Turkey’s Syria Problem

Turkey’s Syria conundrum
Sinan Ulgen, 25 Aug 2012, National Interest

Syria used to be the poster child for Ankara’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy. At the peak of their rapprochement, Turkey and Syria were holding joint cabinet meetings and talking about spearheading a common market in the Middle East. Then the Arab wave of reforms reached Damascus. The relationship turned hostile as […]

With the support of Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey’s foreign minister Davutoglu positioned Ankara in the vanguard of the community of nations seeking regime change in Syria. Thus Ankara gave support to the Syrian National Council and harbored the Free Syrian Army. Even when former UN secretary-general Annan’s plan for a political settlement was announced, the Turkish leadership made it clear that there could be no solution with Assad in power.

With this policy of direct confrontation, Ankara not only strove to obtain the moral high ground. It also sought to precipitate the fall of Assad while building a relationship with the future leadership of Syria by heavily investing in the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated Syrian National Council.

Today, this policy of forcefully pushing the regime change agenda in Syria is under criticism domestically as some of the risks of a post-Assad world are becoming clearer.

The fear in Turkey is of Syria’s disintegration into ethnically and religiously purer ministates, with a Kurdish entity in the north, an Alawite entity in the west and a Sunni entity in the rest. The Kurdish opposition’s recent unilateral power grab in northeastern Syria rekindled Turkish concerns about the emergence of an independent Kurdish entity linking the north of Iraq to the north of Syria.

The right policy response to this threat would certainly have been for the Turkish body politic to finally and permanently address Turkey’s own Kurdish problem. But the Justice and Development Party (AKP) leadership’s prevailing populist tendencies seem to preclude this option despite a well-intentioned effort undertaken before the 2011 elections. The fact that even the highly popular AKP, facing no imminent threat to its rule, backed away from tackling this complex issue does not bode well for the prospects of a lasting settlement.

The failure to solve its own Kurdish problem therefore raises the stakes for Turkey should Syria implode along sectarian lines. As a result (and somewhat paradoxically because it has failed to do so sufficiently at home), Turkey will almost inevitably be pulled in to invest in the future stability and territorial integrity of Syria.

With its long-standing support to the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army, Ankara hopes to have gained the leverage to influence the behavior of the future leadership in the post-Assad era. But now harder choices await Turkish policy makers.

To create the right conditions for the emergence of a political process of reconciliation and reconstruction in Syria, Turkey must shift its position. With Assad on his way out, Ankara should start the practice of conditionality. Its continued support to the Sunni opposition should be conditional on the Sunni leadership taking the lead on midwifing an inclusive, nonhegemonic, multipartite process of political dialogue on the future order in Syria. Also Ankara should seek to reengage with the Alawite minority and support efforts to nurture a new political leadership within this once-powerful minority.

The success of this engagement is critical for a country faced with allegations of exclusively supporting the Sunni camp in Syria alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Only a Turkey that acts in harmony with its secular roots can play the crucial role of helping to build a better future for all Syrians and, by extension, ensuring its own safety and security in this volatile region.

Sinan Ulgen is the chairman of the Istanbul-based think tank EDAM and a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe.

Deserted Syrian town of Anadan

“Edipoglu says the recent big clashes are taking place around the Turkish border with Syria and he says every day, what he calls al-Qaida militants are picked up from their homes and put on the buses in Antakya. He says every day and night, 40 or 50 mini buses leave for Syria and they fight there and come back and this happens every day and he says state authorities are providing the buses, even escorting them.But the Turkish foreign ministry spokesman Selcuk Unal denies that any such support is being given to any of the Syrian rebel groups.”

The Syrian ghost town that shows the future of Aleppo
For a foretaste of the future of Aleppo, you need venture only as far as the nondescript, silent town of Anadan just eight miles to the north-west.
By Richard Spencer, Anadan – Telegraph, 22 Aug 2012

The sound of war is absent, but so is the sound of everything else. When the light breeze drops, not even the shutters covering the shopfronts rattle.

There is no call to prayer from the central mosque, still open for the vanished faithful but deserted, its floor lined with broken glass. The market is empty, stalls cleared of everything up to the stone walls.

There are blasts marks and shell-holes from the battles that sent the women and children and finally men too into flight. But the effect is more ghostly than that suggests, long streets of homes that are mostly intact but seem never to expect anyone to live there again.

Anadan was one of the wellsprings of the uprising in Aleppo province that culminated in the capture of half the ancient city itself. It was the scene of a vicious battle in June between the rebels of the Free Syrian Army, mostly local men, and government troops, before the regime’s tanks were driven out.

Since then it has been shelled from bases in the northern half of the city, and bombed from the air. Earlier this month Amnesty International released satellite imagery of 600 shell craters in and around the town.

Though many seem to have missed their targets, the effect was to drive tens of thousands of people to the refugee centres on the border with Turkey, where 70,000 Syrian have already fled, or to other villages and towns. ….
Anadan is home to the political leader of the lead rebel unit fighting in Aleppo, the Liwa al-Tawhid or “Unity Brigade” – the term has both a religious meaning, referring to the Oneness of Allah, and a secular one.

Abdulaziz al-Salameh “Abu Juma’a” was a honey trader before launching his rebellion.

“He’s strong, he’s fighting for us, he’s part of us,” said Mustafa Qassem, 20, an FSA man guarding, from no one, a junction in town. “Abu Juma’a was famous for his honey, and we respect him. He is very pious.”

Another Anadan native is Abu Juma’a’s cousin, Abdulrahman al-Salameh, who heads a battalion of the Jubhat al-Nusra, a much more radical Islamist brigade which denies frequent reports that it is allied to al-Qaeda.

The regime’s tactics may be intended to scare the province into submission, the tactic which worked for Hafez al-Assad for so long. But it may just have engendered a reckless, religious, do-or-die bravery.

Out of Anadan’s silence, there came a sudden clanking and roaring. There were no regime tanks for miles, but a gun-turret suddenly poked its nose into the square. Bouncing down the road was a captured Russian T55, belching black smoke out of one corner and lurching forwards with difficulty on its half-repaired tracks.

Four young FSA men cheered from its top as it disappeared into the distance, an appropriately Mad Max-style breaking of the silence.

That tank was never going to liberate Damascus, but the MiGs won’t tame Aleppo on their own either. The betting must be on more attrition, more flight, more emptied towns before this is over.

With war, Syrians in constant flight
By BEN HUBBARD | Associated Press

KAFAR HAMRA, Syria (AP) — Civil war has chased Fatima Ghorab and her brood of some two dozen women and children across Syria in search of safe havens that keep disappearing in the booms of artillery shells. They now shelter in an unfinished apartment in this Aleppo suburb, crowded into two rooms with a few plastic chairs and some thin mattresses. If their neighbors didn’t bring them bread, they’d have none.

As her daughters and daughters-in-law and their kids tuck into a simple lunch of tomatoes and cucumbers, canned meat and apricot jam, the 56-year-old housewife from Damascus struggles to comprehend what has become of her life.

“Before all this we were living well,” said Ghorab, whose family ran a supermarket in the capital until it and their home were torched during a government attack on rebels.

“Our house was full and our shop was full. Now we’re 100 degrees below zero.”

CBS News: Assad’s Aleppo backers abandon him, some shift support, cash to rebels in risky gamble
2012-08-23, By Tucker Reals, Khaled Wassef(CBS News)

(CBS News) LONDON – Eighteen months after anti-Assad street protests spiraled into all-out civil war, sources inside Aleppo tell CBS News that many of the business leaders, scholars and other prominent figures in Syria’s largest city, who have backed President Bashar Assad and his family for decades, no longer see a future under his rule.

CBS News has learned that at least 48 of Aleppo’s elite, calling themselves the “Front of Aleppo Islamic Scholars” (FAIS) – which has a Facebook page established just last year – have hand-picked a provisional city council to take over Aleppo when Assad loses his grip on the country – and they are gambling on one of the many rebel groups fighting in the city to become its eventual protectors.

Turkey Discusses Syria Buffer Zone With U.S., Vatan Reports
2012-08-23, By Mark Bentley
Aug. 23 (Bloomberg) — Turkish officials will discuss with the U.S. the possibility of establishing a buffer zone inside Syria to enhance security for Turkey, Vatan reported.

The proposal will be raised at a meeting in Turkey’s capital Ankara today after an agreement between Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to establish an “operational mechanism” with regard to Syria, the Istanbul-based newspaper said.

Gruesome killings mark escalation of violence in Syrian capital
by Liz Sly – Wash Post

ANTAKYA, Turkey — Scores of mutilated, bloodied bodies have been found dumped on the streets and on waste ground on the outskirts of Damascus in recent days, apparently the victims of a surge of extrajudicial killings by Syrian security forces seeking to drive rebel fighters out of the capital and its suburbs.

Safe Havens in Syria: Missions and Requirements for an Air Campaign
Brian T. Haggerty, July 2012, MIT

Capture the Flag: What the rebel banner says about Syria’s civil war.
BY SAMI MOUBAYED | AUGUST 6, 2012 – Foreign Policy

The next boat people; Syria’s Alawites may take to the sea, like the Vietnamese
By Lawrence Solomon, 2012-08-25

Aug. 25 (Financial Post) — If President Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite minority lose Syria’s civil war to the Sunni majority, as Western governments have predicted for more than a year now, the real bloodbath begins. The Sunnis, in revenge for four decades of often-murderous Assad family rule, are sure to seek retribution for the 20,000 brutally killed by Assad in the last 18 months; for the 10,000 wiped out by Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, in a chemical-weapons massacre that put down a 1982 rebellion; and for the countless indignities and injustices throughout the period when the Alawite minority ruled over the Sunni majority.

Two Cheers for Syrian Islamists
So the rebels aren’t secular Jeffersonians. As far as America is concerned, it doesn’t much matter.
BY GARY GAMBILL | AUGUST 23, 2012

…. While there is sure to be regional spillover, it will cut mainly against Tehran. There will be tough times ahead for Lebanon, but ultimately the Assad regime’s death throes can only work against the Shiite Hezbollah movement. Iraq’s ruling Shiite leadership, hitherto sycophantic where Iranian interests are concerned, may find it necessary to distance itself from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s more unpopular Arab clients. With its own restive Sunni minority, Iran itself could be severely rattled by sectarian blowback. ….

Our revolution was civil and pluralistic
25 Aug 2012 Rami G. Khouri

Mass demonstrations in Tahrir Square and street battles in Syria form the dramatic heart of the uprisings and revolutions that define many Arab lands these days, but the soul and the brain of the Arab world to come are being shaped in the epic battles now taking place to write new […]

Austin Tice: ‘It’s nice and all, but please quit telling me to be safe.’
– Journalist Austin Tice, who contributed articles to The Washington Post, is currently missing in Syria.
August 23 – Wash Post

The following was posted by Austin Tice on his Facebook page on July 25. It is republished here with the permission of his parents.

Syrian ex-radio star Honey al Sayed struggles with exile, her country’s fate
Radio host flees Syrian uprising
By Hannah Allam | McClatchy Newspapers

WASHINGTON — Never, ever say the word “revolution.”…

Amateur jihad tests Syrian rebel resources
ReutersBy Suleiman Al-Khalidi | Reuters

ALEPPO, Syria (Reuters) – Talal Mohammad is a long way from Tennessee, and he’s out of his depth.

In an olive grove a few miles from the frontlines of Aleppo, he’s at a loss to explain to a battle-hardened bunch of Syrian rebels what exactly this prosperous, U.S.-trained Saudi dentist is doing there – and what he can offer to their cause.

“Why have you come?” asked one of his new comrades, sharply, as they shared a traditional evening meal, the iftar to break the Ramadan fast, in the twilight of a makeshift training camp.

“Don’t get us wrong,” the man adds quickly, anxious to show due respect to a guest at this solemn ritual of shared faith in Islam. “We appreciate your solidarity. But if you’d brought us money and weapons, that would have been much better.”

Syrians’ war to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad seems to be drawing ever greater numbers of fellow Arabs and other Muslims to the battlefield, many driven by a sense of religious duty to perform jihad, a readiness to suffer for Islam

Writing, Revolution, and Change in Syria: An Interview with Nihad Sirees
Aug 23 2012 by Yusuf Akkawi (trans. by Max Weiss) – Jadilyya

Syrie: rempart de Bachar el-Assad, les Alaouites sont aussi ses otages – par Catherine Goueset
23 août 2012, By

Syria and the US – by Sami Moubayed – New Book

Sami Moubayed has just come out with a wonderful book about US policy toward Syria. Forced to flee his beloved Damascus, Sami is now a Visiting Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Beirut. Bravo Sami

Syria and the USA: Washington’s Relations with Damascus from Wilson to Eisenhower

‘Syria and the USA is a well-told and entertaining overview of US-Syria relations from World War I to the formation of the United Arab Republic. Sami Moubayed provides the reader with insight into how Syrians view events that are crucial to their political development. He explains how general Syrian attitudes toward the US government changed from admiration to anger over the first half of the 20th century and explores how US support for Israeli displacement of Arabs in Palestine and military coups in Syria undermined initial attitudes toward Washington. The author’s interest in the history of women and cinema in Syria gives this diplomatic history cultural depth and a welcome new dimension.’ – Joshua Landis

Here is Philip Khoury of MIT:

The history of relations between Syria and the United States up until the 1960s is little known and understood. Sami Moubayed, one of Syria’s leading young historians, now offers us a remarkably comprehensive study that illustrates how a positive start in diplomatic relations in the early part of the 20th century eventually began to unwind in unfortunate ways by mid-century. Using a variety of sources including the US State Department archives and the private paper collections of Syrian political leaders, Moubayed sheds new light on the political intrigue and shenanigans that were so characteristic of the Cold War era. Scholars and foreign policy experts will appreciate the author’s efforts at reconstructing the history of an important chapter in America’s relationship with the Middle East region.’ –

Nuri al-Maliki’s Strategy toward Syria and Syrian Kurds

Kurdistan Region’s President Massoud Barzani and Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki

An Iraq intelligence specialist, who cannot use his name, wrote to disagree with my analysis of  “Assad’s Kurdish Strategy,” published two days ago. He writes:

Joshua,

I was reading your post on Syrian Kurdistan and noted that you judged that the regional Shia will probably support Syrian Kurdish aspirations.  I think this will not be the case for the Iraqi Shia parties.  Maliki and his allies are locked in a struggle with Barzani and will be very wary of any development that would improve Barzani’s leverage.  They undoubtedly already see the risk that Barzani and the KDP could, at some point, extend the KRG (de facto) into Syrian Kurdistan (or at least extend its influence).  They are already finding it extremely difficult to contain the KRG and keep it within the bounds of a Baghdad-dominated constitutional framework; if Barzani and the KRG were able to jump Iraq’s borders and become part of a broader regional Kurdish alliance, it would be a disaster for the Malikiyoun.  So Baghdad is going to have to walk a very fine line where Syria’s Kurds are concerned:  they can’t denounce Bashar’s strategy of giving the PYD control of Kurdish areas, but neither can they countenance an autonomous, free-floating Syrian Kurdistan that could someday join up with Barzanistan…

My response:

You have presented a compelling argument for why Nuri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Prime Minister, is likely to oppose Assad’s strategy of promoting the PKK (the Syrian Communist Party) as the dominant power in the predominantly Kurdish parts of Eastern Syria. But let me explain the thinking that ultimately persuaded me to conclude that Maliki will go along with Assad’s strategy in the Jazeera, even if doing so causes him to finger through his worry-beads with greater anxiety.

Massoud Barzani, the current President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, has come out against the PKK taking power in Syria. Barzani said last month that he was helping to arm and train fighters from the Kurdish National Council (KNC), which is the PKK’s rival. One must note that the PKK has renamed itself the PYD in Syria. Thus, Barzani has come out squarely on the side of the Kurdish coalition in Syria that sides with the Turks, Americans and Free Syrian Army. He has decided that the PKK is trouble. I presume Barzani is doing this in part because he must maintain good relations with Turkey, his major guarantor against Maliki as well as his major economic partner. He is also correctly leery of the PKK, who are a bunch of hot-head nationalist extremists and who are defined as terrorists by most of his allies. (Turkey blames them for the deaths of 40,000 in Turkey over the last 30 years.) Barzani certainly does not want Kurdish foreign policy being made by the thuggish PKK. Having his own state to worry about, Barzani can no longer afford to be the nationalist militia leader he once was. He cannot gamble away his own state in order to promote Kurdish independence in Syria or even Greater Kurdistan. He will go soft on independence for Syrian Kurdistan in order to promote the interests of Iraqi Kurdistan.

The PKK as Poison Chalise

You are absolutely right about Maliki’s caution when it comes to the possibility of a greater Kurdistan. He does not want it. But, as you underline, he is trying to contain Barzani, behind whom are the Turks. If he can hurt Barzani by forcing him to link up with the PKK, he will ruin Barzani’s delicate understanding with the Turks. Should the PKK come out the winner in Eastern Syria, rather than the more moderate KNC, Barzani will be forced into a very difficult and embarrassing position. He will have to chose between his fellow Kurds in Syria, led by the PKK , and Turkey. For this reason, I suspect that Prime Minister Maliki will devilishly refuse to stand in the way of the PKK in Syrian Kurdistan in order to scuttle Iraqi Kurdistan’s pro-Turkish gambit and saddle Barzani with a “terrorist” partner.

Perhaps, I am being too Machiavellian, but what choice does Maliki have? He must go along with his fellow Shiites in Syria and Iran in their goal to spoil Sunni Arab chances of consolidating their rule in Syria. The best way to do this is to prop up Assad as a key player in Syria, even as he loses control of national government, and to promote minorities, such as the Kurds. This will keep Syria destabilized. Maliki must balance his fear of Kurds against his fear of Sunni Arabs.

In Maliki’s domestic power-struggles, the Kurds are his main competitor today. But in his larger regional struggle, the Sunnis are his nemesis in the longer-run — that is, if they can ever get their act together and emerge from the Arab Spring as unified and productive nations. Were I Maliki, I would promote the PKK in Syria as a poison chalice for Barzani. Even if the Kurds negotiate this crisis successfully to emerge as a larger nation, will a larger Kurdistan stand as a greater threat than the Sunni Arabs? I doubt it. Why? Iraq has already lost Kurdistan. (of course there is the complicating factor of Kirkuk) Kurdistan is land-locked and must depend on its neighbors for trade, transport, overflight permission and so much more. Maliki will always be able to contain Kurdistan because of its dependency on Iraq. He can manage its potential dangers. Afterall, who likes the Kurds among Iraq’s neighbors? Not Iran, not Turkey, not Syrian Arabs, and not Saudi Arabia. Only Israel and the US defend Kurdish interests, largely because the Kurds can be used to counter Arab states and Iran when needed. Turkey has emerged as Kurdistan’s protector of sorts, but that is contingent on Kurdistan keeping its expansionist ambitions in check.

