{"id":16577,"date":"2012-10-28T10:30:58","date_gmt":"2012-10-28T14:30:58","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/?p=16577"},"modified":"2012-10-28T10:30:58","modified_gmt":"2012-10-28T14:30:58","slug":"syrian-war-spillover-in-iraq-will-be-much-worse-than-in-lebanon","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/syrian-war-spillover-in-iraq-will-be-much-worse-than-in-lebanon\/","title":{"rendered":"Syrian War Spillover in Iraq Will Be Much Worse than in Lebanon"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Spillover from the Syrian civil war will be much greater in Iraq than Lebanon.
\n<\/strong>by Joshua Landis, Syria Comment, Oct 28, 2012
\n<\/strong><\/p>\n

Many Western journalists are based in Lebanon, few in Iraq. This explains why relatively small events in Lebanon get dramatic reporting and much larger increases of violence in Iraq, are largely overlooked or elicit little concern.<\/p>\n

Already in response to the growing civil war in Syria, Iraqi violence has spiked and al-Qaida is resurgent there<\/a>. Some days as many as 100 Iraqi Shiites<\/a> are killed by al-Qaida bombings in Iraq.<\/p>\n

The threat of spillover in Lebanon is minor compared to Iraq because the sects in Lebanon all acknowledge that none can rule the country without the others. Even the most powerful, the Shiites, readily confess that they have no chance of turning Lebanon into an Islamic republic because Lebanon has a form of democracy and the majority is against it. Not only do all the sects buy into the notion of power-sharing, they also know that in Lebanon it is impossible for one group to dominate on the others. They learned these simple truths from decades of barbaric fighting.<\/p>\n

In Iraq, the sects have found no peace and little acceptance of the balance of power now being hammered out. Prime Minister Maliki is busy building a Shiite dictatorship and pushing out the remaining centers of Sunni power<\/a> left behind by the Americans in their doomed attempt to promote power-sharing.<\/p>\n

Al-Qaida is rebuilding in Iraq to contest Shiite power. It probably has the backing of a larger segment of the Sunni community that still chafes from its loss of fortune following the US destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Unlike Lebanon, the various sects of Iraq have not found a modus-vivendi. Relations between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq are becoming more vexed as Kurdistan takes ever more steps to assert its independence from Arab Iraq.<\/p>\n

The Sunni-led attempt to depose Assad’s regime is sure to give a big boost to Al-Qaida in Iraq as arms and men flow across the border and find a refuge in Syria. Saudi, Turkish and Qatari support for Syria’s Sunnis is also likely to turbo-charge passions in Iraq, as Sunnis feel empowered to push back against Iranian influence and the Shiite hold on power.<\/p>\n

These are the reasons why Iraq is seeing much more spillover from Syria than Lebanon. Of course, there will be pushing and shoving between the sects in Lebanon, especially as the Sunnis grow in confidence and feel that they can tip the scales on the Shiite assertiveness of the last several years. But they have few delusions of being able to rule Lebanon on their own.<\/p>\n

I leave you with this plum from today’s New York Times:<\/a> An Iraqi Shiite who just returned from years in Damascus says:<\/p>\n

\u201cI can tell that things are going to be crazy in Syria,\u201d he said. \u201cIt\u2019s a sectarian war, and it\u2019s even worse than the one we had here, which was between the militias and the political parties. In Syria, all of the people are involved. You can feel the hatred between the Sunnis and the Alawites. They will do anything to get rid of each other.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

On Monday, I will be giving a lecture at Duke’s Islamic Studies Center <\/a>and on Tuesday, I will speak at the University of North Carolina<\/a><\/p>\n

Intervening in Syria the right way<\/a>
\nBy Fran\u00e7ois Heisbourg, Published: October 25, Fran\u00e7ois Heisbourg is a special adviser at the Foundation for Strategic Research, a Paris-based think tank. PARIS<\/p>\n

Successful military interventions are sufficiently rare as to induce utmost caution when contemplating the use of force in Syria, a country as populous as Iraq or Afghanistan and no less divided along religious and ethnic lines. Yet the legal, political, strategic and military conditions for an international operation are being fulfilled, which is in turn creating an opportunity to bring down Bashar al-Assad\u2019s bloody dictatorship and its regionally destabilizing repression…..<\/p>\n

