{"id":11594,"date":"2011-08-24T12:07:17","date_gmt":"2011-08-24T16:07:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/?p=11594"},"modified":"2011-08-24T22:17:22","modified_gmt":"2011-08-25T02:17:22","slug":"interventionists-versus-non-interventionists","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/interventionists-versus-non-interventionists\/","title":{"rendered":"Interventionists Versus Non-Interventionists"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Interventionists Versus Non-Interventionists <\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>Two distinct camps are forming to battle over Syria policy in Washington.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>[This article was picked up by CNN as <a title=\"Permanent Link:Washington's battle over Syria\" rel=\"bookmark\" href=\"http:\/\/globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com\/2011\/08\/24\/washingtons-battle-over-syria\/\">Washington&#8217;s battle over Syria<\/a>]<\/p>\n<p>The first is made up of the neocons, who are busy fitting the Arab Spring into US strategic interests as they see them. Bolton, Doran, and Abrams have been leading the charge in articulating this argument. (Bolton and Doran articles are copied below)<\/p>\n<p>The second group are the &#8220;realists,&#8221; with a liberal coating. Anthony Cordesman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies  has articulated a &#8220;don&#8217;t get involved&#8221; argument in the article copied  below.<\/p>\n<p>The first want to take down Assad&#8217;s Syria and the second do not.\u00a0 The first group believe that flipping Syria&#8217;s orientation from being pro-Iran and anti-Israel to inverse is as a vital US strategic goal, the second do not. The first see it as part of a broader effort to help friends and hurt enemies. They see Israel and Saudi Arabia as America&#8217;s main allies in the region and want to build them up. They want to crush, Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, and Hamas. Syria is important because of Iran, America&#8217;s number one enemy. They tend to depict the battle in the Middle East as a struggle between good and evil, and freedom versus tyranny. The second see shades of gray. They see an ugly civil war lurking behind the surface of democracy promotion and are not sure Washington would be wise to get sucked into further expensive commitments that have more to do with messy emerging national identities and less to do with US interests.<\/p>\n<p>The neocons have a number of strengths. Clarity is first among them. Second is the nature of the Assad regime, which is oppressive and run by a family surrounded by a narrow elite, dominated by Alawis, a minority community unpopular among a broad section of the Sunni population. The regime has failed to deliver sufficient economic growth to reverse the growing pool of unemployed youth and to raise the standard of living for most Syrians. The country is suffering from all the ills of a growing income gap, drought and bad policies. Reform has been too slow and many believe it will never come because of the vested interests of the narrow and highly corrupt elite at the top. A growing number of Syrians argue that the entire system must be destroyed and Syria must rebuild itself. Increasingly, leaders of the Syrian uprising are beginning to embrace the ideas being put forward by the neocons. In order to win full US backing, they are pushing for acceptance of a complete strategic reversal of Syria&#8217;s foreign policy goals.<\/p>\n<p>The neocons are not advocating direct US military involvement in Syria today. They understand this is not politically feasible. But they are preparing the grounds for a much higher level of military commitment in the future. They understand full well that in order to take down the Assad regime and counter the force of the Syrian military, the Syrian opposition will need to develop a full military option. To do so, it will need major US and NATO backing. This will not be a fight for the feint of heart.<\/p>\n<p>Their strategy for angling the US toward making such a commitment in the future is economic sanctions. Broad economic sanctions imposed on Syria by the EU would have major moral implications down the road. Should Syrians start to starve, as they surely would if real sanctions are imposed, the moral argument for intervention and military escalation would improve. Should the poorest and most vulnerable Syrians begin to expire, as happened in Iraq in the 1990s, military intervention would become necessary to end the suffering and starvation. Liberals would have to support the military option in such a case. Today, most do not. Sanctions imposed now will make military intervention in the future imperative. Liberals embraced the invasion of Iraq in large part because of the moral argument. Saddam was starving his people. It would be hard to resist such an argument.<\/p>\n<p>Europeans governments have so far resisted imposing blanket trade sanctions on Syria for this exact reason. Once we see European governments impose devastating sanctions on Damascus, we may safely assume that they have accepted the notion of greater military involvement down the line in order to solve the humanitarian problem that sanctions will create. Perhaps they will not support a ground invasion as was done in Iraq, but they could support establishing a no-fly-zone and arming and training a proper Syrian insurgency, as was done in Libya. Of course, in Syria it will be a much bigger and more expensive operation as Syria has no frozen assets that can be diverted to fund the opposition. They Syrian army is much tougher than Libya&#8217;s was.<\/p>\n<p>The realists argue that the US should not get militarily involved. They argue that Assad is too strong, and that the US is trying to prune its military commitments rather than grow them. The Assad regime still has the support of important sections of the population. It is not a clear question of good versus evil in Syria; rather, the struggle for power reflects deeper civil and sectarian divisions in Syria. The Syrian opposition is hopelessly divided. Perhaps it will develop a leadership, but that will take time and must be left to emerge organically. The US should not tie its cart so closely to Israel and Saudi Arabia because both countries are pursuing policies which are not good for US interests in the long run. What is more, the realists do not believe that the US should take sides in the broader religious war being fought between Shiites and Sunnis in the Middle East. The US wants to check Iranian power and dissuade it from going nuclear, but it does not want to enter into the religious war. Most importantly, the US has too many military commitments in the Middle East, a region that has sucked up far too much of Washington&#8217;s time and money over the last decade. Greater involvement in Syria is not popular. In the end, this is a Syrian battle and the US cannot decide it&#8217;s outcome.