Sunni Arabs are Nuri al-Maliki’s Long-term Danger

The Sunnis are the long-term danger for Iraq’s Prime Minister. Sunni Arab Nationalism is the BIG threat. Saudi Arabia has the money and America on its side, which enables it to fund the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, potentially empower a future Sunni Syria to counter-balance Shiite Iraq, squeeze Iraq diplomatically and perhaps economically (Should the US ever decide to sanction Iraq due to its alliance with Iran and sanction busting financial transactions with the nasty Persians). The recrudescence of al-Qaida in Iraq, Salafist bombings in Baghdad, and general revanchist Sunni agitation is preventing Maliki from bringing stability and security to Iraq more than the Kurds are. They are not giving up. A consolidated Sunni Syria will breathe new life  into Iraq’s angry Sunnis. They have not come to terms with the notion of a Shiite dominated Iraq. For this reason, Maliki may choose to stoke the flames of Kurdish expansionism in order to douse Sunni expansionism? Keeping the Syrians off balance will help neutralize Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the real neighborhood bullies from Maliki’s perspective. What is more, the chances of the Kurds actually pulling off Greater Kurdistan must look very small compared to the chances that the Sunni Arabs, backed by the US and Israel, will launch a major counter-offensive against the feared “Shiite Crescent”. They are looking to destabilize Iran, overturn Shiite authority in Damascus, roll back Shiite power in Baghdad, and ding Hizbullah’s writ in Lebanon.

You write that “Baghdad is going to have to walk a very fine line where Syria’s Kurds are concerned:  they can’t denounce Bashar’s strategy of giving the PYD control of Kurdish areas, but neither can they countenance an autonomous, free-floating Syrian Kurdistan that could someday join up with Barzanistan…”

This is very well stated. We agree that Maliki faces a dilemma in Syria in balancing Kurds against Sunni Arabs. His balance-of-power calculations will require a delicate dance in which he will likely be compelled to do-si-do his partners, sometimes leaning toward the Kurds and at others toward the Sunni Arabs in order to advance Baghdad’s interests and keep both of his adversaries from growing stronger.

News

Global Insights: Interests Aligned, Iraq’s Maliki Sticks By Syria
By: Richard Weitz | World Politics Review

Amid Syria’s widespread civil disorder, ongoing since March 2011, the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has pressed on with its policy of rapprochement with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime….

Turkish Leaders Appeal for Unity After Deadly Car Bomb
By: Daren Butler | Reuters

Turkey’s leaders called for unity on Wednesday following a car bomb attack which heightened fears that Kurdish militants are exploiting chaos in neighboring Syria and stepping up their decades-old insurgency.

Syria’s Sectarian Echoes in Turkey
By Giorgio Cafiero, August 22, 2012

Not all Turks support their government’s position on Syria. Many Alawite Turks have expressed solidarity with the Assad regime, as have Turkish Alevis (who belong to another often-persecuted sub-sect of Shiite Islam). These Turks highlight an important lesson about the Middle East. In a region with deep sectarian divisions, national unity sometimes proves weaker than transnational religious, ethnic, and linguistic ties….

Turkish public opinion about Syria’s turmoil is most divided in Hatay province, situated on the Mediterranean coast along the Syrian border. Most of the half-million Arab Alawites living in Turkey reside in Hatay, where Alawites and Sunnis live in equal number alongside a sizeable Christian minority.

Since the violence erupted in Syria, a number of Alawite-led pro-Assad demonstrations have erupted in Hatay, while Sunni groups elsewhere in the province have aided and abetted the Free Syrian Army. In March 2012, NPR’s Istanbul-based foreign correspondent, Peter Kenyon, reported that “a large demonstration featured the classic pro-Assad chant: ‘Allah, Syria, Bashar, that’s all.’” According to Al Jazeera, many in Turkey’s Alawite community believe “President Bashar al-Assad is trying to hold a tolerant, pluralist Syria together, and many of them are concerned about how minorities are being treated by the Syrian rebels.” ….

By contrast, religious minorities in Turkey have not received similar protection from their government. During the Turkish Republic’s early years, many Alevis supported Kemal Atatürk because secularism was a key pillar of his ideology. As non-Sunnis, they believed that they could only fare well under a secular political system. However, throughout the last nine decades, Alevi Turks have been persistently marginalized, persecuted, and discriminated against. Right-wing Turkish forces, along with vigilantes and police, committed massacres against Alevi communities in 1978, 1993, and 1995. Moreover, cemevis (Alevi gathering places) are not granted legal status as a place of worship. Even today, numerous NGOs, including the Association for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples and the Humanitarian Relief Foundation, have documented “mysterious marks drawn by individuals on dozens of homes belonging to members of Turkey’s Alevi minority in … Adiyaman.”

Prime Minister Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) is not popular within Alevi circles, and the crisis in Syria has not facilitated an improvement in relations between Turkey’s ruling party and the country’s largest religious minority. Selahattin Ozel, the chairman of the federation of Alevi associations in Turkey, told The Wall Street Journal, “As Turkish Alevis, we do not support an anti-democratic, an anti-humanist regime [in Syria], but we cannot understand why the [Turkish] prime minister so suddenly became an enemy of the Syrian administration.” The Alevis have remained overwhelming supportive of the AKP’s main opposition, the Kemalist-oriented Republican People’s Party (CHP), and many in the community fear that Erdogan is attempting to create a Sunni Islamist state in Turkey….

As Soner Cagaptay reports, “Should Ankara intervene in Syria against the ‘Alawite’ al-Assad regime and militarily support the ‘Sunni’ uprising, some in the Turkish Alevi community might be inclined to view this as a ‘Sunni attack’ against ‘fellow Alevis.’” Ali Yilmaz Cecim, a Turkish Alevi with a negative view of his government’s relationship with the armed Syrian opposition, echoed this view. “They [the Turkish Sunnis] are taking sides with foreigners against fellow Turkish citizens,” he told the Independent. “We know that many of these Syrians coming in have extremist views, that is why they are fighting their government, despite what they say. The people who want to bring them in are doing so because they will help to push their own extremist religious views here, they want to build up numbers.”

The Future of Turkey’s Religious Minorities

According to the Financial Times, “Reports of the black flag of al-Qaeda flying in parts of Syria, along with the kidnap of two western journalists near the Turkish border by an Islamist gang which seems to have included many foreigners, have led to fears that Syria is becoming a magnet for global jihadis.” Earlier this month, Alex Marquardt of ABC reported on Al Qaeda’s growing influence in Syria and stated that “foreign fighters, mostly religious fundamentalists, [are] streaming in – taking up the fight. They want Assad to go and Syria to become an Islamic state.” Unfortunately, the radicalization and internationalization of Syria’s armed opposition only exacerbate the fears of Turkey’s minority communities that Assad’s ouster could undermine their security.

Some Islamist members of Syria’s armed opposition have brought their anti-Alawite prejudices with them into the refugee camps in southern Turkey, thus exacerbating Turkey’s sectarian tensions. Mehmed Aziz, a 28-year-old Syrian refugee at a camp in Ceylanpinar, Turkey — which receives hundreds of refugees on a daily basis — threatened that any Alawites arriving at the camp will be murdered. On August 4, an Alawite family in Surgu was targeted by a Sunni mob at the beginning of Ramadan, which Alawites do not observe. The mob threw stones at the family’s house and chanted “Death to Alawites. We’re going to burn you all down.” The angry mob only dispersed after police officers announced that the Alawite family was moving, which the targeted family never told the police.

Although Bashar Al-Assad’s regime has carried out grave atrocities against his own people and provided many Syrians with reasons to support the armed opposition, Turkey’s Alawite and Alevi communities across the border have legitimate concerns about the regime’s demise….

News Round Up (22 Aug. 2012)

Qadri Jamil, Syrian Deputy PM, Claims Assad ready to discuss resignation

In a press conference that followed a meeting with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow, Syrian Deputy Prime Minister Qadri Jamil said that all issues can be discussed during direct negotiations with the opposition and even ready to discuss Assad’s resignation. This follows in a long line of offers by the Russians and the Assad regime to offer negotiations to the opposition, which has continually insisted that the regime is simply playing for time attempting to shift blame.

Sectarian violence sparked by the conflict in neighboring Syria has erupted in the Lebanese city of Tripoli, with at least eight killed and 75 wounded in clashes between Sunnis and Alawites.

The Free Syrian Army says it controls more than 70 percent of Aleppo. The death Toll yesterday reached 250 according to the opposition with calimed it had killed at least 50 army soldiers – (Damascus: 115, Aleppo: 56, Daraa: 33, Deir Azzour: 17, Homs: 12, Idlib: 5, Latakia: 4, Hama: 3, Suwaida: 1)

The Free Syrian Army captured the state security headquarters, a police station, a military checkpoint and a tank in the Deir Azzour suburb of Mayadin.

Once Deir al-Zur, the capital of the North-eastern region falls to opposition forces, the Syrian government will have lost control of the Jazeera, the region beyond the Euphrates river, which produces much of Syria’s cash crops, such as cotton as well as staple foods, such as wheat. It is also the main oil and gas producing region of the country. The Kurdish parts of the Jazeera have already fallen out of government control and into the hands of the Kurdish Communist Party. It will not be long before most of the Arab tribal regions are lost to the government. The tribal leaders have been the focus of government largesse, diplomacy, and intimidation in an effort to keep them from joining the opposition, but most Arabs in the region are angry at the government for its long neglect of the East, which suffers from widespread poverty, joblessness, and lack of government investment.

Syrian rebels say aid from the United States has been slow to arrive.

Risks of Syrian Intervention Limit Options for U.S.
By STEVEN LEE MYERS and SCOTT SHANE

WASHINGTON — Despite President Obama’s warning to Syria not to use its arsenal of chemical weapons or allow them to fall into the hands of extremists, the administration’s options for intervening remain limited by what its officials have described as a simple calculus: It would make the conflict even worse.

American military operations against Syria, officials reiterated on Tuesday, would risk drawing in Syria’s patrons, principally Iran and Russia, at a much greater level than they already are involved. It would allow Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to rally popular sentiment against the West and embolden Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups now fighting the Assad government to turn their attention to what they would see as another American crusade in the Arab world.

Syria’s deputy prime minister, Qadri Jamil, made the point in Moscow on Tuesday, dismissing Mr. Obama’s warning, and declaring that any foreign military intervention would lead to “a confrontation wider than Syria’s borders.”

At the same time, Mr. Obama’s remarks underscored the fact that there could be limits to the American reluctance to intervene. But it would require a threat to American interests and values that a civil war inside Syria by itself does not: a nightmarish attack using chemical weapons or the transfer of those weapons to hardened enemies of the United States and its allies, including Israel, which the president mentioned on Monday.

“We say it for deterrence effect, of course, but it’s also a reality,” one official said Tuesday, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the administration’s internal strategy deliberations. “The United States is not going to be able to sit it out if Syria starts using chemical weapons on its people.”

The Syrian Foreign Ministry pledged in late July that its stockpile of chemical weapons would be used only against foreign intervention, and that it would “never, never be used against the Syrian people or civilians during this crisis, under any circumstances.”….

Independent: Robert Fisk: ‘No power can bring down the Syrian regime’
2012-08-21

But a halo of brown smoke embraces the horizon and the driver knows better than to follow the motorway signs from the airport. He turns left, gingerly bouncing over the broken median rail, then between two huge piles of rocks like a frightened cat. …

I asked one of the Syrian military elite here if he had any reaction to US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta, who announced two weeks ago that Aleppo would be “a nail in Assad’s coffin” and that of the regime. This was the officer’s reply: “The Syrian regime will stay for ever. No power on earth can bring it down. All regimes will fall – but Syria will stay, because God is on the side of those who are in the right.”…

But access to the Syrian army can sometimes produce a factoid more powerful than statistics. Ahmed, a 21-year-old conscript, tells me how his brother, Private Mohammed Ibrahim Dout, was “martyred” by a sniper. His comrade says: “We are sorry for our brother soldier, but he is now in paradise.” A General tells me of a friend, a Lieutenant in the full-time Syrian army in the Damascus suburb of Douma: “He was married three months ago and was walking to his home in Douma when some men in a van greeted him and offered him a lift.” Lieutenant Assem Abbas, 23, accepted the gesture in good faith.

“We found him later,” the General says, “cut into two pieces and thrown into a sewage tank.”

In Syria, the Soap Opera Is a Casualty of War
By OMAR ADAM SAYFO, OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Published: August 17, 2012

IN the Syrian town my family comes from, every afternoon during the holy month of Ramadan the streets were jammed with people. They were rushing home not only to escape the heat and to prepare the iftar, the evening meal that breaks the fast, but also to catch the latest episodes of their favorite soap operas – the musalsals.

This year’s Ramadan is different. In the midst of a brutal civil war, Syrians are getting more than enough drama from real life. At the same time, Syrian production companies have shelved new shows; investors with ties to President Bashar al-Assad’s government have found their bank accounts frozen; and viewers throughout the Arab world have called for a boycott of Syrian satellite channels. A tax break issued by the government has failed to revive the industry.

While the outcome of the fighting is uncertain, one thing seems clear: in losing the soap opera, the Syrian government has lost one of its most powerful means of spreading ideas and political messages, both within and beyond the country’s borders.

Syrian soap operas took off in the ’90s, when satellite-television access increased across the Arab world, and were watched by tens of millions of people from Morocco to the Persian Gulf. The most successful production companies were always affiliated with the regime and toed the line of government censorship. But in the new millennium, following the second Palestinian intifada, the attacks of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq, Syrian soap operas became more explicitly aligned with the Assad government’s Baathist – or Pan-Arab – ideology. They were increasingly set in the distant past, featuring Arab heroes and glorious wars.

The most prominent of these was a musalsal on the life of Sultan Saladin, the 12th-century defeater of the Crusaders and liberator of Jerusalem. The plot presented Saladin as the ultimate Arab hero, without mentioning his Kurdish origins, and the dialogue was stuffed with Baathist propaganda arguing for the “unity of the Arabs.” Even the most naïve viewer could not fail to associate the Crusaders with the Israelis and Americans or Sa’war – the corrupt Egyptian leader – with President Hosni Mubarak.

As the region’s politics changed, so, too, did Syria’s soap operas. Historical dramas from the ’90s, like “Damascene Days,” showed Arab patriots struggling against Ottoman oppression. But in the series written after the 2003-4 détente between Turkey and Syria, the foes were no longer the Turks but European colonialists. One of the most popular soap operas ever, “Bab al-Hara” or “The Neighborhood’s Gate,” recounts the adventures of the inhabitants of an old Damascus neighborhood who, regardless of their sectarian backgrounds, were united in their opposition to the French.

It may have been propaganda, but for a while, it worked. We, too, regardless of whether we were Christian or Druse, members of the Sunni majority or Alawites like the ruling Assads, cheered Mutaz, the mustachioed tough guy who confronted the chicken-hearted French soldiers; we celebrated the heroism of Um Joseph, the Christian woman who protected the Muslim neighborhood; and we mourned when Abu Issam, the beloved barber and doctor, passed away (or was killed off because of a controversy between the actor and director).

But after this year’s bloody crackdown, anti-sectarian slogans are simply no longer credible. The strength of Syrian drama turned into its weakness.

While there are few soap operas left on television, their stars continue to play a role in Syrian politics. After the authorities assaulted Dara’a in March 2011, hundreds of actors and writers signed the so-called Milk Petition, condemning the crackdown and requesting aid for the region’s children. In response, more than 20 production companies issued a notice accusing the signers of treachery and announcing that they would never work again. If the war goes the other way, the loyalist actors – those who rushed to defend the regime, appearing on talk shows to condemn terrorist groups and foreign conspiracies – will have an equally hard time finding their way back to the screen.

Perhaps the greatest theatrical blow to the Assad government and its myth of a unified Syria came last fall, when Jamal Suleiman, an Alawite actor and the son-in-law of a former minister of information, failed to return from a trip abroad. Just 10 years earlier, he played the role of Saladin, liberator of Jerusalem.

All of these stars and their shows were once tools of the regime, and thankfully they are no longer. But when this war is over, we should remember that the musalsals were also a source of pride for the Syrian people, a homegrown popular art form that once brought all of us together. The rest of the Arab world will not mourn them much; popular Turkish soap operas have already stepped in to fill the gap. But in the hot afternoons of Ramadans to come, in Syria, even the staunchest opponents of the Assads will miss the musalsals.

Omar Adam Sayfo is a researcher in the Netherlands specializing in Arab media.

Der Spiegel: Star Witness Top Syrian Media Host Abandons Assad for the Truth
2012-08-22

Star Witness Top Syrian Media Host Abandons Assad for the Truth By Bastian Berbner in Paris J. B. Russell / Cosmos / Agentur Focus For 15 years, Ola Abbas presented the news on Syrian state television …

“Revolt in Syria,” Stephen Starr’s Book; Sahner on Syrian Heritage beign Destroyed; Ajami on Clinton

Stephen Starr’s new book on Syria is full of startling insights that only someone who has lived and worked there for the last five years could write. It is also a good read. Here is an excerpt.

‘Revolt in Syria: Eye-Witness to the Uprising’ excerpt
By Stephen Starr

Laila met me at a café in downtown Damascus. She was from a wealthy family that lived in Dummar, a suburb on the north-western outskirts of Damascus. She was twenty one years old and in her third year of media studies at Damascus University.

“I saw some students from my class take off their belts and hit medicine students who wanted to hold a demonstration for freedom. It was shocking. Almost everyone in my class is totally pro-government. I’ve cut thirty of my friends from Facebook be¬cause I can’t continue to listen to their rubbish. I’m not talking to two of my cousins because they disagree with me.” The thing that had surprised her most, she said, was how educated peo¬ple she knew were talking about the crisis. “They’re saying we should all stand blindly behind the government.”
I suggested that they were probably afraid of civil war in Syria. Laila disagreed.

“In Jordan there are Palestinians that follow various Palestinian groups, there are Jordanians, Beduins, Christians and so on and they get along. The sectarian idea doesn’t have to apply to Syria.”

