The Annan truce is shaky but neither the Arab League nor the West has a better Idea about what to do in Syria. They opposition militias in the Idlib region are fight among themselves. The growing violence has scared or repulsed many educated and middle-class Syrians, who had been hoping for greater help from outside powers.<\/p>\n
French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said the sanctions had depleted Syrian government financial reserves by half.\u00a0 Egypt’s reserves have also been depleted by half<\/a>, oddly enough. Juppe said the regime of President Bashar Assad was trying to maneuver around the sanctions and that “we must respond to these maneuvers.” Syrian reserves were reported at 18 billion before the revolt began. The sanctions have been unpopular with most Syrians<\/a> because of the inflation, scarcity, and monetary collapse that has made the average Syrian much poorer than he was.<\/p>\n \u00a0The following article describes how the free Syrian Army militias in Idlib province have taken a beating by the Syrian army and in public opinion because many of them turned to kidnapping, robbery, and fighting among themselves.<\/p>\n ??????? ????? ?? ???? \u201d ????? ????\u201d ????? ?????? ?? ?????? ?????<\/a><\/p>\n ??? ???? ???<\/p>\n ?? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ?? ?????? ????? ?????? ????? ?? ??? ????? ??????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ???? ??? ????? ???????? ??? ??? ??????? ???????? ???? ???? ?? ?????? ???? ??? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ???? ? ???? ????? ?????? ???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ??? ?????? ????????? ?? ????? ?? ??????? ?<\/p>\n ????? ???? ????? ????? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ?? ???????? ????? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ??? ?????? ?? ??? ?? ????? ????? ?????? ? ? ????? ??? ???????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ?? ???? ???????? ?? ??? ?????? ???? ? ??? ??? ???? ?? ????? ??????? ?? ???? \u201c??? \u201d ?? ???? ?? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ??????? ?????? ?????? ???? ??????? ???? ???? ???????? ??? ?????? ???? ??? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ??? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ??????? ? \u201d ??????? \u201d ???? ?????? ????? ??? ????? ?????? ???? ????????? ????? ?? ??????? ??????.<\/p>\n ??? ???? ????? ??? ???? ???????? ????? ???? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ????? ?? ???????? ???? ??????? ?????? ?? ????? ?????? ????? ???? ? ?????? ?????????? .<\/p>\n ????? ????? ??? ??? ??? ???? ???: \u201d ?????? ???? ????? ????? ? ?? ??? ?? ?? ? ?? ??? ????? ????? ??????? ?????????? ???? ????? ? ?? ????? ??? ???????? ???? ??????? ? ?? ?????? ???? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ?? ????? ????? ? ????? ?????? ?? ??????? ? ??????? ??? ????? ???????? ??? ????? ???????? ?????? ??? ??????? ???? ????… \u201d .<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n Addendum<\/strong> (7 hours later) : Thomas Pierret writes in an email<\/p>\n Dear Joshua, I’m writing to warn you against the article you put on your blog today, on Idlib militias fighting among themselves. I’ve read several articles of that kind over the last weeks, always on websites that are strongly pro-regime (Arabi Press is one of them). It might well be pure propaganda, and in any case I wouldn’t take these articles at face value. Best, Thomas<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Addendum: Landis replies to Pierret<\/strong>.<\/p>\n Dear Thomas. Many thanks for this cautionary advice. You are absolutely correct to warn against taking pro-government news at face value. There is so much bad, half-truth, and false news coming out of Syria that it is very hard to know what to trust and how to report on it or summarize it. I have been erring on the side of linking to as much as I can, and try to publish contradictory reports next to each other when I can in order to underscore the confusion.\u00a0 I must confess that this report seemed possible to me as I have reliable reports from friends and relatives who travel through the Idlib region being robbed. Two different co-workers of my brother-in-law stopped by gangs on the Aleppo-Idlib road. Both were Sunnis. They were beaten and robbed. None of them take the highway anymore or travel between the two cities because the roads are considered unsafe. Firas, my brother-in-law, who kept a small apartment in Aleppo and traveled there every week in order to oversee a small clothing factory had to find other work based in Latakia, give up his apartment, and stop traveling to Aleppo. The stories of highwaymen attaching people for money are legion. These stories are at the heart of the article I quote above. This was the reason I went with it and quoted from it. All the same, I do not have independent verification of the militias attacking each other, although I have heard many accounts of people who support the revolution during its firs – and largely peaceful phase – losing confidence in it for the reasons reported in this story and because they fear growing lawlessness the emergence of armed groups who are using revolutionary activities as cover for less savory activities. Of course, this is exactly what the government and security forces who have provoked this violence are hoping for in order to discredit the revolution. One does not want to play into their cynical plans, but equally one does not want to whitewash reality. You warning is important. Government papers have incentive to paint the opposition is criminals and must be read with caution and skepticism.