From a strategic standpoint, the civil war in Syria is in a stalemate, with Assad\u2019s forces unable to crush the rebellion and the insurgency militarily incapable of overthrowing the regime. A realistic objective of intervention would be to tilt the balance in favor of the rebel forces, to help expedite Assad\u2019s fall. As in Libya, and unlike in Iraq, intervention would enable the rebellion, not be a substitute for it.<\/p>\n

In military terms, this would be achieved by establishing a 50-mile no-fly zone along the Turkish-Syrian border. No allied aircraft would need to fly in Syrian airspace, as air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles fired from Turkish airspace and territory would have the necessary range to shoot down Syrian bombers or helicopters in the exclusion zone. Allied AWACS radar aircraft, operating well out of range of Syria\u2019s extensive air defenses, would provide full real-time information on any regime aircraft approaching the no-fly zone.<\/p>\n

The zone would include Aleppo, which means the regime\u2019s bombardment of Syria\u2019s largest city would cease. Its fall, along with unimpeded access to logistical support from Turkey, would give the insurgency the upper hand.<\/p>\n

And with no boots on the ground, this intervention would not require an exit strategy.<\/p>\n

Such an intervention is becoming desirable as well as feasible, for want of a better option. Letting the civil war fester will lead to further destabilization in Syria and the wider region \u2014 some of which is already visible in Lebanon and Jordan \u2014 and a radicalization of the conflict. Providing the rebels with weaponry, notably anti-aircraft missiles, raises the dread prospect of blowback, given our inability to control the ultimate destination of such transfers.<\/p>\n

Of course, even an intervention of the kind suggested here won\u2019t guarantee a positive and stable outcome in Syria, any more than the overthrow of Moammar Gaddafi meant that milk and honey were to flow in Libya. But the alternatives are worse. We also know that a heavy \u201cboots on the ground\u201d approach \u2014 as in Iraq or Afghanistan \u2014 is to be strenuously avoided.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Wayne White on NATO’s Arms to Syria Conundrum<\/a>, Former top US intelligence mideast programs director Wayne White examines the arms to syria conundrum<\/p>\n

Recent footage from Syria shows resistance fighters with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile launchers. But those seen were Russian-style SA-7\u2019s possessed by the Syrian army and many other Middle East militaries, rather than advanced US models like the FIM-92 Stinger.<\/p>\n

The question of whether to provide arms to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which is fighting a desperate battle against the Assad regime, remains a difficult and conflicted decision for the US and most other NATO countries. For some, sending arms to the FSA to bring an earlier end to the regime and the continuing bloodshed and destruction is a \u201cno-brainer\u201d. Others maintain that giving the rebels more (and perhaps better) arms would only contribute further to the overall mayhem that might not end for quite a long time regardless.<\/p>\n

For those wishing to respond to rebel pleas for arms, Islamist extremists \u2014 scattered among the scores of militias and local contingents comprising the FSA \u2014 are a central concern. As the civil war has dragged on, there has been rising evidence of these extremists fighting alongside rebel fighters, especially in the north where foreign correspondents have far more access. Many are Syrians, but a number of them have been coming in from neighboring countries to fight as scattered contingents within the FSA (or perhaps merely to find yet another venue for \u201cjihad\u201d against an unpopular secular regime).<\/p>\n

And there is real reason for concern among governments sympathetic to the opposition about arms falling into the wrong hands. It is, after all, difficult to determine who would be the ultimate recipient of munitions assistance once it passes into Syria. In a fluid environment with scores of FSA factions, militant groups might also construct deceptive liaisons to convey false assurances of moderation once they catch wind of selective distribution. Finally, in cities like Aleppo, a number of armed factions appear to be fighting alongside each other and might feel compelled to share munitions for mutual support and protection against regime attacks. The injection of surface-to-air missiles into this conflict is especially risky because they could end up in the hands of terrorist groups and be used against commercial airliners.<\/p>\n

That said, anger is increasing among anti-regime elements within Syria over the failure of the West to provide armed assistance. Had arms been supplied to Syrian rebels considerably sooner, the number of Syrians embittered over the lack of tangible support from the outside, the vast extent of destruction wrought mainly by the regime\u2019s aircraft and heavy weapons, and the number of militants arriving from neighboring countries might have been more limited before the fall of the Assad regime (which this writer assumes is highly likely). The palpable rise in anger toward major Western powers for withholding arms could alone render more Syrians toward anti-Western Islamist appeals.<\/p>\n

