Car Bombs Rip Apart Saadallah al-Jabiri Square in Aleppo

Aleppo and Damascus are the two geese that lay Syria’s golden eggs. The revolutionaries must take them from the regime. The problem is that the regime cannot allow the opposition to have them alive. It will have to kill the golden geese rather than give them up to the enemy. Both sides will grind Syria’s two commercial and political capitals into dust rather then permit the other side to own them and harvest their golden eggs. Aleppo and Damascus produce much of Syria’s wealth. Even more importantly they are the two centers that extract that wealth from the rest of the country. During Ottoman times, it has been estimated that taxes on peasants were 4 times higher than on city dwellers.

The country folk that have been at the heart of this rebellion waited for a Tahrir Square moment. They waited for the city people to rise up and come to their aid. Unfortunately, Aleppo and Damascus did not rise up or couldn’t. Over the last several months the revolutionaries have been taking the revolution to the cities. They insist that the cities cannot be allowed to sit out this revolt; otherwise, the regime will win. Amn wa Istiqrar – security and stability – has been the mantra of this regime for 40 years. The revolution cannot allow it to go on. By taking the fight to the city centers, they will deny the wealthier urbanites the security and safety they have always been willing to settle for.

There is a strong class element to this struggle. It is not only about sect and religion. For the rural Syrians that make up so much of the militias destroying the city centers is a price they are willing to pay to set the city folk on fire. Of course Assad’s army cannot allow the cities to pass into the hands of the opposition. Whoever owns the cities, owns Syria.

The opposition is counting on the fact that once security and stability is taken away from the middle Class and rich, they will side with their fellow Sunnis against the Alawite dominated regime. This is a safe bet. It happened in Lebanon and Iraq. Once the state is gone, people will cleave to their own community or tribe. Most Syrians, before this is over, may well be forced back to that default setting. Can a “free floating” individual survive in the jungle, where no rule of law protects him?


View Larger Map Jabri Square is at the corner of the Park. I couldn’t get the red  pointer to move, but click on the larger map for real detail.

Two car bombs rocked Saadallah al-Jabri Square in Aleppo, causing much damage and death. 40 reported dead so far. VOA story.

The obliterated building to the right of the picture is a well known coffee shop that occupies the corner of the street facing the Siyahi hotel, which is seen at the left of the picture. The real target, however, was undoubtedly the “officers club” or “nadi Al-zubbat” which is located directly to the right of the coffee shop. Other pictures of the scene, clearly show that the club was totally destroyed by the blast.” Another explosion took place near Aleppo’s Chamber of Commerce.

Video of the bomb site is here

It is from a pro-government YouTube network: a lengthy video of the damage, recorded by a man who narrated the scene as he trudged across piles of rubble to the brink of what appeared to be a six-foot-deep bomb crater. Gunfire could be heard nearby.

The facades had been sheared off four buildings, two about eight stories high, and two smaller ones between them. On the other side of an intersection, a building appeared to have collapsed. The man narrating the video said that a coffee shop and a cellphone store had been destroyed along with the hotel, and that several senior officials had come to the scene.

The video then cut to the bodies of two men wearing army uniforms.

“Those are the terrorists carrying explosive belts as we can see attached to the hand of this terrorist,” the cameraman says as the video zooms into to show a corpse’s mouth covered with blood.

In the background, someone shouts an obscenity. “Film the blowup device in his hand, film it!” It was unclear what was in the man’s hand.

New York Times By ANNE BARNARD:

The new fighting caused anguish for supporters and opponents of the government. The bombings on Wednesday hit a central square bordered by a graceful public garden, a downtown district full of hotels and offices, and the Christian neighborhood of Aziziyeh, where many people had sought refuge over the weekend.

Activists also reported that the al-Hal spice market near the site of the bombings was being shelled. Dozens were wounded and people were trapped there by the fighting, activists said….

 

Iran video said to be from today: protesters in Tehran chanting anti-Syria slogans

Syria’s Kurds Build Enclaves as War Rages
Oppressed Group Gains New Freedoms With Help of Political Alliance, Militia
BY JOE PARKINSON – in WSJ

DERIK, Syria—A teacher’s request sends a dozen young arms skyward, with high-pitched pleas to showcase new skills. One by one, the excited pupils walk to the front of their dusty classroom to recite or write in Kurdish—a language outlawed from public life in Syria.

While civil war has shut many schools across the country, here in the Kurdish-dominated northeast, education is expanding into new territory—just one way in which the Assad regime’s focus on fighting rebels in the biggest cities has allowed the emergence of autonomous Kurdish enclaves.

“Until now the regime closed Kurdish eyes and mouths. Now we are …

The Families of Qardaha; Hizbullah Fighters Killed in Syria; Iran’s Currency Collapses from Sanctions

Chroniques du délitement. 2 / Règlement de comptes à Qardaha, antre de la famille Al Assad

Selon les informations disponibles, une altercation est donc intervenue, vendredi 28 septembre, dans un café de Qardaha, entre des membres des familles Al Assad et Chalich, d’une part, et des familles Al Khayyer, Othman et Abboud, de l’autre. Le “seigneur de la montagne” n’a pas supporté d’entendre un membre de la famille Al Khayyer dénoncer à haute voix la gestion calamiteuse du pays par son cousin, le chef de l’Etat, et réclamer le départ de Bachar Al Assad. Son incompétence avait déjà détruit et ruiné la Syrie. Elle risquait de provoquer le désastre et la mort jusque dans sa ville natale. Fidèle à sa réputation, Mohammed Al Assad a aussitôt sorti son pistolet et tiré sur l’impudent qui tenait de tels propos. Mais il a manqué sa cible et l’autre, plus adroit, l’a grièvement blessé par un tir de riposte. S’est ensuivi un affrontement généralisé qui a provoqué plusieurs morts et blessés dans les deux camps…..

Le Monde has put together what is known about the fighting in Qardaha.

The Al-Khayyer, Othman and Abboud families, who it is believed fought with the Assad family, are well respected within the Alawite community. They have produced many lawyers, engineers and doctors, unlike some of the other families of Qardaha.

Dr Abdel-Aziz Al Khayyer, who is featured in this le Monde article was married to my mother-in-law’s cousin, Mona al-Ahmad. He fled Syria after Hafiz al-Assad’s police accused him of being “too Communist”, a catch-all accusation that was used to condemn many critics of the regime. Because the regime could not imprison Abdelaziz al-Khayyer, they arrested his wife, Mona, to try to induce him to give himself up and to dissuade others from dissent. He never did give himself up, and Mona remained imprisoned for many years.

She was tortured in prison and became paranoid and disturbed. When she was finally released, my mother-in-law along with others tried to help Mona get medical help for her paranoia. Mona believed that relatives were out to get her. Her son, Majd, had to be taken care of by his grandmother, who was a strong woman and succeeded in getting herself educated. Her sister, my wife’s grandmother, was married off at the age of 13, and remained illiterate for the rest of her days despite her daughters’ encouragement to return to school. All of her 10 children got advanced degrees and made something of themselves. The story of Mona’s torture and unjustified imprisonment has festered in the family for decades, causing tensions between different branches of the family and much sadness and guilt among those who were unable to help. Unfortunately, every Syrian family has a similar story tucked away – some have many.

Syria’s Kurds prepare for life after Assad
By Loveday Morris in al-Hassaka, Syria, FT

… At a party youth rally in Derik, the speaker rouses the crowd with a message from Mr Ocalan to the Syrian Kurds, which he says was given to a lawyer on a recent prison visit.

“You must not be with Assad, you must not be with the opposition, you must be the third power in Syria,” he quotes Mr Ocalan as saying. “You must prepare 15,000 soldiers to protect the Kurdish areas. If you don’t take this strategy you will be crushed?.?.?.? Every young Kurd must prepare themselves to join up and protect their motherland.”…

Kurds – largely concentrated in the country’s north-east, which holds a significant portion of Syria’s limited but vital oil reserves – have been quietly preparing for a post-Assad future, opening police stations, courts and local councils that they hope will form the foundations of an autonomous region.

The proliferation of newly hung Kurdish flags and signs in the mother tongue in al-Hassaka province give the impression of liberation after years of rule under the Ba’ath party, which expropriated land in Kurdish areas, suppressed expressions of Kurdish identity and arrested thousands of Kurdish activists, especially after riots shook the Kurdish areas in 2004.

But the effort at self-governance is taking place while the regime troops maintain a presence in many of the region’s towns and cities, appearing to turn a blind eye to what would have previously been an unthinkable threat to its power.

Mr Turkmani points to a building a few hundred metres away, where the two-starred Syrian state flag flutters overhead.

“Bashar’s police station,” he says. “They just play cards all day. They have nothing to do.”…

Note from a Syrian friend:

The way Syria has been maltreating its Kurdish citizens is a disgrace. In an a-la-Iraq configuration, Syria’s Kurds should have autonomy. The name of the country should drop the word “Arab” to become the Republic of Syria, which was the name before the racist Baath Party stole power in 1963.

Lebanese official: Hezbollah commander, fighters killed in Syria
AP 02 Oct 2012

A Hezbollah commander and several fighters have been killed inside Syria, a Lebanese security official said Tuesday, a development that could stoke already soaring tensions over the Lebanese militant group’s role in the civil war next door. Hezbollah’s reputation has taken a beating over its support for the Syrian regime, but […]

Syrian state TV lashes out at Hamas leader, calling him a traitor
New York Times, 02 Oct 2012

The New York Times reports: State television in Syria issued a withering attack late Monday on a longtime ally, the leader of the Palestinian militant group Hamas, Khaled Meshal, declaring him an ungrateful child and a corrupt traitor, saying he was having a “romantic emotional crisis” over the Syrian uprising and accusing him of selling […]

Syrian rebels’ backers block arms cache until bickering factions unite
Posted: 02 Oct 2012

The Independent reports: Stockpiles of arms, including anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, are being held in Turkey for use by rebels in Syria’s civil war, but their distribution is being held up because of disunity and feuding between the different groups of fighters, The Independent has learned. In high-level discussions, Qatari and Turkish suppliers told opposition […]

Urgent: Enemies have launched economic “battle” against Iran: Iranian president

Oct. 2, 2012 (Xinhua) — Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Tuesday that the West has launched an economic ” battle” against the Islamic republic.

Civilians plead with Syrian fighters – al-Jazeera

Residents of al-Raqqa, known as ‘hotel’ of the revolution, tell combatants to spare them as rebels plan to take city.

More than 500,000 people are estimated to have fled to the northern city of al-Raqqa over the year-and-a-half long conflict in Syria.

That influx of internally displaced Syrians has doubled al-Raqqa’s population.

Now, as opposition fighters say they plan to take the city from the forces of Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian president, civilians are pleading with the fighters to spare them the violence that would ensue.

Intra-Alawite fighting in Qardaha not Confirmed; Turkey Denies Syria Captured Pilots Alive; `Ar`our Returns to Syria

Minister Calls on People to Raise Backyard Chickens as Subsistence Economy Takes Hold in Growing Parts of the Country – Syria Report

The Minister of Agriculture has called on Syrian citizens to raise chickens as formal economic patterns are gradually disappearing in growing parts of the country.

Jihad Yazigi has an excellent report on the Syrian economy given in London by the London School of Economics, “Inside Syria: 18 Months On,”

….Let’s run the figures in terms of numbers where we are today. Syria’s gross domestic product probably contracted last year anywhere between 12 and 15 percent and this year it will contract anywhere between 20, 25, 30, 35 percent and we don’t really know.  We have absolutely no idea what’s going on in Aleppo, Idlib and Deir ez-Zor, but a very significant contraction. Unemployment is very high. In large parts of the country anyway unemployment is not an issue really because people are just fleeing violence. Foreign exchange reserves like I told you are down. The currency has lost 50 percent of its value in the last 18 months. It was traded at 47 SYP a dollar in March 2011. It is now at 70 SYP. It was at 70 SYP on Friday and 72 SYP on Monday and today at 74 SYP if I understand. Inflation is officially, in June, at 36 percent before the price was at 4 percent so it’s also a significant increase. Government expenses have been – I mean government has larger divested from the economy in terms of investment expenditures. It’s really paying only salaries.

Now, I’m giving you all this data and all these figures, but you have to realise that, in practice, you can’t really talk anymore about the formal economy. For instance, I’m taking about the inflation rate. Officially, that’s one of the very few indicators that are published officially publicly. It is at 36 percent, but you have to look at, first of all, these figures and then very different situations across the country.  For instance, before coming to London, I met someone who has just comeback from a village near the city of Raqqah in the north east. So I was asking him about the economic and social condition there. It’s a village near Raqqah. He was telling me there is no gasoline whatsoever. Telephone is cut off, both the landline network and the mobile phone networks are cut off, no connections. A kilogram of tomatoes which was sold at 25 SYP a few weeks earlier is now sold at 125 SYP and the cooking gas cylinder is sold at a $100. It was very interesting because, for the first time, someone prices anything in dollars. In Syria, you price everything in pounds and, of course, it reminds you a bit of Lebanon where the currency devalued so quickly that people were obliged to fix the price in dollar. But still $100, that’s 10 times its price in Damascus. A cooking gas cylinder in Damascus is sold at 700 SYP in the market at $10…. Read it all

Adnan Ar’our, the controversial sheikh, has returned to Syria. `Ar`ur who became a hero to many in the revolution for cursing Alawites and regime supporters on Saudi TV, has returned to Syria. In this video he is a keynote speaker at a joint leadership meeting of the revolutionary military councils. al-jazeerah video


Fadi Salem on the fighting in Aleppo

Samar Yazbek writes, “shabbiha of Assad’s family, killed 5 of my family from the Othman Family in AL Qurdaha.”

Tweets – Claim fighting within Assad Clan in Qardaha, their mountain town

  • Brian Whitaker ?@Brian_Whit  – Syria — tweets say fighting has broken out among Alawite families in Qardaha, Assad’s home town. Can’t confirm at present
  • Mohja Kahf ?@ProfKahf  – Second source-Latakia ground activist-reporting that head honcho of shabiha Mohamad asaad dead of wounds from Qardaha gunfight #Syria

The news about Assad clan fighting cannot be confirmed and originates from All4Syria, Ayman Abdulnour’s site. Although an excellent site, it is sometimes quick to copy reports and must sometimes retract what turns out to be rumor.

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Business Insider: Iran Reported To Have Given Syrian Regime Up To $10 Billion
2012-10-01

Today, Iran’s currency plummeted to an all-time low: 32,500 rial to the dollar. The hyperinflation is thought to be the result of oil sanctions that could lose the resource-rich nation $50 billion in revenue this year. Yet reports coming out today say they also are giving billions to the Assad regime in Syria to help fund the civil war — up to $10 billion according to the Times of London.

Turkey Denies Al Arabiya Report That Syrians Captured Its Pilots
2012-09-30 By Selcan Hacaoglu

Sept. 30 (Bloomberg) — Turkish Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin denies a report by Al Arabiya that the two pilots of a Turkish fighter jet, shot down by Syria, were captured and killed by Syrian forces.

• Ergin says the television report is “baseless”

• Ergin insists the bodies of the pilots were found in the wreckage of the plane deep in the Mediterranean

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MEMRI:  Pro- And Anti-Assad Camps Share Concerns Over Syria’s Possible Disintegration Into Separate Sectarian, Ethnic Entities,” By: N. MozesColumnists, Syrian Oppositionists: Assad Will Establish An Alawite Mini-State In The Coastal Region

In contrast to the situation in the Kurdish region, where an independent, or at least autonomous, Kurdish entity indeed seems to be emerging, the situation in the ‘Alawite region is less clear, and reports regarding the emergence of an independent ‘Alawite state are of uncertain reliability.

