Dear Josh,

what do YOU think about this? Personally, I can’t see much of a difference between him, Walid al-Mu’allim, Bashar al-Asad, etc.

“The struggle for Lebanon will continue as long as they continue to attempt to isolate it from Syria.” – Is that a threat?

“We defended Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1990 because we did not approve of the occupation of an Arab country.” – Cough*Lebanon1976to2005*Cough

“We like Aoun … Aoun’s statements have been honest, logical, and wise.” – When did that start?

“Some of the European leaders visiting Syria simply repeat American demands verbatim, others repeat some of those demands, while still others are embarrassed to repeat them and they listen to our views.” – So, Europeans are either American dogs or listen to Syria, but don’t have any opinions of their own?

“Have we come to the point where one Israeli hostage is worth an entire nation? This was not the custom even in the era of slavery. What have we come to?” – Actually … that was precisely the old policy of, after concluding a peace treaty with a hostile power, keeping one or two children of the other party’s leader as hostage to ensure that the treaty is maintained. Using history to bolster one’s point really only works if … it works.

But seriously, Josh – what is so important about this article that you & Alex thought it needed to be translated? Does Faruq al-Sharaa even still matter?

–MSK

http://www.niqash.org
http://www.aqoul.com

All4syria sent this article by Seth Wikas. Sorry their website is still blocked and I am sending this in extenso.

Seth Wikas is a visiting fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on Syria’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Institute research assistant Nathan Hodson assisted in the preparation of this PolicyWatch.

“Syria’s Response to the Baker-Hamilton Report
Seth Wikas

On December 6, the long-awaited report of the Iraq Study Group (ISG), often referred to as the Baker-Hamilton commission, will be available to the public. One of the report’s recommendations is likely to be direct talks with Iran and Syria, providing plenty of fodder for American politicians, journalists, and foreign policy experts. But what do Syrian sources have to say about the report and its implications for US policy?

Syria’s three main daily newspapers — al-Thawra, al-Baath, and Tishreen — are all government owned and carefully censored. Other progovernment news sources are online sites such as Champress, Ash-Sham News, and Syria-News.com. Each provides daily coverage of Iraq-related issues, using both international news services and the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA). They also publish many editorials and opinion columns, both from foreign sources (including translations from the international press) and by Syrians. When the major dailies have relatively uniform opinions on a topic, it is highly likely that their position reflects the government view.

Background: How Iraq is Viewed and Covered
The Syrian papers paint a uniformly negative picture of the situation in Iraq. A major theme in the Syrian press, as in much of the Arab press, is that the American invasion of Iraq is yet another example in a long history of Western imperialism, this time cloaked with a veneer of democracy. The invasion was carried out in order to realize American and Zionist interests, and when it comes to the Middle East, Israel is America’s first priority. The newspapers unanimously condemn President George W. Bush (and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld) for the chaos and violence afflicting its eastern neighbor. Noticeably absent from Syrian coverage of the war in Iraq are issues that have made headlines in the American and European press, including foreign fighters crossing into Iraq via the Syrian border and Syrian funds and materiel making their way into the hands of Sunni insurgents.
With respect to Syrian involvement in Iraq, the three major dailies all cover the foreign (mostly European) delegations President Bashar al-Asad and other Syrian officials have received over the past few weeks. The stories emphasize Syria’s concern over the crisis in Iraq and its ability to play a cooperative regional role.