This, in a nutshell, is the US and Western dilemma. Standing by without providing vital arms while the bloodshed continues will probably mean less sympathy and increasing militancy among the rebels over time. After all, more of them (and members of their families) are being killed and maimed because they lack proper arms and sufficient ammunition.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, if the rebels gain access to considerable more arms (meaning militants too in many cases), anti-Western anger would likely abate. But the conflict has already gone on long enough to produce a problematic post-Assad scenario featuring more robust militias competing for power, along with perhaps even more ugly sectarian score-settling against Alawite and Christian minorities that have been supporting the regime. In fact, the great amount of infrastructure, commercial establishments and all manner of housing already destroyed by regime firepower will likely be the source of a potentially profound economic crisis that would generate a heavy measure of frustration, anger and recrimination over some years even after the fall of the regime.<\/p>\n

Consequently, in terms of the available options at this late stage in the struggle, those governments agonizing over the pros and cons of providing arms might well perceive the choice as a sort of \u201cCatch-22.\u201d In the context of the argument on the positive side of the policy ledger that providing arms could bring a swifter defeat of the regime, there is one more possible plus. So far, major Syrian Army units have not chosen to defect en masse, probably because (in addition to the obvious regime-loyalty notion) many realize facing off against the regime would be considerably more dangerous than combating relatively lightly armed rebel contingents. Should, however, rebel forces become considerably more militarily formidable, that shift might trigger such defections and a change on the ground that could be more significant than\u00a0what the rebels have achieved so far.\u00a0That said, even if plenty of additional arms\u00a0were provided,\u00a0the FSA is unlikely to receive tanks, other\u00a0armored\u00a0vehicles and heavy artillery that could match regime capabilities because most rebel fighters are not army defectors and would not be able to operate these more complex weapon-systems nearly as effectively as the Syrian military. So, not only has the US evidently provided little or no arms to the Syrian opposition, Washington may well remain (like many other potential Western suppliers) quite conflicted with respect to doing so.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

\n

–\u00a0Wayne White is a Scholar with\u00a0Washington\u2019s Middle East Institute. He was formerly the Deputy Director of the State Department\u2019s Bureau of Intelligence and Research\u2019s Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia (INR\/NESA) and senior regional analyst. <\/em><\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/div>\n

Wladimir van Wilgenburg writes<\/strong><\/p>\n

Dear Joshua,<\/p>\n

You might want to read this latest report about Syrian Kurdish dynamics<\/a> for the Henry Jackson Society.<\/p>\n

It also shows the FSA-PYD dynamics. There was btw allegedly a fight between Jabhat Al Nusra and PYD\/PKK, after there was a protest against the FSA-presence in Ashrafiyeh. The ‘FSA group’ fired at the demonstration, killing 5. The YPG\/PKK\/PYD now claim 19 were killed <\/a>in revenge<\/p>\n

Best regards, Wladimir van Wilgenburg
\nFreelance analyst\/writer based in the UK\/Iraq\/Netherlands
\nhttp:\/\/www.rudaw.net\/english\/author\/WWilgenburg\/
\nhttp:\/\/www.jamestown.org\/articles-by-author\/?no_cache=1&tx_cablanttnewsstaffrelation_pi1[author]=523
\nhttp:\/\/www.enduringamerica.com\/home\/tag\/wladimir-van-wilgenburg<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Iraqi Sects Join Battle in Syria on Both Sides<\/a>
\nBy YASIR GHAZI and TIM ARANGO
\nNYTimes: October 27, 2012<\/p>\n

BAGHDAD \u2014 Militant Sunnis from Iraq have been going to Syria to fight against President Bashar al-Assad for months. Now Iraqi Shiites are joining the battle in increasing numbers, but on the government\u2019s side, transplanting Iraq\u2019s explosive sectarian conflict to a civil war that is increasingly fueled by religious rivalry.<\/p>\n

Some Iraqi Shiites are traveling to Tehran first, where the Iranian government, Syria\u2019s chief regional ally, is flying them to Damascus, Syria\u2019s capital. Others take tour buses from the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq, on the pretext of making a pilgrimage to an important Shiite shrine in Damascus that for months has been protected by armed Iraqis. While the buses do carry pilgrims, Iraqi Shiite leaders say, they are also ferrying weapons, supplies and fighters to aid the Syrian government.<\/p>\n