Since the start of the uprising, the main elements of the Syrian opposition, chiefly the SNC, have denied claims that the protests have a distinct sectarian or ethnic nature, and have described these claims as propaganda meant to harm the legitimacy of the uprising. They have avoided collectively accusing certain sects of collaborating with the regime, and have characterized the uprising as a popular one encompassing all sectors of Syrian society. However, others in the opposition claimed that, if pressed, Assad would not hesitate to divide Syria in order to ensure his survival, and would establish an Alawite mini-country in the Syrian coastal region, which has a large Alawite population. One of the first to mention this possibility was ‘Abd Al-Halim Khaddam, former Syrian vice president and one of the heads of the Syrian opposition abroad. In January 2012, Khaddam claimed that Assad was arming and fortifying the ‘Alawite region: “Bashar and his clan have distributed rifles and machine guns in ‘Alawite towns and villages, and last month began transferring heavy weapons by land to the coastal region, in order to hide them in the hills and mountains… All the missiles and strategic weapons were also transferred there, as well as some tanks and artillery, because the regime needs them to suppress protestors in the cities. Bashar also planned to send fighter planes to the airfield in Al-Latakia… and is implementing a plan meant to spark a sectarian war… One month ago, Assad told one of his allies in Lebanon of his intention to establish an ‘Alawite state, from which he could launch a sectarian civil war.”[37] However, Khaddam recently questioned the possibility of establishing an Alawite enclave, “since no [Syrian] citizen would agree to the rending of the national fabric.”[38] Similar statements were made by a senior source in the FSA to the London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat: “The regime’s strategy is based on uncompromising combat in Damascus and Aleppo, and if it cannot control them, it will establish a separatist [‘Alawite] state on the Syrian coast…” He added that the opposition would relentlessly fight this state.[40]

Khairallah Khairallah, a Lebanese columnist for Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, claimed that the regime was fighting the opposition in Homs due to the city’s location and its status as the main obstacle to establishing a sustainable ‘Alawite state.[41] The Kuwaiti daily Al-Rai recently reported that the Syrian regime had transferred chemical weapons from a storage facility to Tartus, and estimated that this was done as part of the establishment of an ‘Alawite enclave on the Syrian coast.[42]

Various columnists explained that both Assad’s allies and his opponents, in the region and internationally, have an interest in Syria being divided. Saleh Al-Qalab, a former Jordanian information minister, said that Russia and Iran have a vested interest in defending an Alawite state if one is established, since it will enable them to maintain their influence in the region.[43] Columnist Mu’ataz Al-Murad wrote that the superpowers have a vested interest in dividing Syrian society, since it will lead to minorities asking for their guardianship, thus granting them a foothold in the country.[44]

Columnists: Small Chance For Establishment Of Sectarian States

On the other hand, there are some who dismiss the possibility that viable sectarian and ethnic states will be established, due to the objections among the minorities themselves and for demographic reasons.

‘Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashed, director of Al-Arabiya TV and former editor of Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, spoke of the difficulties that Assad would face if he established an Alawite state: the rebels would pursue him wherever he went, and the Alawites would not agree to defend him and establish a state in a hostile environment and under continuing threats. According to Al-Rashed: “Even if there are internal forces who want to dismantle Syria into mini-states, the region will not tolerate this scenario and countries like Turkey and Iraq will not stand idly by…”[45] George Soulage, a columnist for the Lebanese daily Al-Jumhouriyya and a former advisor to Lebanese defense minister Elias Al-Murr, mentioned several strategic factors that prevent the establishment of a stable Alawite state, such as the lack of infrastructure and defense capabilities. According to Soulage, such a state would not receive international or Arab recognition, and would thus remain isolated. He added that Alawites are no longer the majority even in the coastal region.[46]

Suleiman Taqi Al-Din, a columnist for the Lebanese daily Al-Safir claimed that, even though there is a Kurdish area that is independently administrated, a northern Sunni area that includes provinces outside the control of the regime, and a coastal area with a nearly independent Alawite majority, “this is not a sure path to a division that would cause total separation from the mother country, or to the formulation of plans to establish sectarian mini-states…”  He added that, though sects in various countries can cause anarchy and strife, it is only superpowers that can create states in conflicted regions.”[47]

* N. Mozes is a research fellow at MEMRI.

Syrian-American Doctors Head To The Battle Zone by – NPR

Syrians Trade Blame for Fire
By SAM DAGHER,  WSJ

[image]
Associated PressThe Bab Qensrien neighborhood in Aleppo’s historic old city burned Sunday after a battle set off the fire.

BEIRUT—Syria’s regime and rebels traded blame for a massive fire that continued Sunday to devour parts of Aleppo’s vast ancient market—a treasured commercial, historical and cultural hub—as angry residents tried to assess the damage.

The fire’s origin was unclear, but coming days after rebels announced a fresh offensive to try to break the more than two-month stalemate in the battle for the strategic northern city, it is bound to further polarize Syria’s conflict-weary population.

Meanwhile, some members of Syria’s opposition began questioning the motives and tactics of the Aleppo insurgents who are ostensibly their allies. Some openly accused them of committing war atrocities and taking cover in congested residential neighborhoods and the old city—a Unesco World Heritage site—and using these areas to launch attacks on regime forces.

“People are worn out,” said an Aleppo native and senior member of the Syrian General Revolutionary Commission, a main opposition umbrella group. “It is the same back and forth, the government makes gains and the rebels reclaim a neighborhood; one side calls it cleansing and the other side calls it liberating and the people are paying for it.”

Pro-regime Syrian media didn’t mention the fire in their reports, only referring to continuing operations against “mercenary terrorists” in Aleppo.

The Aleppo native said members of the Tawhid Brigade, the main rebel group now fighting in Aleppo, have become rogue “armed gangs” that are only nominally associated with the Free Syrian Army. That army is itself a loosely linked grouping of local militias and defected military officers fighting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime across the country.

This summer, rebels launched a campaign to bring their fight into the heart of the capital, Damascus, and the country’s most populous city, Aleppo, for the first time.

Control over Aleppo is essential for any plan to create a haven for the opposition in the north, where rebels control much of the countryside.

Most Tawhid fighters came to Aleppo in July from rural predominantly Sunni Arab areas outside the city and harbor animosity toward an ethnically and religiously diverse urban population that has for the most part remained neutral in the conflict or supportive of Mr. Assad and his Shiite-linked leadership.

One of Tawhid’s leaders, defected army colonel Abdel-Jabbar al-Ughaidy, rejected the Aleppo native’s assessment during a telephone interview, blaming regime forces for instigating the attack in Aleppo’s old city.

Video footage posted by Syrian activists on YouTube Sunday—showing huge flames consuming thick wooden doors in the market, a warren of vaulted stone passageways—appeared to offer a more nuanced narrative.

A man, who identifies himself as a Free Syrian Army fighter, can be heard on the video saying that regime forces fired mortar and artillery shells at rebels amassed in the ancient market, causing the conflagration.

“They are shooting at us with snipers so that we do not extinguish the fire, these are people’s shops, their livelihood,” shouts the man as gunfire pops could be heard in the background.

Hassan Sheit, who owns an antique store in the market, said regime forces cordoned off the old city Sunday, keeping shopkeepers out as firetrucks and ambulances rushed in. He said both rebels and regime forces blamed each other for the fire, while some Aleppo residents were describing it as a “revenge attack” by rebels to punish merchants who have not supported them.Mr. Sheit, a Sunni Muslim, said he didn’t know his shop’s fate but that he spent most of the day comforting his Armenian-Christian neighbor whose jewelry store was lost in the fire. “He was sobbing like a child,” he said.

“Nobody is telling the truth,” said Mr. Sheit in a telephone interview. “The old city is the pulse of Aleppo, its heart.”

Residents fear that some of the almost 240 classified monuments in the old city might have been damaged by the fire, including its 13th century Antioch gate and the sprawling Ottoman-era Khan al-Jumruk, which once housed the trade missions and consulates of the British, Dutch and French imperial powers.

Aleppo is one of the world’s oldest continuously inhabited cities and was a key stop on the so-called Silk Road. Its walled old city, which incorporates the ancient souks, mosques, schools and the remains of cathedrals, is both a commercial hub and a tourist draw. It has undergone renovations in recent years funded by the German Organization for Technical Cooperation and the Aga Khan Foundation, among others.

—Rima Abushakra in Beirut contributed to this article.

Write to Sam Dagher at [email protected]

A Well To-Do Syrian Sunni Friend in Aleppo writes:

For a Better Understanding of Aleppo

Over the past few decades, Aleppo’s city center has changed significantly due to a large influx of rural mirgrants. This is no different than other major cities in Syria, but in Aleppo’s case, the countryside is particularly poor and culturally challenged. The city’s diverse resources, cultural sophistication, and business-oriented mentalities characterized its people with generosity and high bigotry-tolerance threshold. Thus, they did not stand in the way of the migrants setling in sectarian neighborhoods, as long as the city made money selling them those houses (or in occasions for humanitarian reasons as with Armenian refugees). And of-course, accompanied with intentional city planning negligence, for over 30 years now, sinking the city in property conflicts. In the 1980s, the regime also laid siege to random communities to punish the city for its sympathy with the Muslim Brotherhood….

The current city neighborhoods are denominated to specific minorities by one or more of the following criteria: religion, sect, clan, region, or tribe.

Thus, Christians, Mardini, Kurds, Armenian, Syriac, shia, Jews (until recently) had their own quarters in the Muslim canvas covering the city, while condensations of regional, clan, and tribal neighborhoods emerged all over the city like Anadani, Izazi, Babi, Deiri (Deir Al Zor), Heib clan, Bar’ri clan, Naim tribe, Battoush tribe, Jeiss tribe, Sukhni tribe… all have their own alleys and districts within the city.

Worth mentioning that, in the business environment, no such divisions exist in the city, and no one is sanctioned according to any criterion. No one is denied entry to the markets……

Assad’s a Jew, claims Egypt TV guest

Dictator’s family descends from Iranian Jewish origin, so-called expert asserts, in interview on station that also first broadcast Arabic-dubbed clip of anti-Islam film

Syria Rebels Practice Patience in the Fight for Damascus Los Angeles Times

The Battle for Aleppo By Jonathan Spyer | The Weekly Standard

….Neither commander professed loyalty to the notional overall leadership of the FSA, at the time still based in Turkey. “I’m a field commander,” Saumar said, “and I’m part of the Aleppo military council. But I’m not part of any external group, and I don’t see them as authoritative.”

Both men stressed an underlying unity among rebel units deriving from the simple goal of defeating and destroying the Assad regime. In Aleppo, I found no reason to doubt this claim, but it raised as many questions as it answered. The FSA is almost exclusively Sunni Arab. But it is not, as one Assad propaganda campaign with some success in Western capitals has it, motivated solely or mainly by Islamist ardor, either of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafist variety. But if the FSA’s only basis for unity is military-tactical, what does this mean for the future political direction of Syria, in the event of the regime’s defeat?

My attempts to bring up the subject of the Syrian National Council or any of the other supposed umbrella groupings of the opposition were immediately dismissed.

 The two most noticeable rebel units in Aleppo, and the only two who appear to transcend the general arrangement of local FSA-affiliated battalions, are the Tawhid Brigade and the Ahrar al-Sham group, both of which are tied to the Islamist current. Checkpoints affiliated with these groups have been established at the most prominent entrance points to the city, testifying to a sort of hierarchy of units, in which these feature close to the top.

Ahrar al-Sham fighters, in their mode of dress and their slogans, clearly identify themselves as Salafist Islamists. Their checkpoints and positions fly white, black, and green flags with slogans from the Koran written on them. They are rumored to be supported by Saudi Arabia and to be affiliated with al Qaeda. My own contacts did not extend to this organization.

Tawhid fighters, by contrast, do not markedly differ in their appearance from the FSA groupings. But the brigade, doubtless the largest single rebel group operating in the Aleppo area, maintains a separate leadership structure from the Aleppo military council and the FSA. I met with one of Tawhid’s leaders, in the Saif al-Dawli section of the city. The man, middle-aged, ginger-bearded, from the Al-Bab area northeast of Aleppo, described himself as one of the five commanders of the brigade. He was frank regarding Tawhid’s differences with the FSA and the Aleppo Military Council. “At the moment the Military Council has cut support from us. But we believe it will be restored in the near future.”

What was the reason for the cut in support, I asked. “Fear,” he said. “Fear of the Islamic states.” (Tawhid is rumored to be a major beneficiary of aid from Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood.) And was this fear justified? Was Tawhid receiving aid from Islamic countries and movements? I didn’t expect a straight answer and was not disappointed. “Relief materials only,” he replied.

In contrast to the FSA fighters and field commanders that I met, the Tawhid commander had no hesitation in describing his political ambitions for Syria. “All the forces want one thing, one thought—an Islamic state, but with protection for minority rights.”

He was predictably dismissive of the Syrian National Council, describing it as a “spokesman” for the Syrian people, rather than a political authority. “The real leadership is inside Syria, in the field—not in Turkey.”….

Aleppo Burns – Dar Zamaria, Sisi House and much of Souq reported Burned

Dar Zamaria, a friend reports, is depicted above. It was one of the finest boutique hotels in Aleppo lovingly restored from a magnificent Ottoman home. I am not convince this is Zamaria as the shot below shows a staircase running in the opposite direction. I am told Sisi House was also burnt down last week. It was the best restaurant in Aleppo for many years.

In Syria’s Largest City, Fire Ravages Ancient Market – Anne Barnard’s article in the New York Times is the best on the souq and why it became a center of conflict. Good quotes from all sides.

….“Our hearts and minds have been burned in this fire,” said a doctor in Aleppo who gave her name only as Dima. “It’s not just a souk and shops, but it’s our soul, too.”

She said she supported peaceful resistance against Mr. Assad, and pronounced herself “annoyed, annoyed, annoyed” with fighters from the rebel Tawhid Brigade, which announced the offensive on Thursday. The fighters said they were seeking to “liberate” neighborhoods that had remained largely pro-government and were being used as posts from which to attack the opposition.

But in a Skype interview, Dima said the recent fighting cast doubt on both the rebel leaders’ tactical wisdom and their intentions. She called them “performers” who had needlessly provoked the government by posing for pictures outside the souk and the nearby 12th-century mosque — which she worried would now be shelled — and who “talked nonsense.”

“There is no decisive battle,” she said. “There are no liberated areas.”

Brig. Bashir al-Hajji, the commander of the Tawhid Brigade, said that the offensive had worked and that rebels were progressing toward the heart of Aleppo. Rebels and activists said the government had started the blaze by firing incendiary bullets…..

Ancient souk burns as fighting rages in Syria – Al-Jazeera
Hundreds of shops destroyed at UNESCO world heritage site in Aleppo’s Old City, as deadly violence continues.

Rebels fighting to topple President Bashar al-Assad announced a new offensive in Aleppo, Syria’s commercial hub of 2.5 million people, on Thursday, but neither side has appeared to make significant gains…..

Did Syrian authorities capture two Turkish pilots and killed them days later? Al-Arabiyya, the Saudi newspaper is reporting that it has many leaked documents, which it has posted, that prove: Acting on Russian intel, Syria forces murdered pilots of downed Turkey jet.

Syria Politic, a Syrian website, is claiming that the documents are forgeries. It argues that there is no such thing as the “Foreign Intelligence Agency” in Syria, the name printed on the documents, but only a “branch”. Also that Syria has no “Joint Command”, something referred to in the docs, etc. See counter arguments in the discussion section in the Syria Politic sight.

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The Sulaimaniya district of Aleppo, which is almost all Christian was his by howitzer shells two days ago, killing one family. The Free Syria Army said it was trying to hit a building which headquarters the Political Security office of Aleppo. It later warned citizens of the area to evacuate to avoid getting hurt.

Video of government bombing of Bab al-Hadid in Aleppo. ??? ??? ?????? ??? Warning: do not watch this if you do not want to see dead and dying people. Most upsetting video I have seen.

Ross Burns, the author of Monuments of Syria, the best guide to Syrian Monuments and former Australian Ambassador to Syria writes this:
I am the author of a couple of books on the history and archaeology of Syria as well as having been a former Australian Ambassador there in the 1980s.
When the troubles started last year, I thought the best way of contributing something to keep alive the memories of the Syria with all its rich complexities was to do a website to provide a visual accompaniment to ‘Monuments of Syria’ (latest edn is I B Tauris, London 2009). As I am operating solo these days (long retired from the Australian Foreign Service), I’ve been building up the site slowly as time permits. Of the 132 or more sites in the book, I have posted about 50 so far but am trying to give priority to sites that might be threatened by the fighting. Also see this Flickr site with many photos.

Middle East: A second winter of war
By Michael Peel, Financial times

Syrians face a future of destitution, surging food costs and shortages of medicines

A displaced family rests in a retail space they are occupying on September 6, 2012, in al-Qusayr, Syria.©Eyevine

No place to hide: Syrian families on the run from shelling, such as this one living in part of an underground shop, shelter in ramshackle buildings as the weather begins to worsen

The wind that blows across the dusty plains north of Damascus will soon take on a wintry chill, gusting through the windowless shells of grey pitted concrete where thousands of Syrians made homeless by war are sheltering.

Refugees from all over this country imploding in conflict are hunkered down in the towering half-finished flats for government workers in the town of Adra, where they can only look wistfully at the completed pastel-painted blocks nearby.