<\/p>\n<p><strong>[End of Landis Commentary]<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>From the Comment Section: Should the Opposition go Military?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Tara<\/strong> writes:<\/p>\n<div>\n<div id=\"edit-comment269168\">\n<blockquote><p>Time may have come for the revolution to change course. \u00a0I am  specifically worried about what I read in 190. \u00a0Selmiayh my not work  anymore. \u00a0Armed resistance with no fly zone and a buffer zone near the  northern border might be the way to go. \u00a0The buffer zone will be the  safe haven for the defectors and I am sure most Sunnis in the army will  defect. \u00a0I am not afraid of civil war. \u00a0Alawites who support the regime  are already in the army or security forces or are Sabbihas. \u00a0They are  already bearing arms. \u00a0Intellectual Alawites and others who do not  currently support the regime will not support it either in case of armed  resistance. \u00a0I doubt Christians civilians will bear arms and die for  the regime as deep down their support is pseudo-support stemming dorm  minority\u2019s complex disorder.<\/p>\n<p>We started hearing some demonstrators on the ground asking for  international protection. \u00a0I am sure this is a growing feeling but  people have not freely expressed it for fear of being labeled traitors.  \u00a0External opposition needs to pay attention to these subtleties. \u00a0We can  waste 2200 lives in vain.<\/p>\n<p>I personally am struggling with this. \u00a0Is armed resistance justified?  absolutely.  2200 killed in cold blood including 100 infants and small  children, more than 10000 arrested, and thousands forced into refugee  camps or exile. \u00a0Is it moral? Absolutely. \u00a0One could argue that allowing  the killings to happen without fighting back is not moral. \u00a0Armed  resistance is not romantic but I am afraid that it might be the only way  to a happy ending.<\/p>\n<p>After all in the fairy tales that I like to read, evil must be  fought. \u00a0It never surrenders out of benevolence. \u00a0Bashar speech might be  the turning point. \u00a0It is clear that he wouldn\u2019t hesitate to unleash  all his evil against the people and you may just not be able to win over  that evil with non violent means.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>sheila writes:<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<blockquote><p>Dear Tara, Even though I usually agree with you on almost everything, I would like  to vehemently disagree with you on the call for armed resistance.\u00a0 I  totally understand where you are coming from.\u00a0 On an emotional level, it  is very hard for any decent human being to watch what is going on in Syria and not feel that something drastic  needs to be done to stop the blood shed, however, the day the  demonstrators carry arms will be the start of the real massacres.\u00a0  Today, the regime has\u00a0 no \u201clegitimate\u201d reason to kill massive numbers of protestors because no one believes the \u201carmed gangs\u201d fantasy,  even though the regime has exhausted all efforts to cement the theory.\u00a0  When the peaceful resistance becomes armed resistance, then the regime  will have the \u201clegitimacy\u201d to kill en mass.\u00a0 Also, to have enough arms to fight the regime, you will definitely need  outside support to pay for and smuggle the equipment.\u00a0 This is not what  we are looking for.\u00a0 As hard as it is on an emotional level to let people die without putting up a fight, it is ultimately the  strongest weapon that we have to fight the regime with.\u00a0 Remember that  were it not for NATO, Gadaffi would have exterminated all the \u201crats\u201d of  Libya,\u00a0 A state army versus armed demonstrates is never a fair match or a winning match for the demonstrators. Hang in there.\u00a0 The days of this regime are numbered.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>Revlon writes:<\/strong><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Due to the mounting loss of human lives, imprisonment, and torture amongst street demonstrators, activists and their families, Youth Syria For Freedom website has issued a statement revising its recommendations on the issue of armed resistence.<\/p>\n<p>&#8211; The statement stresses the importance of maintining peaceful demonstrations and the speedy formation of a representative national councuil.<\/p>\n<p>&#8211; In addition to encouraging army defection, the statement sanctions operations by the FSA against Shabbee7a and Asad&#8217;s forces in defense of civilians.<\/p>\n<p>&#8211; It also acknowledges, that the time might come when Libya style foreign military assistance would be needed!<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>Abu Ammar writes:<br \/>\n<\/strong><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>When your regime is dominated by Alawis and it cracks down with its armed forces and mukhabarat, dominated by Alawis, and slaughters, expels, jails tens of thousands of Syrian Sunnis so that it can maintain its Alawi grip on power, do you honestly expect that there won&#8217;t be sectarian hatred, bearing in mind that these actions are supported by the overwhelming majority of Alawis, something proved by the facts on the ground?  And the deranged menhebeks have the audacity to talk about sectarianism, when they are the biggest benefactors of it?<\/p>\n<p>Why do you expect the people to go to their graves like sheep and for them to smile at you when you kill them? They demand you be pacifists while they slaughter you. They are no different than their Zionist cousins who are outraged that the Palestinians refused to become refugees in their own land.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>majedkhaldoon writes:<\/strong><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Tara<\/p>\n<p>I have been an advocate of arming the people all along,I feel that a brutal dictator will not go unless he is faced with arm protestors, loosing 6000 martyrs between those who were killed,and those who diappeared, and there are more than 20,000 arrest this regime is not going to leave out of embarassment, we just saw two states one in Yemen,it was so far peaceful revolution, and is still going on, and one in Libya, that has just won because it was armed one.