She told me how on 15 June, on the day of the unfurling of a giant Syrian flag in the Mezzah area of Damascus, she had an exam at the nearby faculty of literature. “I had to take off my shoes to cross the street because I couldn’t walk on the flag in order to get to my exam. Then when I started the test I couldn’t concentrate because of the noise from the rally outside. I mean, what type of logic and thinking is this – to hold a huge govern¬ment rally next to a state university where state exams are tak¬ing place? It is just so stupid.

“My house was worth seventy million Syrian pounds [almost US$1.5 million at the time] before the unrest began – we have money, we have a lot to lose. But we will gain more under a dif¬ferent government. My four brothers have to go live and work in Dubai because they can’t get work here and because of the military service. The government is driving its youth away.”

Sipping on a lemon-mint drink, Laila was convinced Syria was being held back by those in power.

“We have to work all year to spend one week in Beirut for some fun. What is this? Beirut is nothing, we could have so much more right here in Syria,” she said, bending marks into her drink¬ing straw in frustration.

Laila said she has been once or twice to Beirut for shopping and to visit pubs and that her closest four or five friends all shared her opinion on ‘The Situation’.
She also told me of the mafia-style workings of the police and security apparatus as the regime worked to stamp out dissent across the country in July.

“My friend’s father was detained in Hama one month ago [May 2011]. Very few people know this, but US$2,000 will allow you to find out where a person is being held. US$4,000 will ensure he or she stays alive although it does not guarantee his or her health. US$2,000 more will get him or her on a list for question¬ing which will mean, at some stage, he or she will be released.”

She said she would like to see foreign military intervention in Syria to kick out the regime. “The regime will never give in because of the system they have organized. I don’t think they will change as they are say¬ing. I would prefer to die by an American or English gun than by someone from my own country.”

For Laila, as for others, corruption and the necessity of wasta are hated aspects of daily life in Syria. Corruption and bureau¬cracy angered her most.
“If I want to get a passport in Jordan it would take me one hour. In Syria it will take forever unless I pay the employee some money.

“My father goes twice a week to an electricity office. When he goes there he has three assistants and they’re all from the 86 area [a predominantly Alawite-inhabited area in west Damas¬cus]. This is the state’s disease, this is how they have worked for decades. It is unsustainable and it needs to be rooted out and ended.”
She said the magazine where she worked part-time was emp¬ty. “There are no employees. Companies have stopped spending money on advertising so the magazine simply has no revenue. It’s as simple as that.”

She went on to talk about the business situation in Syria and the anger it made her feel.
“Do you know how they started Syriatel?” she asked me, refer¬ring to the telecommunications company owned by the presi¬dent’s cousin. “Anyone who wanted to open a mobile phone line had to pay 10,000 Syrian pounds and then wait for months. Then they bought the equipment and technology they needed and started their own company. What rubbish! This is the peo-ple’s company. Those people did not pay for it yet they call it their own.

“Do you know why there are no Starbucks, no McDonald’s and so on in Syria? If I want to start a business I need to give the government 51 per cent ownership. They then take another 10 per cent of the profits from me. So essentially they have 61 per cent of my company. Why would anyone want to open a busi¬ness in this situation? This is why we are such an undeveloped country.”

She told me about the reasons for social inequality in Syria.
“The people who live in 86, the Alawites who have free phone lines and who don’t ever pay for their electricity, are being told they are going to be attacked and are being given guns by the security forces ‘to protect themselves’.

“We have laws but no one obeys them. Why? Because they are not being enforced. People are flexible. If the government leads with a bad example the people will follow.
“People in Dubai or Beirut don’t throw litter on the street, but here we do. Why? I know that if I talk on the phone while driving and a policeman stops me I can give him a smile, slip 500 Syrian pounds [US$10] into my driving license and smile. He’ll let me go.”

I asked her whether it wasn’t the responsibility of the people not to do this, not to give out money to the police and other government workers and not to throw litter in the streets.
“My mother was in the US two months ago and she told me how in one mall there was a green space where people could not sit. In Syria, everyone would sit there for two reasons. One, because they don’t take the average policeman or, for example, ministry inspector seriously. Second, because they simply have nowhere else to go. We have lots of fancy restaurants for rich people but nothing has been put in place for the poor who want to have fun.”

Laila said she was neither an activist nor part of the opposition beyond posting cryptic remarks on her Facebook page. I asked her for the solution to the current unrest.
“We need to turn the clock back to zero. Sure it will take time, maybe five years, but it will certainly be worth it. We have been led as sheep for forty years and if this government stays we will be sheep for forty more.”

I told her that I thought this was the danger. “If you have a sheep that has been following a shepherd for three years and you let him go free he’ll be dead in a week.”
She was visibly angry as she waved my point away:

“I believe that everyone has one chance. The regime has had chances for forty years. They’ve had so many chances since the problems started in March but what have they done? Nothing. They must go.”

‘Revolt in Syria’ was released in the US on August 14.

La vie sans Bachar
Garance Le Caisne, envoyée spéciale à l’ouest d’Alep (en Syrie) – Le Journal du Dimanche 19

REPORTAGE – À l’ouest d’Alep, des milliers de personnes habitent une région libérée. Justice, police, santé, vie en société, il leur faut tout inventer : “Assad voulait qu’on se déchire. C’est le contraire qui est arrivé”

Hillary and the Hollowness of ‘People-to-People’ Diplomacy
By Fouad Ajami, 11 August 2012, Wall Street Journal

The sight of Hillary Clinton cutting a rug on the dance floor this week in South Africa gives away the moral obtuseness of America’s chief diplomat. That image will tell the people of the besieged Syrian city of Aleppo, under attack by a merciless regime, all they need to know about the heartlessness of U.S. foreign policy…..

Syria has now descended, as it was bound to, into a drawn-out conflict, into a full-scale sectarian civil war between the Sunni majority and the Alawi holders of power. But Mrs. Clinton could offer nothing better than this trite, hackneyed observation: “We must figure out ways to hasten the day when bloodshed ends and the political transition begins. We have to make sure that state institutions stay intact.”

These are the words of someone running out the clock on the Syrians, playing for time on behalf of a president who gave her this post knowing there would be at Foggy Bottom a politician like himself instead of a diplomat given to a belief in American power and the American burden in the world….

Letter From Syria
The War Within by Jon Lee Anderson for the New Yorker

As Syria descends into civil war, can its rebel factions unite against the government?

In our new Insight, MEI Research Fellow Linda Matar explores how the al-Asad regime in Syria has been slowing the pace of neoliberal economic reform since the beginning of the country’s uprising in March 2011. For instance, state-controlled cooperatives have been ensuring the availability of food items at reasonable prices, and the government has also raised public sector wages and approved 25,000 new public sector jobs. However, despite these attempts to mitigate social unrest, Matar writes that “these measures have done little to arrest the social disaster already in place.”

Mourning for Syria: I love America, I love Syria, I hate the war, but will things get better if Assad is gone?
By Dalel Khalil in the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, 2012-08-12

On the subject of local governance and organizing committees, this article from last Sunday (12 August) in LeJDD explains how a new civil society is springing up in Northern Syria where Assad no longer rules.

Russia warns West over Syria after Obama threats
By Dominic Evans,BEIRUT | Tue Aug 21, 2012

(Reuters) – Russia warned the West on Tuesday against unilateral action on Syria, a day after U.S. President Barack Obama threatened “enormous consequences” if his Syrian counterpart used chemical or biological arms or even moved them in a menacing way.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, speaking after meeting China’s top diplomat, said Moscow and Beijing were committed to “the need to strictly adhere to the norms of international law…and not to allow their violation”…..

Seeking re-election in November, Obama noted that he had refrained “at this point” from ordering U.S. military engagement in Syria. But when he was asked at a White House news conference whether he might deploy forces, for example to secure Syrian chemical and biological weapons, he said his view could change.

“We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is (if) we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized,” Obama said. “That would change my calculus.”….

Saving Syria – The Wall Street Journal – August 21, 2012
By Christian C. Sahner

Many tragedies have followed the start of the Syrian uprising 18 months ago, but one that deserves more attention is the destruction of Syria’s cultural patrimony. Throughout the country, Roman temples, Crusader castles and medieval mosques have been subject to shelling, gunfire and military occupation. What is more, the collapse of authority has led to widespread theft and looting. As Syria descends into bedlam, the international community must work to protect the country’s historical sites, lest we see a repeat of the destruction of Iraq’s landmarks after 2003.

Syria is the cradle of civilization, with a history of human settlement stretching back 5,000 years. …..

Among the at-risk monuments is the Unesco World Heritage site Crac des Chevaliers, a Crusader fortress of the 12th to 13th centuries, which stands on a hilltop overlooking the plains of Homs. It is regarded as the finest example of medieval castle architecture anywhere in the world. According to reports, Crac was the site of peaceful antigovernment protests in March when it came under shelling. This led to damage to the outer walls, as well as the elegant Crusader chapel inside, which was converted into a mosque in 1271. Other reports indicate that it has served as a hub for foreign fighters who have entered Syria to battle the regime.

Then there is the ancient city of Palmyra, another Unesco World Heritage site, whose ruins lay scattered across a desert oasis 150 miles northeast of Damascus. Looting has been reported throughout the archaeological site, including in the Temple of Bel complex, the stately colonnaded avenue, the Camp of Diocletian, and the Valley of the Tombs.

Some of the most brazen destruction has occurred at the Roman city of Apamea, about 40 miles northwest of Hama. During recent months, Syrian army tanks have occupied the colonnaded street and shelled the 12th-century fortress of Qala’at al-Mudiq, which stands atop the old Roman acropolis. Plunderers have profited from the chaos, arriving in Apamea with heavy digging equipment and absconding with priceless Roman mosaics and column capitals. There is speculation that these kinds of looters are part of a wider network of criminals operating in the Middle East, who pillage archaeological sites on behalf of the black market.

Some of the worst-hit monuments lie in cities that have been the focus of sustained urban warfare. These include Dara’a in the far southwest, where the uprising began in March 2011; its ‘Umari mosque— founded at the time of the Islamic conquests—has sustained heavy shelling. There is also Homs, the veritable center of the uprising, where countless mosques, churches and markets now stand in ruin. Most recently, the fighting has spread to Aleppo, where gunfire has engulfed the great medieval citadel in the center of town, which has served as a makeshift army base.

There are dozens of other examples of destruction throughout the country, not to mention instances of brazen theft from Syrian museums. This has prompted ominous comparisons to postinvasion Iraq, where the collapse of security led to much-publicized looting of the National Museum, along with ancient sites such as Babylon and Nineveh. With no end to the Syrian uprising in sight, what can be done to reverse the trend?

First, the media and nongovernmental organizations must publicize the damage and looting. …..

Assad’s Kurdish Strategy

Assad’s Kurdish Strategy
Joshua Landis – Aug 20, 2012

Assad’s Kurdish strategy appears to be to help the PKK to take control of the Kurdish regions of Syria in the North East. His aim is to hurt both the Free Syrian Army and Turkey, which are leading the opposition against him. In general, his strategy is to weaken the Sunni Arabs of Syria. On July 19, the Syrian Army withdrew from the town of Kobani followed by Efrin, Derik and Amuda as PYD forces swept in to take its place. Many claimed this peaceful transfer of power was orchestrated by the Assad regime and PYD leaders. There was no fighting and no casualties were incurred, according to the PYD , which said the party essentially issued an ultimatum that prompted Syrian government forces to withdraw from their positions.

The PKK, masquerading as the Democratic Union Party (PYD), is the wing of the Kurdish movement that is most anti-Turkish and therefor anti-Free Syrian Army. It is also vocally pan-Kurdish in contrast to many of the other Kurdish parties in Syria, which have positioned themselves, at least for the time-being, around the more limited goal of seeking Kurdish national rights enshrined in an autonomous region within Syria. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party is blamed by Turkish authorities for the death of 40,000 Turks and Kurds over the last several decades due to their separatist agenda and insurgent tactics. Because the PKK is better armed and more militant than other Kurdish groups, it has advantages because it is more prepared for war and the use of force.

The Kurdish National Council (KNC) represents most of the Kurdish parties that oppose the PYD strategy. It is looking for an accommodation with the Free Syrian Army and Syrian opposition forces as a means to gaining national rights and freedom for Kurds. The KNC is a fractious coalition, that is not well armed or organized.

The Kurdish parts of Syria will undoubtedly become the focus of the power struggle that is emerging in the region over Syria. Sunni Arabs and Turks will line up against it. Shiite forces will be inclined to encourage Kurdish independence if only to hurt the Sunni Arabs by playing minorities of every stripe against the against the FSA, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US.

But what should the Kurds do? All Kurds are looking to take advantage of the collapse of central authority in Syria. They see this as an historic opportunity to press for their freedom and national rights. But how hard should they press and how fast? Should they work with Turkey against Assad or should they fight Turkey and ally with Assad? Is this a moment for caution or for audacity? Should they side with the Syrian opposition and Turkey against the Assad regime based on the notion that the Syrian revolt is about freedom versus dictatorship? Or should they side with Syria’s religious minorities against Sunni Arabs, based on the understanding that this uprising is largely sectarian. If this is the case, perhaps Kurds, being an ethnic minority, should stick with minorities in general against Sunni Arabs, who will present the greatest future obstacle to Kurdish ambitions? For decades the Assad regime has stood for Arab chauvinism and the denial of Kurdish national rights. Now that Assad and the Arab Baath Party are losing power, some Kurds calculate that the Free Syrian Army will inherit the banner of Arab Nationalism.

Syria’s Kurds are understandably divided over how to pursue the struggle for Kurdish national rights and freedoms. The Syrian revolution is only in its infancy. The forces on the ground are changing with great speed to meet the challenges of the battlefield. Along with the emergence of new combatants and the transformation of the Syrian Army into an Alawite militia, ideologies are changing as rapidly as the faces of the leading fighters. Trying to keep up with the emerging forces in Syria is a full-time job. Kurds are having as much trouble picking their way through the dynamic battlefield and defining a strategy as everyone else. Their many factions are also fighting furiously among themselves for primacy in what many see as an emerging Kurdish state.

Kurd-Watch: New interview: Mustafa Jum?a, Kurdish politician: »The PYD has weapons and we don’t. They will kill us all.«

KURDWATCH, August 16, 2012—Mustafa Jum?a (b. 1947 in ?Ayn al??Arab [Kobanî]) is Vice President of the Kurdish National Council and Secretary of the Kurdish Freedom Party in Syria (Azadî). On June 24, 2012, he was kidnapped by members of the Democratic Union Party (PYD); since his release, he has been living in Iraqi-Kurdistan. This interview, in which he speaks in particularl about his party’s relationship to the PYD, was conducted a few days before his kidnapping.

In Syria, role of Kurds divides opposition

By Babak Dehghanpisheh, Wash Post

BEIRUT — Opponents of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad are showing signs of splintering along a deep regional fault line, with Arabs and Turks uneasy about a military offensive last month by Syrian Kurds, who overran four towns in the country’s north.

The attacks marked the first time since the 17-month-old uprising began that Kurdish fighters had joined in military action against Assad’s forces. But the Kurdish muscle-flexing has rattled groups such as the Arab-led Free Syrian Army, which until now has played the leading role in the upheaval, and it has unsettled neighboring Turkey, whose animosity toward Assad is surpassed only by apprehension about the Kurds’ broader ambitions in the region.

……In Syria, the Kurdish region is home to 2 million people, and many Turkish officials fear that the Kurds will begin using the area as a base from which to launch attacks on the Turkish military, as they have done for years from neighboring Iraq.Until the recent attacks, Syrian Kurds had stayed on the sidelines, mostly, it appeared, out of concern that a victory by Arab-led opposition groups over Assad’s forces might do little to alter a power balance that has left Kurds relatively weak in Syria. There has been little cooperation between the armed Kurdish groups in the north and the Free Syrian Army, and their relationship seems to be one of mutual distrust.

But in response to the Kurdish moves, Syrian opposition groups such as the Free Syrian Army were quick to reiterate a vow that they will not permit Syria to be divided along ethnic or sectarian lines. The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said he stood ready to send troops into Syria to confront Kurdish forces there if it becomes a base for incursions into Turkey by Kurdish guerrillas.

The U.S. government has also expressed alarm, warning Kurdish groups in Syria that they should not seek to work with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, whose insurgency against the Turkish government has killed at least 40,000 people.

“We share Turkey’s determination that Syria must not become a haven for PKK terrorists, whether now or after the departure of the Assad regime,” Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said on a recent visit to Turkey. The armed group that pushed to take over the territory in northern Syria is the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Syrian affiliate of the PKK. That set off alarm bells in Ankara. PYD representatives deny having links to the PKK, perhaps a sign of their concerns about Turkish intervention….

It’s not clear how appealing this pan-Kurdish sentiment — or the idea of regional autonomy — is to the Kurdish community in Syria. But it could lead to bitter fighting between Kurds and Arabs there if Assad falls. In the view of many Kurds, the Arab-led Syrian opposition, including the Free Syrian Army, embraces the same kind of Arab nationalism that has been used to quash rights in the past.

The main Kurdish attacks took place July 19, when fighters loyal to the PYD spread out in the town of Kobani and pushed forward for three days, taking over Efrin, Derik and Amuda. There was no fighting and no casualties were incurred, according to Semo, the PYD official, who said the party essentially issued an ultimatum that prompted Syrian government forces to withdraw from their positions.

The speed and relative ease with which the PYD fighters took control of the towns have raised some eyebrows, with rivals accusing the Kurdish group of acting as a proxy for the Syrian government.

The situation has become even more complicated because of the role being played by Kurds from neighboring Iraq, where the division of power after the fall of Saddam Hussein has left Kurds with a strong base. Massoud Barzani, a prominent Iraqi Kurdish leader, said last month that he was helping to arm and train fighters from the Kurdish National Council, which is jockeying for power in Syria as a rival to the PYD.

Barzani organized a meeting this month in the Iraqi Kurdish town of Irbil that brought Kurdish and Arab Syrian opposition leaders together with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu but excluded the PYD, the Syrian Kurdish group regarded by the Turks as the most problematic.

“What Turkey needs to do is divide and rule, and that’s exactly what they’re going to do,” said Hiltermann, of the International Crisis Group. “They’re going to woo some Kurds, and they’re going to fight a lot of Kurds. And they’re going to use one Kurd against another Kurd.”

A Fawwaz al-Assad Story by A.D.