The Syrian Press on the ISG
Syrian press reports about the ISG have been quite straightforward, emphasizing its bipartisan constituency and its goals of providing the Bush administration with alternative courses of action. Syrian opinion pieces, however, view the ISG report as a way for the Bush administration to admit failure. The word “failure” (fashl in Arabic) is used extensively in the Syrian press to describe the U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Khalaf al-Jarrad, editor-in-chief of Tishreen, bluntly titled his November 7 op-ed, “Can Baker Fix What Bush Has Destroyed?” The prominent dailies report that the ISG is a way for the Bush administration to save face in light of the increasingly intractable situation in Iraq. Articles and analysis pieces repeat the phrases “lifeline,” “dead end,” and “noble exit” in rhetoric describing a hopeless situation from which the Bush administration must extract itself.
The Syrian press connects the ISG with what it describes as Bush’s failed policy in Iraq and the Republican Party’s loss in the 2006 congressional elections. Articles in Tishreen and al-Baath indicate to their Syrian readership that the U.S. failure in Iraq resulted in a seismic change — the term “earthquake” is used many times — in U.S. domestic public opinion, which caused the Republican Party’s electoral losses. Muhammad Kuneisi, writing in an al-Baath article titled “Two Readings of the American Failure in Iraq,” posited that the failure in Iraq and the Republican electoral losses, in addition to Rumsfeld’s resignation and the Bush administration’s “call for help” in the form of the ISG, point to “the beginning of the end” of U.S. involvement in Iraq. The same article also suggested an alternative reading of the ISG and Rumsfeld’s resignation as part of a grand strategy by the Bush administration to change course but still fulfill its strategic goals in Iraq.
Some space has been devoted to the role of James A. Baker III, co-chair of the ISG. Al-Jarrad’s November 7 Tishreen editorial offered an elaborate (and at times both sarcastic and complimentary) assessment of Baker as a statesman. Quoting from his memoirs, al-Jarrad criticized Baker’s observation that he “possesses the necessary negotiation and political acumen” for statesmanship. On the other hand, the author conceded that Baker may be the right man for the job because of Baker’s familiarity with the Arab players in the Middle East and his identification of former Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad as a sincere man, a hard negotiator, and a serious thinker for whom Baker had great respect. Al-Jarrad also repeated Baker’s assertion that Syria is the key to regional peace and stability.
The Syrian press has expressed skepticism about whether Bush will follow reported ISG recommendations for direct dialogue with Damascus and Tehran, a phased drawdown of troops, and greater coordination with the Iraqi security forces. All three of the major Syrian dailies have, over the course of the past two weeks, included Bush’s oft-made statement that he is not required to follow all of the ISG’s recommendations. The December 4 edition of Tishreen led with the news of Bush’s statement that the ISG report is one of many resources he will consider regarding a change of direction in Iraq. While the press uniformly denounces the Bush policy, some writers view the ISG report as a glimmer of hope. A long piece posted last week on the Champress website sees the ISG report as a sign that the United States wishes to reconsider its policies and discontinue its Iraq “adventure.”

Response by the Government
The Syrian government has not released any significant statements on the ISG report to the domestic or foreign press. The only official to comment on the ISG is the Syrian ambassador in Washington, Imad Mustapha, who coordinated the New York meetings between members of the ISG and Syrian foreign minister Walid al-Muallem during the UN General Assembly in September 2006. Mustapha has repeatedly welcomed the suggestion of direct talks between the United States and Syria and Iran, stressing the constructive role the latter two nations can play in stabilizing Iraq. In his nearly four years as ambassador, Mustapha has repeatedly stressed the advantages of dialogue in his interviews and speeches. The Syrian government, however, has made the chances for this difficult, having been implicated in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri and allowing Hamas leader Khaled Meshal to reside in Damascus. One reading of this juxtaposition is that Mustapha’s role is to be Syria’s advocate for dialogue, but his calls for talks do not necessarily reflect any willingness in Damascus for policy changes.
On the issue of whether to assist the United States in promoting stability in Iraq, the Syrian government has indicated its policy positions through rhetoric and actions. According to the Economist, last month Bashar al-Asad made clear to British emissary Sir Nigel Sheinwald four conditions for greater regional cooperation: (1) an end to the UN investigation into Syria’s role in the Hariri assassination; (2) a guarantee that Washington will not try to undermine the Syrian regime; (3) a return of Syria’s influence in Lebanon; and (4) the return of the Golan Heights. Asad is not averse to talking to the United States or playing a constructive role in Iraq, but he has given his price.

