Juliette El-Mir Saadeh: Gender politics and women in armed conflict
By Christopher Solomon
June 9, 2018 – For Syria Comment 

Juliette El-Mir Saadeh, the wife of Syrian Social Nationalist Party founder Antoun Saadeh, set a trend for the political and social norms for gender politics in the Levant.

The red five-pointed star on the yellow flag of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) evokes the symbolism of the Cold War and the socialist gender egalitarianism of the political left. The world’s attention frequently focuses on the U.S. supported Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) coalition headed by the YPG and the movement’s future in eastern Syria. The highly publicized images of the Kurdish female fighters in the YPJ (the SDF coalition’s female units) have made them a strong source of praise in the West. In the October 2017 YPJ Commander Rojda Felat was widely covered in the press for leading the SDF campaign against Da’esh in Raqqa. Another example was the outcry over the brutal death of the YPJ fighter Amina Omar during Turkey’s military operation in Afrin (who went by the nom de guerre Barin Kobani) in February 2018.

However, with the Assad regime emerging as the prominent political force in Syria’s conflict, Damascus appears to be attempting to reach a political accommodation while simultaneously embarking on a confrontation with the YPG/SDF. The attack by pro-Assad forces on the SDF base near Deir Ezzor in February 2018 contradicts the regime’s willingness to facilitate YPG fighters through its territory to the front in Afrin and lend militia fighters. This leads to the possibility that the recent fighting with Turkish forces in Afrin and the Syrian regimes’ converging interest with the YPG could bring the Kurds “home” to President Assad.

One of the pro-Assad factions (with its own militia), the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), is an interesting case study as it is well-positioned to flex its nationalist credentials as a way for the regime coalition to confront and curtail the YPG/SDF’s efforts to foster a regional autonomy. As the YPG/SDF continues to come into contact with the Assad regime forces along the Euphrates River and elsewhere, the role of women in Syrian politics and in the conflict will become even more pronounced in the coming political shakeup and period of reconstruction, especially given that both camps tend to view themselves as the modern and progressive bulwark best suited for confronting the extreme gender-regressive nature of the country’s Jihadist movements. Given the war’s cruelty and the dangerous conditions often faced by women in Syria, along with rapidly shifting socioeconomic conditions, it will be essential to monitor and analyze the role of women in both within the Assad camp, the YPG/SDF, as well as in the wider opposition groups, and the non-aligned members of Syrian society as a whole.

What does this have to do with Juliette El-Mir Saadeh? There has been little discussion or efforts to explore gender-oriented politics in the Syria regime territories and its place amongst the factions of the pro-Assad forces. To gain insight into the history of this phenomenon and the roots of the Levant’s secular-progressive brand of authoritarianism and political attitudes towards women, the story of Juliette, the Arab World’s first female political prisoner, could be one place for analysts to begin.

Juliette El-Mir Saadeh’s turbulent life

Much of Juliette’s life would be encompassed by the political activities of her husband, Antoun Saadeh and his establishment of the SSNP in 1932. After having fled Lebanon in 1938 due to political persecution from the colonial France authorities, Antoun Saadeh, in a self-imposed exile, arrived in South America with the intention of establishing a network with the Syrian and Lebanese communities living overseas to financially bolster his nascent movement. In 1939 that he met Juliette El-Mir, the daughter of Lebanese immigrants who had moved to Argentina in the late 1800’s. Juliette had been working as a nurse who was training to become a doctor. She began corresponding with Saadeh, with whom her family was impressed, and they married in 1943 (Other sources put the date April 1940 or 1941). After the end of WWII, Saadeh returned to Beirut in 1947 with much fanfare. Juliette joined him in Beirut by the end of 1947 with her two daughters, Sofia and Elissar. The couples’ youngest child, Raghida, was born in Lebanon.

Men and women celebrating the return of Antoun Saadeh in Beirut in 1947.

As the confrontations between Saadeh and the Lebanese government played out, Juliette would become caught up in the violent events that soon turned the party into a pariah, something she wasn’t fully prepared for when they returned to Lebanon. At an event launching for the release of her mother’s memoirs, Dr. Safia Saadeh relayed to the Lebanese writer Samia Nassar Melki, “From her perspective, my mother thought that her husband espoused a very nice ideology and that he would be active in convincing people of that, but not that he would be persecuted for it.”

While in hiding during Saadeh’s July 1949 uprising and flight, Juliette witnessed arguments amongst the partisans who came by her house on the rapidly unfolding situation. A noted emphasis fell on Saadeh’s political advisor, Maaruf Saab, over misleading the others on the planned meeting with Husni Zaim. General Zaim had taken power in March 1949 in Syria’s first military coup. On the surface, it appeared he sought to use Saadeh as a way to establish a friendly SSNP regime in Beirut (he did once insist that Lebanon should be part of Syria) but his true intentions would soon prove otherwise.

On July 6, while hiding in a hotel in Damascus, she learned that her husband would proceed to meet with Zaim and decried the fact that the Syrian dictator had already repeatedly let Saadeh down with broken promises of political support and arms and was not to be trusted. The Saadeh family had a particularly close relationship with the infamous military figure Adib Shishakli, who would later take control of Syria via his own coup. Juliette wrote in her memoirs that she sought the opinion of Shishakli when moving in hiding during the Zaim debacle, including whether or not she should seek refuge at the Greek Orthodox Our Lady of Saidnaya Monastery.

Antoun Saadeh with female SSNP fighters

However, Zaim’s security forces eventually located Saadeh’s family in Latakia and Juliette was moved to the Saidnaya Monastery. On July 10^th that she discovered that Saadeh had been betrayed by Zaim, turned over to the Lebanese army, and subsequently the recipient of a hasty execution on July 8^th. The Patriarch tried to orchestrate the family’s return to Argentina but she refused on the grounds that the Lebanese government must first allow her to collect their personal belongings in Lebanon, a request which was refused. Saadeh left property he owned in Dhour el Choueir to his wife along with four hundred Syrian pounds. After his death, she was also promoted to the SSNP’s Supreme Council and received the title al-Amina al-ula (First Keeper or Trustee).

Though it was Shishakli who rescued the Saadeh family, they eventually came under the protection of SSNP party leader George Abd Messih, but it was a traumatic existence, with Abd Messih having moved in with the family in Syria, and her home became the SSNP’s headquarters. Safia Saadeh recalled to Melki: “The day my father died, I no longer had a home. He took everything from us, he wanted to crush us and with us the legacy of my father. We lived in an atmosphere of fear. I regret her not taking us away. But for her there was no question. She perceived it as loyalty to my father and the cause he died for.”

In regards to George Abd Messih’s leadership and his ultimate legacy, many SSNP members remain divided. Some admired his versatility and toughness, but others detested his overbearing personality. However, he is generally credited for holding the party together after Saadeh’s execution.

One SSNP leader in the U.S. relayed his thoughts on Abd Messih and his doubts on the authenticity of [Juliette’s] memoirs: “There are a lot of question marks surrounding the book, and its contents brought to light some of the major episodes in party history which led to the eventual ‘Intifada’ (the SSNP’s first split) in 1957.  The Deanery of Information in the Party actually released a response to the book titled, “The Memoirs of the First Trustee (Amina) Between the Hammer of Hatreds and the Anvil of Distortion.”  A lot of the events described in the memoirs were unfortunately patently false and proved to be complete distortions. We are unsure if they were even written by Juliette El Mir herself because the book was published long after her death (and after the death of George Abd Messih).”

“The reality is that certain SSNP members have had a historical revulsion toward George Abd Messih because he was very strict when it came to adherence to Party principles and moral standards.  While they had wanted to engage in political dealings at the expense of ideological purity, Abd Messih continuously refused and stood in their way.  As such, they began to mount a propaganda campaign against him throughout the years in an attempt to discredit him and attack his character.  Many of their indoctrinations focused on the demonization of Abd Messih, such that new generations of SSNPers grew up hating Abd Messih without really knowing why.  It was an unfortunate blemish in the history of the SSNP that has had a negative impact on party effectiveness.”