<\/p>\n<p>It is not going to be a civil war, it is national uprising, all syrian will join in, even Alawite,and yes Christians, all against the Assad clan, It is wrong to call it civil war,What is called syrian army is not syrian army , it is assad protection army, and yes we have 17 security forces,all with arms, and the Shabiha(Lijan Sha3bieh),how can a peaceful young men prevail,this is big prison,and surrounded by all kind of weapons&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p>It pains me a lot to see thousand of young men and kids dye this way, in  the long run we will loose more people ,killed by Assad clan, than what  we would have lost if we use the armed revolution. and with peacefull  revolution we may end up getting humilliated and forced to go back to  become slaves again.<br \/>\nSyria will not get divided,and under democracy,we will not be sectarian,those who fight for freedom,will respect freedom.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>Fred Writes:<\/strong><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Perhaps the best military option is to reform the army so that it operates like Hizballah? The current system of conscription with corruption can be devastating for poor families, and is an unnecessary waste of the young men&#8217;s time and the state&#8217;s resources. Hizballah fighters seem to have very high morale, unlike the starving wretches the government is throwing at the people. I&#8217;ve been told of residents in both Hama and Daraa feeding the soldiers that surround them. Also in Deir Ezzor soldiers from Aleppo were breaking into homes simply to steal food. An acquaintance of mine was recently re-drafted into the military and retrained as an intelligence officer. He paid a lot of bribes in order to be relieved of his duties and he is now a civilian again. While he was there he paid from his own pocket to keep 5 conscripts in food and provisions.<\/p>\n<p>To Tara and Aboud &#8211; I understand your point about soldiers&#8217; loyalty to the people but please don&#8217;t forget that many of them are terrified, hungry and exhausted and are in some respects the people most abused by the system.<\/p>\n<p>Military question:<\/p>\n<p>How do we get Syria&#8217;s arsenal of rockets out of the hands of Assad and Company and into the hands of the new state without losing them to other countries&#8217; intelligence services????<\/p>\n<p>Strategic positions:<\/p>\n<p>I like the idea of keeping both Iran and Turkey happy at the same time without needing the current Assad mafia. I don&#8217;t understand why we should throw away a valuable relationship with Iran, simply because it supported Assad. What do you expect it to do? If we get the support of Iran and Turkey, then we can get rid of Assad very quickly, because they can guarantee a way out for him.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>News Round Up<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.indianexpress.com\/news\/us-allies-all-but-rule-out-syria-military-intervention\/836486\/\">US, allies all but rule out Syria military intervention &#8211; <\/a>News agencies<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The United States and its allies have all but ruled out military action against Damascus despite their success in Libya because Syria&#8217;s opposition is less organised and faces a much stronger regime.<\/p>\n<p>Analysts said the situation is far less conducive to foreign intervention in Syria, despite the success of the NATO air campaign that weakened Muammar Gaddafi&#8217;s defences and helped Libyan rebels to reach the heart of Tripoli.<\/p>\n<p>One analyst said that unlike in Libya, the allies would also face Arab opposition to military strikes in Syria, and warned that intervention carried the risk of triggering a broader regional conflict.<\/p>\n<p>State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland all but ruled out allied military intervention in Syria if sanctions and diplomatic pressure fail to stop President Bashar al-Assad from using deadly force to crush protests.<\/p>\n<p>The Syrian people &#8220;have chosen peaceful means to make their views known to their own government,&#8221; Nuland told reporters last week, adding they were following the paths of Gandhi and Martin Luther King.&#8221;So military action is not the preferred course of anyone, not the Syrian people, not the Arab or European or American members of the international community,&#8221; she said.<\/p>\n<p>Nuland reiterated the US stance when asked whether rebel successes in Libya since the weekend would increase the pressure for intervention in Syria.<\/p>\n<p>In France, which led the charge for military action in Libya, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe said there would be no such intervention in Syria even if the rebel advances had what he called &#8220;significant consequences&#8221; for Damascus.<\/p>\n<p>Anthony Cordesman, a security analyst with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies think tank, said the United States and its allies did not have much of a military option in Syria.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;There&#8217;s no overt uprising to back, there&#8217;s no momentum behind the uprising. Your are talking about a country (Syria) with a real military machine, with a serious military capability, unlike Libya which is largely a facade,&#8221; he said.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Until you see a real opposition develop in Syria, some kind of movement that has some credible reason to be backed, you can&#8217;t simply out of context attack Assad&#8217;s regime because it&#8217;s repressive,&#8221; <strong>Cordesman<\/strong> said.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The scale of military operations that would be required (would be much higher than in Libya) and present far more risks of civilian casualties and collateral damage,&#8221; he said.<\/p>\n<p>Radwan<strong> Ziadeh<\/strong>, a US-based Syrian dissident who has met US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, said the rebel successes in Libya will spur more calls within Syria for arming the opposition against Assad.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<div id=\"edit-comment269240\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.foreignpolicy.com\/articles\/2011\/08\/22\/the_nexus_and_the_olive_tree?page=0,2\">The Nexus and the Olive Tree<\/a><br \/>\nThe White House needs to tune out the dramatic events of Syria and Libya and focus on America\u2019s strategic goals in the region.<br \/>\nBY MICHAEL <strong>DORAN <\/strong>| AUGUST 22, 2011<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>At the heart of Obama\u2019s grand strategy was a mistaken definition of the  strategic challenge. Now that the Arab uprisings have dragged the United  States through a crash course on Middle Eastern realities, U.S.  policymakers can more easily recognize the deepest drivers of politics  in the region \u2014 namely, the vast number of severe conflicts that set  Muslims against Muslims. From a practical strategic point of view, there  is no such thing as \u201cthe Muslim world.