-Sham\u2019s plan to have the offensive appear as a local operation, they are not featured in this significant video<\/a> (significant for showcasing the most important prisoners captured by the regime so far). Instead, the group that announces itself in this widely-seen video (and which\u00a0beyond serving as the local face of the offensive for Raqqans also served as the face of the Raqqa takeover for us) was called \u201cJabhat al-Wahdet al-Tahrir al-Islamiyye<\/a>.\u201d Based on what we\u2019ve gleaned from Syria Video, this group\u2014though acting as frontman\u2014was not as significant a force in the offensive as the other major players. Its ranks were drawn by combining one of the FSA battalions (Kitaabet al-Nasir Salahudin<\/em>) and one of the Islamist brigades (Liwa Huthayfa Ibn al-Yaman<\/em>). That it was newly formed resolves our earlier question about why the \u201cEmir\u201d first says he is with the FSA before quickly switching to\u00a0\u201cJabhat al-Wahdet.\u201d<\/p>\n

\"\"

Fig. 4<\/p><\/div>\n

The mix of FSA and Islamist fighters comprising Jabhat al-Wahdet illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing between Islamist and nationalist energies on the ground.<\/p>\n

This developing picture of the Raqqa offensive as a largely outside operation which utilized shrewd techniques to appear local corroborates the first report<\/a> I received after the takeover from a tribe member who asserted that the tribes\u2014long closely supportive of the regime\u2014had not suddenly en masse <\/i>suspended their loyalty. However, this needs to be explored further, as there is evidence of at least one tribe making a switch to the opposition. This tribe (\u201c????? ???? ????<\/a>\u201d) announced that it took up arms to oppose the regime on May 5 (but that was several days after Raqqa fell). Their militia is called \u201c???? ??? ???? ?????\u201d and they called on other tribes<\/a> to join ranks in fighting the regime.<\/p>\n

March 5, 2013<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Liwa Umanaa\u2019 al-Raqqa assumes responsibility of the city to \u201cshow the people that the fighters are their brethren.\u201d<\/p>\n

March 6, 2013\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/b>Prisoners are promised safe passage for surrender, and later exterminated. See section below on possible war crime.<\/p>\n

March 8, 2013\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/b>Abu Jassim, one of the heads of \u201carmy security\u201d in Raqqa (a branch of the mukhabaraat<\/i>), is killed. His head has been shot at point-blank range and his body is dumped from the back of a pickup into the street where\u00a0it is left\u00a0through the day and night, as people come by to kick it and spit on it, saying that he had been a very oppressive and ruthless character in the local power structure. Please be warned that the videos are extremely graphic: 1<\/a>, 2<\/a>, 3<\/a>, 4<\/a>, 5<\/a>.<\/i><\/p>\n

March 9, 2013<\/b>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Videos\u00a0are posted by rebels claiming to have besieged the regime\u2019s 93rd<\/sup> Brigade at an army base in Ain Eissa, further north from Raqqa city within the muhafiza<\/i>.\u00a0Underscoring the trend of outsider initiative in the Raqqa offensive, 3 of the 4 militias besieging the base\u00a0are from Jabal al-Zawiya, Idlib.<\/p>\n

March 31, 2013\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/b>A convoy of the 93rd<\/sup> Brigade comes out of the base and engages in conflict with the rebels. Rumors begin to circulate that tanks were being sent to re-take the city, but these are unconfirmed and likely untrue. Rebels remain confident<\/a> that the muhafiza<\/i> will remain under their control, but until now the muhafiza<\/i> of Raqqa is not completely empty of regime presence. The 93rd<\/sup> Brigade and Division 17 both remain.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

A War Crime in Raqqa?<\/b><\/h5>\n

 <\/p>\n

Syria Video has found six videos dealing with a particular group of prisoners who were promised safety in exchange for surrendering after the city of Raqqa fell<\/a> to the rebels. The prisoners were regime soldiers with army security, and according to the rebels talking in the videos, they were offered safe passage<\/a> in return for laying down their arms. The man with the camera says to the effect of: \u201cWith God\u2019s help Nusra was able to take the base after negotiating and promising the dogs of Assad to give them safe passage if they surrendered.\u201d We see the rebels loading the prisoners onto a bus<\/a>, presumably to drive them out of the city. What seems to have happened instead is that the bus was fired upon, killing the prisoners inside it. March 6 is the date of the surrender, when we see the prisoners on the bus. The next time we see the bus, it is after dark the same day<\/a>. The bus is destroyed. Riddled with bullet holes, its windows are shot out and its tires are flat. The possessions of the men are strewn about on the ground outside the bus. (They had originally boarded the bus with clothes and suitcases, probably having expected they would be sent home.) In a subsequent clip the man filming climbs into the bus and shows us a body on the floor near the back:
\n