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n A FRIEND WRITES:<\/strong><\/p>\n Recent developments in Aleppo Province. The so called FSA has abandoned its checkpoints in the northern countryside of Aleppo, but these checkpoints remain intact (not demolished). It is not clear yet whether the FSA has abandoned its checkpoints in compliance with Anan’s plan or because it cann’t confront regime’s superior air force and army or both.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Foreign Policy: Who Broke Syria?<\/a> In December, the Syrian National Council seems to have made an orchestrated effort to turn Homs into a Syrian Benghazi…. The council spread stories in the international media, for example, suggesting that the Syrian Army had moved up reinforcements with which to strike the city, and that it had given the rebellious Homsies 72 hours to lay down their weapons or be killed. When I phoned a respected veteran activist in Homs, he told me that the charge simply wasn’t true. Things were bad enough, he said, without having to make up scary stories…. <\/strong><\/p>\n The United Nations bought it. Navi Pillay, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, said that<\/a> “many voices are warning that a major assault” on Homs is about to begin, that a further military buildup had already begun. ……<\/p>\n If there was a strategy to internationalize the conflict, however, it failed. The United Nations could do nothing, but the promise that it might may have put ordinary activists and Free Syrian Army rebels in the city at even greater risk. Many were led to believe that help was coming, when it most definitely wasn’t….<\/p>\n ….Nor is it lost on them that Qatar and Saudi Arabia are so democratically backward as to make the Syrian government look like a hippie commune. The SNC’s apparent decision to accept money from the Gulf States to pay salaries to Free Syrian Army guerrillas sounded breathtakingly arrogant, and makes for shockingly bad politics. Not only does lend credence to the conspiracy theories peddled by the government that the uprising is the handiwork of foreign agitators; it risks splitting the indigenous opposition movement and empowering exactly the kind of Sunni extremist groups who are most likely to stoke sectarian tensions.<\/p>\n Whatever the Syrian government now says, the influence of these extremist Sunni factions is currently marginal, even inside the Free Syrian Army. Most of the military defectors are simply conservative Sunnis from farming communities. But Syria is currently exhibiting a brand new irony of our post-war-on-terror era. The secular Syrian liberals and leftist groups that have most in common in Western values don’t want NATO intervention, while it’s exactly the kind of people who don’t much like us — the aging remains of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the newer, more radical Sunni salafists — who are begging for our help.<\/p>\n Who knows: If the unthinking drift toward creating neo-mujahideen in Syria and Iran (a strategy advocated by Foreign Policy’s own James Traub) continues, following a decade in which radical Sunnis became America’s Public Enemy No. 1, Osama bin Laden might have to be posthumously converted back into the freedom fighter America saw him as in the 1980s, marching into battle to drive out one of the last vestiges of godlessness in the Middle East.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Fox News: Syria regime’s finances cut in half by sanctions<\/a> PARIS \u2013 France’s foreign minister says an array of international sanctions targeting Syria’s repressive regime have depleted its financial reserves by half — and Damascus is actively trying to evade them. Alain Juppe called Tuesday for a solid …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n France24 (EN): Al-Assad\u2019s ‘modest and sensitive’ cousin publishes romantic thriller<\/a> Al-Assad\u2019s ‘modest and sensitive’ cousin publishes romantic thriller By Tony Todd the 16\/04\/2012 – 18:30 While President Bashar al-Assad suppresses an uprising in Syria, his first cousin has written a romantic thriller warmly praised by Paris …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n SYRIA\u2019S 31 PERCENTERS: HOW BASHAR AL-ASAD BUILT MINORITY ALLIANCES AND COUNTERED MINORITY FOES<\/a> As the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Asad\u2019s rule enters its first year, Asad appears to have a good command over Syria\u2019s large and fractious minority community. Three of the most prominent minority groups include the Christians, Druze, and Kurds. Asad\u2019s control of these groups was not happenstance but the result of a number of hard- and soft-power moves executed by the regime. These calculations did not simply involve direct internal dealings with said minorities, but also outreach to their populations living in neighboring states and abroad. Due to the regime\u2019s many policies, minority support may continue for some time.