Dear Joshua

I never lived under the Assad rules as I left Syria when I was twenty years old. I have been living outside Syria since 1971. Married to an Anglo-Saxon wife and now I am a grandfather. I can be forgiven if I have little interest in the politics of Syria. However, the current terrible human situation/tragedy made me think I am after all and somehow feel Syrian.

Reading  the article “The Original Shabiha” really made me write to you as my daughter  I and had an experience with Fawwaz al-Assad similar to the “poor female” university student, described in the last post.

In 1993 I went back for a visit to  Syria with my daughter after living in a western country for twenty-two years. My daughter was eighteen years old back then. I wanted to show her where I was borne and  the civilization that existed  in Syria . She was eager to see every bit of it and certainly we did over five weeks spanning the country from North to south and East to West not to mention the Lonely Planet book that  may daughter highlighted  every page of.  My daughter became  very interested in Syria as soon as she started her first year at university. She was really very exited so was I.

Here  is the story. (A part from my wife and  now adult daughter,I never told it to anyone else till now)

Lattakia is where my story starts.

On a recommendation of an old friends, we took  a taxi to a lovely restaurant somewhere along the road to the “Summer presidential Palace” near Lattakia.

The restaurant was virtually empty as it was  a mid-day during the week( apparently not many Syrians dine out during that time). We ordered what the owner or the waiter recommended. Shortly after we started eating, two men and the waiter came to ask me and  my daughter to join a table on the other side on the restaurant(a real strange to us). I said well, we really like to be ourselves and we do not sit with people who we do not know. They left us alone for a short while, and then the waiter came and asked us to leave immediately as there is a security situation here. We did not understand what he really said and  I said we have not finished yet. The other two men came rushing to me and said in Arabic” take your F…..  and leave now or else.  My daughter immediately started crying as she noticed from their tone it is a threatening voice. We had no option but to leave.

On our way out accompanied with the waiter and  two men with him, said to me “we will crush you under the car you and your  F…. daughter “ I said why what is the reason, the answer was “ YOU upset the MOAALEM FAWWAZ” .

I never knew who  FAWWAZ  was before. My daughter was hysterical, crying as she sensed the situation. Luckily she said RING the EMBASSY . This two words have saved us as one of the men understood what she said. A taxi  just arrived ( as it is a gift from god) and we left the restaurant  immediately. What an experience it was. Sadly, We NEVER  been back to Syria since then.   A.D

Syrian Revolution News Round-up writes:

Following the conflicting reports on the defection of Syria’s Vice President Farouq al-Sharaa yesterday, Syrian Foreign Minister Waleed al-Muallim tweeted today that al-Sharaa will be replaced by the Minister of Interior Mohammad al-Sha’aar without giving more details on the reasons behind this change. Regime forces murdered 15 people in the Damascus suburb of al-Tal. The bodies were then identified as close relatives of Deputy Secretary-General of al-Baath Party Abdullah Al-Ahmar who is believed to be incarcerated by the regime.

[J.L.] This suggests that the Baath Party is dead and that most top civilian Sunnis are jumping overboard. The Assad Army is well on its way to becoming an Alawite militia.

Foreign Policy writes:

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made a rare public appearance at a mosque in Damascus on Sunday during the Eid al-Fitr holiday following Ramadan. On Monday, U.N. observers pulled out of Syria after a failed four-month mission as fighting raged in Aleppo, Daraa, and a suburb of Damascus.

WSJ [Reg]: Syria’s Leader Low on Cash—French Minister
2012-08-20

PARIS—Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime is running out of cash to face the insurgency in the country and France plans to discuss with Russia ways to reduce Syrian government funding, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said Monday. The …

In Syria, group suspected of al-Qaeda links gaining prominence in war to topple Assad
By Justin Vela and Liz Sly, Published: August 19

ALEPPO, Syria — A shadowy jihadist organization that first surfaced on the Internet to assert responsibility for suicide bombings in Aleppo and Damascus has stepped out of the shadows and onto the front lines of the war for Syria’s cities.

Here in Aleppo, the al-Nusra Front for the Protection of the People of the Levant, widely known as the Jabhat al-Nusra, is fielding scores of fighters, some of them foreigners, in the battle for control of Syria’s commercial capital, a key prize in the bitter war of attrition being waged across the country.

A look at the Syrian uprising one year later. Thousands of Syrians have died and President Bashar al-Assad remains in power, despite numerous calls by the international

A look at the Syrian uprising one year later. Thousands of Syrians have died and President Bashar al-Assad remains in power, despite numerous calls by the international community for him to step down.

The group, suspected of affiliations to al-Qaeda, says it is also fighting in other locations, including the cities of Homs and Idlib and the suburbs of the capital, Damascus. Its growing role has prompted concerns that the 17-month-old uprising against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime is becoming radicalized as the bloodshed soars…

Jabhat al-Nusra commander Abu Ibrahim said he has 300 men under his control. About 50 of his fighters were seen milling around the mosque, many wearing the baggy, calf-length pants and long beards associated with devout Islamists. Others were inside.

Most of those fighting for Abu Ibrahim, a 32-year-old stone mason from a nearby village, are Syrians from Aleppo and the surrounding countryside. But some are Arab volunteers, among hundreds from the region and beyond who are thought to have trickled into Syria in recent months to join the fight against Assad’s regime. Abu Ibrahim said his contingent included men from Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Lebanon, as well as one Syrian who had fought in Iraq against the Americans….

….a visit to the city did not reveal any significant schism between the fighters of Jabhat al-Nusra and the more-secular units.

Abu Ibrahim said his fighters are part of Liwa al-Tawhid, or the Unity Brigade, a newly formed battalion of rebel groups fighting in and around Aleppo. “We are together,” he said. “There is good coordination.” And although many in the Free Syrian Army say they reject the ideology of Islamist extremism, the fighters of Jabhat al-Nusra are regarded “as heroes” in Aleppo, said Abu Feras, a spokesman for the Aleppo Revolutionary Council. “They fight without fear or hesitation,” he said.

Passing the Hat for the Syrian Rebels
By Philip Giraldi • August 17, 2012, American Conservative

A bizarre interview took place last week on NPR. Michael Martin spoke with Brian Sayers of the Syrian Support Group. Sayers is the group’s director of government relations and is reported to be a former NATO political advisor who was hired to lobby on behalf of the Syrian insurgency this year. The Syrian Support Group’s website claims that it “seeks to facilitate, through all legal means, the protection of Syrian civilians during their historic struggle for freedom.”

Climate Change and the Syrian Uprising
By Shahrzad Mohtadi | 16 August 2012
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Article Highlights

  • A drought unparalleled in recent Syrian history lasted from 2006 to 2010 and led to an unprecedented mass migration of 1.5 million people from farms to urban centers.
  • Because the Assad regime’s economic policies had largely ignored water issues and sustainable agriculture, the drought destroyed many farming communities and placed great strain on urban populations.
  • Although not the leading cause of the Syrian rebellion, the drought-induced migration from farm to city clearly contributed to the uprising and serves as a warning of the potential impact of climate change on political stability.

Inside the Hunt for Assad’s Billions
by Eli Lake Aug 17, 2012

The Syrian regime has as much as $25 billion stashed in offshore tax havens and investments across the Middle East. Finding that fortune could be big business for an elite group of modern-day treasure hunters.

Kidnapping, Spats on Docket of Syria Rebel Boss
By CHARLES LEVINSON

QOBTAN JEBEL, Syria—One morning this week, Sheik Tawfeeq Shehab Eddin replaced his AK-47 with a Bic pen and took up his post behind a metal desk.

Mr. Shehab Eddin is one of the four rural commanders of the Tawheed Division, an Islamist-dominated umbrella force that is leading Syrian rebels’ fight around the country’s largest city, Aleppo, against forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad. Their division has driven pro-Assad forces from much of the Aleppan countryside and some of Aleppo. On Friday, division fighters fought regime tanks near the city’s airport.

Rebels say Syria’s government is stepping up airstrikes on the city of Aleppo as U.N. efforts to promote peace draw sighs from refugees.

The regime’s pullout from much of the countryside last month has left the Tawheed Division as the area’s army, government and police. That is why on Wednesday, Mr. Shehab Eddin and his aides spent some 14 hours hashing out questions about their next deployment to the front line in Aleppo, scrambling to defuse a flare-up with a neighboring Kurdish village and mediating petty disputes between villagers.

“We commanders have been forced to take on all the problems confronting our villages,” he said, adding that elected leaders should eventually take that over. “The role I am playing now is bigger than myself.”

Sheikh Tawfeeq Shehab Eddin breaking the Ramadan fast Wednesday. A commander of the Islamist-dominated rebel force fighting for Aleppo, he spent the day ruling on local disputes.

Similar makeshift governments are springing up in villages across Aleppo province’s countryside, providing interim courts, keeping basic services running, managing finances and distributing aid shipments.

Many of the rebel courts have taken on an Islamic bent. Tawheed Division commanders forbid the torture of detainees. But that ban doesn’t include whipping the soles of detainees’ feet, Tawheed commander Abdel Aziz Salama told several people, including a Human Rights Watch team.

Another group of Tawheed fighters executed four members of an Aleppan family accused of funding and running a hated pro-Assad militia accused of keeping iron-fisted control over restive areas. The division’s field commander, Abdel Qader Saleh, told The Wall Street Journal that the four men were given a battlefield trial before they were killed.

Here in Qobtan Jebel, a pinprick village of century-old stone walled homes in the hills west of Aleppo, Mr. Shehab Eddin’s word is law, at least for now. Before the uprising, the self-taught sheik—also known by his nom du guerre, Abu Soleiman—preached covertly to a small following in an adjacent village about the Syrian regime’s ills.

The sheik’s morning began when two of his fighters brought in a young man they had stopped at a checkpoint with seven jerry cans of gasoline in his car. The commodity is in short supply. The fighters suspected the man might be a smuggler. A couple quick questions satisfied the sheik, who ordered him freed with his fuel.

The next visitor pleaded for the release of a detainee accused of working as a regime informant in the village. The sheik was unmoved. “We have two witnesses and evidence against him,” he said, drawing X’s, O’s and spiral doodles on a blank sheet of paper as he listened.

Next came a stringy youth who said he had just defected from the Syrian army. He was brusquely questioned by the sheik’s aide, Ali al-Haji, a 28-year-old former tank commander with a degree in Islamic law.

The fidgety defector, 20-year-old Ahmed al-Latouf, said he had served as an army mortar man. “There’s no mobiles phones, no television,” he said. “No one knows anything and they believe what their officers tell them—that we are fighting criminal gangs and terrorists.”

The sheik concurred. “We know our brothers in the army have been lied to and brainwashed,” he said, admitting the youth into the ranks of rebel fighters, who elsewhere could be seen doing calisthenics and training with rocket-propelled grenades.

A fighter rushed in. A resident of Qobtan Jebel, he said, had that morning kidnapped a resident of a nearby Kurdish village and was demanding ransom. In retaliation, the Kurds kidnapped four village men.

Kurdish villages dot the local countryside, and relations have cooled since Syria’s civil war took a sectarian turn. With police gone, crime is a growing concern. Rebel commanders say a flare-up now in Kurd relations would play into regime hands. “We’ll call the Kurdish leaders, set up a meeting and solve the problem,” said Mr. Haji.

Next in line was a man from Aleppo who had raised funds for Mr. Shehab Eddin’s brigade, which fought in Aleppo’s Salaheddin neighborhood for 14 days but withdrew last week after supplies wore thin. The fundraiser demanded an explanation for the withdrawal. “We couldn’t stand it anymore. We weren’t getting enough help,” the aide, Mr. Haji, explained, eager not to alienate a supporter.

A group of villagers stormed in waving handguns and assault rifles. A fighter had commandeered their car to ferry supplies to the front, but sold it instead. They vowed revenge.

“Don’t do a thing until I have a chance to look into this,” Mr. Haji said. “Are you really going to kill someone over a car?”

“We spend a lot of time dealing with petty issues while fighting a war at the same time,” Mr. Haji said after they left. “But if you don’t listen to everyone, we’ll lose the people and then the revolution.”

As the sun set, Mr. Haji retired to his commander’s walled residence where he lives with his three wives and 15 children. They broke the Ramadan fast, silently using flatbread to scoop lentil soup, hummus and tuna fish out of metal bowls.

“We’ll set an ambush for the guy who kidnapped the Kurd, and we’ll turn him over to the Kurds, in exchange for our men back,” he said, reclining on a pillow on the cement floor, scrubbing his teeth with a twig. He dispatched a patrol to find the suspected kidnapper. “The regime wants us to fight among ourselves. We can’t allow this to happen,” he said…..

Fabrice Balanche, a Syria expert at the University of Lyon, said the incoming foreign minister, Laurent Fabius, “realised that France had invested too much political capital in the SNC”. He said the new government had instead thrown its weight behind Manaf Tlass – a former Republican Guard general and member of Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle – who defected in July. France is hoping the FSA will coalesce around Tlass, providing some coherence to the disparate array of militias.

The Urgent Need to Prevent a Middle East War
by Patrick Seale Released: 14 Aug 2012

The Middle East is facing an acute danger of war, with unpredictable and potentially devastating consequences for the states and populations of the region. A ‘shadow war’ is already being waged — by Israel and the United States against Iran; by a coalition of countries against Syria; and by the great powers against each other. A mere spark could set this tinder alight.

The threat of a hot war is coming from three main directions: first, from Israel’s relentless and increasingly hysterical war-mongering against Iran; second, from America’s geopolitical ambitions in the oil-rich Gulf and its complicity in Israel’s anti-Iranian campaign; and third, from the naked hostility of some Sunni Arab States towards Iran — and towards Shi‘is and Alawis in general.

These Arab states are apparently unaware that they are playing into the hands of Israeli and American hawks who dream of re-modelling the region in order to subject it to their will. This same neo-con ambition drove the United States to invade and destroy Iraq in the hope of permanently enfeebling it.

The current Israeli war fever rests on a blatant falsehood: that Iran poses an ‘existential threat’ to the Jewish people. What a joke!….

… Can war be prevented? King Abdallah bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia is one of the wisest leaders on the international stage. He alone has the political weight, the resources, and the influence with both the United States and the Muslim rebels in Syria to check the region’s downward rush to disaster. He seems torn between his understandable distaste for some Iranian policies and his instinctive understanding of the need for better Saudi-Iranian relations. Several Gulf officials, in turn, are torn between their fear of a powerful Iran and their understanding that members of the Gulf Cooperation Council share many commercial and strategic interests with the Islamic Republic.

Instead of siding with the United States and Israel in the destruction of Iran and Syria, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies should join with Iran in building a new security system for the region free from external meddling. If they act together, they can spare the region the devastation of war. But they must act soon because time is running out.

“The Original Shabiha,” by Mohammad D.

The Original Shabiha
by Mohammad D.
Aug 17, 2012 for Syria Comment
Edited by Joshua Landis

Fawwaz al-Assad (center) watching his beloved team, Tishriin, play soccer – photo supplied by the author

Who were the first Shabiha? How was the word coined? And how did their numbers spread? The following stories about a few shabiha pioneers are based on my personal experiences in Latakia, Syria in the 1970’s and 1980’s so I can vouch for their truth. I have refrained from embellishment or recounting stories that have been told to me by others.

The Pioneer Smuggler

No one in al-Harf, a small Alawi village in the mountains east of Latakia, knew how Faysal Salloum managed to come into the possession of a car. Not a soul in the village had owned a car before Faysal Salloum drove into town. Fewer than a handful of the village’s inhabitants had driven a car, so seeing Faysal appear behind a dust cloud in his Peugeot 343 caused wonder and conflicting emotions among his townsmen. Like most Alawi villages of the mountain in the 1970s, al-Harf did not have a paved road. A hardscrabble dirt track wound up the hill on the southern side of the village. It plunged down into a steep valley and climbed over the adjacent mountain before connecting to a paved road. A single bus traveled that road going down to the coast road.

A single bus traveled the paved road down the mountain to the coast, where one could get to Latakia. It also connected al-Harf to the larger towns higher in the mountain. The bus was owned by the Awad family, Protestant Christians from al-Jawbeh, to the east. Of course, al-Harf had neither electricity nor running water. Two natural springs east of the village supplied it along with two other villages with water. Until the 1950s, Alawis rarely traveled to a city, which were the preserve of Sunnis. When the French conquered Syria and began taking censuses in the 1920s, they found that Alawis and Sunnis lived together in no town larger than 200 inhabitants. Alawis and Christians lived together, but not Alawis and Sunnis.

When I was a child in the 1970s, it was still rare for villagers to venture out into the larger world. Almost none of the two hundred families that made up our village did. Everyone seemed to work in the fields.

The village lands that extended down into the adjoining valley were planted alternately with tobacco or wheat depending on the season. The steep and rocky hills had been terraced by generations of peasants who had eked out a living in these hills before us. Some plots were planted with sesame and vegetables. Among the fruit trees, fig, pomegranate, and olive were the most common. Two small woods covered the eastern mountains, which were too steep for farming. Although most farming families were poor, we counted ourselves lucky because we had land and did not have to work for the Sunnis.

My Uncle who died in 1997 would leave the house at 4:00 in the morning to walk to Dabbash, where there was an elementary school. By Faysal’s generation in the 1970s, the kids went to school in al-Khraybat, an extension of al-Kishkhashe on the road to Latakia. It was three hills away and took only 45 minutes by foot. In the early morning, one could hear the hyenas’ howling. But the terrain was picturesque. The Mediteranean Sea stretched out miles below us.

Middle School was in al-Fakhoura, a two-hour commute. When I was a child our village had perhaps 5 people who had a brofet (preovette), a ninth grade certificate. Only two had earned a Baccalaureate – my uncle and Dr. Abdal Karim . Faysal was not from the richest families of the village and had not finished his middle school studies. His parents grew tobacco and other crops. They owned a few animals from which they got milk and eggs, like almost other families in the village.

Had a villager wanted to buy a car at that time, he would have had to sell everything that he and his extended family owned including their land in order to get enough money. Faysal Salloum had not sold land. In Syria at that time, only some rich landholders and merchants owned cars. The government itself had few.

The car Faysal was driving was a modest Peugeot 304, most likely stolen. It had Lebanese plates. When Faysal opened the trunk, it was full of Marlboro cigarettes and a few cans of cocking fat, known as samneh.

Faysal, whom no one had heard from for a while, did tell that he went to Tripoli in Lebanon and that he was going the next day to smuggle more. He was shady of course and told things in general exaggeratory way most of the time eluding his listeners from knowing the truth. No one in the village was able or in need to buy the smuggled products, because they owned animals and had their own cooking butter, plus they produced great tobacco.