“I just want my life back,” laments Abu Fadel, who fled the south Damascus conflict zone of Sayyeda Zeinab two months ago and now lives in a three-roomed apartment with 13 other family members. “I want to go back to my home – the home I spent my whole life building.”

Abu Fadel is one of a large and growing number of displaced Syrians who now face a grim choice, as a relief worker puts it, “between freezing and shelling”. The Arab world’s longest-running and most destructive uprising is moving into its second winter with the mass of Syrians at the mercy of a ghastly stalemate, between a regime that has killed ever more brutally and a fragmented armed opposition waging a guerrilla war. Angered by a lethal rebel assault on a military command centre in Damascus this week, President Bashar al-Assad’s forces bombarded rebellious districts of the capital from dusk on Thursday, the frequent thud of explosions a familiar soundtrack for the city and others across Syria.

While the regime continues its 18-month mantra of imminent victory – even sending out mass text messages on Friday telling the rebels it is “game over” – the conflict worsens by the week. The attack on the military command centre was a reminder of the capabilities of a rebellion that now controls large areas in the north of the country and has launched a fresh push to take the biggest city, Aleppo. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based pro-opposition monitoring group, this week said the death toll in Syria’s conflict had passed 30,000, more than half of those in the past five months.

In this atmosphere of extreme violence and constant fear, many Syrians feel abandoned by international powers that are offering no hope of an agreement to stop the fighting in a country at the geographic and strategic heart of the Arab world. For some anti-regime activists, the traditional bogeymen of Tehran, Moscow and Beijing – Mr Assad’s strongest backers – have now been joined by western powers, whom they see as retreating in the face of overplayed concerns about violent religious extremism among some rebels.

“We are not a lie,” sighs a peaceful opposition activist and relief organiser known as Leyla, reeling off the religious affiliations of her heterodox family, in which Sunni Muslims, Christians and Alawites are all represented. “You have to see us as we are. Don’t watch us through your fears.”

The revolts that have swept the Arab world for more than a year and a half have inspired many with their affirmation of people power, but in Syria the vast majority of citizens are impotent in the face of a war enveloping their streets, homes and families. Friday, the Islamic holy day and once the focal point of the original peaceful protests that the regime brutally suppressed, is now just another day.

The demonstrations and resulting casualties are another footnote to daily death tolls sometimes running into the hundreds. When the rebels operate in residential areas and are still seen in some as protectors, it is civilians who bear the brunt of regime violence that has ratcheted up from rifle fire to shelling to air strikes with warplanes, sometimes – according to rights groups – directly aimed at civilian targets such as bread queues.

It is hard now for anyone not to feel the effects of the conflict, whether they are regime supporters whose relatives in the security forces have been killed or the great numbers of people who have seen loyalists of the four-decade old Assad family dictatorship kill, jail or torture family and friends. Government artillery booms out from the Qassioun mountain that looms over Damascus – proof to all, if it were needed, that the regime is prepared to turn parts of the country to rubble to survive. “We are afraid, but we get used to it,” says Alaa, a university student out on a thinly-populated street in the centre of the capital after the military headquarters blast triggered a security lockdown. “Like in the university – we heard some explosions but we continue our lessons.”

While significant parts of Damascus still feel peaceful and ordered, with malls offering expensive clothes and coffee to dwindling clienteles, other areas tell a story of ever-expanding destruction. Cars draw a low, spooky hum from highways gouged by tank tracks. The road out of the capital to Syria’s third city, Homs, infamously bombarded by the regime this year, is flanked by trashed vehicle showrooms and the collapsed buildings of shelled rebellious suburbs.

Many of those Syrians who can afford to leave the country have already gone, adding to the estimated 1.2m people displaced like Abu Fadel in this nation of 21m people. Those who remain face harsh months of high inflation, little work and more of the periodic shortages of petrol, cooking gas and – ominously as the season of biting cold approaches – heating oil known as mazout. The beggars, now in far greater numbers on the capital’s streets, are a kaleidoscope of women in black abayas and veils, grubby adolescent boys and a gaggle of children from the southern suburbs who gather at an intersection between two top hotels.

On Straight Street in Damascus’ old city, which is mentioned in the Bible, a merchant surrounded by tins overflowing with spices says demand has plummeted, with those who do buy often stockpiling because they fear the worst. “We are selling half of what we were two years ago,” he says, moments after a fire engine comes barrelling through the market, the latest emergency in a city full of them.

Still, the merchant says prices have risen 35 per cent overall as the conflict cuts supply routes. The fighting has also wrecked factories in important industries such as pharmaceuticals, while sanctions have made importing goods harder. Merchants in Damascus say that in just a few months the cost of a lean cut of lamb has risen by about 40 per cent, while red peppers from near the battleground of Aleppo have doubled in price. Doctors warn of likely epidemics of bronchitis and pneumonia among cold and hungry people, particularly children, who are short of drugs to treat common contagious diseases and chronic conditions such as asthma and diabetes.

. . . Behind the grim day-to-day reality lie even graver hidden wounds of war, with Syrians of all political views expressing alarm that the new generation of this cosmopolitan but increasingly divided country is now being shaped by conflict. One wealthy Damascene tells of children playing soldiers at school, with one side the regime and the other the Free Syrian Army. In Douma, a poor Damascus suburb battered by government forces over the past nine months, a toyshop owner says the model troops and guns he still displays prominently are selling better than ever. “Everybody is shooting,” he explains. “So the kids want to be part of it.”

Even as Syria collapses, the Assad regime keeps up a surreal narrative that a return to its previous illusory stability is imminent. One of a series of posters put up round Damascus shows a little girl, smiling broadly despite the bombed classroom around her. “Help me to rebuild my school,” she pleads.

It is too much for some to stomach. “Aren’t they ashamed?” remarks one Damascene professional. “Help me rebuild my school, which the government destroyed.”

Yet Syria’s conflict is now so entrenched, with so little hope of resolution, that some people are trying to normalise the unthinkable, returning to shattered areas now at peace – until the never predictable next round of shelling. A foreign diplomat describes a conversation with an acquaintance in Homs, who said his home district, once a battle zone, was much quieter now. The acquaintance still heard explosions in other areas, but admitted he did not care. “He’s slowly becoming less and less afraid of the fighting coming to where he lives,” the diplomat says. “So however long the fighting takes, it’s becoming less and less his problem.”

Back at the Adra flats, Abu Fadel’s family can only wait and watch as their lives unravel. His grandson has bites all over his face from the mosquitoes that infest the half-built structures; his son, who hires out lighting for events, has no work because there are “no parties any more, no weddings, nothing like that.”

For Abu Fadel himself, a carpenter in his 50s, there is only the hope that his dotage will not disappear into the oblivion now threatening Syria, as a regime that took power when he was a teenager fights to an inevitable but perhaps still distant end.

“We were waiting for this age, when we could calm down and enjoy what we were building,” he says, seated on an old foam mattress under one of the window holes that gape so invitingly for Syria’s ill winds. “Now we may have lost it. This is our greatest fear.”

Report: Acting on Russian intel, Syria forces murdered pilots of downed Turkey jet
Al Arabiya cites leaked Syrian documents describing how Assad’s forces seized Turkish crew members while still alive, and killed them following Russian ‘guidance and information.’
By Jack Khoury | Sep.29, 2012 |Haaretz

The crew members of a Turkish fighter jet that crashed into the Mediterranean earlier this year survived the impact, only to be later killed by Syria forces following intelligence provided by Russia, the Al Arabiya network reported on Saturday, citing leaked confidential Syrian documents.

Al Arabiya’s report came amid months of speculation concerning the June 22 incident, involved the suspected downing of Turkish F-4 reconnaissance jet. Turkey has accused Syria of shooting down the warplane, a claim that Damascus has denied, saying that its forces did not intentionally shoot down the jet.

The plane’s wreckage, with the bodies of the its two crew members still trapped inside, was found on the Mediterranean seabed in early July.

Earlier this month, an official report by Turkey’s military indicated that the F-4 was shot down after a Syrian anti-aircraft missile exploded near it, causing it to lose its bearings and subsequently crash.

However, leaked Syrian documents obtained by Al Arabiya on Saturday, indicated that the plane’s two pilots may have been still alive following the crash, the office of with Syrian President Bashar Assad reportedly ordering Syrian forces to murder the captured crew members and return their bodies to the scene of the crash.

One document obtained by Al Arabiya, reportedly sent from Assad’s office to brigadier Hassan Abdel Rahman, who the network identified as the head of Syrian Special Operations, stated that “two Turkish pilots were captured by the Syrian Air Force Intelligence after their jet was shot down in coordination with the Russian naval base in Tartus.”

In addition, the report claimed that the Syrian general was ordered to treat the pilots in accordance to the protocol concerning war prisoners, and that they be investigated concerning Turkey’s alleged role in supporting the Syria uprising against Assad.

Citing a second leaked document, Al Arabiya quoted another order, sent by Assad’s bureau to the heads of Syrian foreign intelligence, according to which unidentified Russian sources may have urged the Syrian regime to slay the Turkish prisoners.

“Based on information and guidance from the Russian leadership comes a need to eliminate the two Turkish pilots detained by the Special Operations Unit in a natural way and their bodies need to be returned to the crash site in international waters,” the document reportedly said.

One document reportedly indicated that Assad was willing to consider a suggestion by a general “Bassam” to transfer the two crewmembers to Lebanon, where they will be held captive by Hezbollah in order to serve as bargaining chips in a later time.

However, this suggestion was eventually rejected, the documents reportedly indicated, without specifying the points against it.

In addition, Al Arabiya reported that the Syrian documents indicated that Assad regime considered threatening Turkey with mobilizing the Kurdistan’s Workers Party militant group against Ankara if Turkey decided on military action against Damascus.

Al Arabiya claims to be in possession of hundreds of classified documents that shed light on the details of an Iranian and Russian involvement in the Assad regime, showing, among other claims, that Damascus’ two allies formed a joint command in Syria.

Furthermore, the leaked papers are said to indicate Hezbollah’s key role in assassinating key Syrian activists as well as orchestrating large-scale bombing attacks in order to sow chaos and instability in the war-torn country.

Manaf Tlass was once one of Bashar al-Assad’s closest friends. – From CNN interview with Manaf Tlass

“He is humble. He loves people,” Tlass said when describing Assad. “But he has changed. The crisis has changed him.”

“I tried to tell him that he had to give up something for the people,” Tlass said of his last conversations with Assad. “That there is a true uprising and that he must go along with it. There is an Arab Spring all around us. You should be part of it and democratize the country. He refused.”
“The old guard around him lulled him into handling the crisis this way.”

“Alawites are being told that the Islamists are taking over – they were considered infidels by the Islamists and that’s what scares them,” Tlass said. “But when there is a project for Syria that can, which can include all parties, the Alawites will defect.”

“Everything will be different once he realizes that the international community has truly decided it’s time to step down,” Tlass said. “He will step down; I am certain of that.

Full interview with Manaf

EU defense ministers rule out military intervention in Syria – 2012-09-28

NICOSIA, Sept. 27 (Xinhua) — European defense ministers meeting in Cyprus on Thursday ruled out the possibility of a military intervention in Syria and advocated a political solution to the crisis faced by the country.

“Our aim is to extend our support to the people in the area to build their own democratic institutions, their own democratic societies and democratic states based on human and political rights,” said Cypriot Defense Minister Demetris Eliades, who chaired the two-day informal meeting.

He added that the European Union is in favor of a political solution in Syria.

“Our priority is to prevent further loss of life and destruction, to restore a peaceful environment and deter a regional escalation of the crisis, especially in Lebanon, because such a development will lead to unpredictable consequences in the region,” Eliades said.

However, Eliades conceded that the situation in Syria is tragic and the general feeling in the meeting was that no end of the crisis is in sight.

Firas Tlass Offers to Finance Syrian Opposition with Worthless Assets

Firas Tlass Offers to Finance the Syrian Opposition with Worthless Assets
By Joshua Landis
Syria Comment, Sept 27, 2012

Firas Tlass’ company is worthless. The brother of General Manaf Tlass is offering to finance a new Syrian opposition with worthless assets. His company, MAS, is bankrupt. Moreover, he has no access to it. According to knowledgeable sources, MAS, which stands for Min Ajl Suriyya or ‘For the sake of Syria’, was largely a worthless shell of a corporation even before he left the country. Now that he has left and declared himself a leader of the opposition, the Syrian authorities will requisition his assets, if they have not done so already, under Syria’s anti-terrorism law. Both Manaf Tlass and Michel Kilo have already had their assets nationalized under the anti-terrorism law. The Tlass family does not have access to any money in Syria. By offering Syrian assets to finance the opposition, he is offering hot air.

If Firas Tlass were serious about putting up money, he would offer a dollar amount out of his personal assets. Instead he is offering a shell corporation that has been impounded..

Here is the story about Firas by of the Telegraph:

One of Syria’s richest men to help fund a rebel army
The Syrian regime’s richest opponent, the business magnate Firas Tlass has pledged his fortune to the “revolution”, promising to fund rebel groups, humanitarian aid and an organisation to deal with the chaos after President Assad has gone.

The Tlass family has long been a stalwart of the Syrian regime
By , Istanbul, 27 Sep 2012

In his first interview with a western newspaper since leaving Syria, the country’s biggest industrial tycoon has told the Daily Telegraph of how the ownership of his conglomerate of huge companies is to be given to a panel of leading opposition figures, and the profits used to help to build a democratic society in Syria.

“I am supporting a complete program [to oust the regime]. I am putting my fortune behind this, totally, until the end,” said Mr Tlass. “But this is nothing. If I give all my money it is not worth one gram of the blood spilt by the Syrian people.”

The Tlass family has long been a stalwart of the Syrian regime. Mr Firas’ father Mustafa Tlass and Bashar al-Assad’s father Hafez, worked together to bring the Assad family to power. His brother is the defected Brigadier General Manaf Tlass who was a close childhood friend of the Syrian president.

For decades the family benefited from its insider status. Firas Tlass was thought to have been influential on the privatisation process started by the regime in recent decades. Named Min Ajl Suriyya (MAS), or ‘For the sake of Syria’, Mr Tlass’ empire spans several industries in Syria, from roasting coffee beans to construction and is thought to be worth billions of Syrian pounds.

“What Syria gave me I will give it back to Syria,” said Mr Tlass.

After the collapse of the Syrian regime Mr Tlass said he plans to create a non-governmental organisation that will have formal ownership of MAS. “I am preparing the legal papers now. It will be owned by a panel of seven leading figures of the opposition, and I will make the accounts public and transparent,” said Mr Tlass.

The NGO will use the company’s profits to “prepare the people of Syria for new way of thinking”, said Mr Tlass: “My dream is that Syria becomes a real democratic country”.

His antipathy with the Syrian government stretches back for nearly a decade said Mr Tlass. “The Assad family thinks that they own this country and that the people in it are their sheep. Only the family owns the farm. Even us, people close to the regime, we were just seen as their guards. That’s how they work with Syria,” said Mr Tlass, recounting a catalogue of examples where businessmen who had garnered favour with the country’s leadership were given sizeable business contracts.

“In 2005 I made friends with part of the opposition. We put together a study for political, economic and social reform and sent it to Bashar. Two months later I received a cold reply asking me why, as a businessman I was dealing in politics?” said Mr Tlass.

Mr Tlass told the Daily Telegraph that he would never seek a political leadership role in a future Syria, but he dismissed exiled opposition groups, including the bedraggled Syrian National Council as lacking the vision saying Bashar al-Assad would stay in power for “50 more years” if they led the revolution.

Instead he said he would fund a new leadership from “inside Syria”. Refusing to give names he said a number of community leaders from cities across Syria were part of a group being groomed to form a transitional government.

“We need to create a national front, a council of 30 people that can form a transitional council and govern for the period up until the election of a new parliament,” said Mr Tlass.

The council should represent the dozens of groups that currently make up Syria’s fragmented opposition as well as Alawite figures from the ousted regime he said. “The Alawites look to the regime as their representatives, non-regime figures are seen as traitors if they join the opposition. We have to include some of the old guards”.

In the past weeks Mr Tlass had been speaking with key figures of the country’s business elite and working to convince them to join the revolution, he told the Daily Telegraph. As businesses close and the country’s economy slides to a standstill amid the civil war, the country’s commercial core is beginning to jump ship he said. Even business partners of Syria’s biggest businessman and regime loyalist Rami Makhlouf are beginning to move away from the Assad family he said.

“Most of Makhlouf’s business partners are leaving him,” said Mr Tlass. “Now we need the Syrian businessmen from inside and outside the country to group together and provide funds for the opposition”.