\u201d Any effort to write a narrative  of cooperation with a thing that does not actually exist is bound to  encounter severe difficulties.<\/p>\n<p>The United States must therefore dispense entirely with grand  strategies that seek to foster a conciliatory image of the United States  and to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, it should focus on the  key challenge posed by the Arab uprisings: managing intra-Muslim  conflict.<\/p>\n<p>This requires returning to the question that Saudi Arabia\u2019s King  Abdullah first posed to Obama: What is the strategy of the United States  toward Iran? At stake in Syria today is nothing less than the future of  the Iranian regional security system. It should not escape notice that  the Saudis, though hostile to the populist wave in general, have now  aligned themselves against Assad. As much as they fear revolution, the  Saudis fear the Islamic Republic of Iran even more, and they see the  Syrian crisis as an opportunity to deal a severe blow to it. The United  States should adopt a similar view.<\/p>\n<p>The contest on the ground in Syria, obviously, has profoundly local  causes. Nevertheless, the regional struggle between Iran and its rivals  will play a significant role in shaping it. After Assad falls, a proxy  war will erupt, with outside powers seeking to cultivate Syrian clients.  Iran and Hezbollah will use the covert and brutal methods that they  have honed in Lebanon and Iraq. They will preserve what they can from  the remnants of Assad\u2019s security services, while simultaneously arming  and training new proxies. They will kill off and intimidate those  Syrians who get in their way.<\/p>\n<p>The United States has a vital interest in thwarting Iran. To do so  effectively, however, it must develop a serious and sustained regional  containment strategy. The process of writing the new strategy begins,  like before, in Riyadh and Ankara. This time, however, Obama should  reverse his attitude toward the preferences of King Abdullah and Prime  Minister Erdogan. The Syrian crisis offers a new opportunity to reach a  strategic accommodation with the Saudis. At the same time, it should  also force Washington to re-evaluate the Turks\u2019 no-problems policy. To  date, this policy has worked to the net benefit of Iran and Syria and to  the detriment of the United States. There is no reason to believe that  it will produce a different result in the future.<\/p>\n<p>Writing a new grand strategy is important, but not urgent. It can  always be put off until tomorrow, \u201cwhen things calm down.\u201d In the  meantime, the phone is ringing. The world was treated to images of  cheering Libyans retaking their capital on Aug. 21; the United States  will surely be called upon to play a role in the messy political  transition that will follow. The Aug. 18 terrorist attack in Israel has  raised the specter of another Gaza war, while also escalating tensions  with Egypt. And next month, the question of Palestinian statehood may  well be taken up by the United Nations.<\/p>\n<p>These and many other matters will soon fill up the calendar of U.S.  officials. But if Washington is not careful, all these urgent issues  will push aside consideration of grand strategy, precisely when it is  needed most.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.rasmussenreports.com\/public_content\/politics\/general_politics\/august_2011\/only_12_think_u_s_should_step_up_involvement_in_syria\">Only 12% Americans Think U.S. Should Step Up Involvement in Syria<\/a><br \/>\nMonday, August 22, 2011<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The Obama administration has increased its criticism of Syria\u2019s violent response to anti-government protests, and both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are now calling for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down. But most U.S. voters continue to think America should mind its own business when it comes to Syria. Just 12% of Likely U.S. Voters believe the United States should get more directly involved in the Syrian crisis, according to a new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey. Sixty-six percent (66%) think the United States should leave the Syrian situation alone. Twenty-two percent (22%) are not sure which course is better.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.nypost.com\/p\/news\/opinion\/opedcolumnists\/facing_facts_on_syria_miscues_9tvNIc2fAoy7Dn9NTfpkcI\">New York Post: Facing facts on O\u2019s Syria miscues<\/a><\/p>\n<p>2011-08-24 John Bolton<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The end of the Khadafy regime in Libya has focused new attention on the rebels in Syria &#8212; as has last week\u2019s belated call by President Obama for the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. But it will take a more radical Obama course correction to make a real &#8230;<\/p>\n<p>we should have pursued regime change, aiding legitimate opposition groups and thereby empowering responsible Syrian believers in a free and open society. Instead, we face an environment today where radical Islamists are potential successors to the Ba\u2019athists.<\/p>\n<p>Third, Obama has never understood Iran\u2019s domineering role in Syria. Beyond the Ba\u2019ath Party\u2019s historical propensity for brutality and repression, long ago perfected by Bashar\u2019s father, Iran\u2019s increasingly hegemonic position has virtually ensured that he will not contravene Tehran\u2019s will.<\/p>\n<p>Given Iran\u2019s use of Syria to fund and arm Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist groups, and its likely use of Syria to hide aspects of its nuclear-weapons program, Iran was never going to permit \u201creform.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Indeed, the administration needs to face Iran\u2019s influence across the region. Syria\u2019s and Hezbollah\u2019s murderous intervention has rendered Lebanon virtually prostrate yet again. Hamas\u2019s indiscriminate terrorism against Israel has destroyed the prospects for Palestinian unity and a responsible path to statehood and representative government. Now, with Mubarak\u2019s fall in Egypt, Hamas can conspire in public with its parent organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, to radicalize Egyptians as well as Palestinians.<\/p>\n<p>Obama either didn\u2019t comprehend this relationship, or was simply unwilling to cross the Iranians because of his ethereal hopes to negotiate with Tehran to end its nuclear-weapons program. White House mistakes continue to allow Iran to prevail in Syria.<\/p>\n<p>Fourth, calling for regime change isn\u2019t just a question of timing but also of leadership. The administration waited far too long, thus minimizing the impact of its rhetoric, which is all that its policy really amounts to.