Faysal left in a hurry to sell his goods in the city because he would make real money. He was dressed in army camouflage like an officer of one of the best units of the Syrian Army. At that moment in history only two units in the Syrian Army were allowed only to wear camouflage: The Special Forces (al-Wahdat al-Khassa) and the Defense Brigades (Sarayah al-Difa’). Faysal knew this and of course he was pretending to be one of the officers of Sarayah al-Difa’, which has more Alawites than the Wahdat al-Khassa, and which was less disciplined. The guys in the village knew that he was bluffing with his army outfit.

The Defense Brigades (Sarayah al-Difa’) was headed by Rif’at al-Assad, the brother of the president. It was formed in the 1970’s and had mostly Alawi officers and soldiers in it. The officers of the Sarayah were notorious for their bad behavior wherever they went. They intimidated regular citizens and abused thier power. The Special Forces did not have this reputation. They were professional soldiers. The al-Sarayah officers looked like the smugglers and many of them would later take up smuggle.

Faysal dressed and looked like one of those officers. He wore aviator sunglasses that became a staple of his wardrobe. He had brand new Italian dress shoes. Faysal was blonde with blue eyes, medium height with a tough mountain built. It was around 1977.

To buy Italian shoes at that time in Syria cost most of the monthly salary of a government employee. Only the rich could afford them. Stores were not allowed to import them on the pretext of encouraging local industry. Government shoes were sold at one store, Batta.

It was downtown Lattakia on Baghdad Street and across from al-Bustan Cafe, where all of al-Shabiha would occupy tables on it everyday.

The government at that moment claimed to be a socialist and banned the import of luxury goods. Italian Shoes were considered a luxury item making them even more expensive and an item to smuggle. Some shoes and clothes stores sold them on the sides. Lattakia has a bustling market. The Italian shoes were worn by the old money. They were a sign of richness, but this was about to change with this new wave of smugglers, who would dress up better than the richest man in town. Beware, these guys are coming from the mountains.

The government also banned products deemed “Colonialist/Imperialist” like Coca Cola, Levis, and Marlboros. Those products were on the boycott list. They were accused of siding with Israel, which was used for all types of excesses. All of this did not mean that the people did not want these products and looked after them. Faysal, as well as the first generation of smugglers, knew all of the demands of the Syrian markets and soon in his modest car he was covering the distances between Lebanon and the various buyers.

Faysal drew attention fast because he was really bombastic like all of the smugglers. He did not keep a low profile when it came to dressing. His outings as an officer in the Army’s units draw attentions to him fast. At this stage also he attracted some of his childhood friends who wanted a piece of the action. They wanted to dress like him better than the richest man in Latakia.

Here comes Fayez, and Ghassan, two unsuccessful young men. One was from the same village al-Harf (Ghassan), while the other is from the neighboring village, al-Khishkhashe. The two friends Fayez and Ghassan did not finish high school also at that moment. They were sent by their families to the city of Latakia to finish high school there. Both were failures because of partying and chasing women. They were living in a hotel at that moment. It was their fifth time trying to pass the high school final test.

Fayez and Ghassan were not bad looking, but their clothes were ordinary. Their parents were giving them money from their savings from what they made from selling their harvests in the city. It was was not a lot. They had some land but not that much, plus, land needs someone to tend to it and these two men knew they needed to seek their fortune outside the village. They are from the first generation of Alawis to be able to go down to the city with no fear.

They knew all of this and were conscious about that. They were not the only materialistic persons in town. The culture was mostly like that, like everywhere in the world. Therefore they spend the money they made from their first trip smuggling with Faysal on clothes of course. They started to look good. Fayez was tall, blonde with blue eyes. He looked like a Holywood actor, and started looking more like that with the slew of clothes he started getting for himself from Lebanon’s nice stores. Ghassan was also tall, skinny with brown hair and eyes. He looked really good also with European slacks and glasses. They found success with women, but what type of women, do not ask. They drank of course. Religion for them was just their belonging to the Alawis. None of the three knew anything about the Alawi creed or religion. Books, education and culture were not on their menu.

The trio started working using the little car for runs. Faysal was the boss while the other two were his employees getting money from him every time they went to Lebanon and back. Their business thrived. Customers as far away as Aleppo wanted what they had to sell. They wanted to fill their stores with whatever the government prohibited.

The three guys made money and partied away. Many times they would drive around making a racket and dressed up really well. This drew bad attention to them. Latakia had way more big fish than these three. Trouble found them quickly. Soon their car was confiscated by the regular Police. It was parked and the guys woke up to see it gone. But Faysal managed to get it back from police custody through a small bribe and soon he was on his way to Lebanon to do the same thing again. The guys were lucky the first time. No one got into trouble.

Faysal, and his two underlings, did not really know any high officers or work for any important man. There was no important government or army figure from his village. Consequently, Faysal’s car was taken from him a second time. This time with him inside of it. H was stopped by the Mukhabarat. He was dressed in a captain’s uniform (Naqeeb). He was sent to prison. Ghassan and Fayez were not with him and were lucky to escape prison. They got the scare of their lives, however, and stayed in the village for the next year trying to pretend to study for high school. They stopped working as smugglers because they were not as tough and courageous as Faysal. It was a tough business, dangerous at many times. All of them were in their early twenties.

There was no harsh sentencing against smuggling at that moment in Syria and Faysal was able to get out in a year because it was his first offense. Also, he was not carrying much contraband in his car except for clothes. Most likely it was the clothes the Mukhabart officers would wear for a while. When Faysal got out, he chose to work solo. Soon he headed to Lebanon and got a better car this time: a Mercedes Benz that he drove like a hurricane to avoid capture and cover the distances fast. He did his runs in record time and his fortunes started showing again.

With the Mercedes, Faysal made more trips. This time he was more convincing as an army officer because he was driving the right car. He dressed in camouflage again for his work and wore Italian dress shoes and sunglasses. When lounging or driving around town to be seen, he changed into high end slacks.

This period of actions that resembled super powers brought the first hints of the word that we know today as Shabbih. His ability to go fast is described in Arabic as Yashbahu Shabhan ????/?????/????? (???? ????)?. Shabih is an Alawi term. The Alawites first started bringing it up to describe people like Faysal and their actions. Some of them would say describing:.

???? ?????? ??? ?? ????? ???????

Alawis and Sunnis use the verb Shabaha ??? for the same meaning. For example, they both use it when someone makes a dive into the water. They also use it primarily in soccer to describe an action of the goalie where that goalie jumps from a standing position to be airborne. So the verb Shabaha here means someone who goes airborne in a spectacular manner, therefore the more airborne the goalie gets the more admiration he gets for his Shabha ???? ???????.

The first people to be called shabih were soccer goalies. A good Shabih is he who could make the most spectacular airborne saves. Shabha here means a jump and a save. Also, when diving into the water a good Shabih is the one who could make better spectacular dives. Divers would always come to the swimming clubs and show their skills. The best Shabih was the one who would make the best dives. So Tashbeeh is a fast spectacular action.

This fast spectacular action brought Faysal many new clients, soon he was traveling as far as Aleppo to deliver what the merchants would ask for. The market needed many things that were not available. Tobacco and electrical supplies were among the most visible and profitable.

This again did not last for long. He could not drive that Mercedes without arousing suspicion, envy and wrath. He was arrested again and given a multi-year sentenced. Next time I saw him it was after he got out of prison years later: wearing a camouflage army get up with his mirror aviator sunglasses and of course shiny Italian shoes. This time he had a big Range Rover. I knew he was going to get caught or something because by now people from al-Assad family started showing up in that lucrative business and they also were driving big fancy cars with fake license plates. The Range Rover was going to be too much of an item for him to keep.

al-Assad’s family first major Shabih: Malek al-Assad was the first smuggler of al-Assad family whom people started seeing and hearing about.

First, rumors started coming out that some people from al-Assad family started getting into the business. It was also in the second half of the 1970’s when Malek al-Assad started showing up in Latakia in a Mercedes Benz even the richest man in Latakia did not own. Before the Mercedes Benz, Malek used to take the Bus from al-Qurdaha anywhere he wanted to go. Of course, he had not finished that much education.

The bus line between al-Qurdaha in that mountain and the cities of Latakia or Jableh was the scene of the first acts of thuggery by an Assad family member. They used to take the bus back then. Most of these stories were about Malek al-Assad, the son of Umm Anwar. al-Assad family did not have the men it had later so at that moment they had few adults. Hafez al-Assad had teenage kids, so did his brothers Rif’at and Jamil. It was Malek the son of his half brother Ibrahim at that moment was fit, willing, able and at the right age. He was the first generation, probably by himself.

Stories started coming out that Malek was harassing fellow riders on the bus, demanding the best seat anytime he took that bus. He would brag about his family. The riders were all Alawites of course, poor mostly, had been subjected to harassment for generations, so they really did not pay him that much attention. Malek knew that and like every bully who needed a bigger stage especially with his new fortune. Later, he started showing up in Latakia not straight from the bus stop but fresh in his clothes and fancy car.

Lattakia is a seaport and some families have real fortunes, but still they could not match the speed Malek al-Assad was changing his super fancy cars when he busted into the scene. All the cars, of course, had fake license plates, and most likely were stolen in Lebanon, or even Europe. He was a sharp dresser also with a taste for leather jackets with the army green pants he would wear. All of his cars were Mercedes Benzes.

The legitimate license plates cost a fortune. It was the taxes one would pay on the car. This tax was incredibly high preventing almost all Syrians from buying cars. The Syrian government imported only a small number of cars each year. There were no car dealerships. Only the state could import cars. The government of course had banned the import of cars also except the ones it imported every ten or so years. To buy a car from the government meant that you had to front a huge amount of money, wait years, and of course pay a bribe to get your car, if, in fact, the cars were actually imported. During my life in Syria in the 1970’s and 1980’s the government imported cars twice (French Peugot in the mid 1970’s and Mazda, and Mitsubishi in the mid 1980’s). Cars were extremely expensive.

Malek al-Assad did not have problems with getting cars. Lebanon was the place especially with the civil war worsening there by the year. The Syrian arm’s grip was tightening on Lebanon and car theft sky-rocketed. The Syrian army officers in Lebanon started getting their hands on these cars, as did hustlers like Malek al-Assad and Faysal Sallum, who of course had to pretend to be to go through the army check points which was manned as usual by conscripts who were easily intimidated.

Now there came into existence an economy that depended on these smugglers. in Latakia, the lucrative imported cigarettes started employing many poor Alawis and Sunnis from the poor hoods to peddle the cigarettes all over the busy down town area. Stores all over the city carried all types of banned foreign cigarettes to their many customers. Most people smoked of course, both men and women.
Electronics flew in to the stores that were owned mainly by non-Alawis. There was no sectarianism in the issue. Everyone worked together to provide contraband to a country hungry for foreign goods.

Malek al-Assad provided many things the market wanted including weapons. The weapons would cause him problems. He is the first one to be known to raise the stakes of smuggling that started growing with the worsening of the situation in Lebanon, the main source of goods so far.

Historically, Latakia always has its own smugglers, who would typically use boats to ferry contraband into the city. Those smugglers were all Sunnis. These thugs/smugglers were locally known as Ugada ??????. They were the remnants of a class of thugs from the Ottoman days that has a celebrated place in Syrian history. The history of this class of thugs is similar to that of al-Shabiha today. They were a type of Shabiha for the land owners, the Ottomans and whoever was able to pay. They had their own gangs in the early 1970’s. But, with the beginning of the problems between the Assad rule and Sunnis the Ugada paid a price. Most of these thugs were killed at the hands of the Mukhabarat in the coming years.

The weapons that Malek al-Assad smuggled and sold were not welcomed, especially as country had started to experience escalating armed confrontations between the Assad government and its Islamic leaning opponents. People started saying that Malek al-Assad sold weapons to the enemies of the Baath. This got Malek al-Assad into hot water with Hafez al-Assad. So, Malek al-Assad disappeared for a while and people said that he was jailed for few days. His booming business came to a halt.

When Malek al-Assad surfaced again, he kept on wearing the same outfits, but you could tell that he was a changed man. He increasingly sit in al-Bustan café by himself with his car parked out front, but his trips to Lebanon stopped. He became a liability to those he asked favors of. Before long he was driving people as an ordinary taxi driver on the Damascus-Latakia line. His nice Mercedes Benz became a taxi. He died in a car accident in the 1980’s.

Malek was the son of Umm Anwar, who was married to Ibrahim, the older half brother of Hafez al-Assad’s half brother. Umm Anwar started filling the role of her son and soon her stooges were running the smuggling routs. Malek was also the first in a line of many al-Assad men who became major players in the smuggling game.

Fawaz al-Assad the first real Shabih

Fawaz al-Assad and his henchmen gave the meaning we know today to the word Shabiha. Other men from al-Assad family played a role in creating this word and the concept of Tashbeeh; i.e to act like a thug, but it was Fawwaz who was the pioneer thug that stood out in the city of Latakia and its surroundings. He was well above the rest of them.

When Malek al-Assad and Faysal Salloum started the first wave of smuggling, Fawwaz al-Assad was in elementary or middle school. But by the time Fawwaz hit high school he surpassed every smuggler in the region. He took over fast in the realm of Tashbih.

Fawwaz came onto the scene like a bat out of hell. He grew up with smuggling flourishing around him in his hometown of al-Qurdaha and the whole of the Syrian coast. He knew he could have power because he and his brother, Munther, were the only full-blooded nephews of President Hafez al-Assad. Jamil, their father, was Hafez’s younger brother. Rifaat was the youngest of the three Assad brothers. Fawaz quickly understood that he was above the law because of his father. No one would dare to stoop him.

Jamil, Fawwaz’s father, had limited education or luck prior to his brother’s take-over in 1970. He was a modest government employee. But it did not take him long before he drove around in super fancy cars and presented himself as a very important man. The 1970’s and 1980’s saw the quick rise of Jamil al-Assad.

The first major move was when Jamil al-Assad established an organization called al-Murtada with some type of religious agenda. We learned about it when he suddenly brought hundreds of Sunni Bedouins and camped them in other people’s land right next to his fancy beach house, which was in an upscale beach club. Soon you would see the Bedouins in their traditional gear scaring the girls in bikinis off the beach. It was a very bizarre incident that was repeated yearly for a number of years during that period.

Some people say that the aim of al-Murtada was to convert people to the Alawite creed. Reality said that al-Murtada was a chaotic adventure, because Jamil himself was not sure about his own religion. But al-Murtada drew attention to Jamil al-Assad. People started knowing him more and more. As for his religious adventures; Jamil al-Assad showed very bizarre religious tendencies in his life. He wanted to become some sort of a religious leader and he could not. I visited Syria in the late 1990’s and they told me that he had became a Wahhabi, seeking to destroy Alawite saints shrines in the mountain.

The second major move by Jamil al-Assad was establishing his office on Baghdad street that started dealing with the port of Latakia. Historically the port made money to those who control the lines and did freight forwarding for them. Christians were pioneers in this and controlled many lines. Sunnis were in it too and controlled some major lines like the Russian by the Safwat family. Hafez al-Assad nationalized all of them under al-Sahel, which was to be controlled by Jamil and his goons. Safwat still controlled the Russian line, which was one of the most lucrative. Freight forwarding is a big business in Latakia, with Jamil the Alawites got into it for the first time, and shoved aside the notable families of the city.

Fawwaz used his father’s powers to his advantage. He rapidly became the super power in Latakia, and probably its richest inhabitant. The richest because it was no secret that he and his cousins controlled the smuggling routes along the entire coast: Latakia, Jableh, Banyas and Tartus. They had clients in many other cities.
During the second part of the 1980’s, the second generation of Assad’s family smugglers hit the scene.

Fawwaz started to show thuggish tendencies early on in his life. Stories about him with his gang beating up people started coming out from the early years of the 1980’s. Soon we all would witness this first hand. He would drive around Latakia staring down people. If you challenged him or didn’t demure you would pay a heavy price.

At that time, Latakia had many cafes and meeting spots for the local population. Soon all of these public areas would be invaded by Fawwaz. For example, he started coming and sitting in al-Bustan cafe; located in a very strategic area in downtown Latakia. The Café was owned by two brothers from the Sheikho family who had a very thriving business. But, soon all of that changed with Fawwaz liking the place. He would come and verbally abuse most of the people there. Soon, no locals would go there and mostly the Shabiha of Fawwaz dominated the place, sitting watching the people go by in that busy location. No one would escape their taunts.

Many times Fawwaz started fights in my part of town. The youth of the area congregated to promenade in a popular area. That practice is known locally as mushwar, which means a stroll in a nice atmosphere. That nice atmosphere was never there and the Mushwar became an event for every thug to parade their cars and powers in front of the girls of course. All of those thugs would disappear when Fawwaz would be around. Fawwaz would parade his car, then do car tricks before picking on someone. Most of the people he would pick on were peaceful, meek citizens. Fawwaz would do this when he had his men with him. When he was alone he would stare people down mostly. He had that angry look all the time.

When Fawwaz was around 20 years old his entourage was not that big or known. But you would see them in action every now and then. He was armed of course all of the time. The other smugglers were watching all of this. They all wanted to stay clear of him. But, slowly they started working with him enabling him to parade them and intimidate people more. People started wanting to avoid him more and more. One of those was Faysal Salloum who at that moment was driving a Range Rover. There were no Range Rovers in Syria at that time. The Army started getting them later. So, when Fawwaz saw that Range Rover he asked Faysal to lend it to him for a small ride. Faysal never saw that car again.

The thug in Fawwaz started coming out day after day. Remember, he was still in his early 20’s. People started hearing and seeing more and more of his henchmen. Those guys were mostly big tough mountain kids, who saw a chance to make some money. They were not sharply dressed at all. They were the first smugglers to wear intimidating outfits all the time instead of Italian Slacks. They were designed to strike fear, not to look fancy.

Fawwaz was not a good looking young man himself. He always looked angry, or could explode at any moment. Fawwaz was not a handsome fellow like many of the first wave of smugglers. His men were ugly beasts of a sort. All had beards. Fawwaz himself would have a beard every now and then. His head was big and have a strange shape. His body was never athletic, with him being a little overweight most of the times. He was dressed with the latest slacks and shoes, of course, but he never struck people as a well dresser or a handsome fellow. He rarely dressed in army camouflage or army get ups.