It was only a month later that Zaim himself was overthrown by Syrian army officers connected to the SSNP. Confronting the deposed general in the presidential palace, a plotter accused Zaim of “betraying Saadeh.” After Za’im was executed at Mezzeh prison on August 14, Shishakli brought Zaim’s bloody shirt in front of Juliette and shouted, “We have avenged him!” One party elder remarked that this scene was a big shock to Juliette, being from Latin America. Shishakli would go on to launch his own political party, the Arab Liberation Movement (ALM), which was modeled after the SSNP.

(Above) Juliette pictured with unidentified party members. Dr. Sofia Saadeh said she did not know who the men were and underscored the extreme hardships faced by the family: “I do not have such pictures because everything was taken from our home in Damascus in 1955, and our home in Lebanon in 1962 including my dad and grandfather’s libraries that contained a lot of rare books and manuscripts.”

Abd Messih’s legacy and Juliette’s fate are closely associated with the 1955 assassination of Adnan al-Malki and the Baath’s purge of the party in Syria, which saw member of SSNP imprisoned or flee to Lebanon. However, Juliette was one such member who sat through the show trials and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the Qala’a Dimashq (Citadel of Damascus – now a UNESCO World Heritage Site), which had served as a prison during the French Mandate before it was finally closed in 1986.  After Hafez al-Assad’s faction of the Baath Party (the so-called Military Committee) carried out coup and overthrew the anti-UAR secessionist government on March 8, 1963, Juliette was pardoned and released due to ill health on December 26, 1963. The Syrian government stipulated her release on the condition she would not live in any Arab country so she went into exile in Paris, France. Juliette remained active in the party as a member of the Supreme Council until her death in 1976 in Beirut.

One Syrian historian reflected on his thoughts on her memoirs, “Juliette El-Mir’s memoirs are among the finest I have read. They are peppered with detail, emotional, informative, and entertaining, all at once. They are also very honest, which is not often true for memoirs. Regardless who physically wrote them, she obviously dictated the narrative.” While Juliette is still highly venerated by all factions of the SSNP, it is evident by the views of some factions who call into question the validity of her memoirs and her troubled relationship with Abd Messih show how one woman’s place in history continues to haunt the party today. Her legacy as the first woman political prisoner in the Arab World exemplifies the long history of political persecution and fraught nature of women in the region.

The SSNP, the YPJ, and women in the Levant: Bullets and the ballot box

Syrian women in the Independence Day military parade in 1957

The Levant in particular has been the scene of female participation in the region’s conflicts. Of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Cold War left a heavy mark on gender roles and combat in the Levant, especially among the governments and non-state actors aligned with the Soviet Union. For instance, Syria under Hafez al-Assad and the local branch of the Baath Party ideologically conditioned women through a military-style education system. One other example was Rifaat al-Assad, the brother of Hafez, whose own loyal military units saw female troops roamed through Damascus in the 1970s, forcing the veils and hijabs off the heads of women on the streets as an unsanctioned part of Rifaat’s attitude towards modernization. In the West, the SSNP is typically viewed as a far-right party.  While regarded as militaristic and violent, the SSNP, like the Baath formed later on, had an avant-garde character that influenced many other secular-nationalist movements in the Levant. It influenced the Arab Liberation Movement (ALM) during the Shishakli period. The ALM had a socially inclusive approach towards women but was later disbanded after Shishakli’s fall from power. Furthermore, unlike communism, which never really took off in the Arab World, the SSNP was thought to be an indigenous party.

In the Syrian Civil War, the scope of women fighting against the so-called Islamic State (Da’esh) has been well documented. The YPG-SDF gained widespread praise for leading the fight against Da’esh. However, they have been unable to shake the allegations they are tied to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which also has a dominant female presence. Outside of the region, the ideology of the PKK has also been compared to Peru’s Shining Path or Colombian FARC, both which used women fighters. At one point during Nepal’s Civil War (1996-2006), the Maoist insurgency’s ranks were thought to be half female fighters. In the Sri Lankan conflict (1983-2009), the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) gained notoriety for their widespread use of female suicide bombers, with missions based not on the promise of an after-life, but for duty or service to the community or the nation. Dr. Robert Pape noted in his book, Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It, the LTTE foster this concept through “Thatkodai” which means giving oneself. This also evokes another, similar Tamil word “Thatkollai” for killing oneself. Of course this secular concept of sacrifice for the nation is also found within both the SSNP and YPG.

How does the SSNP typically view the Kurds and the YPG-SDF? Kurdish separatism is viewed as an anathema to the SSNP’s ideology since it runs counter to the party’s goal of creating Greater Syria. The party hence regularly denounces any attempt of Kurdish regionalism, autonomy, or independence as a conspiratorial Jewish project.

However, one interesting ideological overlap that is not widely considered is the irredentist nature of both the SSNP and Kurdish nationalism. An SSNP party member even suggested privately, that individual members propose their own theories: “We should support the Kurds, because Kurdistan is Eastern and Northern Natural Syria, and it is currently occupied by the Iranians and the Turks, and also divided by Syria and Iraq. Therefor the establishment of Kurdistan is one way of uniting Syria and Iraq and taking back our stolen lands and is worth considering.”

An edited screenshot of an image posted in a Twitter feud between Kurdish supporters and an SSNP sympathizer showing both sides share irredentist dreams of lost land unredeemed due to European colonialism.

Is there any historical ideological connection or inspiration between the YPG’s official political body, the Democratic Union Party (the PYD) and Kurdish nationalism with the early SSNP and Baath Party from the 1930s-1950s? The PYD is a more recent party, founded only in September 2003, but it is especially interesting to note the shared progressive ideology or gender equality that would be considered part of the political left.

Up until 1955, the SSNP itself maintained a united front, but began to split after the Adnan al-Malki assassination. Toward the end of the 1960s both the SSNP and Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) introduced major changes to their strategic policies which coincided on many fronts. The SSNP did not change its irredentist ideology but began to emphasis the leftist and socialist features in it, which made it easier for the party to reconcile with all leftist groups, including the Communists. Inaam Raad, a leading party theoretician and leader and assumed the SSNP’s presidency and fostered a strong anti-Zionist position. In addition, Raad had leftist tendencies and aligned the SSNP closely with the Soviet Union and the socialist-oriented Lebanese National Movement which contained the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the LCP, and the PLO under Arafat during the Lebanese Civil War.

Another brief point worth mentioning is the strong emphasis by both parties on the cult of leadership personality, with each sharing a deep and enduring veneration for leaders who paid in full for the cause: the SSNP’s Antoun Saadeh (execution) and the PYD’s Abdullah Ocalan (life imprisonment).

The SSNP storm logo either defacing or juxtaposed with a hammer and sickle

Rana Khalaf, a research fellow at the Centre for Syrian Studies at the University of St. Andrews spoke at length on the history and the ideology of the PYD: “One important area you would need to consider is the era difference. The PYD, under the leadership of the Abdullah Ocalan-inspired Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) shares the ideology of the PKK, which is much older. However, the discourse of the PKK did evolve over time. One major difference (between the PYD, the SSNP and Baath) is that the PYD follows an anarchist ideology (my emphasis added) that sees the notion of the state itself as problematic, thus advocating the notion of democratic confederalism. However, the theory is different in practice in this and other aspects.

Take for instance the PYD’s discourse on gender equality. It is noted by many of the activists I have interviewed that the progressive co-presidency rule they follow – which implies a man and a women govern together is also mainly used to keep power with the PYD; this co-presidency is also often shared between a cadre (PYD trusted member who has the power) and a non-cadre . One example cited by activists is a shared presidency between an Arab tribal man (who is the non-cadre with no real power) and a Kurdish women (who is the cadre that takes orders from the PYD) in a local council where the young woman is not herself empowered by this position, rather she is used to serve as the mouthpiece of the PYD.