On a more hopeful note, in late November, al-Mouallem visited Baghdad and reestablished Syrian-Iraqi diplomatic ties. There were some indications during that trip that Syria is prepared to work more closely with the Iraqi government. Sending an ambassador-level official to Iraq and fulfilling its promise to restore an embassy in Baghdad would indicate that Syria is interested in Iraq’s stability.

Conclusions
The Syrian press welcomes any change in U.S. policy in Iraq but is highly skeptical that President Bush will follow the ISG’s recommendations. Irrespective of any suggested or implemented policy change, Asad has already announced his conditions for adopting a significantly more positive regional role.

V.P. Farouq al-Sharaa whined:

“As for Palestine, The Israelis have surrounded the Palestinians and blockaded them. They are starving a whole people and do not permit anyone to come to their aid. They hold an entire nation hostage. They complain about the Palestinians holding one Israeli soldier hostage. Have we come to the point where one Israeli hostage is worth an entire nation? This was not the custom even in the era of slavery. What have we come to?”

Your eminence,

Tell Hamas and the PA that if they recognize Israel and desist from terrorism, perhaps the Palestinians wouldn’t have to suffer to much.

I guess it’s all about priorities.

Dear MSK

When you read Shara’s comments, you can either go through them trying to find the points you plan to criticize, or you can try to pick the useful signals.

For example, the fact Shara surfaced to tell these things is by itself a signal. He is the hawk in Syrian foreign policy making. The fact champress posted it in the most prominent position, says it is not only old Farouk making irrelevant personal statements.

Syria’s position these days is: we will work hard to convince the Americans and Israelis that we want peace (as Moualem keeps saying), but we will not give up in advance our current tactics and alliances in order to be accepted as a peace partner … as shara just implied.

Here are some of the very clear statements Shara made

1) Our relations with Egypt have deteriorated to some extent, but we will probably go back to normal relations.

2) Our relations with Saudi Arabia are much worse… there is a hint that King Abdullah and Bashar’s relations are not reconcilable for now, and then it is linked to the way Chirac is on the phone trying to maintain international support for his personal decision to corner and boycott the Syrians … the linkage implying that the Saudi king is doing similar things… and therefore do not expect improvement in Syrian Saudi and Syrian French relations for a long time.

Similarly go through every point and you’ll se a clear statement of Syrian positions on every issue out there today.

Going back to the points you made:

“The struggle for Lebanon will continue as long as they continue to attempt to isolate it from Syria.” – Is that a threat?

“We like Aoun … Aoun’s statements have been honest, logical, and wise.” – When did that start?

Let’s look at the reversal of Syrian positions on Aoun. Why is it that you find that bizarre? true that in the late eighties Aoun was not Syria’s friend, but if we want to pick this as an example to show that the Syrian are somehow not consistent .. then what do we say about the alliances of the different Lebanese factions? at some point Jumblat shifted on a monthly basis, And everyone else took old enemies as current allies, no? .. and what about the way the Americans? can you find a few examples of how they also support some figures, then they fight them? Saddam for example.

And again, the difference between Syrian “occupation of Lebanon” and Saddam’s invasion then occupation of Kuwait is clear enough, although I agree with you that the Syrians stayed a decade too long. But they maintained international cover for their “occupation” and when a UN resolution asked them to leave .. they left very quickly, didn’t they.

And again, if you want similarly contradictory statements form the others:

1) The Americans made this statement 2 years ago (about Syrian presence in Lebanon): We can not accept for a country to have its army in another country and to try to use it to influence the politics of that country … cough *Iraq* cough.