Fawwaz has one older brother: Mundhir. It was said that he was smuggling before Fawwaz. This makes sense, but he was not in the scene like his younger flashy brother. Fawwaz started coming to the city of Latakia to usher in his notorious era of Tashbih, i.e: acting like a gangster. Before that he was confined to the town of al-Qurdaha. When he was around 16 years old driving the biggest and baddest Mercedes with few armed tough looking men with him. I saw them many times.

Fawwaz liked what the city of Latakia had to offer, you would be able to see him everyday in al-Bustan Cafe with his guys, or driving his Mercedes around harassing people here and there. Latakia always had areas where the young locals walk and meet. Baghdad Street was one famous spot. He was on that almost every night. AS a matter of fact, Fawwaz was on that street most of the 1980’s. He always had the biggest and baddest car. His license plates were fake of course, but they were not Lebanese. They were Syrian license plates that were similar to those you see on Mukhabarat cars. He paraded himself daily.

Fawwaz and this next generation of Assad family smugglers were the first to introduce the Mercedes known as al-Shabah (the Ghost). This car was the biggest Mercedes ever built. The smugglers would always have fake license plates with tinted windows. The rear windshield was reserved for pictures of the Father the Commander. This intimidating car, with the way these smugglers drive it mixed with their action gives the word Shabiha its real meaning we know today. The car added to popularity of that name from the fact it was called al-Shabah. Now everyone knows al-Shabiha because of al-Assad family goons and their intimidating little army.

The Actions of Fawwaz and some of that generation of Shabiha that I witnessed and could be called thuggish are many. I can list tens of them, or probably need a full book for them. Some of them stand out more than others, however. The first vivid one was the time he drove his Mercedes over the sidewalk to intercept my friend Saddiq Gharib to scare and intimidate him. This was because Fawwaz was in love with a college student that was the classmate of Saddiq, who is a college professor now. She was Christian and studied French Literature. Her class was the one next to mine in the College of Literature (Kulliyat al-Adab) of the University of Tishreen. Fawwaz was probably in high school then when he would force his way into the college to attend classes with this beautiful girl. The professors would not be able to say no to him, and Fawwaz and sometimes his friends would lurk loud outside the class room causing havoc. This went on for a little while till one professor refused to teach. The professor was Alawite, who said that Fawwaz was making a mockery of the education system when he is following the girl into everywhere she went to in the college. Fawwaz stormed the office of the dean following the girl that day. The professors went on strike for few days. At least some professors made a stand. Us students were helpless and would avoid anywhere Fawwaz would be in college. Remember the college had a guard outside to prevent the non-students from entering. So, imagine what this poor guard would do to prevent Fawwaz from entering. Fawwaz was rude and loud and this incident became an issue. After Hafez al -Assad heard about the incident Fawwaz never came back to our college. The girl and her parents migrated out of Syria on the hush. I knew her well then. That did not mean also that Fawwaz would not attend the university functions throughout my college years!!!

By the second half of the 1980’s Fawwaz was the most important man in town. He liked soccer and supported Tishreen, one of the two big teams in the city of Latakia. Fawwaz would bring his big Mercedes and drive a loop before he would park it and sit on a chair watching the game from the track.

The game would be attended sometimes by important officials. Fawwaz would not care about them. He had his own seat in the fenced in area of the stadium where only players and coaches were allowed in. He had his own rules.

Always Fawwaz would have few words with the referee before the game also. In one very famous incident Fawwaz took his gun out and let out some shots. The game was between Hutteen and Tishreen and a forward scored on an offside goal for Fawwaz’ team Tishreen. The referee in that famous incident changed his mind after the gun shot to claim the goal in favor of Fawwaz’ team. That made Fawwaz happier and he let out more shots. Fawwaz was a real bully and acted like one. Officials would avoid him. He gave the word Shabih its full meaning in the minds of Syrians.

By the end of the 1980’s Jamil al-Assad had a PH.D and millions of dollars. Fawwaz became a lawyer and people address him as Ustadh (teacher). Of course he has millions, married to a beautiful girl, have the biggest house in al-Zira’a, and of course was the president of Tishreen Sports Club. Faysal Salloum was in prison with not a penny to his name.

News Round Up (14 Aug 2012)

Haaretz: Report: Assad’s brother ‘fighting for his life,’ month after losing both legs in Damascus bomb attack
2012-08-14 – Haartz – By Avi Issacharoff

Report: Assad’s brother ‘fighting for his life,’ month after Damascus bomb attack Russian deputy foreign minister tells Saudi newspaper that Maher Assad, commander of the Fourth Armored Division, lost both his legs in an attack last July; in an attack last July; report adds Bashar Assad signals he is willing to give up power….Quoting Russian deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov, the newspaper reported that Maher Assad’s condition “is very serious and he is fighting for his life.”

Free Syria Army takes Police Station in Aleppo – Says it was Headquarters of the  shabiha of al Bari of Aleppo.


Yamin Writes:

Some keep stating that the Alawites are heading to the coast to establish their state. Most of these people want to see the bond broken between the Alawites and the Sunni Arab supporters. If given a choice between the Syrian Army and the Free Syrian Army, about 30 percent of the Sunni Arabs will support the Syrian Army. The rumors about the Alawite state is to cause the 30 percent to break the bond and change sides, or to shrink it to say 10 percent.

I believe that the Alawites have made up their mind to stay and fight in Syria (Plan A) or take with them a part of the Sunni areas east of the mountains (Plan B). The Alawites will not want to face a full Sunni hostile interior if they can secure to their side some of the Sunni. Not to forget the Sunni in the coast cities. This so called Alawite state, if it happens, will be more than 40 percent Sunni (ala Lebanon).

No one mentions these days that the Alawites succeeded in securing two deputies in the Lebanese Parliament after the 1989 Taif Agreement. They put their foot in the door. I think this is their Plan C, to try to accomplish what was denied them in 1936, an inclusion into Lebanon. Sometimes I think this is their Plan A.

Plan D, if there is a Plan D, will be to have an Alawite State including only the mixed coast cities.

Plan E, if we go beyond Plan D, a pure Alawite State, is not considered by anyone with brains.

Foreign Policy

Syria’s Ex-Prime Minister Riyad Farid Hijab made his first public appearance since his defection to Jordan last week. At a televised news conference in Amman, Hijab said the regime of Bashar al-Assad is falling, stating, “The Syrian regime only controls 30 percent of Syria’s territory. It has collapsed militarily, economically, and morally.” Meanwhile, new clashes were reported in Damascus and Aleppo, a day after opposition fighters downed a government fighter jet, raising questions over whether the opposition has the capability of challenging the regime’s control of the sky. Conversely, the Syrian government insists a technical failure caused the jet to crash. The United States, Britain, and France have changed their policy on assisting the opposition shifting from a focus on the Syrian National Council (SNC) toward building direct links with separate internal opposition groups. The western countries are concerned over the SNC’s inability to unite the opposition and fear funds have been diverted toward extremist Islamic groups.

Hundreds of manufacturing plants located in the industrial cities of Aleppo and Deir-ez-Zor have stopped functioning because of the rising insecurity leading to potentially severe shortages of products in the local market including medicines.(Syria Report)

Syria’s embattled regime laid plans to use Russian banks as part of an emergency effort to sidestep American and European sanctions on oil and financial transactions, according to Syrian government documents and correspondence reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

The documents offer an inside look at how a shrinking group of regime loyalists is working to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s government. Over the past several weeks, senior Syrian officials have held a series of meetings to discuss how to conduct business after being cut off from most Western banking institutions and trade, the documents indicate. The documents, which span a …

A peaceful post-Assad order is probable
Rami Khoury, Daily Star

For months now, speculation by analysts, diplomats, scholars and journalists about the nature of the post-Bashar Assad transition in Syria has been as dynamic as the events on the ground. But with one big difference: Most analyses of events on the ground rely on facts; but discussion of how events will […]

Syria: Some in opposition fear rebels miscalculated in Aleppo
LA Times ALEPPO, Syria

In million-dollar apartments in a neighborhood of the city as yet unscathed, the battle for Aleppo plays out daily on flat-screen TVs. Amid imported sofas and abstract art, the revolution doesn’t seem so close…. From the balcony, which on this night let in a little cool summer breeze, his family can occasionally see smoke rising above other Aleppo neighborhoods that are under attack by forces loyal to President Bashar Assad.

The father is solidly opposed to Assad, but he fears the prospect of rebels who have filtered in from the suburbs seizing his neighborhood as they try to take Syria’s largest city and commercial hub.

“What [the rebels] did was wrong, coming in and forcing all these civilians to flee and live in schools. You came to protect civilians, but now you’re hurting them?” said the father, one of the city’s merchants. “It’s wrong what they did.”

As the fighting intensifies in a city once regarded as immune to the violence racking much of Syria, some opposition activists are concerned that those who have taken up arms against Assad have made a serious miscalculation here. They fear that the offensive is creating a humanitarian crisis they are ill-equipped to handle and turning many of those affected against the rebels.

“The military campaign for Aleppo came too, too early,” said Marcell Shehwaro, a dentistry graduate and a prominent activist. “Because people here didn’t see the government violence that would make them believe the Free Syrian Army was needed.”

Even now, weeks into the battle for Aleppo, the traffic of everyday routines still snarls roundabouts in safer parts of the city. Syria’s national flag still flies freely here, and the walls are devoid of antigovernment graffiti that festoon rebel-held areas.

Pricey restaurants in nice neighborhoods open — expectantly — every night.

Abdulaziz “Abu Jumuah” Salameh, who heads a coalition of dozens of militias called the Al Tawheed Brigade, acknowledged that the city may not have wanted the rebel offensive to begin so soon. But that didn’t matter: The revolution has its own timing.

“Other provinces finished their revolution, and Aleppo hadn’t started yet,” he said, speaking from his headquarters in Tal Rifaat, a town north of the city. “You could wait 100 years, and Aleppo still won’t be ready.”

Even as rebels continue to stream into Aleppo, there is bitter disagreement over whether they can win over its residents….

The Battle for Aleppo
Robert G. Rabil,  August 14, 2012, National Interest
Notwithstanding the destruction and staggering loss of life as the raging battle for Syria’s commercial capital of Aleppo continues, the battle for both the regime and the opposition has taken on a multidimensional strategic aspect. The battle for Aleppo confirms that the first phase of the Syrian civil war has ended, and the battle for consolidating sectarian cantonization has begun. And it has initiated a process with far-reaching implications for Syria and the region.
The descent of the Free Syrian Army on Aleppo is tactically and strategically motivated. The opposition has succeeded in taking the battle against the regime to the country’s commercial hub, a city that not long ago was a bastion of support for the regime. Moreover, timing the battle for Aleppo on the heels of the deadly strike against the regime’s senior echelons in the capital’s national-security headquarters undoubtedly is meant to tear down the regime’s psychological power over its loyalists and supporters.
Strategically, however, the battle is about reconnecting Aleppo and its environs to its historic hinterland in Turkey, much as Homs and Hama had been historically connected to Northern Lebanon. This reconnection enhances the influence of Turkey over the opposition, represented mainly by the Syrian National Council, and provides the Free Syrian Army with a strategic route for receiving armaments from Ankara. Heavy weaponry from Turkey reportedly has already begun to be transported to the rebels in Aleppo, signifying that the attack on the city was no less a Turkish than a rebel decision.
The move against Aleppo also has been taken with two objectives in mind for the Turks and the rebels. Seizing Aleppo, besides pushing back or forcing the regime’s forces into submission, affords the Turkish government a say over the future of the Kurdish Qamishli area in northeast Syria and helps to prevent irredentist stirrings in the Turkish Hatay province in which a significant number of minorities reside. Given that the Kurds of Qamishli have refused to join the Syrian National Council yet claim opposition to the regime, Turkey has grown concerned about a future autonomous Kurdish enclave along its border.
Moreover, Aleppo’s environs and some of its neighborhoods include a significant number of minorities, especially Kurds. Ankara is jittery about the Kurds’ ambivalent political position and allegiance, which could create serious implications for Turkey’s domestic and regional policies. Not only have the Kurds refused to join the Syrian National Council; reportedly a significant number of them belong to the Kurdish Democratic Union Party. The party has a close relationship with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which has resumed its militant campaign against Turkish authorities. As a result, Ankara has been on the lookout for any outside meddling in the affairs of minorities in the Hatay province.
This strategic maneuver by the Turks, however, has been affected by two misgivings, prolonging the battle for Aleppo at the expense of a great loss in property and lives as well as creating circumstances under which unintended consequences could alter the makeup of power within the opposition. Turkey has supported the Muslim Brotherhood within the Syrian National Council and has exerted significant influence over the decisions and movements of the Free Syrian Army, whose main bases are located in Turkey and alongside the Syrian-Turkish border.
Despite this support and influence, Turkey has failed to help the opposition formulate a political vision with a military strategy. The fight against the regime in Aleppo, among other places, has been done on an ad hoc basis. The decision-making process and movements of the Free Syrian Army are either constrained by the Turkish government or hampered by unilateral actions of the various groups associated with the rebels. This has given the regime some breathing room as it capitalizes on the tactical and strategic discord among the opposition. In addition, based on interviews I conducted recently with Syrians who fled to Lebanon, Assad still enjoys some popular support in both Damascus and Aleppo. This partly has convinced the regime to dig in and augment its rhetoric that it is battling terrorists.
Aleppo has emerged as a focal point for geostrategic domestic and regional considerations. The regime can ill afford to lose this strategically located commercial city, which could lay open the road to Idlib and then Latakia, the capital of Alawi heartland. Moreover, the regime recognizes that losing the city may compel anxious minorities to join the opposition, and it could therefore lose whatever remains of its popular base of support….

Treasury Dept: Treasury Lifts Sanctions Against Defected Syrian Prime Minister
2012-08-14

Treasury Lifts Sanctions Against Defected Syrian Prime Minister 8/14/2012 Page Content WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today is lifting sanctions against former Prime Minister of Syria Riyad Hijab who recently severed his ties …

Davuto?lu says Turkey not against Kurdish autonomy in post-Assad Syria
Today’s Zaman
 August 11, 2012

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davuto?lu has said Turkey would not be opposed to a possible autonomous Kurdish region in Syria following the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, if all groups in the country can agree on it.

Davuto?lu’s comments came as he spoke to reporters aboard a plane carrying a Turkish delegation to Myanmar on Thursday. Stating that Turkey is not against the improvement of Kurds’ rights in Syria, the foreign minister recalled that he had met with leaders of the Syrian National Council (SNC) and the Kurdish National Council (KNC) during a visit he paid to Arbil.

“I told them, the leader of the SNC chairs the council as a Syrian Kurd. And you [KNC] are sitting here as Syrian Kurds. Sit down and come to terms. What we oppose is the threat of terrorism and the possibility of one of you claiming possession of somewhere. Elections should be held in Syria; a parliament should be formed that includes Kurds, Turkmens and Arabs. You can come together and say we will grant autonomy [to the Kurds]. This is up to you. We would not oppose that,” Davuto?lu said.

Turkey announced it strongly opposes the presence of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Syria’s northern cities along the Turkish border following the withdrawal of Assad’s forces from predominantly Kurdish-populated areas to fight opposition forces in Damascus and Aleppo. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an earlier warned that Turkey will intervene if “terrorist formations” emerge along its border.

Syria’s rebels: Who will come out on top?
The rebels are a diverse bunch who are co-operating—for the time being
Aug 11th 2012 | JEBEL ZAWIYA | ECONOMIST

KINGS make war, but wars also make kings. A year ago, when Syrian government troops first tried to enter Jebel Zawiya, a region south-west of Aleppo where rugged hills enfold 33 villages, a handyman called Jamal Marouf gathered seven men and set off to fight the intruders. Now he claims to command 7,000 fighters, whose reach stretches over much of rural Idleb province, from Turkey’s border to Hama in the south. Perhaps to match their growing ambition, Mr Marouf’s “Martyrs of Jebel Zawiya” recently changed their brigade’s name to “Martyrs of Syria”.

The Sunni farmers who grow olives, figs and cherries have long resented the rule of the Assads and their Alawite co-religionists. Since the uprising took off a year ago, the Syrian army has wreaked havoc in Jebel Zawiya, as elsewhere in Sunni-populated regions. But the growing cost of fighting the tenacious rebels, combined with the need to reinforce strained government troops in Aleppo, Syria’s biggest city that is now locked in a furious battle, has pushed the army out of the area. Last month it quit, leaving just a few isolated outposts from which it lobs shells into rebellious villages.

Unlike other parts of the country where civilian committees work alongside rebel groups, here it is the men with the guns who plainly run the show with scant civilian input. Mr Marouf, one of the two biggest strongmen in Idleb, pays his men the equivalent of $60 a month, runs a prison in his village and is setting up a court.

About 20 minutes’ drive down the road, Ali Bakran is the up-and-coming leader of another rebel unit called the Qisas (Retaliation) Brigade. His is a much smaller outfit. His skinnier young men hang out in a graffiti-covered town hall, where bookcases serve as shelves for storing improvised bombs. Mr Bakran runs a tight ship. He displays sheets with details of every man in his unit, including names of family members, the number of each kind of weapon, and a thumb print. “When Assad goes, I want to be first to put down my gun and go back to my normal life,” says Ibrahim, who fiddles with a walkie-talkie as a 17-year-old boy puts an AK-47 over his shoulder, and rebels roar past in cars blaring anti-Assad songs.

Other rebel groups sound less pacific. In Serjeh, a village perched on a hill overlooking olive trees rooted in earth the colour of terracotta, the bulky, uniformed men of Suqur al-Sham (Falcons of Syria) strike a sterner tone. The jihadists’ black standard hangs in the office of Abu Issa, the group’s burly leader, whose piercing blue eyes match a large blue stone set in his ring. Some say his rebel band is one of the biggest in the country. “People want to join us because we have enough weapons, good fighters and are on the right path,” he says. “We want an Islamic state.”

None of these groups gives its allegiance to the Free Syrian Army, the rebels’ would-be umbrella that has its headquarters in Turkey. But they are working together for the moment. Jebel Zawiya’s main commanders meet every ten days or so, and talk to their comrades in other regions. Concerted attacks on army checkpoints have been working well, and the groups are co-operating in laying mines on roads used by the army to reach their villages. On August 7th the rebels from various groups rushed off together to blow up tanks and fire at troops moving along the motorway from the coast to join the battle for Aleppo. The men of Jebel Zawiya have turned stretches of this road, as well as the main Aleppo-Damascus highway, into a lethal gauntlet for Mr Assad’s forces.