<\/p>\n<p>Moreover, prior sanctions, and those just announced by Obama and being discussed in Europe, haven\u2019t squeezed Syria\u2019s regime, nor are they likely to. Sanctions targeting particular institutions and individuals can almost never be effective because they are so susceptible to evasion. Only sweeping sanctions, swiftly and decisively applied and effectively enforced, have a chance of real effect. That is a far cry from what Obama and the European Union have actually done.<\/p>\n<p>Fifth, Assad\u2019s departure alone doesn\u2019t mean broader change. For example, Alawite and Sunni generals may ditch him but maintain a military dictatorship, quite possibly leaving Iran in a dominant role. Or, absent a deal, Sunnis may use force to exact a heavy, bloody price from Alawites for the long Assad dictatorships. Moreover, Sunni Arab governments certainly want to diminish Iran\u2019s influence in Syria, which means it may simply become another front in the Iranian-Saudi battle for dominance within Islam and in the Middle East, already reflected in Bahrain. That is hardly good news for Syria\u2019s civilian population.<\/p>\n<p>Obama has thus far grievously mishandled Syria, as he has an increasingly long list of other crisis spots. Americans will soon have to decide if they can do better, with a president who remembers that true leaders lead from the front.<\/p>\n<p>John Bolton is a former US ambassador to the UN. His latest book is \u201cSurrender Is Not an Option.\u201d<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><strong>&#8216;New Sun&#8217; by Sinan Antoon<\/strong> translated to English for your blog. You can view it also on <a href=\"http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=k-UfrJsc43o\">youtube and enjoy the music by Malek Jandali, <\/a>23 July 2011<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"edit-comment269229\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/en.rian.ru\/world\/20110823\/166074582.html\">Moscow urges world community to bolster all-Syrian dialogue<\/a><br \/>\nMOSCOW, August 23 (RIA Novosti)<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>The international community should bolster a dialogue between all of the  parties of the Syrian conflict, Valery Loshchinin, Permanent  Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office in  Geneva said on Tuesday.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cRussia believes that Syrians themselves should settle the situation  in their country through an all-Syrian dialogue,\u201d the diplomat said at a  UN Human Rights Council special session on the situation of human  rights in Syria.<\/p>\n<p>The diplomat emphasized that the global community should assist the  Syrian opposition and government to come to terms on necessary reforms.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cThe Russian leadership is ready to take additional energetic  measures to push forward the process of political and socio-economical  reforms,\u201d Loshchinin added.<\/p>\n<p>Syria has been rocked by mass protests demanding reforms and the  resignation of President Bashar Assad for almost six months. Pressure  from international powers has mounted to end the crackdown.<\/p>\n<p>According to UN investigators, some 2,200 civilians are thought to  have been killed since protests began in the southern city of Deraa in  mid-March.<\/p>\n<p>The Syrian government says over 500 servicemen and security officers were also killed.<\/p>\n<p>The UN Human Rights Council is drafting a resolution that \u201cdeplores  the continuing indiscriminate attacks on its [Syrian] population\u201d and  seeks an immediate stop to \u201call acts of violence,\u201d the BBC reported on  Monday.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cPeople are just beginning to form an opposition and so they are  treading carefully. This is understandable,\u201d said Mahmud Osman, an  opposition member at the meeting in Turkey. \u201cWe don\u2019t claim to represent  the whole of Syria. But we are talking to everyone and we are trying to  build a consensus.\u201d<br \/>\nmore\u2026<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/world\/2011\/aug\/23\/syrian-opposition-national-council\">Syrian opposition moves towards setting up national council<\/a> &#8211; Guardian<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>Splits remain in opposition fragmented by sectarian and ideological  tensions, with no clear next steps beyond demands for more freedom<\/p>\n<p>Syria\u2019s fragmented opposition took steps towards forming a national  council on Tuesday, but serious divisions and mistrust among the members  prevented them from presenting a unified front against president Bashar  al-Assad\u2019s regime more than five months into the country\u2019s uprising,  participants said.<\/p>\n<p>The opposition, fragmented by years of sectarian and ideological  tensions, has made unprecedented gains against the regime, but there is  no clear leadership or platform beyond the demands for more freedom and  for Assad to step down.<\/p>\n<p>With Assad\u2019s forces cracking down on the protests, the overall death toll has reached 2,200, the United Nations said this week.<\/p>\n<p>Opposition members have been meeting in neighbouring Turkey in recent  days, but there were conflicting reports about exactly what emerged.  Obeida al-Nahhas told the Associated Press that a council had been  formed but the details were still being completed; others said there was  no council to speak of yet.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The Libya lesson<\/p>\n<p>Kadafi may fall, but that doesn&#8217;t mean the U.S. should pursue the same strategy in, say, Syria.<\/p>\n<p>August 23, 2011<\/p>\n<p>http:\/\/www.latimes.com\/news\/opinion\/opinionla\/la-ed-libya-20110823,0,5149844.story<\/p>\n<p>The international campaign against Libyan leader Moammar Kadafi is on the verge of a historic achievement: The judicious use of force by Western nations has given that nation&#8217;s rebellion the opportunity to eliminate a longtime scourge. And yet the experience of Libya, though it ushers out an unstable ruler, offers an uncertain model for U.S. foreign policy.<\/p>\n<p>The use of force to address the internal abominations of other nations raises profoundly difficult questions for American policymakers. Eager not to serve as the world&#8217;s police force and yet determined to support democratic values and human rights, the United States often finds itself facing limited, unpalatable options. It may stand aside and allow rulers to abuse their people, or it may intervene, risking American lives and reinforcing the international impression that this nation is entitled to govern others.