News Round Up (Sept 27, 2012)

From Foreign Policy: The United Nations’ refugee agency, UNHCR, has warned that up to 700,000 refugees might flee Syria by the end of the year. This number is dramatically larger than the previously estimated 100,000, which has already been surpassed. About 294,000 Syrians have already left. According to the agency, between 2,000 and 3,000 people a day are fleeing the civil war in Syria, seeking refuge in neighboring countries. Meanwhile the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights has estimated more than 305 people died in clashes on Wednesday. Opposition forces have made gains in the two month long battle for Aleppo, forcing Syrian forces to curtail flights to and from the Abu Duhur Air Base after they shot down at least two MIG attack jets.

Rebels bombed the Army General Command in Damascus early Wednesday morning in what was the second day of heavy bombing in the capital. The Qatari emir called on Arab nations to intervene in Syria to end the civil war. French President Francois Hollande called on the U.N. to enforce “liberated zones” in Syria. A report from Save the Children detailed torture and imprisonment of children in Syria. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called for international action to halt the killing.

Turkey’s Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan said he might be open to talks with the Kurdish militant group, PKK, as the southeast has seen a spike in violence.

5 Reasons to Intervene in Syria Now‘ (Michael Doran and Max Boot, The New York Times)

“First, American intervention would diminish Iran’s influence in the Arab world. Second, a more muscular American policy could keep the conflict from spreading. Third, by training and equipping reliable partners within Syria’s internal opposition, America could create a bulwark against extremist groups like Al Qaeda, which are present and are seeking safe havens in ungoverned corners of Syria. Fourth, American leadership on Syria could improve relations with key allies like Turkey and Qatar. Finally, American action could end a terrible human-rights disaster within Syria and stop the exodus of refugees, which is creating a burden on neighboring states.”

Absent a workable plan for saving lives or a compelling strategic rationale for intervention, the United States should stay out of the conflict—while using all means short of force to dissuade the participants and their regional backers from committing egregious human-rights abuses. Once the smoke clears, Syria will need a benefactor with clean hands to help it pick up the pieces.
BY NATHANIEL L. ROSENBLATT | SEPTEMBER 27, 2012
Bashar al-Assad may fall, but is the worst yet to come? ….Unlike in Tunisia or Egypt, the odds of a successful transition to democracy may be even lower for Syria; research by Gene Sharp and others suggests that violent revolutions more often than not result in new, illiberal governments. This leaves Syria with a paradox: The more rebels wage a war against the Assad regime, the less likely they are to achieve democracy, reconstruction, or reconciliation. …. The lesson of past U.S. engagements in the Middle East is not that the United States should avoid intervention — but that it must try in Syria, as the country’s future without foreign assistance would be intolerable. Intervention won’t be pretty, easy, or cheap, but it is better than the alternatives.
Wissam Keyrouz, AFP – September 27, 2012

Qatar’s call for Arab military intervention in Syria would be difficult to achieve practically and politically, and would risk dragging the region into an all-out conflict, analysts say.

Qatar’s emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani on Tuesday urged Arab action over war-torn Syria because of the failure of the UN Security Council and other international efforts to end the conflict.

Because of this failure, “it is better for Arab countries to intervene themselves out of their humanitarian, political and military duties and do what is necessary to stop the bloodshed,” Sheikh Hamad told the General Assembly.

But according to Mustafa al-Ani of the Gulf Research Centre in Dubai, “Arab countries do not have the military capabilities to act as deterrent forces and do not have a united leadership or coordination.”

“An Arab intervention would also open the door for a counter intervention by (Syria’s staunch ally) Iran, and eventually a regional conflict,” said Ani.

Qatar’s emir cited the precedent of an Arab intervention force sent to Lebanon in the 1970s in a bid to halt that country’s civil war. He called the 1976 Arab League-backed operation “a step that proved to be effective and useful.”

But for Ani, the Lebanon intervention, as well as a similar Arab intervention to counter Iraqi forces in Kuwait based on a decision by the Arab League in 1961, “failed politically and militarily.”

In October 1976, a 30,000-strong predominantly Syrian Arab Deterrent Force was sent to Lebanon.

Three years later, Arab troops withdrew, except for the Syrians who stayed on until they eventually pulled out under international pressure in 2005.

On the Homs frontline with Syrian government snipers by – excellent short video of Homs fighting.

Fighting for Idlib, September 27, 2012 – By Ben Solomon and Christopher Chivers

Putin condemns bloody regime change in Middle East
By PETER LEONARD, Associated Press

MOSCOW (AP) — Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a strong warning Wednesday against inciting violent regime change in the Middle East — an apparent rebuke to Western calls for an end to Syrian President Bashar Assad’s rule.

Putin said the international community should operate as a united front to soothe the tensions in the Mideast and claimed that a bloody regime change would only fuel further unrest.

“Violence only begets violence,” Putin said in a speech to foreign diplomats in Moscow…..

Suffering in Assad-supporting village – BBC video with Lyse Doucet.

Senior Clinton deputy for Syria retiring: U.S. official

NEW YORK (Reuters) – One of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s top deputies for Syria plans to retire, a senior U.S. official said on Tuesday, although he played down any impact on policy.

Frederic Hof, who along with U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford has been the main anchor of the State Department team handling the Syria crisis, has informed Clinton he intends to step down, the official said.

“He is going to be retiring,” the official told reporters in New York, where Clinton is attending this week’s meeting of the U.N. General Assembly. Syria is among the top issues under discussion.

“There comes a time when it really is important for us to reconnect with our families and spend time with them, and that’s the reason he has decided to step down,” the official said.

“The secretary is extremely grateful for his leadership and all the work he has done on a variety of issues.”

Hof, a Middle East expert and special adviser to Clinton on Syria, has worked to encourage the country’s fractured opposition to find greater cohesion and present a viable alternative to President Bashar al-Assad government.

Guest Post: Qatar – Rich and Dangerous
Submitted by Felix Imonti of OilPrice.com

Qatar: Rich and Dangerous

Qatar had ten billion dollars in investments in Libya to protect.  The Barwa Real Estate Company alone had two billion committed to the construction of a beach resort near Tripoli.

While the bullets were still flying, Qatar signed eight billion dollars in agreements with the NTC.  Just in case things with the NTC didn’t work out, they financed rivals Abdel Hakim Belhaj, leader of the February 17 Martyr’s Brigade, and Sheik Ali Salabi, a radical cleric who had been exiled in Doha.

If Qatar’s investments of ten billion dollars seem substantial, the future has far more to offer.  Reconstruction costs are estimated at seven hundred billion dollars.  The Chinese and Russians had left behind between them thirty billion in incomplete contracts and investments and all of it is there for the taking for those who aided the revolution.

No sooner had Qaddafi been caught and shot, Qatar approached Bashar Al-Assad to establish a transitional government with the Moslem Brotherhood.  As you would expect, relinquishing power to the Brotherhood was an offer that he could refuse.  It didn’t take long before he heard his sentence pronounced in January 2012 on the CBS television program, 60 Minutes by Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.

The Emir declared that foreign troops should be sent into Syria.  At the Friends of Syria conference in February, Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani said, “We should do whatever necessary to help [the Syrian opposition], including giving them weapons to defend themselves.”

Why would Qatar want to become involved in Syria where they have little invested?  A map reveals that the kingdom is a geographic prisoner in a small enclave on the Persian Gulf coast.

It relies upon the export of LNG, because it is restricted by Saudi Arabia from building pipelines to distant markets.  In 2009, the proposal of a pipeline to Europe through Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the Nabucco pipeline was considered, but Saudi Arabia that is angered by its smaller and much louder brother has blocked any overland expansion.

Already the largest LNG producer, Qatar will not increase the production of LNG.  The market is becoming glutted with eight new facilities in Australia coming online between 2014 and 2020.

A saturated North American gas market and a far more competitive Asian market leaves only Europe.  The discovery in 2009 of a new gas field near Israel, Lebanon, Cyprus, and Syria opened new possibilities to bypass the Saudi Barrier and to secure a new source of income.  Pipelines are in place already in Turkey to receive the gas.  Only Al-Assad is in the way.

Qatar along with the Turks would like to remove Al-Assad and install the Syrian chapter of the Moslem Brotherhood.  It is the best organized political movement in the chaotic society and can block Saudi Arabia’s efforts to install a more fanatical Wahhabi based regime.  Once the Brotherhood is in power, the Emir’s broad connections with Brotherhood groups throughout the region should make it easy for him to find a friendly ear and an open hand in Damascus.

A control centre has been established in the Turkish city of Adana near the Syrian border to direct the rebels against Al-Assad.  Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Abdullah al-Saud asked to have the Turks establish a joint Turkish, Saudi, Qatari operations center.  “The Turks liked the idea of having the base in Adana so that they could supervise its operations” a source in the Gulf told Reuters.

The fighting is likely to continue for many more months, but Qatar is in for the long term.  At the end, there will be contracts for the massive reconstruction and there will be the development of the gas fields.  In any case, Al-Assad must go.  There is nothing personal; it is strictly business to preserve the future tranquility and well-being of Qatar. Read »

News Round Up (Sept 25, 2012)

Bob BowkerA bleak future for Syria
Bob Bowker – ABC news, Australia

Professor Bob Bowker, from ANU’s Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, says the Assad regime is capable of preserving itself, but the institutions of the state are being reduced to rubble, both figuratively and literally.

An excellent analysis by Nir Rosen in the London Review of Books on the place of the Alawite minority in Syria, their dominance within the regime and their strong sense of vulnerability as a community should the regime fall provides an insightful appreciation of the outlook for Syria.

Rosen underlines the unwavering support for Bashar al-Assad among ordinary Alawites, no matter what violence is deployed by the Syrian regime against its opposition. He emphasises that for the Alawite rank and file, this is a primordial, existential conflict.

Rosen also makes the point that the regime continues to enjoy backing from privileged Sunnis as well. That remains an important, and generally under-reported factor: the regime would have fallen long ago if its base was exclusively Alawite.

Whereas the larger part, at least, of the Sunni population is now looking forward to an end to the regime which has brutalised their lives, it can continue to expect the urban Sunni middle class in Damascus and Aleppo to calculate the odds where their own interests are concerned.

They continue to back Bashar as a distasteful but superior alternative to the chaos that would follow a fall of the ruling elite, and the even greater consequences of an Islamist ascendancy for their interests, lifestyles and values. The likelihood, if not the inevitability, of such ascendancy is very high.

The material impact at present of jihadist fighters is easily over stated. Some analysts are reluctant to highlight it because it accords with the regime’s efforts at depicting the conflict as one against ‘terrorists’.

However the longer the conflict continues, the more likely it is that the jihadists will come to the forefront of the Islamist opposition, because they are clearly, by virtue of their experience, external support and commitment, a superior fighting force.

Meanwhile the Islamists more generally can be expected to develop the organisational skills and political capacity to draw upon the frustrations and anger of the lowest end of the Sunni socio-economic spectrum better than any secular-minded opposition groups.

Rosen finds the Alawites are not thinking (at this stage, at least) of withdrawing to an Alawite bastion based around their community in the mountains along the Mediterranean seaboard. They continue to see the state as their instrument for achieving their goals (which they appear still to define, in their own minds, in national, rather than sectarian terms).

Given the intermingling of Sunnis and Alawites in urban areas since the 1970s, and the proximity of differently-aligned villages to each other, especially on the plains to the east of the Alawite mountains, and the deployment by the regime of heavy weapons against civilian areas occupied by rebel forces or sympathisers, the scope for killing is vast. In practice, that may mean an even wider degree of bloodletting if the regime collapses.

Bashar al-Assad is a complex part of this picture. That he and those around him deserve to be on trial for crimes against humanity is beyond dispute. The application of overwhelming violence against civilian populations, no matter whether they harboured elements seeking to overthrow the regime, is despicable. But there is something deeply enigmatic, even tragic, about his role.

Bashar al-Assad never wanted to be the president of Syria. He was by inclination a reformer who failed miserably to show the qualities of leadership that the situation demanded, and that his own popular audience expected him to deliver, in the early phase of the uprising. The task was beyond him, as it would have been for most ordinary mortals. The choices he made (or perhaps was obliged to take by those around him) deepened the crisis. But few others from the elite would have performed at a level that might have averted the catastrophe that is now upon Syria.

If Assad sought to restrain those Alawites who are most disposed to use violence, he would probably be replaced by someone who was seen by the Alawites as more resolute. Those outsiders who call for Assad to go should be cognisant of that likelihood. Though no-one would wish it to happen, their approach is tantamount to opening the way to an even higher level of violence, because there is no political program that would prevent a last-ditch effort by the Alawites to put down their opponents, or the ethnic cleansing of the Alawites and their supporters by a victorious opposition.

Barring the effects of an assassination and a sudden collapse of Alawite morale, Syria has embarked on a conflict that is going to continue until the various parties are exhausted by the killing. There is no desire for a political solution, nor is there such a solution available. The external players all have interests in keeping their proxies in the field. The costs for them are minimal (except perhaps for Turkey, now facing growing pressure in regard to the refugee presence).

The Lebanese civil war continued for 15 years until the exhaustion factor took effect. Iraq has been subjected to political violence for nine years. We should not be surprised if the Syrian conflict matches those time scales.

The capacity of Arab countries to rectify the physical damage of conflict, especially when Arab funds begin to flow, should not be discounted. Jordan recovered from the material losses of the conflict with the Palestinians in 1970-71 as Gulf investors and then oil money fled Beirut. Lebanon, with Saudi funding, has recovered in most ways from the destruction and trauma of the civil war. Iraq, using its oil revenues, is moving gradually and painfully forward.

But it is not possible to predict how long it may take to rebuild the credibility and authority of the institutions of government, and a sense of political community, in countries where the social and political scars of conflict remain vivid, decades after the event.

In the case of Syria, the regime is capable of preserving itself, but the institutions of the state are being reduced to rubble, both figuratively and literally. Socially and perhaps territorially, the country is fragmenting.

What political and ideological orientation Syria may take on over coming years will depend on whether the Assad regime does indeed survive the state. It will also depend, to some extent, on what happens in Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia over the next decade. But no country in the region will be immune from the consequences of what is now unfolding.

Bob Bowker is Adjunct Professor at the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Australian National University. He served in Damascus from 1979 to 1981, and was accredited as Australian ambassador to Syria from 2005 to 2008. View his full profile here. He was also ambassador to Egypt and Jordan.

President Obama – Why is the US supporting Al Qaeda in Syria? – Live Leak, Reality Check – short video, first several minutes particularly good.

Class Is Not in Session: The tragedy of Syria’s schoolchildren – FP

The Syrian Alawites and Negotiated Departure for al-Assad
Strafor

Summary:

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad reiterated in an interview published Sept. 21 in Egyptian weekly magazine al-Ahram al-Arabi that the rebels seeking the collapse of his regime will not succeed. He added, however, that the door to dialogue remains open. The leaders of the Syrian military — who belong to Syria’s minority Alawite community, the pillar of the al-Assad regime — have thus far rejected the U.S.-led international offers to make a deal with the opposition. This is because al-Assad has managed to slow rebel advances, and because the Alawites are fearful of their status in a post-Assad Syria. But their opposition to a deal with the rebels does not mean they will continue to insist that al-Assad remain head of state.

Analysis

The Alawites do not necessarily oppose a negotiated removal of the al-Assad clan from power, but they do oppose any deal that would lead to a weakening of their sect’s hold on power. This meshes with Washington’s desire to see regime-change in Syria but continuity of the state machinery. Ideally for the United States, Syria’s military-led security establishment would abandon al-Assad and negotiate an agreement with the opposition backed by the West, the Arab states and Turkey.

Zalmay Khalilzad, a prominent Bush administration envoy to the Middle East and South Asia, called Sept. 20 for the Obama administration to encourage Syria’s generals to carry out a coup against al-Assad. Washington has in fact sought just this. It has hoped that growing pressure from the rebellion would induce al-Assad’s generals to cut a deal to preserve the regime without al-Assad.

A Battle of Attrition

So far, the Alawites have not shown any interest in the international offer. All signs suggest that despite its setbacks, the military has decided to remain allied with al-Assad. To a great degree, this has been due to the situation on the battlefield, which is at a stalemate. While the fighting continues, neither side has been able to secure all of Aleppo or any other major urban center. The fighting in Syria instead has been a battle of attrition, with each side seeking to outlast the other. The regime weathered serious jolts over the summer, such as the bombing of the national security council building that claimed the lives of three top members of the Syrian security elite and the defection of prominent Brig. Gen. Manaf Tlass, who had been associated with al-Assad.