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Foreign Affairs: Alawites for Assad<\/a> Since the start of the revolt in Syria, the country\u2019s Alawites have been instrumental in maintaining President Bashar al-Assad\u2019s hold on power. A sect of Shia …<\/p>\n The Alawites\u2019 loyalty to Assad today is hardly assured, however. Despite popular notions of a rich, privileged Alawite class dominating Syria, the country\u2019s current regime provides little tangible benefit to most Alawite citizens. Rural Alawites have struggled as a result of cuts in fuel subsidies and new laws restricting the sale of tobacco — their primary crop for centuries. Indeed, since the provision of basic services by the first Assad in the 1970s and 1980s, most Alawite villages — with the exception of Qardaha, the home of Assad\u2019s tribe, the Kalbiyya — have developed little. Donkeys remain a common form of transport for many, and motor vehicles are scarce, with dilapidated minibuses offering the only way to commute to the cities for work.<\/p>\n Some Alawites are explicitly breaking ranks. Last September, for example, three prominent Alawite sheikhs, Mohib Nisafi, Yassin Hussein, and Mussa Mansour, issued a joint statement declaring their \u201cinnocence from these atrocities carried out by Bashar al-Assad and his aides, who belong to all religious sects.\u201d According to Monzer Makhouz, an Alawite member of the Syrian National Council, a leading opposition group, Alawites are joining protests in the coastal cities of the Alawite territory. And in recent weeks, evidence has emerged of defections of Alawite soldiers and intelligence officers, seemingly from less privileged Alawite tribes, who have described themselves as \u201cFree Alawites\u201d and called for other Alawites to join them. …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Two Car bombs exploded in Aleppo on Tuesday killing 5 and wounding 16.<\/a><\/p>\n Salon: Syrian rebels\u2019 man in D.C.<\/a> Radwan Ziadeh fled Syria with his wife via the Jordanian border in October 2007. He had come to Washington many times before that, for conferences dealing with his work on Syrian politics. But upon returning to his homeland after one Washington …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n ASSAD CONTINUES ATTACKS ON THE OPPOSITION<\/a> Data from one of the key Syrian opposition groups, the Local Coordination Committees (LCC), shows a persistent pattern of violent, armed regime actions against the people despite the ceasefire that supposedly went into force last week:<\/p>\n The regime has effectively continued its struggle against the armed and unarmed opposition, even using heavy weapons at times, though less frequently than before. Around twenty people are dying each day since the beginning of the ceasefire.<\/p>\n From Friday through mid-Sunday, the LCC reported some sixty-eight violent regime actions across the country. All major centers of opposition were targeted: Aleppo, Deraa, Homs, the Damascus countryside, Idlib, Deir al-Zour, and Hama. Regime tactics included shelling of cities with heavy weapons (artillery, tanks, and BMP armored vehicles), shooting at demonstrators and other individuals, raids with armored vehicles on opposition towns and neighborhoods, breaking up demonstrations with gunfire, physical assaults on demonstrators, and arrests.<\/p>\n The widespread use of violent tactics will be a challenge for the UN monitoring mission, even if it reaches its projected strength of 250. The regime’s actions also suggest that it has no intention of negotiating anything but the opposition’s surrender.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n A FRIEND WRITES:<\/strong><\/p>\n Recent developments in Aleppo Province. The so called FSA has abandoned its checkpoints in the northern countryside of Aleppo, but these checkpoints remain intact (not demolished). It is not clear yet whether the FSA has abandoned its checkpoints in compliance with Anan’s plan or because it cann’t confront regime’s superior air force and army or both.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n COULD THE GULF STATES INTERVENE IN SYRIA?<\/a> If the Gulf states decide to aid the Syrian armed opposition, they have considerable equipment and expertise they could bring to bear. BACKGROUND PRECEDENTS FOR SYRIA INTERVENTION Why Turks don\u2019t smile<\/a><\/p>\n A Turkish friend of mine who has lived in the United States for many years once told me an amusing experience of hers. After more than a decade in the land of freedom, she came back to Istanbul for a few weeks. While strolling the streets, she inadvertently smiled at people with whom she came face to face. In return, though, she did not get the polite response that she was used to. Instead, the women she smiled at looked surprised, and worse, the men she smiled at looked aroused.<\/p>\n \u201cI realized that those men took my smile as a sexual hint,\u201d my friend told me. \u201cOne of them even began to follow me in a very excited mood!\u201d<\/p>\n Soon, my friend wisely adapted to the Turkish manners: In this country, you don\u2019t smile at strangers. You simply look the other way, and, if you come eye to eye, you try to look tough.<\/p>\n For a while, and as a sociologist-wannabe, I have been wondering why this is the case. Gradually, I have become convinced that this no-smile attitude tells us a lot about the nature of Turkish society: As surveys also prove, this is one of the places on earth in which people trust each other the least. Hence, they can easily see other members of society as potential threats or even enemies. Not really. Quite the contrary, Turks are famous for their hospitality and generosity, and they are also known to be very loyal to their friends.