“Nonetheless, relative to all other governance actors across Syria today, the PYD’s theory and practice in regards to women’s participation in governance and the economy is amongst the most progressive. The PYD is one of very few armed groups that specifically focus on women’s empowerment in its discourse. In fact, it is only in PYD-held areas that a legal framework has been made and implemented supporting a 40% quota for women in its public administration and imposing women’s co- presidency in public positions. This will bear fruit in the future and is a positive mark for them. For instance, the 40% quota for women in its public administration one gender-related question mark is the PYD’s outlook on gender and Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transsexual (LGBT) rights. Quoting a feminist journalist who has posed that question to key leaders in Rojava, the main argument she said she received in response to this was that ‘there are no LGBT people in Rojava!’”

“In regards to the ideology itself and its translation…the KCK’s ideology is argued by some critics to have been written in Turkish and not accurately translated in Arabic. Also within the leadership’s secret inner circle there is rumor about two groups of followers understanding this ideology differently from each other. As the KCK remains a secret one, it will be difficult to check if this is true.”

Khalaf also touched on how the Assad regime hosted the PKK for a time to have geopolitical leverage on Turkey. “They were one of armed groups the regime supported in order to use as leverage on neighboring countries which in the case of the PKK was Turkey. Looking at its trend in treating these groups, it was not strange for the Syrian regime to keep these movements in check with some of their members questioned or detained from time to time. This ensured their power remained limited and under the control of the regime.”

“Kurdish parities in Syria have been secretly active since 1957 and never ceased to exist, thus their well-organized civil society groups. However, while most parties have been subjected to the strong oppression and surveillance of the regime, the PKK was monitored as well and some of its members followed and detained at times – was politically tolerated and even supported militarily. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Syrian regime hosted and supported the training of PKK members in training camps, even outside Syria in neighboring countries. However, as the relationship between the regime and Turkey was warming up in the late 1990s, a deal between the two has meant that the regime had to send Ocalan, the movement’s leader, into exile in 1998. Albeit not directly sent or handed to Turkey by the regime, Ocalan ended detained in Turkey to date. Additionally, many members of the PKK in Syria were actually detained and tortured by the regime. Thus, it is inaccurate to say they have had the regimes unquestioned support or that it was a smooth relationship, however, the regime did tolerate the PKK and support them when it strongly oppressed others.”

She also discussed the possibility of a political reconciliation or accommodation between the PYD and Baathist regime after the conflict, “This all depends on how the conflict ends, what political settlement is reached and how much power each actor has. Currently, both the regime and the PKK need and are dependent on each other. There is evidence of some tension and lacking trust between the two and also of strong cooperation between them. A ‘precarious co-existence’ is how I describe their relationship at the moment. What the future holds for their relationship is up to actors and factors beyond them both. Hypothetically speaking, if it was up to the regime alone, I cannot see much evidence of any true intention of sharing power, let alone with the PYD which it is unlikely to politically tolerate in its current shape and power beyond the conflict situation. If less powerful and/or in another form, there is a possibility – again depending on how the conflict ends. Evidently, the PYD/PKK has sown the seeds for its participation in governance in some form, at some stage, in this region in the future.”

In regards to the history of women fighting with the SSNP, perhaps the most infamous case was Sana’a Mehaidli (“Bride of the South”), who left a deep impression on a generation of Lebanese youth. See The Girl in the Red Beret written in 2009 by Lina Mounzer. However, there were many other examples of female SSNP militants taking part in either suicide missions or participating as regular militia fighters. Interestingly, the party’s Eagles of the Whirlwind militia in the Syrian conflict does not appear to be fielding women fighters in combat roles, nor carrying out suicide attacks against the YPG, Syrian rebel factions, Da’esh, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), or the any of the other jihadists groups. This could be due to the limited size of Assad’s forces or the fact they are operating in the capacity as a government-sponsored support force, instead of insurgency targeting Israeli Defense Forces (such as in Lebanon in the 1980s).

However, it is curious why the Syrian regime forces have not featured women fighters prominently in their propaganda videos depicting front line combat scenes in the conflict’s major battles. Despite how much praise and attention the YPJ has won, the Assad typically regulates women to the roles off the battlefields – reporters, humanitarian aid, spokespersons, entertainment, moral boosters, etc. Though the regime is eager to illustrate it is the only version of Syria that is capable of maintaining an open, liberal environment for women, it still retains a rather traditional approach to women in its combat forces, whereas the YPG-SDF have won hearts and minds by putting women on near-equal status in the fight against Da’esh. Essentially, the regime sees itself as a paternal protector to keep women safe from the country’s jihadist elements. Regime military women, when in uniform and armed, are primarily stationed in primarily defensive or support roles.

(Above) Women in uniforms with the SSNP Eagles of the Whirlwind insignia on the right arm, with the party’s storm logo on the left arm. A military source, Roland Bartetzko, said they appeared to be wearing a British “desert kit” style uniform but the camo pattern are not an exact match, but rather likely a “fantasy” copy ordered online. The trousers are a U.S. style in cut and the design of the pockets. Especially interesting to note is there are no other SSNP fighters seen in online images/video wearing this type of uniform, therefore, this image appears to be for promotional use. In addition, there are no pictures or video footage of female SSNP militants actively fighting in the Syrian Civil War.

One SSNP youth in Damascus explained, “Syria is different than Lebanon unfortunately, in Lebanon the SSNP is more Orthodox, women members would fight alongside men (in the Lebanese Civil War), would commit suicide bombings…etc…in Syria, thanks to Baath Party’s incomplete (read inefficient) secularism, Syrians are unfamiliar with females fighting.” On the other hand, the women of the YPG have been far more active, even fighting to the death. One incident during Turkey’s Afrin offensive was erroneously described by the New York Times as a suicide bombing. A Kurdish activist relayed this was likely more a “last stand” type moment against the Turks, rather than a suicide operation planned in advanced.

One female SSNP member, Zenab Khierbeck, hailed the YPJ woman who committed suicide in 2014 on the battle field rather than risk capture by Da’esh. She tweeted: #Syria… A Kurdish fighter heroine named Jilan shot herself so she would not fall into the hands of the #Da’esh criminals.

Female members of the Gozarto Protection Force are one other example of a pro-regime militia fielding women.

A female SSNP member named Jianna Khadher Eid was killed while enrolled in the National Defense Forces in October 2017. Note the SSNP party’s storm logo on the memorial.

Screenshot of SSNP women marching before Assaad Hardan in a 2010 parade in Dhour el Choueir, Lebanon

Syrian women campaigning for their right to vote in the early 1950s

Lebanon and Syria have always stood out compared to the rest of the region, this comes in the shifting attitudes towards gender in the region. Inas Mohammed Khair al-Mallouhi (pictured above) is a deputy in the Syrian parliament representing the Tartus Governorate. According to an SSNP member affiliated with Ali Haidar’s Intifada faction, she is part of the SSNP’s Markaz (Center) faction, which is the party’s largest faction under Hanna Al-Nashif and Assaad Hardan, headquartered in Beirut. She is described by her party comrades as “an outspoken woman,” and commended for having made a few “controversial but brave” statements in her political career:

1. Russia does not have the right to write a constitution for Syria.
2. The government is not paying enough salaries.
3. The Syrian parliament is full of people who don’t do their job.
4. She proposed that the Syriac language be studied in schools instead of French, because “the French language is useless.”

A young SSNP member in Damascus said “the Syrian people are used to ‘silent MPs,’ so this is a huge change in what people are used to and they like it.” He also added MP Mallouhi is not with the Markaz faction but with the Joseph Sweid and Issam al-Mahayri branch because “the suggestion to teach Syriac sounds likes their faction, as they are more anti-Arabist than the Markaz faction.” Syriac is still used by some Syrian Christian sects for liturgy. In Ali Haidar’s Intifada faction, there are two women in the supreme council (the highest legislative body of the party) and three women on the executive board (the highest executive body of the party).