The bombing and the Tlass defection demoralized the core of the military and led to further defections. Significantly, Tlass is a Sunni. Contrary to expectations, no further defections by prominent Sunnis have taken place, and the Alawite core remains intact.

Visit our Syria page for related analysis, videos, situation reports and maps.

Alawite reticence goes beyond battlefield assessments to fears of a loss of influence in any post-Assad power-sharing agreement. At this point, they have decided to stand their ground and fight. In his first interview since his defection, Tlass made the telling remark Aug. 30 that his main work is to convince the Alawites that they do not have to “commit suicide along with the regime.”

Convincing them to abandon al-Assad is one thing, since the Alawites have long realized that the beleaguered president is not salvageable. But convincing them to share power will be quite another. Any power-sharing deal will see them lose some of the privileges they have enjoyed since modern Syria’s creation in 1946. At best, they will be relegated to the status of junior partners in a Sunni-dominated regime. They will face the specter of retribution killings by Sunnis who long endured brutal suppression at the hands of the Alawite regime. Thus the Alawites have not leaped at the offer from the United States to mount a coup against al-Assad. At this point, they hope to avoid any major shifts so they can maintain a position of relative strength from which to better negotiate a deal with the opposition, hence their focus on the battlefield.

The Syrian Alawites and Negotiated Departure for al-Assad

A number of recent developments have worked in the Alawites’ favor. For many months, international stakeholders have grown wary of the possibility that ousting al-Assad and eliminating Iranian-led Shiite Islamist regional influence may be paving the way for Sunni Islamism, and perhaps even transnational jihadism. Last week’s violence and militia action in reaction to a U.S.-produced film deemed offensive to the Prophet Mohammad has reinforced this perception.

The Syrian regime hopes that the killing of the U.S. ambassador in Libya and other attacks on U.S. and Western facilities and personnel across the region will force the rebels’ international backers at least to pause and reassess the situation. One of the regime’s key demands has been that weapons and fighters flowing into the Levantine country need to be stopped. It is not clear to what extent this will actually happen, though any efforts in this regard would help the regime.

The Challenge of a Negotiated Settlement

Ultimately, all parties and international supporters involved want a negotiated settlement. Whether they can achieve it is another matter. Such a settlement depends on reaching a mutually acceptable balance of power between the Alawites and the Sunnis — on creating a formula where the Sunnis can achieve a significant amount of power without the Alawites losing too much of it. Something along the lines of the 1989 Taif Accords that ended 15 years of civil war in Lebanon would be required. Similar to the Taif agreement, a settlement in Syria will require a great deal of bargaining between Western and regional powers. The accord that ended the conflict in Lebanon required the region’s two main sectarian rivals, Saudi Arabia and the Iranians, reach an understanding, and Syria played a critical role in ensuring the implementation of the agreement.

Now that Syria itself is the subject of civil war, the situation is much more difficult. Sectarian polarization in the region has increased exponentially since 1989 due to the rise of Iran and its Arab Shiite allies. International stakeholders’ competing interests will also complicate the situation.

Talk also has centered on attaining a Yemen-like solution for Syria, in which President al-Assad exits the scene and the various elements of the regime reconfigure themselves into a new government without regime change. But such a settlement would entail a new power-sharing agreement that brings in the Sunni opposition. It is also not at all certain whether al-Assad would agree to step down quietly. Convincing him to could only take place if his generals, the Iranians and the Russians pressed him and he was given financial, legal and political guarantees.

Assuming he did agree to depart, there is still the question — much on Iranian and Russian minds — of whether the Alawites could remain a strong force without the al-Assads at the helm. A new, capable Alawite leadership would thus have to emerge before the Alawites would be comfortable having al-Assad exit.

Al-Assad’s departure is not imminent, however, in large part because Iran — the most influential player that could facilitate or hinder such an outcome — has been kept out of the process. But in the past few days, initial signs have emerged that the United States might be willing to allow Iran a role in planning Syria’s future.

When were the minorities oppressed?
By Michel Kilo, Monday, 24 September 2012 – al-Arabiya

 Just as the militarized Ba’athist regime incited the people against their Kurdish brethren, it also incited all Syrians against one another, carefully implanting doubts amongst them, instilling and fortifying various prejudgments and poisoning their consciousness. It became increasingly easy for the regime to charge citizens with any amount of hostility, playing an important role in shaping their opinions and attitudes towards one another. The regime was unable to win over its citizens after the role it played in the Arab and Syrian defeat during the June Aggression (Six Day War), and therefore did not fulfil any of its promises but in fact achieved their opposite, drawing out a comprehensive strategic game of ‘divide and conquer’ instilled to tear the community apart, hell bent on pitting citizens against one another, exploiting any differences found amongst them or those that the regime was successful in implanting. Such policies had no purpose other than to transform the Syrian society into discordant conflicting factions, unable to agree on any one uniting ideology or common principle other than those ridiculous ones related to the health of the regime’s policies and the ingenuity of its omniscient leader, as well as the inevitability of continued devotion and loyalty to him under any condition or circumstance, on the basis that he was the foundation, the immortal father whom the mortal obsolescent populace owed everything to, including their very existence.

This strategy was the essence of the regime’s internal policy for almost half a century,….

The oppression of minorities will end with the end of a regime that had been hell bent on awakening sectarian strife and implicating Syrians in conflicts they were successfully moving past. Had that not been the case, it would not have been possible for Hafez Al Assad and scores of Alawite youth to move up the army ranks; they would not have been able to participate in the heart of power, eventually usurping it.

Fearful Alawites pay sectarian militias in battered Homs
Tuesday, 25 Sep 2012 | Reuters, by Solomon
(The identity of the journalist has been withheld for security reasons)

HOMS, Syria (Reuters) – “Shabbiha” militias in Syria’s most shell-shocked city used to offer fellow minority Alawites protection out of solidarity. Now, security comes at a price: About $300 a month.

Alawite residents in Homs say they are being coerced into helping fund the war effort of the “shabbiha”, brutal sectarian militias supporting President Bashar al-Assad’s crackdown on an 18-month-old rebellion.

“The shabbiha exploit our fear. Every time, there is some excuse – they need food or ammunition. But it’s basically a silent understanding now that each month the wealthier families pay,” says Fareed, a greying surgeon who lives with his family in Zahra, an Alawite district of Homs.

The cost of war is rising at the site of the longest- running battle between Assad’s forces and the rebels. Fareed fears his children could be kidnapped for ransom if he doesn’t pay the shabbiha what they call “protection money”.

Shabbiha are formed mostly from members of Assad’s own Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shi’ite Islam. They have been the fiercest enforcers of a bloody crackdown on the uprising led by Syria’s majority Sunni Muslims, even accused of massacres.

The disgust some Alawites have at the idea of paying for them symbolizes a greater inner conflict many in their sect are struggling with: Do they risk rejecting the crackdown by their Alawite-led government and its brutal militias? Or do they buy in, literally, to the shabbiha argument that this is a fight for existence against Sunnis determined to take revenge?

“I’m not comfortable with it, it seems wrong. But I have no choice,” says Saeed, 40, a balding engineer in a slick black suit. “If I didn’t pay, I could be at risk. These guys are dangerous.”

After months of fighting, only the shabbiha-guarded Alawite enclaves like Zahra are relatively unscathed. Zahra has swelled to nearly 200,000 Alawites in recent months.

The neighborhoods belonging to Hom’s large Sunni population have become graveyards of bombed buildings and shattered streets. Very few families remain.

“THE SAFEST PLACE IN SYRIA”

With jobs and money drying up due to the unrest, the $300 fee is no small sum.

But Alawites in Zahra say that while they know the money they pay is extortion, and that shabbiha violence towards Sunnis puts them more at risk, they are regularly reminded of how precarious their fate is.

As the sound of crashing mortars in the distance shakes the silverware on his dining room table, Fareed stops his rant against shabbiha and sighs.

“Some days, I think we really do need them to protect us,” the elderly doctor says, surveying his four children silently eating their meal.

The fight for Homs has fallen off the front pages as battles erupt in Syria’s bigger cities, Damascus and Aleppo, but it has not eased. Gunfire perpetually rings in the background. Buildings are collapsing in the daily hail of mortars and rocket-propelled grenades.

Shabbiha gangs used to rake in money by looting rebellious Sunni districts in Homs after the army raided them. But now that source of cash has run dry. Asking for “protection money” may be a way to make up for that.

The groups have become well organized in Homs. They have divided Zahra into six regions, each with a local “boss”.

In each area, the boss sends young men with shaved heads and camouflage pants to monitor, strutting about with their rifles in hand. The army stays out, only manning road blocks on the outskirts of the district.

“There is no state presence in Zahra any more, even though it is surrounded by Sunni areas. Yet it is the safest place in Syria,” says Saeed, reluctantly giving the shabbiha their due.

One improvement residents say their donations funded is the building of two 20-metre high blast walls towering over Zahra’s main square. The street had once been within easy range of rebel gunmen atop buildings in neighboring districts.

“This used to be the deadliest spot in Zahra,” says Manhal, the surgeon Fareed’s son, as he walks behind the two massive white-washed walls.

Instead of seeing residents scurrying below, all gunmen nearby can see now is a giant poster that shabbiha plastered over the wall: A portrait of former President Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, who ruled for nearly 30 years until his death.

Frustrated rebels have taken to shooting at the picture instead. The eyes, nose and mouth are riddled with bullet holes.

NOWHERE TO GO

Not far from Fareed’s family home, Wael “the accountant” combs a thick glob of hair cream into his dark hair and gets on his motorbike to make the monthly rounds for his boss.

“In my area we have 15 families. I get the money for the boss whenever there is a need: weapons, gas, car repairs, food for our boys,” says the 25-year-old tough.

Wael doesn’t think what he does is exploitative. He sees it as a service that residents need to pay to maintain. Unhappy residents can leave Homs if they want, he argues. “We even arrange convoys to help them get out – that costs 10,000 lira ($120).”

There is no end in sight to Syria’s civil war. International powers are too deadlocked to negotiate. Fighters show no interest in laying down their arms. Meanwhile, groups like the Alawites feel more vulnerable, and the shabbiha have taken advantage.

Umm Hani, a mother of two in Zahra, noticed the trend after a stunning bomb attack in July that killed four top security officials in Damascus.

“After that, the regime was shaken. And the shabbiha started to take more power, they started to demand more money. Without saying a word, they made their message clear: We are the ones responsible for you. Pay up.”

There are deep wrinkles around Umm Hani’s blue eyes after months of anxiety. Alawites like her feel trapped. She doesn’t have enough savings to leave Syria. She feels she would be unsafe in the mostly Sunni refugee camps on the borders. Paying is the only choice.

“Where can we go? Who would accept us? So we stay, and we deal with our new little pharaohs.”

“Why Manaf Tlas is Uniquely Qualified to Serve the Opposition,” by a Supporter

“Why Manaf Tlas is Uniquely Qualified to Serve the Opposition,” by a Supporter
For Syria Comment, Sept 24, 2012

 A letter from a supporter of Manaf Tlas

It has now been nearly three months since Manaf Tlas’s defection. At the time, his flight from Syria was hailed as the most significant defection.

Every defector has a past association with the regime he leaves. Manaf Tlas has been attacked by some in the opposition because he was part of the Asad regime. The Tlas family has been associated with this regime for decades.  There is no question that the family benefited from their position. Manaf’s father was the defense minister. His brother has been a high profile Businessman.  Manaf himself served in the Republican Guards and has had a close personal relationship with Bashar al-Assad for most of his life. During the last three months, Manaf has tried to explain why that past makes him particularly qualified to serve the opposition today and why he has come out squarely against the regime that he was born into.

For the first few weeks after his flight from Syria, Manaf disappeared from sight. Most suspected that he was in France. His first public communiqué was made on July 17th. On July 25th, he appeared on Al Arabiya Television Station.

He was also briefly filmed attending Umra in Saudi Arabia, when he was interviewed by the Saudi-owned Ashraq alawsat.

He also visited Qatar at this time, but the trip was not covered by the media. This left many with the impression that Manaf was Saudi’s man. This view was mistaken. Indeed, Manaf was warmly welcomed by the Emir of Qatar in Doha on his trip there.

Turkey, in particular, seems to believe in Manaf’s potential. His trips to that country have reportedly helped cement a solid relationship over the past three months

Lately, Mr. Tlas was interviewed by both David Ignatius of the Washington Post and BBC-Arabic where he gave his last public interview.

Where does Manaf stand today?

The Syrian opposition has been deeply divided. Mistrust and backstabbing have been widespread among opposition factions. No one from the opposition wants to hand leadership to another faction for the sake of unity. Manaf’s background and close previous association with the regime makes it particularly difficult for him to quickly earn the trust of the majority in the opposition. The Islamists think he is too secular. The exiled opposition see him as an insider who was himself part of a regime that they have fought for too long. The pro-regime people, on the other hand, consider him a traitor and an opportunist. Manaf has been highly critical of the regime’s leadership while he calls for unity and moderation when it comes to dealing with the institutions of the government.   He has often talked about a “road map”. His strategy builds on the following foundation:

1-      No foreign intervention.

2-      The need to reassure Alawites that they can split from the regime ruled by the Assad family without fear of retribution or marginalization in a new Syria.

3-      The need for the various factions of the opposition and the FSA to unite and reconcile their differences (easier said than done).

4-       The need to ensure that Syria does not lose its minorities and its historic cultural and religious mosaic.

5-      The need to preserve institutions like the Syrian Army and to prevent an Iraq-like destruction of most Government institutions

The above 5-point plan constitutes what he sees as a “safety net” that will preserve Syria in a post-Assad era.

Will Manaf succeed?

Syria’s opposition needs a national leader desperately. It is important to note that by its very nature, the Syrian regime is constructed to prevent any such leaders from emerging. Indeed, to date, the opposition is struggling to unite behind a single person/entity. Each faction sees this as its only chance. Manaf’s military background is important in this chaotic environment. His secular credentials could attract a large following including the country’s minorities.  Alawites were heavily represented in the Republican Guard division that he led. Many reportedly respected and trusted him. This relationship is crucial, if the opposition is to convince Alawites to stop fighting.

Manaf faces many formidable challenges. Many claim that Manaf cannot serve the opposition because he is a member of the Tlas family. His brother, Firas, was a prominent businessman whose success was due to his family’s position. Those in Manaf’s camp do not dispute this but point to the fact that the two brothers led two distinctly separate and independent lives. Surprisingly, there are many that still believe that Manaf’s exit has been coordinated with the palace. This cannot be further from the truth.  The final question in the BBC interview addressed this very point. Clearly, Manaf’s response should put this issue to rest. Those close to him claim that as a military officer, dedicated to his troops and country with broad name recognition, Manaf is well placed to serve the opposition cause.

Those that know Manaf doubt that we have seen the end of him. He has chosen a seemingly slow and deliberate path forward. His effort to promote unity and his five-point plan for ending the regime and bringing Syria out of civil war

Manar Tlas’s interviews

Syrian defector says opposition can win

L’Express interview: “Nous ne voulons pas être libérés par une intervention étrangère”

BFM interview Text – French

Extract of BFM interview video

Al Jazeera chosen part – Arabic

Manaf’s argument that “”We must convince Alawites that they do not have to commit Suicide along with the regime,” is key to sparing Syria from a much longer and more brutal civil war. So long as Alawites believe that they must stand by Assad’s side in order to save themselves, they can and will destroy Syria.

A Syrian defector’s mission
August 30, 2012 12:36 AM
By David Ignatius in the Washington Post

Syria’s most prominent military defector says the key to political transition in the country is to provide a “safety net” that persuades Alawites they won’t be massacred if they break with President Bashar Assad.

“My main work is to convince the Alawites that they do not have to commit suicide along with the regime,” said Manaf Tlass, a former general in the Syrian army who left the country in July. He spoke Tuesday at a location in France where he has taken refuge. It was his first in-depth interview since he broke with Assad, who was once his close friend.

Tlass said that before there can be a political transition, there must first be a channel of trust between the opposition Free Syrian Army and reconcilable members of the military who are ready to break with Assad, much as Tlass did. Without such links, he said, Assad’s overthrow would plunge the country into a period of anarchic violence and Syria’s chemical weapons would be up for grabs.

“Today, many Alawites are not happy with what’s happening on the ground, but where is the safe zone for them?” he said. “Alawites need to know that there’s a strong side that will guarantee their safety if they defect.” Though Tlass is a Sunni Muslim, he commanded a unit of the Special Republican Guard, which is about 80-percent Alawite, the ethnic minority from which Assad and his inner circle are drawn.