2) Saad Hariri from Saudi Arabia, and with Saudi accent, declared: “the days when Lebanon can be ruled from outside are over”

I’m sorry if I sounded too critical of your comments. My criticism is not really directed at you (you did not over do it) but others, like Mr. Badran, have made it a habit of going through any Syrian statements and trying to find things to ridicule … as if all the politicians in the world, and especially the Lebanese and American politicians, are 100% honest, consistent and logical in their statements.

And one other thing, this assumption that Shara did not say anything significant, implies one thing: the Syrians are not significant .. no matter what they say, they are only barking.

I think it is time Syria’s adversaries stop ridiculing the Syrians and start listening to what they have to say, because even if you do not agree with them, they ARE significant.

Good comment Alex. It’s given that people see what they want to see depending on their political views. We are all guilty of that.

I think the Syrians have predicted much of the political situation in the Middle East better than many. I have to say I underestimated them in that department. For one the Americans are reluctantly turning 180 degrees on their Iraq policy, long are the days when we they screamed, criticized and even threatened the Syrians over their role in Iraq. And many dismissed Damascus’s prediction that Iraq will become Washington’s swamp.

And anyone remembers who the hell Brammertz is??? The Lebanese political arena has shifted away from the Hariri investigation and into factors the Syrians control much of. They might have used rudimentary means to achieve their strategic edge, but at least they did achieve it.

Terror suspects expelled from Egypt

CAIRO, Egypt – Authorities expelled two Belgians and eight French terrorist suspects Thursday, but an American and another French citizen remained in Egyptian custody, officials said.

The 12, along with an unknown number of Egyptians and Arabs from other countries, were arrested late last month for allegedly belonging to an Islamist terror cell plotting attacks.
…

Security officials said the suspects had a relationship with Omar Abdullah Hamra, the leader of the Islamic militant group Tawhid and Jihad, who killed himself by detonating an explosives belt while trying to cross into Lebanon from Syria. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue.
AP

Dear Alex,

thank you for your exhaustive reply. Maybe it would’ve been better had you added those explanations to the translation in the post.

As for your comments on my questions:

(1) I am not Tony Badran. If you have a bone to pick with him, you know where his blog is.

(2) I did not say that I find the Syrian regime’s change of its attitude towards Aoun bizarre. I asked a very simple question: When did that start? I didn’t think I would have to explain what I meant with a question about the beginning of a process on the human time scale. Btw, I personally don’t think that the regime’s “attitude” towards Aoun has changed at all. Right now he’s just more useful as a spoiler against March 14, but I highly doubt anyone in the Qasr al-Sha’b actually likes him.

(3) Please don’t play the “you say Mr. X did something bad? What about the other ones, Mr. Y & Mr. Z, who did something as bad or even worse???” game. You’re not Abu Ammar. I wasn’t claiming that Jumblatt’s flip-flopping (FINALLY I get to use that term!) was something to be emulated or justified. And Aoun’s own about-face wasn’t even the topic here.

(4) As for the Syrian occupation of Lebanon:

(a) Again, only because countries A, B, and C are illegally occupying areas doesn’t make it right for country D to do likewise. It’s still wrong.

(b) You know as well as I do what the Ta’if Accord said and just HOW the extensions of the Syrian “mandate” came about. Nobody here – not Josh, not the commenters – is making any claims for “brotherly help”. And the Syrian occupation forces didn’t leave because of 1559. They left because a quarter of Lebanon’s population demonstrated against them, thus giving popular support to 1559 making the Syrian occupation untenable.

(5) I did not say that what Al-Sharaa said was not significant. I just wanted to know what exactly made his speech so important that you had to translate & post it here. That was an honest, curious question. And it occurred to me in light of Josh’s statement that “Sharaa was kicked upstairs to the Vice Presidency”, suggesting that he had been removed from the inner circle.

In the end, your explanatory remarks – if already included in the post itself – would’ve helped to understand the context of Al-Sharaa’s remarks and their significance.

And while I very well understand that a whole number of on- and offline commentators are getting on your nerves, I would still suggest to not stoop down to their level and freely determine what others have insinuated based on one’s gut feeling.