<\/p>\n<p>In Libya, the Obama administration chose a middle course. The U.S. provided limited air and drone support to rebels who might well have been defeated without it. It declined to act unilaterally but rather played a supporting role in an effort led by European nations that have a greater stake in Libya&#8217;s stability. And though there were signs of mission creep, of deepening embroilment in Libya&#8217;s civil war, the U.S. largely resisted those temptations. Not one American soldier set foot in Libya.<\/p>\n<p>Success should not breed complacency, however. What caused Kadafi to lose control of the country was less the pressure of outsiders than the fundamental weakness of his hollow regime. It would be foolish to assume that other governments, even in the region, are as susceptible to challenge. In Syria, for instance, the government of Bashar Assad retains, at least for the moment, the support of a formidable army and continues to pummel its people into submission; the death toll there is thought to exceed 2,200. Last week, the Obama administration, in conjunction with U.S. allies, called for Assad to step down and imposed sanctions on Syrian oil and American investment in Syria. Those were wise and measured steps, calibrated to the specifics of that situation.<\/p>\n<p>Some will see in the crumbling of Kadafi&#8217;s regime a template for action in Syria. That&#8217;s the wrong lesson. Instead, the apparent success of the Libyan rebels is a reminder that every crisis is unique, and that each calls for the nuanced application of leverage in defense of American values and interests. Force is sometimes justified, but it should only be deployed when other methods have failed, when it can serve a vital end and when it can be effective in securing that result&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.google.com\/hostednews\/afp\/article\/ALeqM5iJOzPVE7xEPh3S8qIzIuYHGF8o8A?docId=CNG.28a184296dda6208bfa99078cd9b334d.21\">US ambassador visits southern Syria<\/a><br \/>\n(AFP) \u2013  23 aug 2011<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>WASHINGTON \u2014 The US ambassador to Damascus on Tuesday visited, without  Syrian permission, a town in the south of the country and met with  members of the opposition there, US officials said.<\/p>\n<p>Officials said Robert Ford made the visit to Jassem, which they  conceded lies beyond a 25-kilometer (15-mile) limit from Damascus that  the Syrians set after they were angered by a visit he made last month to  the city of Hama.<\/p>\n<p>Beyond that limit, permission is required.<\/p>\n<p>In Washington, US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said  Ford informed the Syrian Foreign Ministry only after he returned to  Damascus because three of his previous requests to travel beyond the  limit were denied.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cHe made clear to them that the reason that he didn\u2019t inform them  before the visit was because they haven\u2019t been approving any visits, by  anybody, anywhere,\u201d Nuland told reporters.<\/p>\n<p>Nuland said Ford went to Jassem, some 65 kilometers (42 miles) south  of Damascus, because there had been peaceful protests there.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cHe had a chance there to talk to a number of Syrians, including  those in the opposition. And then he drove back to Damascus,\u201d Nuland  said.<\/p>\n<p>A large number of security forces accompanied him and the Syrian  Foreign Ministry was not surprised to learn of his visit, she said.<\/p>\n<p>An embassy spokesman in Damascus who asked not to be named said Ford visited Jassem \u201cas part of his routine diplomatic duties.\u201d Jassem is in southern Daraa province, epicenter of anti-regime  protests  that broke out in mid-March, where according to activists 15  people  were killed on Friday by security forces when they opened fire to  crush  a demonstration.<br \/>\nmore\u2026<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\" http:\/\/www.gulfsands.com\/s\/NewsReleases.asp?ReportID=474112\">Gulfsands Petrol: Syria Sanctions and Commercial Relationships with Makhlouf Interests,<\/a> 2011-08-24<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>London, 24th August, 2011: Gulfsands Petroleum plc (&#8220;Gulfsands&#8221;, the  &#8220;Group&#8221; or the &#8220;Company&#8221; &#8211; AIM: GPX), the oil and gas production,  exploration and development company with activities in Syria, Iraq,  Tunisia, Italy and the U.S.A., wish to provide &#8230; <span style=\"font-size: x-small;\">Gulfsands Petroleum in oil payments to Assad cousin<\/span><\/p>\n<p>By Lina Saigol and Sylvia Pfeifer in London<\/p>\n<p>Gulfsands Petroleum, the London-listed oil and gas company, agreed to  give a share of profits from its production activities in Syria to a  company controlled by Rami Makhlouf, the first cousin of Syrian  president Bashar al-Assad.<\/p>\n<p>The company has also paid more than $1m in fees to Ramak, the Makhlouf  family\u2019s holding company, for services connected with its operations in  the country.<\/p>\n<p>The revelations show that the links between Gulfsands and Mr Makhlouf,  who is closely associated with the Syrian regime and is estimated to  control up to 60 per cent of the Syrian economy, go much further than  previously thought. The Al Mashreq Investment Fund, which is majority controlled by Mr Makhlouf, owns a 5.7 per cent stake  in Gulfsands.<\/p>\n<p>Mr Makhlouf has been put under sanctions by both the US and the European  Union for his links to the Syrian regime, which has been accused of  killing 2,400 protestors since uprisings began in March. However, the EU  has not yet imposed any sanctions on Gulfsands.<\/p>\n<p>Gulfsands and its 50:50 joint venture partner at the time, Ocean Energy,  were awarded an interest in Block 26, Syria\u2019s biggest oil producing  area, in an open tender in 2000. Under an agreement Gulfsands and Ocean  agreed to give Ramak a 2.5 per cent net profit interest in Block 26.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: x-small;\">Here is an interesting report on Alevis of Trkey by the Turkish Government&#8217;s Washington think tank SETA.<br \/>\n<\/span><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/setadc.org\/reports\/283-seta-policy-report-qalevi-opening-and-the-democratization-initiative-in-turkeyq-by-talha-kose\">ALEVI OPENING AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION INITIATIVE IN TURKEY<\/a><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>ABSTRACT<\/p>\n<p>The \u201cAlevi Issue\u201d is one of the most complicated and, at the same time, largely misunderstood problems in Turkey. Conflicts, resentments, grievances, and perpetual fears about Alevis that have existed for centuries have been publicly voiced through different mechanisms; yet, the message had never been understood thoroughly by the interlocutors of the Alevis. The discussions on the issue in various social and political contexts have often revolved around a rather limited list of Alevi identity-based claims&#8230;..