Tlass, 49, spoke movingly about his break from Assad, who, he said, has so bloodied his name that he will never be able to rule Syria effectively again. It began in the spring of 2011, when protests were spreading and Tlass offered to meet with demonstrators. He told Assad about an April 2011 meeting in Darayya with young rebels, whose fathers were silent but obviously proud. “This is the revolution of the fathers through their children,” Tlass warned, noting that such a conflict would be impossible to win by force.

Assad was a changeable, uncertain man, increasingly swayed by the harder line of his family, especially his brother Maher and his cousin Hafez Makhlouf, who heads the internal branch of Syrian intelligence. “If you impose power, people will be afraid, and they will step back,” Makhlouf admonished Tlass.

Tlass says that by May 2011, his counsel of outreach was ignored and his contacts were being arrested after he met them. This was the case even in Rastan, a town in central Syria where his father was born. After Tlass tried to make peace there, he was scolded by Makhlouf. Tlass stopped commanding his army unit after that.

The rupture came in July 2011, when Assad summoned him and asked why he wasn’t leading his troops. Tlass said he responded that the president and his men weren’t sincere about compromise. “You are making me a liar. You and Syria are committing suicide,” he recalls saying. Assad responded that such counsel was “too simple,” and that he was moving to the “security option.”

“You are carrying a heavy load – and if you want to fly, you have to drop that load,” Tlass says he told Assad at that last meeting. “But it seems the heavy load – the family, the inner circle – has won.”

Tlass says he thought at first that he could stay in Damascus, in silent opposition to the hard-liners’ policies. But as the violence increased to countrywide slaughter, he says, “my conscience could not bear it anymore.” He began thinking about how to flee by the end of last year.

The former general still has the rugged good looks that made him a charismatic military leader, which has led some to speculate that he might play a role in a Syrian transition. But Tlass says he doesn’t want any position in a future government, and is focused only on his “road map” for avoiding sectarian strife. He’s probably wise to disavow political ambition, as his wealth, secular lifestyle and prominent background (his father was defense minister) make him a target for a populist, Islamist opposition movement.

I first met Tlass a half-dozen years ago in Damascus, which may be one reason he decided to break his silence and give the interview. When I asked him what he would say to Assad if he could send him one more message, he was overcome by emotion for a moment and left the room. When he returned, he said: “How can anyone think he is protecting his country when his air force and tanks are hitting his own territory?”

AP, Monday September 10 2012, GREG KELLER

Associated Press= BEIRUT (AP) — Syria’s most prominent defector said in an interview that aired Monday that he opposes any foreign military intervention in the country’s civil war and that he is confident the opposition can topple President Bashar Assad’s regime.

But Manaf Tlass, a Syrian general who was the first member of Assad’s inner circle to join the opposition, said the rebels need weapons.

“The Syrian people must not be robbed of their victory, they must be given support, aid, arms,” Tlass said in a recorded interview that aired Monday on French television station BFM.

He called on outside powers to give the opposition “all the aid and support” needed to topple Assad.

Has the Syria State Collapsed?

Has the Syria State Collapsed? Not yet. It is still paying the salaries of hundreds of thousands of Syrians employees, pensioners, and security personnel

The video announcing the move is titled “Communique Number One From The Inside”

Syria’s government employment roll is 1,072,000, according to Syria’s Statistical Abstract (2009). This figure excludes military and security forces, estimated at more than 300,000. Thus, the number of people benefiting in the largess would be close to 1.4 million, assuming pensioners are excluded.

Many people write that the State has collapsed. This will not be completely true until it stops paying salaries, which sustain many families. Salaries for pensioners and employees are being paid in those regions of Syria that retain government offices. Even in Kurdish controlled regions, government offices are still paying state employees even if they are not turning up to work. Admittedly inflation has diminished the value of salaries, and many services, such as education are being provided in only some areas. Subsidized foods and fuel are no longer being provided with any regularity.”… Despite the announcement of the command move, rebels still have to rely on Turkey as a rear base for supplies and reinforcements. In the past few months, rebels have captured wide swaths of Syrian territory bordering Turkey, along with three border crossings, allowing them to ferry supplies and people into Syria. FSA commander Col. Riad al-Asaad announced the move of the command center in a video with the title “Free Syrian Army Communique Number 1 from Inside.” Wearing a military uniform and surrounded by a dozen gunmen, the commander said the aim is to “start the plan to liberate Damascus soon, God willing.”

JimMuir of BBC News,writes: The move by the FSA command to set up shop inside Syria…implies confidence that rebel control of “liberated areas” in the north of the country is stable …

Landis in NYTimes argues: “The problem is that it gives the Syrian Air Force a target. We have to see whether this is a credible headquarters or just a mobile camp that gives them a P.O. box in Syria.”…. Though parts of Syria are outside government control, the air force bombs at will. …. Analysts said that Syria had long been home to the real commanders — “The purported F.S.A. leaders in Turkey have never exercised anything like full command and control over the rebellion,” said Michael Wahid Hanna, an analyst at The Century Foundation. “They have seen their role diminish as the center of gravity continues to shift to leaders and fighters inside Syria.”

The move might also signal a shift in relations between the armed Syrian opposition and Turkey, which has long sought to “run the show,” Mr. Landis said. While the rebels still need Turkey as a haven and arms conduit, a move into Syria may allow them to exercise more control, for instance, reducing the influence of groups favored by Turkey, like the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood.

Syrian Kurds do not want independence, but greater autonomy within a Syrian solution, according to an activist with the Syrian Revolution Memory Project. He writes:

“the pictures that I see week in week out paint a different picture than what the PKK or PYD are portraying. What I observe in the pictures is a constant demand for a federated solution but a solution that is within the Syrian framework. The independence flag is always present, and demands for a federal solution can be seen on many of the banners as is the picture of the late Mishaal Timmo (who I believe was killed by the PKK/PYD?). Also the people that seem to organize these protest go by this name: “????? ???????? ???? ??????” Kurdish Youth United Committee   I have no idea to whom this group is affiliated but I would guess that they belong t the wider LCC network.”

The Afghanistan war budget for this year—over $110 billion. the national debt topped out at an astounding $16 trillion. The rising debt isn’t entirely due to the war in Afghanistan. But the war, which has cost over $600 billion to date, is one factor in America’s economic crisis. So is the $1 trillion plus spent on the Iraq war. This causes Americans to be reluctant to take the lead in Syria. The increase in insider attacks against NATO troops – 51 this year – has top leaders in Congress considering an accelerated draw down. Both Obama and Mitt Romney appear committed to a long-term continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan despite overwhelmingly popular disapproval, suggesting the war will continue whether the American people want it to or not.

Nir Rosen is one of the very best journalists on Syria. He has done a superb job writing up his observations drawn from his extensive traveling within the Alawite regions of Syria. As always, his insights ring true to what I know of Syria and the Alawites.

Among the Alawites‘ (Nir Rosen, The London Review of Books)

“Syria’s Alawite heartland is defined by its funerals. In Qirdaha in the mountainous Latakia province, hometown of the Assad dynasty, I watched as two police motorcycles drove up the hill, pictures of Bashar mounted on their windshields. An ambulance followed, carrying the body of a dead lieutenant colonel from state security. As the convoy passed, the men around me let off bursts of automatic fire. My local guides were embarrassed that I had seen this display, and claimed it was the first time it had happened. ?He is a martyr, so it is considered a wedding.’ Schoolchildren and teachers lining the route threw rice and flower petals. ?There is no god but God and the martyr is the beloved of God!’ they chanted. Hundreds of mourners in black walked up through the village streets to the local shrine. ?Welcome, oh martyr,’ they shouted. ?We want no one but Assad!'”

Guardian: “Syria: the foreign fighters joining the war against Bashar al-Assad”

…..At the border post of Bab al Hawa some days later, a confrontation was brewing between the jihadis and Syrian rebels.

Fighters from the Farouq brigade – one of the best-equipped and most disciplined units in the FSA – were sleeping on the grass in the shadow of a big concrete arch. The fighters wore military uniforms and green T-shirts emblazoned with insignia of the brigade – an achievement in the disarray of the revolution. They had many tanks and armoured vehicles captured from the Syrian army parked around the border post, under cover.

Nearby, a group of 20 jihadis had gathered in a circle around a burly Egyptian with a chest-long silver beard.

“You are in confrontation with two apostate armies,” the Egyptian told the men, referring to the Syrian army and Free Syrian Army. “When you have finished with one army you will start with the next.”

The confrontation had started a few weeks ago, when the foreign jihadis, who played a major role in defeating government forces at the border post, raised the black flag of al-Qaida, emblazoned by the seal of the prophet, on the border post.

The Farouq brigade demanded the flag be lowered lest it antagonise the Turks and threaten the rebels’ vital supply route. One bearded fighter in the Farouq brigade, a salafi himself, said he had pleaded with jihadis, telling them that their presence would stop Nato from sending supplies. “They told me they were here to stop Nato,” he said.

The rebels gave them an ultimatum to evacuate, and the jihadis had taken up attack positions on the stony hills overlooking the post, surrounding the Farouq fighters. who in turn were threatening to use their armoured vehicles.

I spoke to the regional commander of the Farouq brigade, a muscular young lieutenant from the southern province of Dara’a called Abdulah Abu Zaid. “I will not allow the spread of Takfiri [the act of accusing other Muslims of apostasy] ideology,” he told me in his military compound a few kilometres from the border post. “Not now, not later. The Islam we had during the regime was disfigured Islam and what they are bringing us is also disfigured. The Islam we need is a civil Islam and not the takfiri Islam.”

The jihadis, he said, had looted and stolen from the local people and demanded protection money from local businesses in order not to steal their merchandise. “I managed to stop them,” he said, “and I won’t let them spread here.”

Later that day he issued an ultimatum to their commander, a Syrian called Abu Mohamad al Abssi, to leave the area with his foreign jihadis or he would be killed.

I met Abu Mohamad, a monosyllabic doctor, the next day. He emphasized that he had been struggling against the regime since 1992 while the Free Syria Army were defected officers who until recently served the regime. The Arab spring was, he said, a result of Islamic fervor.

“We will never leave our positions here,” he said in a quiet voice. “God-willing we will win.”

A few days later, Abu Mohamad’s body was found in a ditch. He had been kidnapped and killed.

Foreign Policy

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad spoke with Egyptian news outlet, al-Ahram al-Arabi, in a rare interview. He said that armed groups are exercising terrorism and are not popular with Syrians, and that his regime would not fall like that of Libyan, Muammar al-Qaddafi. Of the regional overthrow of Arab regimes, Assad asserted it had “not worked in the interest of freedom, democracy, or ending social injustice as much as helped create chaos.” The opposition Syrian National Council has continued to call for intervention in the civil war in Syria that increasingly appears to be moving toward stalemate. A Syrian warplane hit a fuel station killing an estimated 54 people after opposition forces overtook an area on the fringes of al-Raqqa province on the border with Turkey, which has long been a government stronghold. Raqqah province, in north central Syria, sits strategically between the heavily contested and embattled Aleppo and Deir al-Zour provinces. The gas station is south of the border crossing of Tal Abyad, which the opposition reportedly gained control of after days of fighting. Tal Abyad is at least the third border crossing between Syria and Turkey overtaken by the opposition. Fighting additionally continued in Aleppo and across Syria with at least 225 people reported killed on Thursday.

Seeking credibility, Syrian regime allows opposition group to go ahead with Damascus meeting
By Associated Press, Updated: Sunday, September 23,

DAMASCUS, Syria — Syrian opposition figures who reject foreign intervention in Syria’s 18-month conflict called for the ouster of President Bashar Assad at a rare meeting Sunday in the nation’s capital. The gathering was tolerated by the regime in an apparent attempt to lend credibility to its claims that it remains open to political reform despite its bloody crackdown on dissent…..On Thursday, two senior NCB leaders disappeared after landing at Damascus International Airport, along with a friend who was to pick them up, and the NCB has blamed the regime for the disappearance. The government claimed the three were kidnapped by “terrorist groups,” a phrase it uses for rebels. Syria seizes opposition members after China trip – opposition By Oliver Holmes, (Reuters) – Security forces seized three members of Syria’s government-sanctioned opposition shortly after they returned from an official trip to China, a spokesman for the group said on Friday.Syria says missing opponents kidnapped by “terrorists

“Rescuing Syria” conference postponed due to opposition’s division

DAMASCUS, Sept. 22 (Xinhua) — A total of 28 Syrian opposition groups and parties announced Saturday the indefinite postponement of the long-awaited National Conference for Rescuing Syria, which was slated for Sept. 23.  Full story

History Repeats Itself as Tragedy – FP
The must-read secret Pentagon memo on Syria’s 1982 massacre.

Post: How Saudi Arabia Is Turning Syria’s Rebels Into An Effective Army

Opposition tells pope Syria regime threat to Christians, 2012-09-23 (PTI)

Syrian Christian opposition leader George Sabra told Pope Benedict XVI that the survival of the Damascus regime poses a threat to the country’s Christians, the Syrian National Council said today.

“The survival of the (President Bashar al-) Assad regime is a danger to Christians and Muslims in Syria alike,” Sabra, who is spokesman for the opposition SNC, told the pontiff during a visit to the Vatican yesterday. Sabra, who was accompanied by the exiled group’s head Abdel Basset Sayda in meeting the pope, also thanked him for his visit to Lebanon and guidance to Middle East Christians, the SNC said in a statement.

How does Bashar al-Assad view Syria?
Posted: 21 Sep 2012 – FP

David W. Lesch, author of Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad, writes: I got to know Assad fairly well over the years. I do not see him as either an eccentric or as a bloodthirsty killer, along the lines of Muammar al-Qaddafi or Saddam Hussein. People I know who have met all three …

Assad’s removal perhaps will just be a matter of time — although it may take longer than many want. Unfortunately, it is unlikely to be a pretty sight. As Anne Applebaum once wrote in an article on revolution and the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, for there to be an orderly transition from dictatorship to democracy, two elements are crucial: “an elite willing to hand over power, and an alternative elite organized enough to accept it.”…

Syria: Is the Proposed Cure Worse than the Status Quo?
By: Barry Rubin

… The Turks want a Muslim Brotherhood government; the Qataris do, too. The Saudis want to get rid of the current regime and replace it with a Sunni, anti-Iran one. With proper U.S. leadership and coordination the Saudis might play a constructive role but given Obama’s policy they will mainly just support Sunni Islamists as they did in Iraq.As if to outdo America, the French government is actually supporting for Syria’s leader a loudmouth former regime insider of no proven talent who is a radical Arab nationalist and someone who the rebels loathe….

“The Russians are right in trying to prevent an outright rebel victory in Syria” (thanks to FLC)

“…The real humanitarian disaster would come with a total government collapse and rebel victory because there are “at risk” minorities in the path of the mostly Sunni revolution. The Christians and the Shiite Alawites risk the fate of Iraq’s Sunnis and Christians in the wake of the decapitation of the Sunni dominated Saddam Hussein regime. Like Iraq’s Sunni minority, the Alawite minority in Syria will likely be targets of a revenge seeking Sunni majority. Realists in the Assad government, such as the recently departed Prime Minister, are probably now looking for an emergency landing and negotiations may be their only alternate runway.

As much as I hate to admit it, the Russians are probably right in trying to prevent an outright rebel victory. They see the unintended consequences more clearly than our neo-hawks who are urging military intervention. As always, the Russian reasoning is cold blooded and cynical, but those of us who are veterans of Lebanon, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan know the horror that can ensue when governance breaks down completely. The best chance for a negotiated end to the civil war would be an American-Russian-Turkish sponsored cease fire and peace conference. The Russians have leverage with the Assad government, but the rebels know that American and Turkish economic and diplomatic support is needed for any reasonable attempt to build a post-Assad government that has real legitimacy beyond the Sunni neighbors in the region…”

The Realist Prism: Syria Crisis Could Redraw Middle East Map
By Nikolas Gvosdev, U.S. Foreign Policy

U.S. pundits commenting on the protests that have swept across the Middle East this past week have focused on finger-pointing and partisan sniping, with conservatives calling for Washington to show more strength and liberals advocating more outreach. Few have wanted to deal with a far more unpleasant reality: The de facto pro-U.S. coalition of Turkey, Israel and moderate Sunni Arab states is disintegrating.

An Israeli Show of Force in the Golan Heights – video

Syria Uprising: Assad Says Arab Spring Brought Chaos BBC

Why the Syrian Rebels May Be Guilty of War Crimes By: Aryn Baker | Time

Condi Rice autobiography, she says King Abdullah of KSA always HATED Bashar Assad, he hated his father but respected Senior’s power.