\u201cDozens of Iraqis are joining us, and our brigade is growing day by day,\u201d Ahmad al-Hassani, a 25-year-old Iraqi fighter, said by telephone from Damascus. He said that he arrived there two months ago, taking a flight from Tehran….Abu Mohamed, an official in Babil Province with the Sadrist Trend, a political party aligned with the populist Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr, said he recently received an invitation from the Sadrists\u2019 leadership to a meeting in Najaf to discuss a pilgrimage to the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab, a holy Shiite site in Damascus.<\/p>\n

\u00a0\u201cWe knew that this is not the real purpose because the situation is not suitable for such a visit,\u201d he said. \u201cWhen we went to Najaf, they told us it\u2019s a call for fighting in Syria against the Salafis,\u201d ultraconservative Sunni Muslims.<\/p>\n

A senior Sadrist official and former member of Parliament, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that convoys of buses from Najaf, ostensibly for pilgrims, were carrying weapons and fighters to Damascus….Abu Sajad, who moved to Damascus in 2008 and joined the fight after the rebellion began, said he and other Iraqi fighters were indeed fighting to protect the shrine. A former fighter in Mr. Sadr\u2019s Mahdi Army in Iraq, he said he was given weapons and supplies by the Syrian government.<\/p>\n

But as the fight evolved, and Iraqis began to be killed and kidnapped, it reminded him too much of the Iraq he left, and so he recently returned to his home in Basra.<\/p>\n

\u201cI can tell that things are going to be crazy in Syria,\u201d he said. \u201cIt\u2019s a sectarian war, and it\u2019s even worse than the one we had here, which was between the militias and the political parties. In Syria, all of the people are involved. You can feel the hatred between the Sunnis and the Alawites. They will do anything to get rid of each other.\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n

Iraqi Shiites did not initially take sides in Syria. Many Shiites here despise Mr. Assad for his affiliation with the Baath Party, the party of Saddam Hussein, and the support he gave foreign Sunni fighters during the Iraq war.<\/p>\n

But as the uprising became an armed rebellion that began to attract Sunni extremists, many Shiites came to see the war in existential terms. Devout Shiites in Iraq often describe the Syrian conflict as the beginning of the fulfillment of a Shiite prophecy that presages the end of time by predicting that an army, headed by a devil-like figure named Sufyani, will rise in Syria and then conquer Iraq\u2019s Shiites.<\/p>\n

It was the bombing of an important shrine in Samarra in 2006 that escalated Iraq\u2019s sectarian civil war, and many Iraqis see the events in Syria as replicating their own recent bloody history, but with even greater potential consequences.<\/p>\n

Hassan al-Rubaie, a Shiite cleric from Baquba, the capital of Diyala Province, said, \u201cThe destruction of the shrine of Sayyida Zeinab in Syria will mean the start of sectarian civil war in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

More than 30 killed in Baghdad bomb blasts<\/a>
\nGulf Times – 28 October, 2012<\/p>\n

Bombings on Shia neighbourhoods in Baghdad and a blast on an Iranian pilgrim bus killed more than 30 people yesterday, marring Iraqi celebrations of the second day of Eid al-Adha.<\/p>\n

Two car bombs exploded yesterday, one ripping into a restaurant in the Shia stronghold of Sadr City and killing at least 23 people, police and hospital sources said.<\/p>\n

\u201cI was just selling fruit and we were surprised by a huge explosion on the other side of the street,\u201d Hassan Falih Shami, a grocery stall owner near the site of the blast. \u201cYou can see pools of blood, the shoes and pieces of clothing.\u201d<\/p>\n

Hours earlier, a roadside bomb planted near an open-air market killed seven people, including three children at a playground. Another blast killed six people when it hit a bus carrying Iranian pilgrims to a Baghdad shrine, police and hospital officials said.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Turkey Reassesses Its Ties To Syria\u2019s Opposition<\/a>
\nBy: Youssef al-Sharif posted on Thursday, Oct 25, 2012
\nPublisher: Al-Hayat (Pan Arab) (Translated and republished by al-monitor
\nOriginal Title: Ankara Crisis with Syrian Opposition and Adha Truce<\/p>\n