Tartus MP Inas Mohammed Khair al-Mallouhi pictured in the middle with other SSNP figures. They will debate Syrian Minister of Awqaf (Religious Endowments) Dr. Mohammad Abdul-Sattar al-Sayyed in parliament on the issue of civil marriage, an objective which the party is “pushing hard.”

The SSNP’s Facebook page hailing a recent workshop title, “Strengthening the role of Syrian women” organized by the Syrian Cultural Foundation held at the Pullman Hotel in Al Shahba, Aleppo. The post noted “150 women from various political, social, cultural, economic and media activities attended the workshop.”

“O’ Virgin Mary protect the leader and the Eagles in Saidnaya.”

Although staunchly secular, individual SSNP members will occasionally post Christian-themed images on its social media accounts. This is one example which pays homage to Mary and calling on her to protect the party’s militia. Of course, this is the work of partisans acting as an individuals and not officially sanctioned party material.

“My mother and my country are the ones who started my life and they forever be in it. O’ God help me to be good to them.” – Saadeh, Happy Mothers’ Day

Arwa Abu Ezzeddine, in an October 2015 interview with the pro-Assad Janoubia (South) news outlet, said she joined the party in 1986 and has been active in the central leadership since 2004. She said, “Women have played an active role since the founding of the party. Since entering the cage with the eagles there is no distinction between men and women. Antoun Saadeh played the role as a human example in society, so women can radiate within the party,” she said. There have been a number of women who played a prominent role since the early years of the party’s founding, most notably Afifa Haddad and other influential members in Beirut, such as Fayza Maalouf Antiba and Amina Najla Matouk.

In the case of SSNP comrade Afifa Haddad, the sister of Fouad Haddad (one of the SSNP’s original founding members), she played a role when the party was still underground. The Haddads owned a restaurant opposite the American University in Beirut, which was a meeting place for the teachers and students affiliated with the party.  Afifa acted as a look out during the meetings. When Saadeh was first arrested by the French in November 1935, Afifa brought him food (the food was from Haddad’s restaurant). Consequently, she was able to relay messages from Saadeh to his SSNP comrades on the outside. Afifa is considered the first woman in the party.

Female political participation, however, remains precarious in Lebanon. The SSNP, along with others, including Hezbollah, the PSP, LCP, Kataeb Party, and the Future Movement, were the subject of a report in 2014 by the Lebanese Women Democratic Gathering (RDFL). According to Al-Akhbar English, “The study shows that one or two women are represented in each party’s leadership body. None of the parties that were studied adopted a quota for women in their internal organization, 33 percent absolutely rejected a women’s quota, 50 percent appointed women in some leadership positions and 16.6 percent nominated women for parliamentary elections.” One case was the SSNP member and Lebanese reporter Ghadi Francis, who a few years ago called for an “SSNP Spring” within the party. She noted the movement’s inability to reform and lamented the stagnant nature of the party. Francis was then attacked allegedly by Asaad Hardan’s bodyguard.

An unidentified SSNP woman speaks at a party event in Syria.

One should note that the focus solely on armed women for what lays ahead for Syria is not an accurate indicator for female empowerment. The history of Juliette’s political status and veneration offers only a fleeting glimpse of an early social and political ideology that has, like many other 20^th century egalitarian movements of its time, has fallen short of its intended goals. Also, women empowerment means structural changes to the laws, processes, representation – i.e. the unequal power structures. The example of one woman leader, as often throughout history, is an exception not the norm.

Khalaf offered some concluding thoughts on the gender dynamics of the YPJ: “Women fighters in the Syrian conflict are primarily perceived in an orientalist manner by Western media. Both the SSNP and YPG/J are not fighting for the full pursuit of women’s rights. They are fighting for an ideology – be it nationalist or not – the institutional patriarchy of which they will be crushed under. True, the PYD is supporting women in its discourse, laws and some practices far better than other (especially Islamist) armed actors and this is very positive; yet institutionally, true women emancipation is lagging far behind. For instance, if one wants to narrow the focus just to the institutions ruling women fighters – is the YPJ command equal to the YPG? Why do women fighters in the YPJ (unlike the men in the YPG) have to leave its ranks if married? Who made rule – a man? What about women’s freedom to choose? Critically, we do not need to over romanticize women fighters or generalize individual cases of women who made it to the top against all odds. Truly assessing the feminist struggle in the region means looking at how women are challenging the patriarchal power structures ruling them.”

Outside of the conflict, Syrian women struggle for inclusion at the highest levels of international diplomacy as well. According to one source, the regime strongly fought against the inclusion of Syrian women in the advisory board for the United Nations special envoy for the Syria Staffan de Mistura’s office. It denied them (like the opposition) a seat at the negotiation table. The conservative members of the opposition, in their Islamist discourse, saw women’s voice as Awra (a source of shame); as for the regime, it claimed they were with the opposition. The women then tried to add prestigious women from the regime’s side to the board (one from a government ministry and a TV presenter). Now the regime prohibits these women from leaving Syria.

Meanwhile, in Syria, the regime forces and the YPG will continue to square off as they both seek to ward off the Turks and the remaining Syrian rebels. The lasting legacy of women fighting amongst the YPG is still undetermined. As seen with Eastern Ghouta, Idlib Province is likely to eventually fall to the regime, the YPG-SDF and the pro-regime forces could become the last two standing. Though the U.S. Administration has recently indicated it may soon pull out from Syria, this is unlikely since the wider geopolitical nature of the conflict still remains unresolved. A renewed effort by the U.S. to accommodate Turkey with the removal of Kurdish militia from the town of Manbij may also open new possibilities between the YPG and the regime. Simultaneous threats and negotiations will further this trend.

The red star looks likely to stay over eastern Syria. Some on the regime side talking about a guerilla war to recover the territory occupied by the YPG and Americans (the SSNP could be one regime faction well-positioned for this task) and the war could yet drag on for years. Still, the striking similarities between the SSNP and the YPG both demonstrate a rarity in the Middle East: they are two organizations with an intense dedication to ideological purity in an era of, as one Syria analyst put it, “ideological bankruptcy.” They both retain their own unique irredentist visions and own brands of romantic nationalism and have created a niche for women in their political hierarchies and fighting forces. As Syria’s women are still subject to extreme violence and vulnerability, the role of women within the future of these two political movements will merit further study.

Christopher Solomon is a Middle East Analyst and works for a U.S. defense consultancy in the DC area. In addition to Syria Comment, his writing has appeared on NATO’s Atlantic Voices, Raddington Report, Global Risk Insights, and the Small Wars Journal. He earned his MA from the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) at the University of Pittsburgh. He also interned at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. Follow him on Twitter @Solomon_Chris

It Would Have Been Preferable Not to Militarily Intervene in Syria; It Has Turned Out to Be a Disaster
By Ambassador Dr. Nikolaos van Dam @nikolaosvandam 
Interviewed by Mohsen Abdelmoumen
Originally published June 03, 2018 on American Herald Tribune

U.S. Involves itself Ever Deeper in Middle East with No Clear Strategic Interest
By Sam Farah
For Syria Comment – June 6, 2018

On May 8, President Trump announced that he was pulling the U.S. out of the Iran deal. On May 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced his 12 points demanding total capitulation of Iran to the U.S. government. In doing so, he effectively putting the U.S. on a war path with Iran.

This deepening engagement of the U.S. in the Middle East defies logic. It is contrary to the geopolitical interests of the U.S.

The main argument for America’s engagement in the Middle East is oil and trade. For starters, the U.S. no longer relies on imported oil. In 2017, the net import of petroleum was 19% of total U.S. oil consumption, the lowest since 1967.

And of that dwindling imported oil portion that the U.S. relies on for energy security, the share of imports from OPEC and Persian Gulf countries has declined. Today, Canada is the largest source of U.S. petroleum imports, representing 40% of its total.

Second, the Middle East is not an important market for U.S. exports. In 2016, according to the World Bank, total U.S. exports amounted to almost $1.6 trillion, of which our two closest allies in the region — Saudi Arabia and Israel — took roughly 1% each, even when the value of all American weapons sold in the region is included.