<\/p>\n<p>The overall objectives of the Alevi identity struggle fall under four major categories that are closely related to each other:19 i) maintenance of the Alevi identity in modern, urban social contexts, ii) recognition of Alevi identity as an equal and legitimate element of Turkish society, iii) allocation of material resources for the Alevi identity-based institutions, iv) acknowledgement of the historical traumas and victimhood of Alevis and certain guarantees that would prevent the possible recurrence of traumatic experiences. &#8230;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.foreignpolicy.com\/articles\/2011\/08\/11\/islamic_evolution?page=full\">Islamic Evolution: <\/a>How Turkey taught the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood to reconcile faith and democracy.<br \/>\nBY PIOTR ZALEWSKI | AUGUST 11, 2011 in Foreign Policy<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>ISTANBUL \u2014 Fawaz Zakri was 17 years old when his father told him to pack his bags, bid goodbye to his family, and cross the border into Turkey. The year was 1981, and the northern Syrian city of Aleppo, where Zakri had grown up, was in the throes of a violent anti-government insurgency led by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.<\/p>\n<p>Zakri&#8217;s father feared that his son&#8217;s links with the Brothers would be enough to land him in jail, or worse. &#8220;I was a sympathizer,&#8221; Zakri qualifies, &#8220;but not a member.&#8221; Two years earlier, the Brotherhood had attacked a local military academy, killing dozens of cadets in an assault that marked the beginning of an all-out war between the Sunni Islamist group and the Alawite regime of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.<\/p>\n<p>Protests, assassinations, and terrorist attacks, many carried out by the Brotherhood, had since become routine. Syrian troops and security forces responded with a ruthless crackdown, at times employing artillery fire against neighborhoods in Aleppo. The war culminated in 1982, when, in the wake of another Brotherhood uprising, Assad&#8217;s troops killed tens of thousands of people in the city of Hama. The massacre crushed the Brotherhood&#8217;s Syrian wing, and its surviving activists scattered &#8212; many eventually settling across the border in Turkey.<\/p>\n<p>Zakri&#8217;s escape placed him beyond not only the reach of the Syrian regime, but also the militant ideology of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood of that era. Thirty years removed from his flight, Zakri is a graduate of one of Turkey&#8217;s finest universities, an iPhone-toting businessman with a trade in grains and heavy machinery, and a fluent English speaker. He is also, at least to some extent, a changed man &#8212; a committed Islamist, to be sure, but one of a different hue. &#8220;After we came to Turkey,&#8221; he says, &#8220;people like me, we faced a revolution in our thoughts.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>While many in Europe and the United States fear that Turkey&#8217;s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has introduced a dangerous Islamist influence into the country&#8217;s traditionally secular and Western-oriented stance, religious groups struggling to overthrow stagnant autocracies across the Arab world take a different lesson from the party&#8217;s success. Particularly in Syria, where President Bashar al-Assad&#8217;s crackdown on a domestic uprising has become increasingly brutal during the holy month of Ramadan, pious activists have looked to Turkey as a model for reconciling their faith with the democratic hopes of the Arab Spring.<\/p>\n<p>But Turkish politicians steer clear of the &#8220;M&#8221; word. &#8220;We do not use that language because we do not want to patronize anyone,&#8221; Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan&#8217;s chief foreign-policy adviser, Ibrahim Kalin, told me this spring. &#8220;We do not want to impose our experience on others.&#8221; There is more to this, of course. The days when the Arab world suspected Turkey of being a U.S. &#8220;Trojan horse&#8221; in the Middle East might be long gone, but the Turks, who remember President George W. Bush&#8217;s repeated references to the &#8220;Turkish model,&#8221; remain wary of being seen as doing the West&#8217;s bidding.<\/p>\n<p>As Syrians continue to risk their lives to call for an end to the Assad regime, however, the impact of the Turkish experience on the Brotherhood&#8217;s political evolution is coming into clearer focus. In 2002, under the leadership of Ali al-Bayanouni, the Brotherhood publicly disavowed violence and embraced parliamentary democracy. In the years that followed, it called for free elections in Syria and announced its support for women&#8217;s rights. This April, during the early days of the Syrian uprising, Brotherhood leaders held a news conference in Istanbul in which they denounced the Assad regime. And then in June, at a Syrian opposition conference held in the Turkish city of Antalya, Brotherhood members put their signatures on a declaration that called for &#8220;the freedom of belief, expression and practice of religion, under a civil state.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Bayanouni, who headed the group from 1996 to 2010, continues to strike notes that place him more in line with today&#8217;s pious Turkish politicians than the hard-edged Brotherhood leaders of days past. &#8220;Firstly, we believe that the state in Islam is a civil state, not a state ruled by any religious leaders or clerics,&#8221; he told me, speaking from London. &#8220;Secondly, we cannot impose any particular way of dressing on citizens&#8230;. We do call for and encourage [women] to wear the hijab and to follow Islamic behavior and action, but individuals must be free to choose what they want.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>Although the Brotherhood isn&#8217;t new to parliamentary democracy, said Bayanouni, citing the group&#8217;s participation in Syria&#8217;s 1961 elections, the AKP has provided it with a blueprint for reform. &#8220;The AKP is neutral in the area of religion &#8212; neither does it impose religion upon Turkish citizens nor does it seek to fight religion,&#8221; Bayanouni noted, &#8220;and for this reason we find [it] to be an excellent model.&#8221;&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I think [the Brothers] themselves know that the very strong fundamentalist positions are impossible to apply these days in Syria,&#8221; says Rime Allaf, a Syrian researcher at Chatham House. &#8220;Twenty or 30 years ago, they were a force that would have presented a lot of question marks for the rest of society.