Summary:<\/strong> Two months ago, political and media quarters in Turkey seemed optimistic about a possible change in Washington’s position on the Syrian crisis after the United States presidential election. Turkey backed Syria\u2019s opposition after conflict broke out between the government and rebels, writes Youssef al-Sharif. But it has been a tumultuous relationship, and with a cease-fire looming, Turkey could have a change of heart.<\/p>\n

They expected that Washington would start working on settling the issue, either by mobilizing the Friends of Syria group and exhorting them to create a safe zone in northern Syria, or by arming the opposition and providing it with financial, military and intelligence support in order to bring down the regime.<\/p>\n

However, this optimism faded away and was replaced by tension and the exchange of missiles across the border with Syria. This optimism was also affected by the positions of the Syrian opposition, which is splintered both politically and militarily.<\/p>\n

The image that all Turkish quarters had envisioned was that if a greater amount of Syrian opponents joined the Syrian National Council (SNC), which was supposed to overhaul its structure to attract more members, and if the opposition’s armed military on the ground were unified, then the stage would be set for the post-US elections period, which would witness a crucial move on the part of Washington.<\/p>\n

However, the Turkish efforts in this regard were a complete fiasco. In fact, Ankara found itself facing a new \u2014 and perhaps more difficult \u2014 test in light of the Eid al-Adha truce project launched by UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi.<\/p>\n

This project was perceived by many Turkish parties as a prelude to correct the track of the Turkish policy, after Turkey had lost hope in the Syrian opposition. Still, Turkey is clinging to the hope of overthrowing the regime of Bashar al-Assad, but it may have begun to reconsider its position and settle for a smaller piece of the new ruling pie in Syria.<\/p>\n

In fact, the Istanbul visit by CIA Director David Petraeus in early September revived the old Turkish optimism.<\/p>\n

According to sources within the Syrian opposition, Petraeus met with a number of Free Syrian Army (FSA) leaders and militant groups on the ground, including the FSA Unification Brigade, Abdulkadir Saleh, who made his first public appearance in Istanbul in conjunction with Petraeus\u2019 visit.<\/p>\n

Saleh announced that the opposition seized 70% of Aleppo and is working on unifying the ranks of the armed groups. He then announced the formation of the Free National Army, which is supposed to bring together all of the opposition\u2019s armed militias. Afterwards, the free army’s military leaders were exhorted to move inside Syria to be able to closely watch and lead the operations on the ground, thus increasing talks about an important meeting held by the Free Syrian National Council in Doha.<\/p>\n

For a while, it seemed that the main opposition parties responded to the Turkish move to unite their ranks in front of the American observer, but it was not long before this picture faded away, either due to Syrian tactics on the ground, which worked on dragging Turkey into the conflict by bombing its territory, or due to the Aleppo bombings, whose responsibility was claimed by al-Qaeda and which came as a fatal response to Turkey’s efforts to unify the military command of the opposition.<\/p>\n

At first, articles were leaked to Western newspapers. They said the supply of arms to the FSA and armed groups has been stopped as a punishment for their failure to unite.<\/p>\n

These articles were followed by accusations against specific Arab countries of financing jihadist and religious groups that didn\u2019t fall under the auspices of the FSA in Syria. Then, there were official US and international statements that formally voiced their concern over the activity of “extremist” groups that are operating on the ground without allowing anyone to have any influence on their decisions or objectives.<\/p>\n

It seemed that criticizing the performance of the opposition’s armed militias was tantamount, even if indirectly, to criticizing Ankara. Turkey bet on the scenario of a military settlement, despite the fact that it was the one refusing to provide the opposition with anti-tank weapons and other advanced anti-aircraft out of fear that these could fall into the hands of terrorist groups that might later use them against the interests of Turkey.<\/p>\n

This is because Turkey is the most affected by the terrorists that are joining the confrontation, be they from al-Qaeda or from the Kurdistan Workers\u2019 Party (PKK).<\/p>\n

Thus, Ankara faced difficulties in achieving its goal of directly overthrowing the Syrian regime militarily, and it seemed that its choice has cornered it and put it at the mercy of the actions of the Syrian political and armed opposition.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, it seemed like Damascus had more options to respond to this Turkish rationale. Consequently, it endeavored to drag Turkey into its war, and conveyed a message to its northern neighbor that it was making a mistake by thinking that the military option on the ground would be limited to within Syria\u2019s borders.<\/p>\n