Today the U.S. top export markets are Canada, Mexico, China, Japan, and E.U. countries. In addition, the two most important maritime trade routes are the English Channel and the Strait of Malacca. The Channel has traffic on both the UK-Europe and North Sea-Atlantic routes, and is the world’s busiest seaway, accommodating over 500 ships per day. The Strait of Malacca runs between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and according to estimates from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) Review of Maritime Transport 2011, almost half of the world’s total annual seaborne trade tonnage passed through the Strait of Malacca.

There are two other arguments for U.S. involvement in the Middle East, one altruistic and the other Machiavellian. While American reliance on Middle Eastern oil has diminished, the Middle East remains an important producer of the world’s oil. Of the 87 million barrels of oil produced per day globally in 2011, approximately 20% passed through the Strait of Hormuz.

Some argue that the U.S. plays a crucial and altruistic role in protecting the free flow of oil from the Middle East and through the strait of Hormuz. Only the U.S. can prevent a global oil shock that could rock the global economy. But that American goodwill comes at a real price tag for the American taxpayer. Roger J. Stern of Princeton University estimates that the U.S. has spent $8 trillion between 1976 and 2010 protecting the oil flow from the Persian Gulf. The worry is that Iran, or another bad actor, could shut down the oil traffic in the Middle East and bring the world to its knees. This argument, however, belies the fact that oil is the lifeline of the Iranian economy and shutting down oil production or flow from the Middle East would also suffocate its own economy, and that any such action will bring together a global coalition to roll back Iran and reopen the flow of oil.

Others argue that U.S. military hegemony over the Persian Gulf is much more Machiavellian. They point out that the U.S. has not simply protected the free flow of the oil trade, but has also used its power to sanction oil production in countries whose policies it opposes, such as Iran, Sudan, Syria, and Libya. In line with this argument that U.S. hegemony over the Persian Gulf is pursued not merely to protect friends but also to punish enemies, the U.S. is ultimately seeking leverage over China by preserving its control over the Persian Gulf. But the U.S. already has significant forward power projection in the region, with both the Navy’s 5^th Fleet headquartered in Bahrain and the U.S. Air Force at the Al Udeid air base in Qatar. The security of both these bases is jeopardized and the cost of maintaining our presence there is increased by provoking Iran as Trump and Pompeo are doing. Moreover, Roger Stern, in a piece published by TIME magazine, argues that the current U.S. military emphasis on the Persian Gulf has diverted precious defense resources away from the western Pacific, where China poses a far graver, long-term threat to American interests.

Today, any further U.S. military involvement in the Middle East is counterproductive to America’s interest. Ironically, President Trump ran his presidential campaign in part by building on Americans’ frustration with what they view as a foreign policy failure in the Middle East, promising to pull the U.S. out of the region. Instead America is deepening its involvement in the Syrian war, ramping up confrontation with Iran, and provoking the Muslim world by steamrolling the Palestinians. What the U.S. should instead do is work with its traditional global partners, as well as China and Russia, to build a framework for peace and stability in the Middle East. It should share the cost of protecting the Persian Gulf pipeline with countries that most benefit from it — namely Japan, China, India and South Korea.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

How should Iran’s intentions in Syria be understood? The question is all the more relevant in light of the recent exchange of missile fire on the border between the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and Syria. Writing in The Intercept back in March 2018, Robert Wright argued that DC think-tanks “warp our vision” and prevent us from applying “cognitive empathy” when it comes to Iranian intentions in Syria in particular. By “cognitive empathy,” Wright means understanding how a particular side thinks about a situation and why it acts in certain ways in that situation. Through this lens, Wright argues that Iran’s intentions in Syria should primarily be understood as embodying objectives of defence and deterrence: intervening to save a key ally (the Syrian government) and deterring the threat of attacks by the U.S. and Israel against Iran.

There is some truth to Wright’s framing of Iranian intentions, and “cognitive empathy” is no doubt an important thing to remember in analysis. However, I believe his piece assumes too much of a false dichotomy: either Iran’s intentions are primarily defensive or offensive/expansionist in nature. In reality, it can be simultaneously true that Iran has a policy of “forward defence” in Syria (as Vali Nasr puts it) and wishes to increase its influence in Syria and the wider region in comparison with the pre-2011 status-quo for a variety of reasons that are not merely matters of defence and deterrence. Here, I will explore in more detail some key controversies regarding Iran’s presence in Syria and how they relate to questions of Iranian intentions in the country.

The Land Route: The concept of a land route running from Iran to the Mediterranean has repeatedly come up in reference to the military campaigns launched against the Islamic State in the east of Syria. It has been argued that Iran considers it vital to secure a contiguous land route as an alternative to its use of air routes to supply its clients inside Syria and Lebanon (airlift to Syria and then a very short land route to Lebanon), partly because the land route running from Iran to the Mediterranean would supposedly make it easier to conceal weapon supplies and thus prevent weapon transfers from being hit by Israeli strikes. In one reading, this land route would be a “prize of such enormity that even the great Persian empires have scarcely dreamt of it.”

Unsurprisingly, the campaigns launched against the Islamic State in eastern Syria last year involved a competition for grabbing territory in Deir az-Zor province, with the Syrian Democratic Forces and the United States on one side and the Syrian government and its Iranian and Russian allies on the other.

I would caution against viewing a land route for Iran as the main motivation for the offensive on the part of the Syrian government and its allies. The Syrian government had its own very compelling reasons to go on the offensive: seeking to reclaim oil and gas resources and re-open a land trade route with Iraq in a bid to boost its economy and reduce dependence on aid from its allies. Further, the air routes Iran utilises are well-established and reliable. After all, there is no U.S.-imposed no-fly zone over all of Iraq and Syria. Technically speaking, a land route for Iran did exist for a brief window in the first months of 2012 following the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, though it was not used.

However, it does not follow from these points that the Iranians do not have any interest in a land route. Indeed, Iranian-client forces- such as the Iraqi groups Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’, Harakat al-Nujaba’ and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali, as well as the Afghan Shi’i Fatemiyoun- maintain a heavy presence in the Albukamal area in eastern Deir az-Zor province on the border with Iraq. There have also been deployments to Albukamal on assignments for units of the Iranian-backed Local Defence Forces, which is on the registers of the Syrian armed forces, has both Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps [IRGC] commanders and Syrian army officers in its leadership structure and has integrated many of the familiar Syrian Hezbollah groups into its ranks. Liwa al-Baqir, one of the most prominent Local Defence Forces group, has established a more lasting presence in the border areas and Deir az-Zor province . According to the former leader of Liwa al-Imam Zain al-Abidin, who is currently in Deir az-Zor and regularly goes to the Albukamal area, “The Revolutionary Guard [IRGC] is responsible for it [security in Albukamal].”

Members of Liwa al-Mukhtar al-Thiqfi (Idlib Local Defence Forces affiliate) with Afghan fighters in al-Mayadeen, eastern Deir az-Zor province.

These data points do not mean that there is no role for the Syrian army in security in the border areas. For example, Syrian army general Hassan Muhammad is both chief of staff of the Syrian army’s Third Legion (III Corps) and head of the Syrian government’s security committee in Albukamal. Part of his role entails security inspections along the border. Yet the concentration of Iranian forces and their clients in the area is highly unlikely to be a coincidence and points to an interest in a land route.

Rather than conjuring up sensationalist images of the land route as an imperial prize rivalling the conquests of Persian empires, one should instead think of it as a long-term project and a back-up plan in case the air routes are completely blocked off, in so far as a land route has real benefits on the ground. Thus, the land route would become more relevant in the scenario of a future war between Iran and another country (e.g. Israel and/or the U.S.). The concept of the land route is also inextricably bound to the political and security scene in Iraq. As Michael Knights notes, the land route can be seen as a “political space” rather than a “physical space.” As he explains, the land route “only exists on the days it’s used, and its basis is Iraq’s case-by-case willingness to allow it.”