Libyan fighting in Syria symbolizes fears
Nick Paton Walsh and James Foley
Thu September 20, 2012

  • Foreign fighters with Syrian rebels
  • One such Libyan fighter tells CNN he is a freedom fighter not an Islamist
  • Experts differ on how many foreign fighters are in Syria and what they will want when the fighting ends

(CNN) — Feras races across a dusty crossroads, firing his AK-47 wildly at regime forces somewhere down the road ahead of him. This is Aleppo, and he is one of many rebel fighters there, slogging it out street by street, often not seeing their enemy or much progress for weeks.

But Feras is different in a way that has sparked great fears and controversy. Feras is Libyan. He is one of Syria’s “foreign fighters.”

The presence of foreigners among the ranks of Syria’s rebels has been seized on by nearly all sides to suit their purposes…..

He staunchly rejected claims that foreign fighters are radicals or have links to al Qaeda. “I’m only a student. I left my money, my student, my family. We are not al Qaeda. We are not coming to break this country, we’re coming to help.”

He says his politics are simple. He wants an Islamic government for Syria but only, he says, because most of its people are Muslim anyway.

This is for him a fight to help another people, after which he wants to return home to Libya. And he rejects the more radical ideology of Salafists.

He knows about loss himself. His brother was killed in Libya’s civil war, and he still wears his black shirt. And since he has been in Syria, a Libyan friend of his has also been killed in the fighting.

Ducking in and out of Aleppo’s ruins, and narrowly missing being hit by a tank shell, it’s clear he is willing to endure great risk to this end. In fact, he tells Foley he is willing to die for this cause…..

Veteran Syria analyst Joshua Landis said one of the most important roles that these foreign elements had played so far was that of “scaring the Gulf states and the USA from further involvement. An obvious thing to do [to help the rebels] is to send Stinger [surface to air] missiles. That would change the balance of power but nobody wants to do that,” he said, citing concerns such potent weaponry could fall into the wrong hands.

But he added fears of radicalism were also being used by foreign powers to excuse a lack of intervention.

“It is cover for a lot of other things. Syria is a poor broken down country, a swamp. Obama is clear is that he does not want to get into Syria. They are reaching for every pretext under the sun. They do not want to get into another major nation building project. So they are cutting Syria off.”…

Managing the Collapse of the Assad Regime’ (Ausama Monajed, The Huffington Post)

“The FSA should begin by consolidating its leadership under one commanding general. This would not only address foreign frustrations of not having a central point of contact with the FSA but would also make transferring funds and arms much easier. Moreover, it would increase accountability should outside arms find their way into the hands of extremist groups, who may later use these arms against Western interests, similar to the recent attack on the American Consulate in Benghazi which resulted in the tragic death of four Americans, including the Ambassador. United States Defence Secretary Leon Panetta testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last March that “there has been no single unifying military alternative that can be recognised, appointed, or contacted” in the Syrian opposition. A centralised command with clear leadership for the FSA would close this gap and facilitate greater cooperation with Turkey, Gulf countries, and the West. It would also help the FSA prioritise its operations during the political transition in Syria, from locking down Assad’s cache of chemical weapons to securing the country’s volatile borders.”

In Syria, Aleppo residents grapple with hardship, uncertainties– Los Angeles Times, September 19, 2012

As fighting drags on, Aleppo has gone from Syria’s affluent business hub to an edgy, apocalyptic city where life and commerce have yielded to homicidal mayhem.

ALEPPO, Syria — The elderly woman, covered in a long black gown and matching headdress, was despondent. Tears of anguish flooded her eyes. She stood at the entrance to the cobblestone streets of the Old City, pleading with the rebel fighter.

“Why can’t you get the bakeries running?” she implored, saying she had spent four hours seeking fresh bread for her family. “We are not accustomed to living like this.”

At the receiving end of her exhortations was a strapping 27-year-old country boy with a white T-shirt, sandals and a rifle who called himself Abu Mohammed.

“We can’t do everything,” he shrugged, blaming government forces for blocking fuel supplies to operate the bakeries. “We can’t fight a war and run a city.”

US should buy Syria’s chemical weapons
By PORCHER L. TAYLOR
09/08/2012

The US should offer to buy Syria’s WMD before they fall into the wrong hands.

Unlike former US president George W. Bush’s quixotic and futile quest to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, gone is the decades-long intelligence community surmise that Syria possesses large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

Chillingly, last month, Syria’s Foreign Ministry publicly made a smoking-gun confession that it not only possessed these WMD, but would use those weapons against outside interveners in its prolonged civil war. The US and Israel replied with gusto to Syria’s thinly veiled threat.

In a bold but prudent effort to help stabilize a post-Assad government and to pre-empt the need for either the US or Israel to raid and secure Syria’s WMD stockpiles, the US should offer to buy those WMD now from the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army. As a pre-emptive economic diplomacy carrot, the price should be at least $80 million.

The predominant Syrian opposition forces could use the money to reboot that nation’s economy out of the ashes of civil war with a Marshall-type Plan. Once purchased, the US must destroy Syria’s WMD at one of the US Army Chemical Materials Agency’s disposal sites in the US, under the watchful eyes of UN inspectors.

Surprisingly, remarkable precedent exists in the US diplomacy playbook for such a cash-for-weapons disarmament deal. In 1997, the Pentagon exercised the power of the purse by pre-emptively buying twenty-one of the then top-of-the-line MiG-29 fighter jets from Moldova, a former Soviet republic, after Moldova tipped the US off that Iran was on the verge of buying the jets.

Quickly moving in, the US Air Force bought the jets for allegedly $80 million. Ominously, fourteen of the planes were nuclear-capable S models – which had never been analyzed by the US intelligence community. Here we had the Pentagon snatch a potential military threat out of the weapons marketplace by simply outbidding a pariah state. President Barack Obama should be just as innovative and savvy with Syria’s WMD. I proposed in a 1997 op-ed article that the Pentagon should offer to buy Saddam Hussein’s purported cache of WMD…..
The writer is a West Point graduate and a professor in the School of Professional & Continuing Studies at the University of Richmond. He once taught the national security law course in the university’s School of Law.

The mystery of the Syria contact group
By Vijay Prashad – Asia Times

In late August, Egypt’s new president Mohammed Morsi proposed the formation of a regional initiative to stem the conflict in Syria. Five decades ago, Egypt and Syria were yoked together to form the United Arab Republic, an experiment that lasted less than three years. Since then relations between the two states has ebbed and flowed, reliant more on the winds of mutual opportunity…

When Morsi asked the Saudi Arabia to sign up to the Contact Group, it had little choice but to join and take the fourth seat. A credible source from the website Jadaliyya tells me that the Saudi Arabia and the Iranians “struck a deal” at the Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting held in Mecca this August when the Contact Group idea was mooted. “The Saudis would drop its steroidal support of the Syrian opposition in return for the Iranians convincing Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province Shias to tone down their opposition against al-Saud, if not altogether stopping their protests, threats and demands,” the source says.

A source from the Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs would neither affirm nor deny this story, but would say that “it is a likely tale. There were discussions between the two parties about a ‘cease fire’ in the eastern part.” ….

One of the tasks of the Contact Group is to provide the new UN envoy, the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi with a mandate and a roadmap. Brahimi came to Cairo from his meeting with Assad in Damascus. He immediately met the Arab League’s head, Nabil al-Arabi and sat in with the Contact Group.

….Gregory Gause (author of The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, 2010) says, “Saudis think that their side is winning and they don’t want to give the Iranians a seat at this table. They want to beat the Iranians in Syria.”….

As Turkey’s Davutoglu put it, “Consultations with Saudi Arabia are necessary because the kingdom is a key player in the attempt to reach a solution to the Syrian crisis.” If the key player skips more meetings, it will dampen confidence in the Group and therefore in Brahimi for a regional solution to the Syrian crisis.

The Contact Group will meet again at the sidelines of the UN’s General Assembly next week. The Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Ministry will not confirm that its representatives will be at the Group’s meeting. The Egyptians, Iranians and Turks are enthusiastic. So is Brahimi. The road to peace in Syria might go through the Contact Group. But it requires Saudi Arabia involvement to make it credible….

Mass grave with 25 bodies found near Damascus: state media – 2012-09-21

DAMASCUS, Sept. 20 (Xinhua) — Syrian troops Friday uncovered a mass grave with 25 dead bodies in a restive part of suburban Damascus, the state-run SANA news agency said.

The grave was dug out at al-Qadam, which has recently been a hotbed of armed confrontation between the government troops and the armed rebels.

SANA said the residents of al-Qadam had tipped the Syrian troops about the grave, adding that the bodies had been found handcuffed and eye-folded. It said “armed terrorist groups” committed the massacre.

The clashes in Syria have spread to several hotspots nationwide but mainly taking place in the northern city of Aleppo and at a cluster of southern suburbs of Damascus, such as Hajar al-Aswad, Tadamun and al-Yarmouk camp for the Palestinian refugees, where the Syrian authorities said they have rounded up more than 100 “terrorists” on Thursday.

“State of the Internal Opposition,” by Ammar Abdulhamid

This report on the state of the Syrian Opposition is a must read. I have copied what I believe are the important parts, but do read the entire thing. I have long admired Ammar Abdulhamid for his independent and clear thinking. Many readers of Syria Comment have criticized Ammar in the past (See the comments on this post: “Ammar Abdulhamid Emerges as Face of the Syrian Revolution, according to Washington Times post“)

State of the Internal Opposition
by Ammar Abdulhamid, September 11, 2012, based on a trip that he and his wife took to Turkey in Aug.

* For many months, rebel groups were on their own when it came to procuring weapons and supplies. The situation changed six months ago, with the establishment of a special Turkish-Qatari-Saudi “operations room” that supervised all arms flow to the rebels. However, and over the last few weeks, the situation changed again. A reported dispute between Saudi and Qatari officials put an end to the tripartite cooperation and Qatar and Saudi Arabia are acting separately, albeit still under Turkish supervision. The specifics of the dispute are not clear, but the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its role seem to lie at the heart of it. The main task of the operations room is to supervise the distribution process of supplies. With backing from Turkey and Qatar, the Brotherhood prefers to take control over the entire process, a development that will leave many groups unsupported, including the largest and most effective fighting units on the ground, but it will give the Brotherhood the ability to control military operations to match its ability to manipulate the political processes in the oppositional scene abroad. To date, the largest rebel groups are still unwilling to endorse a strict Islamist agenda, irrespective of who is in charge: Salafist groups or Brotherhood types. These groups are completely reliant on support from the operations room as well as on supplies they can procure for themselves inside Syria. MB control will starve them out, or push them into a brittle alliance that will not survive the test of time and which will increase mutual animus. In an effort to appease all sides of the divide, Turkish authorities seem willing to let each side run their own supply network. So, the Saudis will continue to back their room, Qatar will back the Brotherhood, and Salafis will receive backing from both while continuing to have their owned independent sponsors from all over the world. For now, however, the main operations room is the one receiving Saudi backing….

* Leaders of local rebel groups are fast acquiring all the usual traits and characteristics associated with warlords, their intentions notwithstanding. The ethos driving the devolution towards warlordism is fed mostly by international inaction, now increasingly perceived in conspiratorial terms, as well as lack of trust in existing political opposition groups and their growing disunity. …

* The divide between Islamist groups advocating, openly or quietly, the establishment of an Islamic state, and other rebel groups, who represent the majority of rebels and still cling to the more inclusive concept of a civil state, is now wider than ever, with the two sides openly competing over acquisition and control of the meager logistical support trickling across the Turkish and Iraqi borders, and at occasions, Jordanian and Lebanese borders. Though occasional hijackings of supplies intended to other groups have been reported, the competition between groups remains for the most part nonviolent in nature and restricted to intrigue behind closed doors. This is not likely to last for long,…

* The Brotherhood and Salafist groups have also managed to control coverage of the Revolution in most Arabic media channels through their sympathizers already employed there, and through outright purchase of smaller channels operated by the opposition. They also used their larger financial reserves to establish control over most media teams operating inside the country, irrespective of the actual ideologies of the founding members. This allows the groups to appear as much larger and more influential over the processes on the ground than they actually are, at least at this stage…..

* The potential for warlordism is not going unnoticed by rebel leaders which continue to strive towards greater unity and coordination. Recent developments are particularly telling. In Idlib, and parts of the rural areas of Hama, Homs and Aleppo, most fighting groups, ideology notwithstanding, are now coming together under the banner of the Brigades and Fighting Units of Syria’s Martyrs (Kata’ib wa Alwiyat Shuhada’ Souriyya). The key figure behind this development is one Jamal Maarouf, AKA Abu Khalid. A pious man and a husband of three (polygamy is pretty common in rural areas throughout Syria), Abu Khalid in essence stands for traditional values, a mixture of Islam and rural mores rather than political ideology. In the absence of operational political and judicial structures in his territory in Jabal Al-Zawiyeh, he reportedly relies on Sharia to resolve disputes, but remains willing to let such matters be decided by a local government should one be established. Abu Khalid does not advocate the establishment of an Islamic State, is wary of Salafi groups and hates the Brotherhood. But, in operational matters, he cooperates with all. Syria’s Martyrs Brigades currently include 45,000 strong. But not all major rebel groups are willing to join the Syria Martyrs Brigades. Many, especially the more Islamist-leaning ones, like Al-Farouq and Farouq Al-Shamal, have chosen to come together under a different coalition that was provisionally called Al-Jabha Al-Islamiya li Tahrir Souriyya or The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Syria, led by Ahmad Abu Issa, a rival of Abu Khalid from Jabal al-Zawiyeh. Until recently, Abu Issa has led the Suqur Al-Sham Brigades, which operates mostly in Jabal Al-Zawiyeh. By the time of its public announcement on September 10, however, the coalition had metamorphosed into the Front for the Liberation of Syria. Suqur Al-Sham, Al-Frouq Brigades (Homs, Hama), Ansar Al-Islam (Damascus and Suburbs) and the Revolutionary Council of Deir Ezzor, all joined the Front. On September 3, a group of FSA officers in Antakya announced the formation of the National Syrian Army meant as replacement of the FSA and hoping to unite all groups. Initial reports claimed that rebel groups in Daraa and few in Lattakia and Damascus have rushed to join it. Some also claimed that Al-Tawhid Brigade currently operating in Aleppo City and the rural areas to its north has also joined the NSA. But officers in Antakya say that these reports are not accurate and that, at this stage, no group has confirmed their readiness to officially join the NSA. Indeed, Al-Tawhid recently joined the Revolutionary Military Council of Aleppo, a local front the Muslim Brotherhood, as evidenced by the fact that its political wing, dubbed the Provisional Transitional Council, includes the likes of Hamzah Ramadan and Ghassan Al-Najjar. …The picture emerging on the ground, then, is one of regional as well as ideological differences, with personalities of certain figures playing a major role in shaping the scene as well. As things at this stage, ongoing attempts at unification in the hope of avoiding warlordism are in fact contributing to it as phenomenon by consolidating power in the hands of few specific groups.

* Leaders of larger rebel groups have been able to provide a measure of security in areas under their control, but they have so far failed to provide any solid governance structures, other than token support to committees started by civil activists to ensure that basic services are provided. Meanwhile, and as we have noted above, even non-Islamist leaders tend to fall back on the Sharia as the main source of law when dealing with local informants, troublemakers and captives, due to lack of knowledge of the civil code and inability to recruit civil judges.

* The FSA: In Antakya, the head of the High Military Council, Brig. Gen. Mustafa Al-Shaikh, originally from the town of Rastan in Homs Province, is emerging as the go-to figure for rebel leaders. Col. Riad Al-Ass’aad is fast becoming irrelevant and is distrusted even by people from his own hometown in Idlib Province…..there are a few high ranking officers who defected over the last few months and who continue to shun the spotlight. Some have been briefed by Turkish and, at occasions, western security officials, but their intentions and plans remain unclear.

* The SNC: on the ground, the Syrian National Council remains irrelevant. … The old SNC leader, the Sorbonne Professor, Bourhan Ghalioun, is reportedly planning a comeback, but current leader Abdelbassit Seida is said to have gown attached to his position as well. … On the other hand, SNC leaders are also planning to form a transitional government in response to a request from France who promised to recognize such government when formed. The French did not clarify what their criteria for recognition will be. Other efforts for forming a transitional government are also underway.