But rebel harmony may not last. Ideologies differ. Many of Mr Issa’s Islamists are the sons of men killed or imprisoned during the uprising against Hafez Assad, father of the current president, in the 1980s. They are well organised and well funded. Rich traders give them cash, whereas groups such as Mr Bakran’s are short of ammunition, relying on the booty they may pick up when they attack army checkpoints.

Most locals seem genuinely to back the rebels, but the fighters’ tactics worry some people. At a disused school that serves as a makeshift prison, detainees under Mr Marouf’s control look in fair shape. A frightened 24-year-old student was picked up at a checkpoint in the nearby town of Marat Numan because his father is a general in the army. When asked his crime, a prison guard rubs his fingers together to signify cash. Mr Marouf concedes that prisoners are often hostages that can be swapped for his men held by the regime. In the end, the strongest man’s word is the law.

The Syrian crisis presents Turkey with another dilemma, writes David Gardner – Guardian

Struggling to define the Syrian opposition
By Elise Labott – CNN

In the weeks before he defected from Syria, then-Prime Minister Riad Hijab put feelers out to contacts in the United States and other governments.

In addition to ensuring his family got out of the country, Hijab wanted guarantees that he would not be persecuted for his role in the government of President Bashar al-Assad, U.S. officials say.

“He wanted assurances from the opposition that a post-Assad Syria will take into account all Syrians, including minorities, and there will not be revenge attacks on those who at one time supported the regime,” one administration official said. The official described Washington’s role as that of a “middleman.”

The United States was able to produce a chorus of voices from the Syrian opposition promising that Syrians planning for a post-Assad transition are committed to ensuring human rights for all Syrians, including minorities. But that’s far from a guarantee for Hijab or for any defector.

Herein lies the problem with Syrian opposition. Although American officials have sought to broaden its outreach within the Syrian opposition, Washington hasn’t been able to identify a group of Syrians inside the country that U.S. officials believe will be calling the shots the day after the regime falls.

There is a grassroots political opposition with viable political structures on the ground in Syria. Revolutionary councils and Local Coordinating Committees (LCC) are organizing civil resistance and coordinating with the country’s armed opposition.

In some areas, the opposition serves as de-facto local governments by providing services to the Syrian people. Yet more than two years into the conflict, there is precious little harmonization between these groups and the Syrian National Council, the primary organization interfacing with the international community, which is made up of expats and which is roundly criticized inside the country as a bunch of dilettantes….

Officials say don’t see the shape of American assistance changing anytime soon.

“The whole idea of doing anything more is not on the table,” one senior official told me of the possibility of military aid. “Our sole job as of now is to plan for the day after.”

In Turkey this past weekend, CNN’s Ivan Watson reported that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with Syrian opposition activists, asking them about those still inside the country.

“She wanted to know who the U.S. should give money to, and who they should not give money to,” one activist told Watson…..

Officials now say the United States wants a “soft landing” that keeps institutions intact.

“We want the bloodshed to end but it needs to end apace with political developments,” another official said. “So when Assad goes, there is not more bloodshed.”

The University of Oklahoma’s Josh Landis, who runs the blog “Syria Comment,” warns that U.S. reluctance to arm the opposition puts it at a disadvantage in helping shape the post-al-Assad climate.

Landis points to a climate where complete lack of unity within the opposition has helped al-Assad take advantage of the civil war to live another day. Reports currently suggest as many as one hundred militias or more are operating throughout Syria, rarely coordinating among each other, similar to the civil war in Lebanon in the 1980s.

If Syria is left in ruins after a protracted sectarian conflict, Landis predicts the idea of Syria rising out of the ashes with expatriates imposing rule of law will seem very farfetched.

“Ultimately the ones who win this will be the guys with the guns,” Landis predicts. “They will have the power and will make Syria in their own image. They aren’t going to fly in a bunch of doctors and lawyers and engineers in to tell them how to share the wealth.”

Secretary of State Clinton has used the frustration with the opposition as one of the biggest reasons for not providing it more support.

By helping to better connect its disparate actors, Washington would lose its best excuse not to wade further into the conflict in Syria. But in doing so, it would find its most credible candidates for not only ending the conflict, but undertaking a transition once they do.

Sky News (GB): Syrian Defector: Rebels Have The Will To Win
2012-08-13

A senior Syrian army officer who has defected to the opposition has told Sky News he believes most of his fellow high-ranking soldiers would also leave if they could. The unnamed Lieutenant Colonel, who is now in an Free Syrian Army (FSA) safe house …

ASSAD’S SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY
By Aaron Y. Zelin, Pravda Slovakia, August 14, 2012

While most individuals involved in the rebellion are Syrian, foreign fighters now have a very real presence that should worry both the regime and the opposition.

When the Syrian uprising first began, one of President Bashar al-Assad’s justifications for his harsh crackdowns against protesters and, later, armed elements was because he considered them foreign terrorists. At the time, this claim was ludicrous. The overwhelming majority of individuals were Syrians looking to shake off the yoke of Bashar and his father Hafiz’s decades-long Baathist dictatorship.

While most individuals involved with the current rebellion are still Syrian, foreign fighters now have a very real presence that should worry not only the Assad regime but also Syrians in the opposition. Most foreign fighters go abroad to defend their fellow Muslim brethren from being slaughtered. Once in the area of battle, though, many come into closer contact with hardline jihadis as well as fighters from other countries and are exposed to new ideas. Therefore, portions of foreign fighters are not fighting to help establish a future state for Syrian nationals. Rather, they hope to annex it to be part of their grander aims of establishing emirates that will eventually lead to a reestablished Caliphate, however fanciful this project might be.

At this point, on-the-ground media coverage in English, French, Arabic, German, and other languages reports between 800-2,000 foreigners currently in Syria, accounting for less than 10% of the fighters. Most have come since the beginning of the year: a large contingent comes from the states surrounding Syria: Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan, while a smaller North African contingent hails from Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria. The presence of Westerners at this point has been minimal.

These individuals are linking up with not only the Free Syrian Army (FSA) but also jihadi organizations. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades and Fatah al-Isla, both of them Lebanese jihadi organizations fighting under the banner of the al-Khilafah Brigade in Syria, have entered the fray. So too have less-established, but growing organizations like Jabhat al-Nusrah, believed to be the strongest jihadi actor in Syria, as well as Ahrar ash-Sham. Another group, Liwa al-Ummah, comprising 90 percent Syrian fighters, is led by the Irish-Libyan Mahdi al-Harati, previously a commander in the Tripoli Brigade that helped topple the Qadhafi regime a year ago in Libya.

What is problematic with all of this is….

Syria: Prospects for Intervention
Chatham House, August 2012

…With little or no prospect for a negotiated end to the civil conflict in Syria, the discussion focused on the prospects for foreign intervention across a range of options, taking into account the current diplomatic stalemate, existing lines of support to conflicting parties, and alternative international approaches that may emerge as the situation deteriorates.

Key findings:

  • Foreign intervention is already occurring, semi-covertly, in the form of weapons supply and training to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), logistical and communications support, and non-military actions such as sanctions, together with diplomatic support (if not full recognition) for opposition groups such as the Syrian National Council (SNC).
  • The choice is no longer one of intervention versus non-intervention, but rather between maintaining or increasing existing levels of external intervention and allowing the conflict to drift. Intervention is occurring at a number of levels and there is a need for the international community to consider carefully both the consequences of the ongoing semi-covert intervention and the possible consequences of more overt military intervention.
  • The decision over whether to escalate intervention should rest on a thorough examination of the ‘balance of consequences’ and on other relevant factors including the constraints of international law. The costs and risks of different forms of intervention also have to be weighed against the risks and costs of non-intervention.
  • The most likely options for scaled-up intervention are the supply of more and heavier arms to the FSA and an intensification of covert action; punitive air strikes triggered by a major crisis such as a massacre in Aleppo; and an intensification of externally imposed sanctions. The risks associated with the first two scenarios are high and the benefits are not easily quantifiable in view of the inevitable unforeseen consequences.Read Paper >

Syria’s Coming Sectarian Crack-UpAssad’s forces will retreat to the north, and an Iranian-backed Alawite canton will be born.
BY MICHAEL DORAN

The Obama administration has been decrying the spread of sectarianism in war-torn Syria and calling for the preservation of state institutions there. A “managed transition” is the new mantra in Washington. This isn’t a policy but a prayer. Syrian state institutions are inherently sectarian, and they are crumbling before our eyes.

Syria is like Humpty Dumpty. Made up of four or five diverse regions glued together after World War I, the country is an accident of great-power politics. Like neighboring Lebanon, it has now dissolved into its constituent parts. The Free Syrian Army isn’t a unified force but rather a …

Syrian opposition prepares for transition
By Borzou Daragahi in Beirut – LA Times

Syria’s opposition has already laid the groundwork to take control of security and administration after what they consider will be the inevitable collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, according to a dozen activists gathered for a training workshop abroad.

The transition plans are flawed and murky, admit the activists, who fear a fall could trigger reprisal attacks against the Alawites who serve the regime

“It will be chaos for a while,” said Moataz, an activist from Damascus. But discussions and planning about the postwar period are a major concern for opponents of the Syrian regime, the activists said in a lengthy group interview in Beirut.

Was Insufficient Economic Growth A Critical Factor? – A SyriaComment Article From 2006 By Ehsani

This morning, Mitt Romney picked Representative Paul Ryan as his running-mate as the Republican party attempts to win back the White House from President Obama.

This choice is noteworthy because it will make the economy and the country’s fiscal challenges the focal point of this election. Mr Ryan is the current Budget Committee Chairman. The upcoming election is unlikely to be about Mr. Obama’s color or Mr. Romney’s religious beliefs.

Why is this important or relevant?

As many readers know, I have been highlighting the importance of economics for years when it comes to Syria. Following the previous note entitled “Could Syria’s Current Predicament Have Been Avoided Over A Decade Ago?”, a number of readers thought that the post was too simplistic. Surely, one cannot blame the current crisis on the failure to allow the Damascus Spring to flourish during 2001.

It is extremely difficult to agree on the main factor that led to the Syrian crisis. Over the past 17 months, several reasons have been offered. The list includes:

-Sunni-Shia (Alawi) sectarian divide
-Syria’s position with respect to Iran.
-Breaking the resistance.
-Domestic Corruption.
-The heavy handedness of the security apparatus.
-Lack of economic opportunities for vast majority of the populace.

The above list is by no means complete of course. As the regular readers of this forum recall however, I have long maintained that issues relating to the lack of economic growth constitute the dominant factors behind not only the Syrian uprising but those in the region as a whole.

Insufficient economic growth coupled with widespread corruption (I consider both related) is a lethal combination. In such an environment, the cake that is made up of yearly income/production is too small to be shared by the majority of the population.  Without expanding the size of the cake, the ranks of the unemployed will swell and incomes will stagnate and fall in real terms. Incomes will not be able to keep up with both inflation and a fast growing population.  This important topic was addressed in a post six years ago this month.

Back in August of 2006, I wrote a “Personal Memo” :

The key points discussed in the note are:

“Syria is made up of two separate countries: Syria 1 which contains close to one million people and Syria 2 which contains the remaining 19 million.

Syria 1 is made up of the affluent, highly connected industrialists, merchants and very high Government officials. Given the high standard of living of this group, one would expect them to support the regime and the current status quo. While most may admit that that progress has been slow, they are quick to point that given the circumstances, the country is on the right track. They highlight their latest cell phones, home and office Internet connections as well as their brand new cars as irrefutable signs of the economic and social advances that the country has been experiencing as of late. Seen from their prism, the Syrian economy seems prosperous judging by the superb outdoor dinners, number of servants, lovely homes, fancy cars, latest cell phones, rising land values, and monopolistic businesses.

Life could not be more different for the 19 million people of Syria 2.    It is clear that this silent majority has suffered the brunt of this grave economic mismanagement. This is evident in this group’s salary levels. If they were lucky enough to have jobs, salaries of this group is likely to be around Syp 10,000 ($200) per month. Their average family size is 6-7 (four to five children).

The vast majority of the population is likely to suffer even further going forward. Though inconceivable, their children may fare even worse than their horrific $6 payday. The population explosion has resulted in scores of unemployed men walking its major cities. Those residing in the rural part of the country have fared even worse. Their decision to locate to the big cities has made things even worse. It is my conviction that this regime cannot reform fast enough to arrest the decline in its economy and the standards of living of its citizens.”

To be fair, the above challenges are not unique to Syria. The demographic challenge covers the whole region.   The oil producing region of the Middle East is blessed with staggering earnings from energy production and exports. This is likely to delay their day of reckoning. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia reportedly spent an extra $65 billion last year to fend off any hints of domestic discontent. The none-oil producing countries of the region simply don’t have anywhere near such financial resources to do the same. For countries like Egypt, Yemen and Syria to have a chance, they need to engineer China-like economic growth rates in order to survive.  Without such growth, their young populations will keep revolting for years to come.

I will conclude with a another short article that I wrote back in the fall of 2010 following the events of Tahrir Square and prior to the start of the Syrian uprising:

“In the twenty-five years between 1980 and 2005, Yemen’s total fertility (children per women) averaged 7.49. Iraq’s was 5.67. Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt averaged 5.42, 5.19, and 4.25 respectively. In contrast, the United States and Western Europe averaged 1.96 and 1.56. Over the same period, real economic growth in the Arab world was largely stagnant. When populations double every twenty-five years and real incomes stay constant, future revolutions are baked in the cake.

Economic reforms like those offered by the political establishment lack the speed or vigor to match the droves of young men waiting to enter the region’s labor force. The region’s official unemployment rates mask the severity of the problem. Close to 40 percent of the population is under the age of fourteen and they will soon join the labor force. Furthermore, women’s labor participation rates are in the teens, the lowest in the world. This is also likely to increase. Consequently, real economic growth in the region must match Chinese levels—and fast. With no vibrant industrial policy, insufficient energy and renewable water resources, an outmoded education system, and median house price-to-income ratios close to ten (the United States is at three), Arab countries are riding their Titanics straight into their respective icebergs. Tunisia and Egypt are only the beginning. Yes, the Arab world could do with less corruption and more democracy and freedom, but none of this is likely to matter. The region needs to create between eighty and ninety million jobs over the next twenty years. This is 12,500 jobs a day.

Expect the Tahrir Square of every Arab capital to occupy our evening news for years to come.”

Creating a Syrian Swamp: Assad’s ‘Plan B’

Creating a Syrian Swamp: Assad’s ‘Plan B’
By Joshua Landis
August 10, 2012

Is the regime’s “end game” coming soon? I fear not. Assad is likely to treat Syria as he did Iraq and Lebanon: he will work to break them apart. In 2005, a friend who was close to the regime told me that Assad and those around him were convinced that they could defeat President Bush’s attempts to change the regime in Syria. They said:

Bush thinks he can use Iraq against us. But Iraq is not a nation. We will help turn its factions against the US. It will turn into a swamp and suck the US in. This is what we did to Israel and the US in Lebanon in the 1980s.

Today, Assad will treat Syria as he did Lebanon and Iraq earlier. He will gamble that it is not a nation and will work to tear it apart. Already he has withdrawn from the Kurdish parts of Syria. Friends in Aleppo tell me that Assad is arming the Kurds there. He will arm the Arab tribes in the hope that they will resist central control. I am told that a number of the tribes of Aleppo gathered to condemn the Free Syrian Army following the killing of a leader of the al-Berri tribe, Ali Zeineddin al-Berri, also known as Zeno, who was accused of leading a pro-regime shabiha militia group. Assad will arm those that fear the Free Syrian Army, such as the Aleppo tribes, which he has used to police Aleppo. As Damascus and Aleppo slip out of his control, he may well try to destroy them sooner than allow them to fall intact to the Free Syrian Army. Anyone who has ruled Syria knows that Damascus is its linchpin. By reducing it to ruins, Syria may become ungovernable. He will build up the rural groups that have chafed under Damascus’ control.

In order to survive, Assad and his Alawite generals will struggle to turn Syria into Lebanon – a fractured nation, where no one community can rule. He may lose Syria, but could still remain a player, and his Alawite minority will not be destroyed. Today, Junblatt, Geagea, Gemayyal, Franjia and other warlords are respected members of parliament and society. All might have been taken to the international court and charged with crimes against humanity two decades ago. After all, somewhere between 100,000 to 150,000 Lebanese were killed out of a population of three million during the civil war. When the Lebanese came to terms with the fact that no one camp could impose its rule over the others, they had no choice but to bury the hatchet and move forward.

If Assad surrenders, hundreds of regime leaders will be executed or tried for crimes against their fellow countrymen. The broader Alawite community fears the possibility of aimless retribution. To avoid this, Assad is likely to pursue the Lebanon option: turn Syria into a swamp and create chaos out of Syria’s sects and factions. It is a strategy of playing upon divisions to sow chaos. Already the Syrian Army has largely been transformed into an Alawite militia. If Assad must withdraw from Damascus, he will have nowhere to fall back on but Latakia and the coastal mountains. I have argued that the Alawite region cannot be turned into an independent state, but it does provide Assad and the remnants of the Syrian Army a social base. Just as Lebanon’s Maronites did not create an independent state in the Lebanon Mountains, they did use it to deny Muslim forces undivided supremacy over Lebanon. The Syrian opposition will have difficulty defeating Assad’s army. This is certainly true if opposition forces remain as fragmented as they are today. Assad is gambling on his enemies being unable to unite. He is working assiduously to turn Syria into a swamp in order to save what he can of his power and the lives of those around him.

If Assad is successful in this ambition, there will be no clear endgame to the fighting in Syria. Syria’s Baathist regime cannot survive. It is already collapsing. Most state institutions are no longer functioning. Order has broken down in many parts of the country. New authorities are springing up as the old disappear. But Assad’s army in its transformed state is likely to remain a powerful force. It is difficult to see how a clear winner will emerge in Syria. A new national pact will have to be hammered out between the forces on the ground. But those forces are only just beginning to take shape in their new forms today.

Syria Comment News (No moderation of comments)

I will try abandoning moderation of the comment section for several weeks as an experiment. I have been receiving numerous complaints. I have had great trouble keeping good moderators because people are angry. Every moderator is attacked for being partisan and unfair. Their job becomes unsatisfying if not impossible. Consequently, I will try not to moderate the comment section for several weeks and pray that all commentators remain civil and resist attacks on other commentators. Attacking ideas is fine. Attacking people is not. I want to keep the comment section useful and friendly to all. Ideally comments will add valuable information for our readers. This blog is a group effort. Best to you all. Joshua

News Round Up

Will Syria’s Kurds benefit from the crisis?
By Jonathan Marcus BBC Diplomatic Correspondent

Sowing chaos?