Demography:  One way this argument runs is that there is an Iranian-backed/directed plan to depopulate large parts of Syria (e.g. the border areas with Lebanon) and replace the displaced Sunnis with foreign Shi’i settlers and their families. The supposed intentions behind this alleged plan are to ensure that these areas do not become future epicentres of revolt, to alter the nature of Syria’s demographic makeup (i.e. rendering it far more Shi’i and ideologically aligned with Iran) and to create a stable land-route running from Iran to the Mediterranean and populated with Shi’a loyal to Iran.

Little evidence has emerged to support claims of an Iranian plan along these lines. Demographic engineering on such a scale would be a very difficult task to accomplish. There is also little prospect for Iran to transform Syria into an Islamic republic. Meanwhile, displacements in many places are explained more readily in terms of the Syrian government’s own thinking (e.g. the Alawite-Sunni sectarian dynamic in Homs city and the desire for insurgent elements and their supporters in proximity to the capital to be removed).

Nonetheless, in a few areas- most notably the “Triangle of Death” area at the intersection of Damascus countryside, Quneitra and Deraa governorates- bases for Iranian client forces (clearly intended for long-term military purposes) have been established at the expense of displaced locals. For instance, the village of Deir Maker in that area is virtually devoid of all of its original inhabitants as it has become a base for Hezbollah, according to a rebel originally from Deir Maker who fought in Beit Jann, as well as sources in the nearby town of Kanaker to the northeast, which agreed to a “reconciliation” at the end of 2016.

Deir Maker and the wider area.

The outlet al-Modon touched on this matter in a report in May 2017, claiming that Hezbollah’s official in the “Triangle of Death” area- al-Hajj Abu Abdullah- had given orders to allow for Syrian Hezbollah fighters to bring their families to the area and settle there. The outlet claimed that more than 70 families of Syrian Hezbollah fighters had arrived to settle in the localities of Deir Maker and Sultana. The outlet added that the families of these Syrian Hezbollah fighters had come from al-Fu’a and Kafariya (the two besieged Shi’i villages in Idlib province) and the al-Wafideen camp (Sunni Palestinian-Syrian refugee camp northeast of Douma). The report says that in contrast, the displaced original inhabitants of the “Triangle of Death” area had tried petitioning the Syrian military intelligence branch in Sa’sa’ to return to their villages but without success.

Another issue that relates to Iranian intentions in Syria and partly touches on demography is the matter of encouraging conversions to Shi’i Islam. Iran, after all, is a state that engages in proselytism for Shi’i Islam, so it is logical to expect that Iran would exploit opportunities to promote the faith. Indeed, Iranian proselytism was already active on the ground in Syria before the civil war, despite downplaying of the phenomenon by some foreign observers back then. In some places of course, such as the primarily Druze province of al-Suwayda’, proselytising proves too controversial to make any meaningful headway, and there are non-Shi’a who join Syrian Hezbollah groups with no intention of converting to Shi’i Islam.

Arguably, the most prominent armed group linked to the phenomenon of conversion to Shi’i Islam is Liwa al-Baqir, which plays on the link between Bekara tribesmen and the fifth Shi’i imam Muhammad al-Baqir. Conversions of some Bekara tribesmen had already been occurring before the war in Aleppo province in particular, but Liwa al-Baqir’s ascendancy is undoubtedly continuing that trend and encouraging conversions beyond the group’s original recruitment base.

Proselytising efforts for Shi’i Islam in Syria have created some controversy. From a post in late February 2018 by a pro-government page for al-Zahara’ neighbourhood in Aleppo city: “By decree of the Awqaf ministry and his eminence Sheikh Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun the mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic! Our correspondent has affirmed that people from the Iranian-Iraqi Ahfad al-Hussein commission are giving lessons in creed in a number of mosques of Aleppo urging children to become Shi’a and encouraging them with rewards and gifts.”

More broadly, the former leader of Liwa al-Imam Zain al-Abidin characterises one Iranian aim in eastern Syria as “Shi’ifying the Deir az-Zor region in its entirety.” As he explained to me:

“I am not against any sect or madhhab, but Deir az-Zor has Shi’i customs in it of course by instinct and habit, and a large proportion of the youth who joined the fighting fronts have become convinced to become Shi’a of course out of love for our Sayyid al-Hussein and Imam Ali, and there has been good faith on the part of the Revolutionary Guard [IRGC] and Hezbollah in treatment and granting rights. This thing has had a great impact on the generation of youth in the city [of Deir az-Zor].”

Striving for conversions to Shi’i Islam among parts of the native population seems much more realistic as a goal than settling large numbers of foreign Shi’a in Syria. Incidentally, from Deir az-Zor there have been claims of Afghan Shi’a settling in houses in Albukamal. On these claims, the former leader of Liwa al-Imam Zain al-Abidin explains that “this thing [Afghans occupying homes in Albukamal] is temporary as the area is almost devoid of people. As for the people who return, their houses are evacuated and handed over to them.”

Golan Front Against Israel: This concept has repeatedly come up in reference to the proximity of Iranian forces and their clients to the border with the Golan Heights and their presence in southern Syria more generally. The matter came up in an al-Mayadeen interview with Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah at the beginning of this year:

“Q: Sayyid, there is the front of the south of Syria and many have spoken about it and it is a source of great concern with the Israelis: that Hezbollah and Iran, with the aid and support of the Syrian army that has also fought for seven years, are preparing a resistance on the borders from the Golan to the southern borders in their entirety. Is it true that there is a new resistance on the Syrian-Palestinian borders against Israel?

A: This is also among the matters about which it is better to be silent on in the end.

Q: This is a silent interview, Sayyid.

A: You are the one going to difficult questions. The enemy has the right to be worried, because what has happened in the south of Syria in the end is experience that has been made available now among the Syrian people and the Syrian army as a regular army. You know that those who fight in Syria are not only the army: those they call the auxiliary forces in the Syrian media. There are popular Syrian formations: youth from the sons of different villages, towns and regions, they have fought in their provinces. There is great advanced experience that these youth have obtained especially on the southern front because the fighting in the southern front has sometimes taken the classical form and sometimes the form of guerrilla warfare from the two sides. Practically this has given rise to a manpower structure on the level of thought, experience and preparedness that can be brought together perhaps during 24 hours. It is not conditional on the existence or lack of existence of a real formation. Our very presence in southern Syria, whose circumstances have been connected with the nature of the current battle in Syria: the fact we are present, it is natural that the Israelis should be worried, because there is conflict between us and the Israelis. Thus we see the Israelis are worried about all that is happening in the south of Syria. And they are working, applying pressure and trying to benefit from American pressure and speaking with Russia. And they are trying to threaten that there should be no resistance or resisting presence in southern Syria, but they have not realised this until now.

Q: I understand from your words Sayyid that resistance cells prepared for any future war with Israel have arisen there?

A: The resistance is present in southern Syria, and in all circumstances, regardless of the defensive title, this is very natural because it is Syria’s right that this should be present for it in the event of aggression against it one day and it has the right if one day it takes the decision to resort to the popular resistance in liberating the Golan. And if you remember in the last years before the beginning of the events in Syria, President Bashar al-Assad referred to this matter and also stated that it is possible for us one day to arrive at this choice. It is a logical and natural choice, and Israel deeply fears it.

Q: President al-Assad was speaking about a popular Syrian resistance. Now, according to what I understand from you sir, there is a popular Syrian and non-Syrian resistance present in the southern front?

A: Yes.”

Is the intent here to build up a “resistance” front and start a “liberation” war against Israel, or is it really just about deterring Israel from attacking as “no side wants war”? The answer lies somewhere in between. There is probably no wish for an all-out war on any side, but the constant rhetoric of “resistance” and fighting Israel demands some form of realisation on the ground in order to maintain credibility: that is, building up a “resistance” front in proximity to the border areas with a view to harassing Israeli forces through occasional small-scale probing.