Syria argued that al-Qaeda attacks, which increased in Aleppo, are in the interest of the Syrian regime at the political level, even if they harmed it at the military one.<\/p>\n

Then, Turkey was shocked by the Syrian political opposition, which it had previously embraced, when the Syrian National Movement revealed documents that were reportedly leaked from the Syrian intelligence. According to these documents, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad ordered the killing of two Turkish pilots after their reconnaissance aircraft was targeted near the Syrian coast and crashed into international waters. The pilots survived the incident.<\/p>\n

Ankara believed that the disclosure of these documents was an attempt by the Syrian opposition to draw the Turkish army into a war against Syria or to embarrass the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in public. This irritated the Turkish government and pushed it to adopt a sarcastic position toward these documents and to question their authenticity.<\/p>\n

This incident, as well as the repeated attempts by the Syrian National Council to restructure itself, probably prompted Ankara to lose confidence in the Syrian opposition or at least to reconsider its calculations regarding the future of Syria.<\/p>\n

Based on that, some Turkish observers believe that Turkey will go back on its previous positions regarding a military settlement on the ground.<\/p>\n

They also say that Turkey has begun to accept middle solutions that allow a transitional government to emerge that include representatives of the regime as well as Chinese and Iranian interests, which would be similar to the \u201cblocking third\u201d government in Lebanon.<\/p>\n

Then, Ankara\u2019s conflict would change from a conflict with the Assad regime into a conflict with Assad in person. This was reflected in the proposal by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to allow Farouk al-Shara to manage the transitional phase, knowing that Shara was never enthusiastic about the Syrian-Turkish rapprochement.<\/p>\n

This rapprochement, which began in 2004 and was not part of any harmonization and cooperation plan, maintained skepticism about Ankara’s intentions regarding this rapprochement with Damascus.<\/p>\n

At that time, some Turkish observers believed that marginalizing Shara by appointing him vice president was a reason behind his position regarding Turkey.<\/p>\n

Ankara \u2014 which previously announced its support for the Geneva statement and its reservations about imposing this statement on the Syrian opposition, and reaffirmed the need that the Syrian people choose the most appropriate solution to their crisis \u2014 is currently testing the Syrian opposition through the truce proposal to halt fighting during the Eid al-Adha holiday.<\/p>\n

It is true that Ankara seemed to support this proposal and to use it as the foundation for discussion with Tehran \u2014 in the meeting between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Azerbaijan \u2014 and that Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutolgu formally called all parties in Syria to cease fire during the Eid holiday.<\/p>\n

However, Turkey remains in an unenviable position, whatever the results of this call for a truce proposal. In fact, if the Syrian opposition complies with Brahimi’s proposal, the Syrian regime will increasingly accuse Turkey of controlling the armed opposition and logistically supporting it, even though this option may radically change the path of the conflict in Syria and turn it into a political dispute rather than a military one.<\/p>\n

However, if the armed opposition rejects this proposal or is driven to fight back in response to the regime, Turkish efforts will be in vain and it will become clear to Turkish politicians that they cannot rely on the Syrian opposition.<\/p>\n

Ankara is aware of these consequences, but it still preferred to support the truce proposal, knowing that the Syrian regime would not be committed to it and may seek to expand the conflict to the region.<\/p>\n

This test and its outcomes will represent an important experience for Turkey, which is preparing to host Russian President Vladimir Putin in an official visit in early December. The visit is a true chance to harmonize their views regarding Syria, especially because it will follow the announcement of the winner in the US presidential elections.<\/p>\n

This would make the Russian-Turkish dialogue more realistic, when the post-elections landscape becomes clear and Ankara determines its stance regarding the armed opposition on the ground.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Iraq to see drop in foreign investment this year<\/a><\/p>\n

Foreign investment in Iraq is set to drop slightly to $ 35bn this year as potential investors, including its rich Arabian Gulf neighbours, hesitate in the face of the continuing regional tensions and political insecurity,…<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Spillover from the Syrian civil war will be much greater in Iraq than Lebanon. by Joshua Landis, Syria Comment, Oct 28, 2012 Many Western journalists are based in Lebanon, few in Iraq. 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