<\/p>\n But there is a catch here: Turks are very good to people that they know well, such as their family and kin. Yet, for the people with whom they are less familiar, their attitude dramatically changes. In other words, if they see a familiar face on the street, they go out of their way to show affection. For unfamiliar faces, however, they have nothing but suspicion.<\/p>\n This social reality of Turkey seems to tell us a lot about the nature of its politics as well: Here, every political camp is filled with contempt and paranoia for the other camps. (In the 1970s, this led the country to near civil war; …..<\/p><\/blockquote>\n Burhan Ghalioun’s email hacked. Published by al-akhbar. No real surprises<\/strong><\/p>\n http:\/\/www.al-akhbar.com\/node\/62452<\/a><\/p>\n ? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ????? ????? ?????? Fred Hof email … Saud Alfaisal …<\/p>\n ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ?????? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?? ??????? ???? ????? ????? ???? ??? ????? ????? ????? ?????? ????? ??? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?? ???? ????????? ???????? ???<\/p>\n 2- ?????? ?????? ?. ???? ????<\/p>\n ????: ????? ?????? ???????? ???? ????? ??? ??? ????? ????? ?????? ?????? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ??? ??? ??????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ?. ???? (???????) ??????? (?. ????)<\/p>\n 8- ?????? ???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ?????? ??? ?? ???? ?? ???? ??????? ?????? ???? ?? ???? 10 ???? ????? ?????? ??????<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Annan truce is shaky but neither the Arab League nor the West has a better Idea about what to do in Syria. They opposition militias in the Idlib region are fight among themselves. The growing violence has scared or repulsed many educated and middle-class Syrians, who had been hoping for greater help from outside […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"sfsi_plus_gutenberg_text_before_share":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_show_text_before_share":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_icon_type":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_icon_alignemt":"","sfsi_plus_gutenburg_max_per_row":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[96],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14373","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-syria-revolution-2011"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"yoast_head":"\n\n
\nBashar al-Assad did. But the international community and the media made things worse.
\nBY JAMES HARKIN | APRIL 17, 2012, Foreign Policy<\/p>\n
\n2012-04-17<\/p>\n
\n2012-04-16<\/p>\n
\nBy Phillip Smyth April 15, 2012, MERIA<\/p>\n
\n2012-04-16<\/p>\n
\n2012-04-17<\/p>\n
\nBy Jeffrey White – WINEP
\nApril 17, 2012<\/p>\n
\nBy Michael Knights – winep<\/p>\n
\n******************************
\nThe participation of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the Libyan conflict demonstrated the Gulf Cooperation Council’s activism and capability. In recent months, therefore, speculation has focused on possible GCC intervention in the Syrian civil war. On February 27, Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani told the Friends of Syria conference in Tunis that “we should do whatever is necessary to help [Syrian oppositionists], including giving them weapons to defend themselves.” On March 31, Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal echoed this statement: “The arming of the [Syrian] opposition is a duty.” What capabilities, then, would the Gulf states bring in terms of support to armed proxies? And what would be the risks related to their intervention?<\/p>\n
\nExternal security assistance to states and substate groups can be divided into two broad categories: foreign internal defense (FID) and unconventional warfare. FID support comprises security assistance provided to a government for the purpose of overcoming insurgent or terrorist groups, while unconventional warfare refers to support provided by external actors to the insurgents. In either case, foreign support may include provision of training, equipment, or operations, in some cases via direct involvement of foreign combat forces.
\nGCC states have a significant track record in FID and are quickly gaining experience in unconventional warfare missions. Both FID and unconventional warfare accentuate funding, technology, airpower, and special forces — attributes possessed by the Gulf Arab monarchies. Likewise, factors that have traditionally hindered GCC military effectiveness — limited manpower, inability to field large numbers of high-quality units — are deemphasized. The partial deniability afforded by the use of militant proxies is also attractive to the cautious Gulf monarchies.<\/p>\n
\nSaudi Arabia offers a significant pedigree in terms of unconventional warfare campaigns: ..<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\nBut why? Are Turks inherently rude, antisocial or nasty people?<\/p>\n
\nhttp:\/\/www.al-akhbar.com\/node\/62451<\/a>
\n? ???????? ????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ???????
\nhttp:\/\/www.al-akhbar.com\/node\/62449<\/a>
\n? ???? ????? \u00ab???? ??????\u00bb ???? ??????
\nhttp:\/\/www.al-akhbar.com\/node\/62450<\/p>\n