…. Noted Syria expert Joshua Landis of the University of Oklahoma says that while Syria’s Kurds are a compact minority they are not a majority even in the north eastern border area with Turkey – where they constitute some 30-40% of the population.

They have sometimes tense relations with local Sunni Arab tribes who see this as an integral part of Syrian territory, reinforced by the fact that this is an area rich in oil resources vital to the Syrian economy.

Prof Landis argues that what is going on in the Kurdish north-east offers a useful pointer to President Assad’s “Plan B” should his control over key cities like Damascus and Aleppo crumble

He says that the “embattled president withdrew government forces from the north-east because he couldn’t control it and wanted to focus on the most important battles in Aleppo and Damascus”.

“But in the back of the president’s mind, there may be the thought that empowering the Kurds is a way of weakening the Sunni Arab majority and underlining the risks of fragmentation should his government fall. It’s a strategy of playing upon divisions to sow chaos,” he said.

This way, says Prof Landis, “the Syrian Army – which is rapidly becoming an Alawite militia, whilst still the strongest military force – may lose control over large swathes of the country, but will remain a vital factor in determining the political outcome in Syria”.

It is a bleak prospect.

Prof Landis asserts that President Assad “may lose Syria, but could still remain a player, and his Alawite minority will not be destroyed”.

“That’s the future of Syria,” he says, with little enthusiasm. “It’s what Lebanon was and what Iraq became.”

Insight: Syria rebels see future fight with foreign radicals
By Erika Solomon, ALEPPO, Syria | Tue Aug 7, 2012

A Free Syrian Army fighter screams in pain after he was injured in a leg by shrapnel from a shell fired from a Syrian Army tank in the Salaheddine neighbourhood of central Aleppo August 7, 2012.
REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic

(Reuters) – Abu Bakr, a Syrian rebel commander on the outskirts of Aleppo, is a devoted Islamist determined to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad. But the radical allies that have joined the rebels in recent months alarm even him.

“Let me be clear. I am an Islamist, my fighters are Islamists. But there is more than one type of Islamist,” he told Reuters. “These men coming fought in insurgencies like Iraq. They are too extreme, they want to blow up any symbol of the state, even schools.”

Seventeen months into the uprising against Assad, Syria’s rebels are grateful for the support of Islamist fighters from around the region. They bring weapons, money, expertise and determination to the fight.

But some worry that when the battle against Assad is over they may discover their allies – including fighters from the Gulf, Libya, Eastern Europe or as far as the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area – have different aims than most Syrians.

“Our goal is to make a new future, not destroy everything,” Abu Bakr said, sighing as he rattled his prayer beads. “As bloody as it is now, this stage is simple. We all have the same cause: topple the regime. When Bashar falls, we may find a new battlefront against our former allies.”

Abu Bakr and his comrades say they envision Syria as a conservative version of Turkey’s moderate Islamist rule, not an autocratic theocracy. They are unnerved by a recent kidnapping of foreign journalists and attacks on state infrastructure….

One of the most effective and elusive groups in Aleppo now sending reinforcements into Damascus is called Ahrar al-Sham, “The Free Men of Syria.” Its fighters accept the bulk of jihadist foreign fighters in Idlib and Aleppo, rebels say.

“They’re extremely effective and secretive. They coordinate with us to attack the regime but they don’t take orders from anyone. They get weapons and explosives smuggled from abroad that are much better,” said a rebel in Aleppo called Anwar.

Other groups are amateurs working alone, and it shows…

ISLAMIC STATE

But most rebels don’t have clear answers for what they mean when they say they are Islamist or want an Islamic state.

“We want to build a state where our citizens are equal, Muslims and minorities,” said the young rebel Anwar, as he watched an Islamic TV station from a safe house in Aleppo.

“We want to be able to choose our own future, not have it be determined by poverty or our religion.”

The fighters from Syria are mostly poor, uneducated young men from rural areas. Decades of repressed anger have helped shape their ideas. Most say that as members of the country’s Sunni Muslim majority, their families were harassed and discriminated against by security forces.

….Commander Abu Bakr says that while he objects to the severe radical approach, he too hopes for an Islamic state.

“Let’s first get rid of the regime, re-establish stability, have national dialogue, and then gradually try to create the Islamic state and give people time to get used to it,” he said.

“I don’t want to immediately impose Sharia law and start cutting off people’s hands for stealing. I believe in Sharia. But if we force it on people, we will create fear. We have to assure minorities we will treat them well.”

Rebel fighters are exhausted and can’t afford to take on new opponents, said fighters from northern Idlib, in a convoy heading to the battle in neighboring Aleppo. Amr, a 20-year-old rebel, said his comrades had their hands full trying to topple the government and maintain order in areas they control.

“We already are fighting the regime and now we’re fighting crime. We just don’t have time to deal with these extremists,” he sighed. “But don’t worry, their day will come.”

On Damascus Streets, Front Lines Multiply
Neighborhood Patrols in Syrian Capital Take Up Arms for the Regime; In Some Areas, Rebels Are Manning the Checkpoints.
By NOUR MALAS

Syrian army fighters in Damascus in July. Regime backers have asserted control over much of the capital.

DAMASCUS—Syria’s capital, once a haven from the violence tearing through much of the country, now has multiple front lines and bears battle scars of its own.

A maze of checkpoints and neighborhood patrols run by the most hardened supporters of President Bashar al-Assad has allowed the government to reassert control in most areas—after rebel fighters stunned soldiers and residents last month.

Local councils of regime supporters, called Popular Committees, were months ago given the task by municipalities to guard their respective neighborhoods. Now, their members—mostly men in their 20s and 30s—have been armed with rifles and handguns, issued ID cards and given monthly salaries.

New license plates that read “protection of order” are displayed on a growing number of cars around the capital. The word for “order” in Arabic, locals point out, can also mean “regime,” a pun not lost on Syrians on both sides of the conflict.

But the weeklong government bombardment of crowded neighborhoods last month also gained rebel fighters some sympathy in other corners of the capital, making regime opponents out of displaced civilians and turning rebellious southern districts into nearly lawless enclaves. Still, many regime opponents say it was premature or reckless of rebels to bring the fight to the capital…..

Assad appears on TV with Iranian security chief
Washington Post

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad made a rare appearance with the head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council on Tuesday in video footage broadcast on state television. Assad has made one appearance since the assassination of four top security officials on July 18. In video footage broadcast the following day, he was shown swearing in a new defense minister.

Saeed Jalili, a top security official in Iran and the country’s lead nuclear negotiator, visited Damascus on Tuesday to discuss the fate of 48 Iranians captured by rebels just outside the capital on Saturday, as well as the ongoing crisis in Syria.

“Kidnapping innocent people is not acceptable anywhere in the world,” Jalili said, according to the official Islamic Republic News Agency. He said Iran would do what it could to “secure release of the 48 innocent pilgrims kidnapped in Syria.”

He also said the only way to resolve the unrest in the country would be to find a “Syrian solution.”

LBC: Samaha confesses involvement in bombing plans
August 9, 2012

LBC television reported Thursday that detained ex-Information Minister Michel Samaha confessed under interrogation that he had transferred “explosives from Syria to Lebanon in order to carry out bombings in North Lebanon, particularly in the area of Akkar, with Syria’s knowledge.”

Guardian (GB): The Muslim Brotherhood wants a future for all Syrians2012-08-06

The future of democracy in Syria is the subject of many concerns: people are worried about the treatment of minorities and women, possible acts of revenge, and the likelihood of transitional justice. Some ask about universal human rights. Others …

State Department and Pentagon Plan for Post-Assad Syria By STEVEN LEE MYERS and THOM SHANKER, August 4, 2012

WASHINGTON — Even with fighting raging in Syria and President Bashar al-Assad digging in, the State Department and Pentagon are quietly sharpening plans to cope with a flood of refugees, help maintain basic health and municipal services, restart a shattered economy and avoid a security vacuum in the wake of Mr. Assad’s fall, administration officials…

State Department Spokesman Patrick Ventrell said at a daily press briefing Monday:

“What we’re focused on and our concern is that as the opposition comes together with the remaining elements of the regime that don’t have blood on their hands, that they create an inclusive Syria where the rights of all Syrians are respected. And so that’s our focus and that’s what we’re directly communicating to the opposition, and that’s certainly where our feelings are.”..

 Daily Caller: Behind the White House’s secret Syria plan 2012-08-07

 The White House won’t keep its own secrets, never mind those of the SEALs, Pentagon, or Israel — especially if leaking secrets helps President Obama look like a tough guy in his uphill re-election campaign. The latest leak is a gusher, and …

Divisions may hinder Muslim Brotherhood in Syria
© Oxford Analytica 2012 – Thursday, August 9 2012
At the start of the uprising in March 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood was not well placed to claim the leadership of post-Assad Syria: it had no organised presence inside the country and was beset by long-standing rivalries. However, the uprising has enabled it to bolster its credibility and re-establish a foothold among the domestic opposition. It is now on course to play a prominent role in the conflict — and the political system that follows the Assad family’s 40-year rule.
Impact
•The fall of the Assad regime will remove obstacles to increased Turkish, Qatari, and possibly Egyptian support.
•Both Iran and Saudi Arabia will resent the Brotherhood’s rise, with Riyadh trying to curtail its influence by supporting rival forces.
•The movement’s moderate positions are likely to make it appear as a ‘reasonable’ alternative to more radical Islamic forces.
What next
As soon as security conditions allow, the Muslim Brotherhood will return to Syria to claim a place within the new political order. This will not be an easy task. Although it will benefit from its connections with armed groups and foreign governments, it will face strong opposition from both Islamist and secular rivals. The movement will also need to address internal divisions, and rebuild its Damascus branch.
Analysis
For decades, the Brotherhood has dominated the exiled opposition. This is a result of the mass exodus of its members that occurred between the 1963 Ba’athist coup that brought the Assads to power, and the regime’s final eradication of the movement’s presence inside Syria following the 1979-1982 Islamic uprising.
The Brotherhood played a leading role in the conferences held by exiled opponents in Turkey in the first half of 2011. It rapidly became the leading force within the main exiled opposition body, the Syrian National Council (SNC) that was created in Istanbul last August. It took about one-quarter of the seats and established alliances with many other members, including secular figures such as the SNC’s first president, Burhan Ghalioun. In addition to its size and experience, the Brotherhood has been able to influence the SNC’s decisions thanks to its close relations with the latter’s two main supporters, Turkey and Qatar (see QATAR: Foreign policy activism meets constraints – February 3, 2012).
Factionalism issues
However, the movement remains handicapped by factionalism based on long-running regional divisions. In the early 1970s, the Damascus branch seceded from the organisation and gradually ceased to play any significant role, even in exile. During the following decades, endemic rivalry persisted between the Aleppo and Hama branches. In 2010, the Brotherhood’s secretary-general, Aleppo branch member Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, was replaced with a new leadership entirely composed of members of the Hama branch. This followed a number of leadership failures by Bayanuni, including his unfruitful alliance in 2006 with former Vice-President Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who by then was in exile.
The new leadership is headed by Riyad Shaqfa and his deputy Faruq Tayfur, the most senior Brotherhood representative within the SNC. Although the two branches have recently reconciled, the Aleppo branch has continued to act autonomously, to the extent that it runs its own coalition within the SNC, the National Action Group led by Ahmad Ramadan.
Rebuilding grass-root networks
The creation of a ‘liberated zone’ in the north could facilitate the Brotherhood’s return this year
After establishing its hegemony over the exiled opposition, the Brotherhood’s top priority has been to rebuild bridges with Syrian society. It has attempted to do this by channeling funds into the country, first for humanitarian purposes, then from late 2011 onwards, in support of armed groups. The reconstruction of the movement’s base inside Syria has thus been carried out on a clientelist basis rather than through the recruitment of genuine followers.
Its attempt to re-enter the Syrian political scene has relied on the movement’s own structures such as the Committee for the Protection of Civilians. The latter is an umbrella organisation that was created in December 2011 and subsequently secured the allegiance of several insurgent groups, the most powerful of which is the Khalid Bin al-Walid Brigade in Homs province.
Islamist competition
The Brotherhood’s rise may exacerbate Syria’s regional and ideological divisions
However, the Brotherhood has also been accused of using the SNC’s resources for its own purposes, in particular through its control of the Relief and Development Office. This issue has been a source of tensions not only with secular opponents, but also with other Islamist groups such as the Syrian National Movement. The latter constitutes a serious potential rival for the Brotherhood given that its leaders left Syria only after March 2011 and thus command a much fresher network of supporters on the ground.
Inside Syria, pro-Brotherhood brigades also compete with Saudi-backed military coalitions such as the Front of the Revolutionaries of Syria, and at least some branches of the Free Syrian Army that have reportedly distanced themselves from the Brotherhood-SNC-Qatar nexus (see SYRIA: Opposition splits cloud transition prospects – May 14, 2012).
Despite past tactical alliances with the Muslim Brothers, the Saudi monarchy is worried about the fact that their recent electoral victories in the region might encourage its own citizens to demand political reforms. In Syria, therefore, Riyadh has tended to support the Brotherhood’s rivals, particularly politically conservative forces such as Bedouin tribes and defected officers.
Policy agenda
Pragmatism would likely determine the movement’s actions once in power
In ideological terms, the Syrian Brotherhood espouses moderate positions in line with the regional movement. It has always advocated a form of ‘Islamic democracy’ that combines the institutions of a liberal democratic state (free multi-party elections, a powerful parliament, separation of power) with the ‘gradual Islamisation of law’. Over the last decade the organisation has clarified its position on religious minorities by rejecting any form of discrimination against them.
The Brotherhood’s economic policies advocate a radical break with the incumbent regime state-centred approach in favour of a liberal system characterised by minimal state intervention and maximum private initiative (see NORTH AFRICA: Islamists to be pragmatic on economy – April 10, 2012).
In the realm of foreign policy, the Brotherhood will have to walk a fine line between the advocacy of a nationalist agenda, which will be key to the movement’s legitimacy, and the need to follow a realistic course of action in order to preserve its relations with pro-Western states in the region
Nicholas D. Kristof: Obama AWOL in Syria
….As I see it, there are three main reasons for action in Syria.
First, the longer the fighting goes on, the more it destabilizes the region. Syria is now in a civil war linked to the Sunni-Shiite divide in the region. The more deaths, the more refugees, the more revenge killing, the tougher it will be to put Humpty Dumpty together. The longer the war persists, the more risk of spillover into Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan.
Second, Assad is believed to have many tons of sarin and VX nerve agents. Those chemical weapons could end up in the hands of jihadis or on the global black market, and we should work with Syrian rebels to help secure them if necessary.
Third, there’s a humanitarian imperative. It appears that several times more people have been killed in Syria than in Libya when that intervention began, and the toll is rising steeply.
Syrian rebels driven by religion, but on their own terms,” Wash Post
By Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith, Published: August 9

….Abu Berri says he became a committed member of the Salafists, the ultraconservative Sunni sect, after spending nine years in Saudi Arabia.

Many of his peers, he says, are also becoming Salafists, even those who have little understanding of this brand of puritanical Islam. Abdelr Razzaq Tlass, the charismatic leader of a brigade in the city of Homs, traded his mustache for a beard, he notes. “They grow beards to defy the regime,” he says. “In fact, we’re even willing to say we’re al-Qaeda to annoy the regime.”

Syrian activists often play down the religious aspect of the country’s revolution, insisting that in a conservative society it is only natural that people who are suffering should seek refuge in religion. But as the regime’s brutality has intensified, the rebel movement has become more radicalized. In this overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim struggle against a minority Alawite regime, Salafists and other Islamists say they are fighting a jihad against the Assads.

Crime Wave Engulfs Syria as Its Cities Reel From War
By an employee of THE NEW YORK TIMES and DAMIEN CAVE
Published: August 9, 2012

….Kidnapping, rare before, is now rampant, as a man named Hur discovered here last month. He simply wanted to drive home. The man shoving a pistol into his back had other plans. “Keep walking,” the gunman told Hur, 40, a successful businessman, as they approached his car. “Get in.”

Hur said he initially thought he was being arrested by government agents. But then, after blindfolding him, his three captors made a phone call that revealed baser motives.

“They asked my family to ransom me with 15 million Syrian pounds,” Hur said of the abductors’ demand for about $200,000. “They were criminals, not a political group. They told me they knew me and they knew my family could pay.”….

It was Iraq, circa 2003, in miniature: in areas where decades of suppressive government have suddenly been lifted, looting, violence and sectarianism have begun to thrive.

But the lawlessness may be more systemic. For years, the Assad government relied for control on private militias called shabiha that were paid by the government or by its wealthy supporters. With the government stretched financially and many businessmen fleeing or switching sides, those payments appear to have stopped, Ms. Hanano and others said, leading many militia members to pay themselves however they can, often with violence as a byproduct….

“In the Shadow of Assad’s Bombs
by Samar Yazbek, a novelist and journalist, who is als the authorof “A Woman in the Crossfire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolution.” Powerful personal account from an embattled village, written by an Alawi woman who has renounced the regime.
New York Times op-ed

….I was the only woman among them, and the young F.S.A. men treated me like part of the group. During that meeting it became clear that it’s a mistake to consider the F.S.A. as a single bloc. It is a hodgepodge of battalions, including secularists, moderate Islamists and all-too-ordinary people who joined up to defend their lives and their families.

At the end of our journey back to Saraqib, the commander told me, “We are one people, we and the Alawites are brothers. We had never thought about the sort of things that the regime is trying to stir up.”

I was silent for a moment, until I realized what he was telling me, the daughter of a well-known Alawite family that supports President Bashar al-Assad unconditionally. Some of my relatives have publicly disowned me for turning my back on the regime as many others have, announcing on Facebook that I am no longer considered one of them.

I squeezed the commander’s hand. ….

“There was an apple seller who came to Saraqib today. He was killed by that sniper up on the radio building. An army patrol passed by, took the apple cart and they all started eating the apples even as the merchant’s corpse was sprawled out on the ground,” she recounted. “The apple seller’s son was shouting and crying for someone to help him move his father so that he could give him a decent burial. One of them motioned at the son to go and ask the neighbors for help.”

Before the sound of a fighter jet flying overhead boomed, the woman said, “Poor guy. He was just a stranger who wanted to sell his apples.”