In conclusion, there are grounds for understanding some of Iran’s policies in Syria in terms of pragmatism and rational interests, but there is also a clear element of ideology behind some of its actions, and those actions cannot be understood only in terms of defence and deterrence. Otherwise, one risks becoming an apologist for Iranian policies that are problematic in many ways, such as the aggravation of wider sectarian tensions in the region.

The Last Thing the Middle East Needs Now Is Another War 
By Robert Rabil – @robertgrabil
For Syria Comment – April 27, 2018

The growing vocal call to punish the Syrian regime for its flagrant violation of human rights, including its recent alleged use of chemical weapons against its own people, has become the peg on which to hang the coordinated efforts to cast the regime as a threat to the national security interest of United States. This call is clearly not about punishing the regime, as it deserves. It is about decapitating the regime and building up public opinion to support such a dangerous undertaking. Contrary to the desires of some U.S. media and governmental personnel, the recent U.S.-led strike against the regime’s chemical plants was balanced and morally justified. However, the critical stance of U.S. President Donald Trump on the Iran deal and the growing possibility he may cancel it could become the trigger to a military confrontation between the U.S. and Iran and the Syrian regime. The problem is that this probable confrontation will most likely involve Russia and Israel. Few arguments have underscored this threatening Iran-Syria linkage as meticulously as Bret Stephen’s argument penned on the pages of the New York Times under the title “Staring Down Syria.”

Stephen regurgitates the argument aired by some among the left, the right, and the neoconservatives that the Syrian regime is a terrible one that has engaged in some of the most egregious forms of oppression and suppression against its own people, including the use of chemical weapons, and thus it must be punished. Significantly, he unequivocally asserts that a punishment in the form of a limited missile strike will be ineffective and that the “U.S. should target Assad and his senior lieutenants directly in a decapitation strike, just as the U.S. attempted in Iraq in 2003, and against Osama bin Laden in 2011.” He then emphasizes that “if we [Americans] are serious about confronting Iran, Syria remains the most important battlefield.”

It is mind boggling that someone as astute as Stephen would call for the decapitation of the regime in the same way that the U.S. had done in Iraq without providing an alternative to the regime. No less significant, does “our” seriousness about confronting Iran require decapitating the Syrian regime? Is the eradication of the Syrian regime a prerequisite for confronting Iran? This is a dangerous and flawed logic divorced from the harsh reality of the Levant. How could anyone invoke what the U.S. attempted in Iraq without admitting and internalizing the staggering human and financial cost the U.S. has paid? Has the notion of what may happen the day after the decapitation strike and confrontation with Iran crossed Stephen’s mind, or the minds of those echoing him?

Undoubtedly, this course would impel Syria to further descend into anarchy and chaos, leading to significant regional and international strife. A decapitating strike against the Syrian regime and/or an open confrontation with Iran in Syria would most likely put Moscow and Washington on a path of armed conflict. Russia made its position clear that it will respond to any game-changing attack on Syria. Second, it is no exaggeration to argue that Levantine and foreign Shi’i and Sunni jihadis will abound, focusing on the death of American troops even more than demonstrating their hatred for each other. In this respect, it is noteworthy that although the U.S. has defeated the Islamic State in the Levant, the U.S. has not even come close to vanquishing sister Salafi-jihadi organizations roaming through parts of Syria. Jaish al-Islam, Ahrar al-Sham, and al-Qaeda affiliated al-Nusra (under its fresh name Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), to name only few, command thousands of jihadi fighters. Significantly, al-Qaeda in Syria or al-Nusra has replenished its ranks from other Salafi-jihadi organizations, including the Islamic State, and has entrenched its power in Idlib province. This development, by itself alone, constitutes a clear and present danger to the U.S., given al-Qaeda’s strategy to target the American homeland and interests. No less significant, the pro-Iranian Iraqi Mobilization Units, which are part of the Iraqi government, have reportedly cordoned off military bases in Iraq in which American troops and weaponry are stationed.  They have called on American leadership not to use American jets or planes in any attack against the Syrian regime. Regional countries, split along the Iran-Saudi fault line, will most likely continue stoking the fire of civil war by supporting their proxies. The removal of the Syrian regime by foce would quite possibly lead to the spillover of sectarian strife into Syria’s neighboring countries, where millions of Syrian refugees would find themselves at the mercy of sanguinarily resentful host populations and armed groups.

Most importantly, is it in the national interest of Washington to risk a war over Syria, and by extension Iran, with Moscow after what United States has gone through in Iraq and Afghanistan with little to show for the enormous sacrifices Americans have made?

No doubt, Iran has played a spoiler role in the region and has projected its power at the expense of Arab Sunni state. Pointedly, Iran has been trying to entrench its military presence in Syria, including in the vicinity of the Golan Heights, thereby posing a serious security risk to Israel. Israel has tried to prevent Iran and its proxies, especially Hezbollah, from enhancing their military presence in Syria. It has consistently raided Syrian, Iranian and Hezbollah army bases and units that could have potentially produced game-changing security dynamics. These raids, with the exception of Israel’s air strike against the Syrian army T4 base on April 9, 2018, have been carried out with the advance knowledge of Russia, with which Israel maintained a hotline to avoid any clash between the two countries. The Syrian T4 military base near Homs hosted, in addition to Russian and Syrian troops, an Iranian drone facility out of which an armed Iranian drone was sent to Israel on February 10. Israel shot down the advanced Iranian drone early on February 10 and subsequently carried out the attack on the T4 base in which seven Iranian were killed, including a colonel. The raid on the base put in sharp relief the conflicted Israel-Iran relationship, but it also underscored the deterioration of Israel-Russian relations. Israel, for the first time, did not give an advance notice of the strike to Russia, and Russia immediately sent a delegation to Iran to draw out a plan as how to respond to both potential wide ranging Israeli and American strikes. This did not happen in a vacuum.

Crucially, Israel-Russia relations have recently become tense, potentially affecting the national security interest of both countries. Israel has not been happy with Russia’s unwillingness to keep Iranian forces far from the Golan Heights, and Russia has not been happy with Israel’s maneuvering with the U.S. to deprive Moscow a political victory in Syria and bleed Iran there.

The defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria has ushered in a new set of dynamics in which Iran, Hezbollah and Iraqi Mobilization Units have strengthened their presence in Syria and have been trying to build up their power in Lebanon. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized that “Iran had taken over Lebanon…When Israelis and the Arabs agree on one thing, people should pay attention. We should stop this Iranian takeover.”

In his policy recommendations for Israel for 2016-2020, former Military Intelligence Chief Amos Yadlin wrote “Israel must prepare itself for a full scale military conflict with Hezbollah.” Conversely, some Israeli analysts have argued that Israel’s shared concerns and growing intelligence cooperation with Saudi Arabia is pushing Jerusalem to the precipice of war. Clearly, the unfolding developments in Syria have made the geostrategic and military dynamics between Israel and Iran more complex and fraught with danger and uncertainty. Israel feels the urgency of addressing Iran’s growing strategic threat today before becoming a harsh and difficult reality.