&#8221; Today, however, &#8220;speaking as somebody who is secular &#8230; I can give them the benefit of the doubt.&#8221;&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>The AKP&#8217;s success in bridging the gap between Islamist principles and Western norms attracted the admiration of Brotherhood sympathizers such as Khaled Khoja, head of the Turkish chapter of the Damascus Declaration committee, an umbrella group of the Syrian opposition. Khoja spent two years in a Syrian jail between 1980 and 1982, he says, on account of his father&#8217;s affiliation with the Brotherhood. Following his release, Khoja left Syria and arrived, via Libya, in Turkey. He was only 17 years old.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;[Abul Ala] Maududi, [Ruhollah] Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb,&#8221; he says, listing the names of the Islamist firebrands from years past. &#8220;Their manner was not successful for Islamic communities, producing division and conflict. The Turkish manner has showed us a different [way].&#8221;&#8230;.<\/p>\n<p>The AKP&#8217;s success in bridging the gap between Islamist principles and Western norms attracted the admiration of Brotherhood sympathizers such as Khaled Khoja, head of the Turkish chapter of the Damascus Declaration committee, an umbrella group of the Syrian opposition. Khoja spent two years in a Syrian jail between 1980 and 1982, he says, on account of his father&#8217;s affiliation with the Brotherhood. Following his release, Khoja left Syria and arrived, via Libya, in Turkey. He was only 17 years old.<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;[Abul Ala] Maududi, [Ruhollah] Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb,&#8221; he says, listing the names of the Islamist firebrands from years past. &#8220;Their manner was not successful for Islamic communities, producing division and conflict. The Turkish manner has showed us a different [way].&#8221;&#8230;<\/p>\n<p>But first, activists like Nahas may need to break ranks with their own leaders, they say. The story of the AKP&#8217;s rise &#8212; Erdogan&#8217;s break with Erbakan, his former mentor, and his subsequent embrace of a more inclusionary type of politics &#8212; has not gone unnoticed among the Syrian Brotherhood&#8217;s younger members. The AKP&#8217;s success, says Nahas, &#8220;made people feel that they could do a revolution inside their organization and get somewhere.&#8221; Groups like the Brotherhood were designed as secretive, underground organizations to escape the reach of hostile security forces. &#8220;This means that now, with the openness, they have to change.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/bit.ly\/nQGA1P\">Is Turkey shutting its doors to Syrians?<\/a><\/p>\n<p>by Burcu G\u00fcltekin Punsmann*<\/p>\n<p>Are we on the verge of losing Syria? This idea fills me with bitterness and frustration since Syria is facing what may be its greatest isolation in more than four decades of rule by the al-Assad family. Turkey was on its way to helping Syrians win&#8230;<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: x-small;\">&#8230;There was much hope that in  the case of Syria, economic interdependence could have been converted  into political convergence, that it was possible to tame the other  side&#8217;s behavior with our force of traction. Turkey has become the  country that enjoys the most leverage in Syria. Syria could be managed as long as the regime felt  comfortable of its survival. Today Damascus and Aleppo remain calm as  the economic elite are fearful of a chaotic aftermath to Mr. Assad&#8217;s  government. No one can wish to see Damascus and Aleppo go up in flames. The Syrian government should return to rationality.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>There will be no going back to the &#8217;90s in Turkish-Syrian relations.  Turkey will not become the enemy of yesterday again. A total of 7,239  Syrians escaping from their own government found shelter in Turkey,  while some 17,000 more are said to be on their way. This refugee flow was boosted the public&#8217;s sympathy for the plight of  their persecuted neighbors.<\/p>\n<p>No one had ever pursued any democratization agenda in Syria. That can&#8217;t  be a ground to put Turkey&#8217;s engagement policy on trial. According to the  data of the Turkish National Police, entries from Syria to Turkey have  increased by 635 percent in the last 10 years, the fastest growth registered from countries in the Middle East. Syria  ranks second after Iran in terms of visitors, which equaled 899,494 in  2010. Over holiday periods, hotels in Mersin were full of Syrian  tourists, mainly middle class families. By opening its gates, Turkey has had the most powerful effect, demonstrating the  benefits of democracy, and has directly supported the social  transformation process across the border.<\/p>\n<p>Are we going to shut our doors to Syrians today? Will this be the best way to stand by the Syrian people?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Interventionists Versus Non-Interventionists Two distinct camps are forming to battle over Syria policy in Washington. [This article was picked up by CNN as Washington&#8217;s battle over Syria] The first is made up of the neocons, who are busy fitting the Arab Spring into US strategic interests as they see them. Bolton, Doran, and Abrams have [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"sfsi_plus_gutenberg_text_before_share":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_show_text_before_share":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_icon_type":"","sfsi_plus_gutenberg_icon_alignemt":"","sfsi_plus_gutenburg_max_per_row":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[96],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11594","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-syria-revolution-2011"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v24.8.1 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Interventionists Versus Non-Interventionists  - Syria Comment<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/joshualandis.com\/blog\/interventionists-versus-non-interventionists\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Interventionists Versus Non-Interventionists  - Syria Comment\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Interventionists Versus Non-Interventionists Two distinct camps are forming to battle over Syria policy in Washington. 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[This article was picked up by CNN as Washington&#8217;s battle over Syria] The first is made up of the neocons, who are busy fitting the Arab Spring into US strategic interests as they see them. 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