–MSK

http://www.niqash.org
http://www.aqoul.com

PS: Did I mention that Aqoul has been nominated for the Weblog Award? Just saying … in case anyone wants to vote for us. Wa laa shukr ‘ala waajib.

Al-Mustaqbal spin reaches Le Monde and the UN:

Des djihadistes viseraient 36 personnalités antisyriennes au Liban

Selon des sources palestiniennes et libanaises, un commando d’une cinquantaine de militants affiliés à Al-Qaida et ayant combattu en Irak s’est infiltré au Liban, via la Syrie, pour y perpétrer “un complot terroriste de Damas visant à assassiner 36 personnalités libanaises antisyriennes”. Ces informations sont contenues dans un document confidentiel – dont Le Monde a pu prendre connaissance – adressé, le 1er décembre, au quartier général de l’ONU par un haut fonctionnaire de l’organisation déployée dans la région.

Selon ce document, le représentant de l’Organisation de libération de la Palestine (OLP) au Liban, Abbas Zaki, a informé le responsable onusien qu'”une cinquantaine de militants bien armés affiliés à Al-Qaida sont entrés au Liban par la Syrie et se sont installés dans le camp de réfugiés de Nahr Al-Bared, dans le nord du Liban”. Ils avaient, auparavant, combattu en Irak, affirme la note, selon laquelle ils se seraient infiltrés, il y a plusieurs mois, au Liban, où ils “sont parvenus à rassembler autour d’eux près de 200 Palestiniens et Libanais”.

Ce groupe, poursuit l’officiel onusien, s’est d’abord affilié au “Fatah Intifada”, basé à Damas, avant de se scinder pour former le “Fatah Al-Islam”. Le “Fatah Intifada”, prosyrien, est lui-même issu d’une scission du Fatah dans les années 1980.

Toujours selon le document onusien, “des agents de sécurité de l’OLP à Nahr Al-Bared ont eu un affrontement militaire avec les hommes du Fatah Al-Islam (…) et ont arrêté six hommes alors que les autres s’enfuyaient”. Quatre d’entre eux, des Libanais, auraient été libérés. Les deux autres, un Syrien et un Saoudien, ont été remis au gouvernement libanais. “Des sources militaires au sein du gouvernement nous ont dit que les deux militants capturés ont donné des informations sur un complot terroriste de Damas pour assassiner 36 personnalités libanaises antisyriennes”, dit le texte.

Ahmed Fatfat, qui était ministre libanais de l’intérieur par intérim au moment des faits, à la fin novembre, et qui siège toujours au gouvernement, a confirmé au Monde, mercredi 6 décembre, avoir eu connaissance de ces allégations, sans être en mesure de les confirmer. Le ministre juge abusive l’affiliation du groupe à l’organisation mère Al-Qaida et met en doute “l’islamisme” dont il se réclamerait. Il s’agit d’après lui d’une “Al-Qaida syrienne”. “Ils sont très bien entraînés et équipés, et leurs ordres viennent de Damas”, a-t-il souligné.

Selon Ahmed Fatfat, “un seul et unique membre affilié à la vraie Al-Qaida a été arrêté au Liban”, il y a quelques mois, alors qu’il participait à la préparation d’attentats à New York.
Le Monde

He really deserves to have Fatfatism named after him.

[…] MKS asked in the comment section of the last post, "Josh – what is so important about this article by Sharaa that you and Alex thought it needed to be translated? Does Faruq al-Sharaa even still matter?" […]

Dear MSK

I neither avoid nor seek entering into another discussion with Tony. I actually enjoyed the useless “discussion” I had with him last year at Ammar’s blog. It is ok to have fun with politics sometimes, even when it sounds like a heated discussion. People I always argue with, like Ammar and Atassi and Ehsani are all friends.

And as I concluded my comments above, I apologize if it sounded like they are directed at you (they were, but to a much lesser extent).