* The National Coordination Body (NCB): formed inside the country by traditional opposition figures from the secular left, this particular opposition coalition, for all the good intentions of most of its founders, has served only one purpose so far: to illustrate how cut off traditional opposition groups are from the grassroots. …

* The Islamists – the Muslim Brotherhood: Salafi and MB-affiliated groups in Syria and the Syrian diaspora are carrying out their activities with the expected messianic zeal of a people who believe that their moment under the sun has finally come. Indeed, ever since the beginning of the Revolution and benefitting from its good relations with Turkish authorities, the Brotherhood has been busy buying, bullying and intriguing its way into relevance. In many ways, it seems that the lesson MB leaders drew from history is to emulate Hafiz Al-Assad’s own tactics in controlling the political scene in the country. These tactics include: infiltrating every political and rebel movement, controlling every civil and humanitarian initiative, and hording access to the media. …. The Brotherhood has many Salafi-leaning members in its larger base. So, by pandering to Salafists, it is hoping to become an umbrella organization for most Islamist groups in the country. Indeed, the MB is already providing financial support to many Salafi-oriented rebel groups, including Al-Tawhid (Aleppo), Al-Farouq (Homs and Hama) and Ansar Al-Islam (Damascus), but that does not necessarily translate into political allegiance, at least not on the longer run. Indeed, at this stage, it’s hard to know who is manipulating whom in the ongoing interactions between Salafi groups and the Brotherhood. On the other hand, not even under the banner of the Syrian National Council has the MB deigned to provide assistance to groups that refuse to espouse an Islamist agenda. This renders dubious any claim that the Brotherhood makes regarding commitment to the establishment of a civil state. Indeed, for all its public declarations in support of a civil state, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is emerging as the more ideologically committed to the establishment of an Islamic state than all MB branches in the region. ….

* The Islamists – the Salafi Groups: Unsurprisingly, rebel leaders have shown a significant degree of distrust vis-à-vis the Brotherhood and its agendas, and have shown a greater preference for dealing with Salafi groups. For all their calls for the establishment of an Islamic state, Salafi groups seem more willing to accept that the best that they could have at this stage is the creation of Salafist enclaves, or, in civil parlance, Salafist electoral districts. Salafi groups might accept funding from the Brotherhood, but their commitment to an MB agenda, as we noted, is unclear to say the least. Leaders of Salafist groups are emerging from amongst the grassroots, rather than the rank-and-file of the exile community, they feel rooted in the local communities and are more tuned to local realities and aspirations….

* Confessional Minorities: For all the talk about the anti-revolutionary attitude of the Alawite and Christian communities, there are many Alawites and Christians taking part in the revolution both as political activists and as rebels. Their basic attitude towards working with various political and rebel groups could provide certain clues as to future political alliances and on-ground dynamics. Most Alawites and Christians fight with smaller units with clear secular tendencies, such as Unit 111 based in the town of Bdama in Idlib Province. But when it comes to a choice between working with MB-affiliated or Salafi-affiliated groups, most Alawites and Christians prefer MB. The MB is more familiar to them, and by adopting Assad and Ba’ath tactics, the MB is presenting a more familiar political style as well: one based on back room deals and manipulation of the political scene. By comparison, Salafi groups seem more alien and threatening: they openly call for the establishment of an Islamic state…

The Druze community in the suburb of Jeramana in Damascus is coming under increased pressure both by pro-Assad militias and by pro-revolution activists to take a firm stand with either camp. The few Druze villages in Idlib province are providing shelter to refugees from rebel communities. With a population of less than 150,000, the Ismailites of Syria have from the very beginning showed greater sympathy with the revolutionaries and have organized numerous anti-Assad rallies in the town of Salmiyyeh. But they are virtually besieged by loyalist villages, Alawite and Christian, and are unlikely to get more involved.

* Foreign fighters, mostly from Gulf States, Libya, Tunisia, Chechnya, Somalia and Sudan, now number as much as 3,500 by some estimates, and operate out of their own bases in northern and central Syria. Working with a comparable number of Syrian recruits they are at occasions clearly affiliated with Al-Qaeda or similar Jihadi organizations, although the role of Jabhat Al-Nusrah (The Succor Front) in this is not clear. There are also quite a few “foreign” fighters who seem more motivated by Arab nationalism than Jihadi agendas. According to activists based in Antakya, individual members of the Brotherhood seem to be implicated in smuggling Jihadi elements into the country. Some local rebel commanders, while wary of their presence, are, nonetheless, coordinating some operations with them. The groups have already been implicated in hostage taking, torture of captives and mutilations, especially of Alawite prisoners. Although we are only talking about a handful of cases at this stage, the trend is alarming.

… It’s not clear why Turkish authorities put up with Al-Qaeda cells springing up near their borders, and with foreign fighters pouring through. But for now, they don’t seem overly alarmed by the development.

* Of the 3,500 foreign fighters, around 1,300 are said to be Libyans operating mostly in northern Syria and Al-Haffeh Region in Lattakia Province. …

* Though still a tiny minority, an increasing number of individuals acting in the name of the Free Syrian Army are now involved in racketeering activities, including blackmail of local business communities, misuse of funds donated to support the revolution and trading in arms and medical supplies provided free of charge by support groups…..In the town of Eizaz, in Aleppo Province, recently pounded to the ground by Assad’s MIGs, there is now a small band of 200 fighters led by a character called Ammar Dadikhi, a smuggler and a Salafist who proclaims his disdain of the Syrian people to his visitors and calls for the establishment of an Islamic State. He is also the man believed to hold most Hezbollah prisoners in Aleppo. He is one of dozens such characters now emerging all over the country, establishing little fiefdoms and complicating an already complex situation: too small to be considered warlords, too armed to be dismissed. They are the dogs and rascals of this war.

* In another alarming trend, ranking members of the Syrian National Council, the Muslim Brotherhood, and other opposition coalitions are busy establishing their own militias on the ground….Personal agendas are often as prominent as ideological ones.

* Still, and for all the disillusionment, disappointment and disaffection that people felt, all activists and rebel leaders we met have yet to fall on anti-Western sentiments. They are critical of Europe and the U.S., President Obama in particular, and are beginning to entertain all sorts of conspiratorial theories as to why intervention has not happened. But they are not hostile per se, and are still calling for international intervention…

* Many if not all rebel groups still dream of a traditional military victory over Assad. They still think of the liberation process as a military conquest allowing them to move from one town to another, from one region to another, until all Assad’s loyalist forces and militias are defeated and rebel groups have wrested control of every inch of the country. Being aware of the many ideological and personal differences that separate them, certain rebel groups seem to think that military muscle might be the way to deal with their current partners as well down the road. …

State of the State

* The Assad regime may not have fallen yet, but the state has already collapsed. At this stage, Syria is nothing more than a hodgepodge collection of militarized national, tribal and confessional cantons connected by a fraying thread: a quickly fading memory of a united Syria. The regime might remain in control of certain key services and regions, and it might still be able to crackdown and rain terror from the skies on its opponents and their supporting communities, but large swaths of the country have clearly slipped beyond its control. The problem: no parallel governance structures worthy of the name are emerging anywhere. …

* Ethnic cleansing of Sahel Al-Ghab area in Hama province and certain parts of rural Homs is for now a done deal and will not be easily reversible, if ever…

* Individual Acts of vendettas are increasing. Sectarian sentiments are now the norm rather than the exception. ….

* Taking the current state of affairs in consideration, the odds of a successful partition of Syria, even if unofficial, have actually plummeted over the last few weeks. Neither the Alawites nor the Kurds, the two likely groups to opt for such an arrangement, will be allowed to rest in peace in their newly carved out territories. In the coast, local Sunni communities are already stockpiling on weapons to fight against ethnic cleansing that is bound to take place when Alawites make their move. Considering the proximity of different communities to each other and increasing sectarian tensions, their posture may not remain defensive once the process begins to unfold, especially in the region of Al-Haffeh. In fact, as we write this report, a battle is raging in the northernmost parts of Al-Haffeh region, centered on the village of Burj Kassab and its surroundings, where rebels are trying to gain access to the sea and counteract ethnic cleansing by pro-Assad militias. The move, however, have forced residents in nearby Alawite villages to leave their homes, as their villages came under pounding for the first time since the beginning of the revolution. So, sooner rather than later, and barring full scale international intervention, Sunni Arabs, driven by a desire for vengeance, will take the fight to the Alawites, and what has been seeded in Homs, Aleppo, Damascus, Daraa, Hama and Deir Ezzor will be harvested in Lattakia, Jableh and Tartous.

* In Kurdish regions, Arab tribes are reportedly arming themselves in preparation to defend the “integrity of the state.” Kurds, who are also arming themselves, have been able to prevent confrontations by measuring their steps and attempting to establish wider contact with some tribal leaders to allay their fears and address their concerns. Much still needs to be done in this regard if an Arab-Kurdish conflict is to be prevented. Intra-Kurdish rivalry is also on the increase, as PYD loyalists continue to assert themselves on the ground in an attempt to impose control over Kurdish-majority towns. To complicate matters, different PYD leaders and factions seem to be serving different agendas. Syria’s Kurds are now locked in their own internal struggles, which could devolve into conflict, and until they reach some real agreement between themselves or implement the agreement already reached in Irbil (Hewler), they can be considered effectively hors de combat as far as the revolution is concerned, in spite of the revolutionary sympathies of young Kurdish activists.

* A general breakdown in law and order is unsurprisingly reported everywhere. The regime has reportedly released most criminal convicts and Jihadi leaders from its prisons. The move seems to come as part of a strategy to encourage lawlessness and discredit the rebels. Indeed, special security units were formed tasked with carrying out robberies and kidnappings and blame it on the Free Syrian Army. Still, genuine criminal gangs have also appeared quite independently ….

The Humanitarian Front

* From the humanitarian perspective, the situation in Syria is growing increasingly dire. It’s unfathomable why more is not being done,….Only one camp now has an active school that teaches in Arabic. Educational activities in other camps are episodic, and instruction is carried out in Turkish. Volunteers and NGOs who could bridge these gaps are not allowed access. Turkish authorities have finally called for more international help. Western officials we met, however, are not sure what difference this will actually mean on the ground. Turkish authorities are highly suspicious of international NGOs and prefer to try to manage the situation on their own. UNHCR has not been called in. But as the number of refugees in Turkey fast approaches 100,000 and could double by yearend, it is becoming increasingly clear to them that some help beyond financial grants is needed. Turkish authorities are now hoping to establish camps inside Syrian territories, even without an official declaration of a safe zone. The camps will be put under rebel control and rebels will be tasked with protecting them.

* On the medical front, what’s being provided to the wounded in all these countries is woefully inadequate, and though Turkey comes out ahead again, much still needs to be done. Amputees are proliferating in border hospitals in Turkey amidst reports that in many cases the amputation was unnecessary. No counseling is provided. Local staff does not speak Arabic …

* Inside Syria, the situation of the IDPs is tragic…

The Turkish Role

* For all the assertions of solidarity with the Syrian people and all the declared willingness to coordinate policies and actions with the Obama Administration and other NATO allies, Turkey’s leaders’ attitude vis-à-vis the current conflict in Syria remains difficult to decipher. At this stage, they seem to be looking at the situation through the visor of internal identity politics. The Kurdish Question is definitely on the minds of Turkish authorities, so is the less publicized Alawite Question. Though the likelihood of an Alawite uprising is minimal, Alawite discontent could further complicate AKP electoral calculations in certain key provinces. Neither Turkey’s Kurds nor Alawites would be happy with increased intervention in Syria. ….

* No matter what the U.S. and other western powers have to say regarding the SNC, Turkish authorities, though aware of MB’s shortcomings, including its lack of a large popular base in the country and its internal divisions, remain wedded to it because of the ideological connections between AKP and MB, pure and simple. No amount of pressure can break their connection.

The U.S. and Turkey-Based Opposition

* As part of its ongoing outreach to the opposition, the U.S. has finally opened a special office in Istanbul dedicated to this end: The Office of Syrian Opposition Support (OSOS). The office is meant to serve “as a training facility, coordination center, and point of contact for the international community with opposition networks inside Syria,” and “is staffed by Syrian activists who maintain extensive relationships with opposition councils and civil society organizations inside the country.” OSOS, we are told, “will serve as a clearinghouse for information on the opposition and its needs, build the capacity of opposition groups and activists and facilitate the distribution of assistance into Syria.” Out of deference to Turkish authorities and the SNC, ranking members from the SNC and the Brotherhood were included in the advisory board, including current SNC leader Abdelbassit Seida, and MB interlocutor Molham Aldroby. OSOS is funded by the State Department, as were previous efforts at supporting the opposition in Istanbul. Our stay in Turkey coincided with OSOS-organized workshops on sectarianism (Istanbul) and women empowerment (Gaziantep and Kilis). It’s clear at this stage that the focus is on civil society in the broader sense. ….

* Other American-supported efforts in Istanbul will include working with experts from the United States Institute for Peace to fund an office for a Syrian NGO called “The Day After” dedicated to training Syrian activists on the challenges of the transitional period. …

Another U.S. sponsored initiative is the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center currently being established under the auspices of IREX and which might open an office in Istanbul as well. The center will be dedicated to managing the challenges of transitional justice in Syria. Activists on the ground are also reporting and for the first time that the communications equipment, long-promised by the Americans, are making their way into the country as well. OSOS and American NGOs seem to be involved in the distribution process as well.

Concluding Observations

* Realities on the ground as well as regional geopolitical realities indicate that outright military victory by any one side is just as impossible as holding a viable dialog with Assad. Assad does need to be taken out of the Syrian Equation, and military means seem the only way to achieve that, eventually. But military means will prove woefully inadequate when it comes to what lies beyond this necessary step: stabilizing the country, getting all the pieces of the puzzle back to fit, and dealing with rebel leaders and ethnic and regional realities…..

* Future engagement with activist and rebel leaders by members of the international community should seek to convey to all the limit of the military solution in securing the country. At one point or another, the rebels and activists need to be ready to negotiate with representatives from other side of the divide. No matter how the military situation changes on the ground, there will always be communities and enclaves where the majority population has backed the Assad camp, be it out of confessional or ideological loyalties, or out of pure self-interest. These people will be ready to fight to the bitter end if they thought that their survival is at stake, especially after so many massacres have been perpetrated by them or in their name. Rebels and activists have a learning curve to be ready for dealing with this situation. ….

* At end of the day, a political process is still required to bring this conflict to an end, … The political process needed at this stage should focus on producing exactly this new constitution, spelling out the specifics of how communal and regional rights will be protected, and clarifying how transitional justice will be meted out and what its limits will be. …

* Syria has been locked in a state of conflict for months, but rather than embark on a serious mediation effort, international leaders have been busy stalling and passing this hot potato…

By demanding that Assad order his troops back to barracks without showing any readiness to punish him,…. international leaders have made themselves irrelevant….Indeed, western leaders’ approach has been to wash their hands of the whole thing, while Russian, Chinese and Iranian leaders were quite willing to dip theirs in the blood being spilled by pro-Assad militias all while adopting their propaganda and lies. This needs to change. …

By now, there is nothing called a regular army in Syria. What we have are pro-Assad militias, made up of a mixture of army troops, security forces and civilians. The overwhelming majority are now Alawites, supported in certain regions and neighborhoods by Christians as well Sunni Arab and Kurdish recruits. Most members of pro-Assad militias have been involved in atrocities, but they really believe that they are fighting for their lives and for their families. In their minds, they are involved in preemption, in preventing future atrocities against their communities. …

We need to find ways to engage the pro-Assad militias themselves. …The most important effort that can be launched at this stage is an outreach strategy led by the rebels and activists in cooperation with representatives of the international community targeting pro-Assad militias meant to induce such outcome. As for Assad and his generals, a trip to the ICC might help bring closure to the victims of their crimes, and might provide family members of all victims a channel for their grief and anger other than retribution.

* The State in Syria has already collapsed and the country will not be pacified for years to come. At this stage, it is effectively a failed state. The thinking at this stage should focus on how Syria could be put back together again, how she can be pacified, how to prevent her humanitarian situation from worsening, and how to prevent spillovers into neighboring countries. The choice facing many in the international community is no longer whether to intervene but how to intervene…..The endgame at this stage could only be the removal of the Assad regime and replacing it with a more accountable system of governance. …. Iran and Russia might be beyond the pale of making a positive contribution in this regard. But most other regional powers can be coaxed into a process once the U.S. is willing to assume a more proactive role. All this will need to take place outside the framework of the UN… Meanwhile, a solution to Assad air power needs to be found … the situation in Syria will have to be micromanaged… by whatever administration occupies the White House…

Ammar Abdulhamid: Syrian pro-Democracy activist, founder of the Tharwa Foundation, and Fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Khawla Yusuf: Syrian pro-democracy activist and co-founder of the Tharwa Foundation.