As for Syrian army presence in Lebanon, please note that Shara said: Syria will NOT send troops into Lebanon again and will send an ambassador plus consuls to every Lebanese city .. when things return to normal.

I disagree with you on the Syrians’ position on Aoun .. I think when he becomes the next president of Lebanon, his first gift from the Syrians will be to credit him with succeeding in getting the Syrians to finally establish an embassy in Beirut.

And I hope the government in Lebanon today will learn from the Syrians who realized that when a million Lebanese demonstrate against you in the street, then there is something “untenable” that needs to be changed.

If we are using Islamic dress code as our metric, is Tehran on the Mediterranean really any worse than Riyadh on the Mediterranean?

Clearly, as G and MSK both implied, this is not about the fear of the Ashrafiya residents having to be forced to celebrate Ashura. This is about the fear of having to watch Syria take back control of Lebanon through its proxies first before it slowly and steadily makes its takeover complete.

Dr. Landis lays it all out by concluding:

“Perhaps negotiating a compromise will be less damaging to their (liberal and western oriented Lebanese) interests than forcing a confrontation that will become ugly? Having Hizbullah takes more power by force will not serve anyone’s interests.”

During the previous post, my friend Alex had an interesting exchange with MSK.

He concluded his comment by saying:

“I think it is time Syria’s adversaries stop ridiculing the Syrians and start listening to what they have to say, because even if you do not agree with them, they ARE significant.”

I personally don’t think that those Lebanese that ridicule Syria do so because they deem it to be insignificant. As a Syrian national, I am not surprised to see the Lebanese react the way they do towards their bigger neighbor. Wouldn’t Syrians have done the same had Turkey occupied our land and extended its welcome after it was invited in with an “international cover”? I don’t think that we can sugarcoat the way Syria conducted itself in Lebanon over the many years it stayed there. Indeed, I wish our leadership spent more of its time fixing the country’s internal problems rather than allocating such a significant amount of its resources to the Lebanon file. Yes, I am aware of the geopolitical importance of this topic to the country. Nonetheless, we cannot blame the Lebanese when they want to free themselves from their more significant neighbor. I know that a lot of people will ask how is Lebanon really free when the French and American Ambassadors have quickly replaced the Syrians as the main power brokers in the country. This brings me to the Lebanese.

There is no question that Lebanon suffers from a fundamental flaw in its core. It is a beautiful country whose people are vibrant, educated and worldly. But, IT CANNOT DEFEND ITSELF. The central government in the country is practically nonexistent and powerless. Its army has no monopoly over armed forces within its borders. This model of governance is not sustainable especially in a region like ours.

The Lebanese therefore should start by blaming themselves first. For them to think that they can live in an island of prosperity, secularism, freedom and all night parties without any interference from outsiders is nothing short of naïve. Until their country’s defense minister can demonstrate that he has a real job for example, its more “significant” neighbors will keep meddling with this lovely country.

Ehsani,

As a Lebanese, I could not have agreed with you more.

We as Lebanese have to realise that we are at the centre of our problems.

Our divisions, our tribalism, our sectarianism, our corruption, our disorganisation is the cause for our demise.

Having said that, I believe that all post-colonial Arab states share the same problems, the only difference is that most have dictators and a central power to prevent an outbreak of horror. Those countries who have attempted democracy in the Arab world have ended up in ruins … Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon.

I do concur with Syrian officials on this when they say that the main root for these failures is that these states are not “nations”, but merely colonialist creations. Therefore, the search for a collective national identity is continuous, and often leads us to internal strife and misery.

Where do our loyalties lie? To the Arab world? To our religious sect? To our “tribe”? To the West? To our village? What are we, who are we?

Every country faces the same problem, perhaps it’s time to start admitting that the “beautiful” states the French and British created are simply artificial creations destined for failure. Perhaps that is the reason why the West created them, divide and conquer.