Conversely, one has to wonder how Iran, representing Shi’a who make up some 15% of the Islamic World, has been able to project its power in a Sunni majority Arab Middle East?  How has Iran become an active player in Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria? A combination of factors has advantaged Iranian involvement in these countries. One undeniable factor has been the unruliness of Arab politics. The Yemeni Zaydis, who are dogmatically closer to Sunni Islam than to Twelver Shi’a Islam, began their rebellion in the 1990s when the central authorities, supported by Saudi Arabia, sought to dispossess the Zaydis of their historic autonomy in Sa’dah. At the same time, Saudi Wahhabi scholars worked to convert the Zaydis to Sunni Wahhabism. At this point, a Houthi scholar sought the help of Iran and subsequently created the Houthi movement. Though most of the Shi’a of Iraq served loyally in the ranks of Iraq’s armed forces, the Shi’a bore the brunt of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s oppressive rule. Therefore, the Shi’a found in Iran a supportive neighbor. The Shi’a of Lebanon had been politically, socially and economically marginalized in the country. Lebanese from various sects attributed the pejorative term of Mutwali to the Shi’a. Notably, they bore the onus of the Arab-Israeli conflict when the PLO, supported by the Sunni leadership, transformed their villages in southern Lebanon into what came to be infamously known as Fathland. Many Shi’a suffered Jerusalem’s retaliatory military responses to the PLO terror acts in Israel carried out from Fathland. All this led to a Shi’a communal political awakening that found its expression in Ayatollah Khomeini’s religio-political mobilization. Ruling a Sunni majority country, the late Alawi president of Syria Hafiz al-Asad strove to forge intimate and strategic relationships with the Shi’a and Iran respectively. He sensed early on the strong anti-Alawi feelings among a large segment of the Sunni population, led by none other than the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to remove the newly self-installed Ba’thi regime in 1964, years before their rebellion in the early 1980s. Before even supporting a theocratic Iran against a sister Iraqi Ba’thi state during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), Asad had already secured a religious opinion from the Iranian born Lebanese Shi’a religious scholar Moussa al-Sadr to the effect that the Alawis are part of Twelver Shi’a Islam.

Ironically, Arab Sunni blunders, including the social ramifications of their authoritarian and oppressive rule, affected Israel the most as it became a rallying cry for both political mobilization and political scapegoating across the Sunni-Shi’a divide in the Middle East. As such, Tehran’s projection of power stems no less from Iran’s regional ambition to prevent Sunni dictation of power in the Middle East than from Sunni political and social blunders. Confronting Iran, therefore, could not be adequately sustained without addressing Arab Sunni socio-political flaws, which helped create incubators of jihadis.

Similarly, Russia feels that Syria is integral to Moscow’s vision of what it considers its strategic sphere of influence. Damascus was a Soviet capital satellite, which President Putin of Russia considers today as essential to project Russian power across the Eastern Mediterranean. This is reinforced by a) Russian concerns of preventing Syria from becoming a jihadi transmission belt deepening transnational Islamism and Salafi-jihadism at the expense of Russia’s moderate Islam, and by b) Russian need to use Syria as a leverage card in its strained relationship with the European Union in relation to the Crimean and Ukrainian crises. No wonder Russia has signed long term agreements with Syria to maintain virtually permanent naval and air bases in the country. The agreement, ratified in January 2018, will allow Russia to expand the Tartous naval facility, Russia’s only naval foothold in the Mediterranean, and grant Russian warships access to Syrian waters and ports. The agreement could be renewed after it elapses in 49 years. In much the same vein, the agreement has also given Russia an indefinite access to Hmeimim air base, from which Russia has launched most of its air strikes against jihadis. Certainly, Russia is in Syria to stay and will not easily buckle under pressure, whether be it political or military, should its presence in the country become threatened.

In this respect, Russia’s strategy to proceed with a political plan to cement its presence in Syria without incurring a heavy financial and military cost, reminiscent of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, has more or less been affected by the United States and Israel’s doubling down on Russian efforts, the Syrian regime and by extension Iran. Russia needs them to regulate its military involvement in Syria. But this neither means that Russia is at one with Iran leading a Shi’a axis nor one with the Syrian regime extending its oppression to the rest of non-Western Syria. Russia has often made it clear to Jordan, Egypt and Arab Gulf countries that it is not supporting an anti-Sunni Shi’a axis. At the same time, Russia cannot disassociate what’s happening in Syria from the rising tension between NATO allies and Russia, as well as from what Moscow perceives the evident shift of the U.S. government toward an anti-Russian stance.

Taking this into consideration, one can easily argue that a premeditated plan to change the politico-military configuration in Syria would entail, at a maximum, a Russian military response, and, at a minimum, further Russian political and military support to Iran and its proxies. Herein lies the real challenge for the U.S. and Israel. How to punish and/or curb the power of the Syrian regime and Iran without pushing Moscow headlong into a strategic alliance with Tehran? This challenge will undoubtedly come again to the fore as the Syrian regime attempts to clear Western Syria from opposition groups. Will the regime use chemical weapons again? The use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians has been the most convenient, yet horrifying, tool for ethnic cleansing. Saddam Hussein used it strategically and expediently against both the Iranians and the Kurds to horrify them into submission and fleeing what he considered his territories. The recent reportedly use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against civilians in Douma brought about the swift surrender of the Salafi-jihadi opposition group Jaish al-Islam.

In this instance, the recent U.S.-led campaign to strike the Syrian regime’s plants of chemical weapons has been adequate and morally justified; and can be repeated should the Syrian regime again use chemical weapons.

When all is said and done, it is the Syrians who have born the brunt of Arab political blunders, Middle Eastern oppressive rule, regional jockeying for power, and international disorder. The tragedy of Syria has long since transcended the country’s borders. Only a political resolution to the Syrian crisis is adequate. In this respect, Washington, as it debates what it is going to do with the Iran deal, can pursue the following broad guidelines to avoid becoming militarily involved in the Syrian crisis:

• Washington does not need to increase its number of troops in Syria. Washington already has leverage vis-à-vis the other actors for it controls a large swath of territories in the northeast of Syria, including an important bread basket fertile ground next to the Euphrates River and few oil wells.
• Washington, despite its growing tension with Moscow, needs to sanction Russian influence in Western Syria and maintain at all times the American-Russian deescalating mechanism.
• Washington needs to create a parallel yet integral deescalating mechanism including the U.S., Russia, and Israel.
• Washington needs to create an American-Russian commission to debate and negotiate contested points as a precursor and a complement to American involvement in the Astana talks.
• Washington should actively engage in the Astana talks, co-sponsored by Russia, Iran and Turkey to deescalate conflict in Syria and pressure the addition of Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the group.
• Washington can balance its relationship with both the Kurds and the Turks, both of whom Washington needs to defeat Salafi-jihadism in Syria. True, the battle against ISIS has been won; nevertheless the war against Salafi-jihadism is far from over. Washington can promise the Kurds a form of autonomy east of the Euphrates, and promise the Turks no support for a contiguous Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. At the same time, Washington should persuade Syrian Kurds to act separately from the Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), as is the case with the Kurdish parties in Iraq.
• Washington should create a context for a political trade-off between northwestern Syria and eastern Syria. Washington needs the cooperation of both Turkey and Russia to bring about the defeat of al-Qaeda in Syria (Al-Nusra) in northwestern Syria, sanctioning thereafter Russian influence there. In exchange, Russia would sanction some form of autonomy for the Arab tribes of eastern Syria, whose security could be enhanced by American and Jordanian support.
• Washington should work on a compromise between Russia and Israel over the security measures of the deescalation zone in southern Syria. Russian and Jordanian troops, supervised by British and American intelligence units and ground surveillance equipment (similar to that alongside the Lebanon-Syria border), can man military outposts and checkpoints to enforce the agreed-upon security measures.
• Parallel to creating an American-Israeli-Russian deescalating mechanism, Washington should encourage revitalizing Israeli-Russian relations.
• American efforts should precede and then complement UN efforts.

In sum, the Syrian crisis is a complex one. It pits domestic, regional and international actors against each other. The growing tension between the U.S. and both Russia and Iran has the ingredients of an armed conflict in the making. Nevertheless, changing the political-military configuration in Syria and curbing Russian and Iranian power is hardly possible without a strong American military presence in Syria and regional cooperation, neither of which are possible for the time being. The words of former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates ring true: “The Last Thing the Middle East Needs Now Is another War.”

Robert Rabil is a professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University. The views expressed in this article are his own. He can be followed @robertgrabil. He is the author of Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon (2003); Syria, United States and the War on Terror in the Middle East (2006); Religion, National Identity and Confessional Politics in Lebanon: The Challenge of Islamism (2011); Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Jihadism (2014); The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: The Double Tragedy of Refugees and Impacted Host Communities (2016); and most recently White Heart (2018).

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party’s (SSNP) Expansion in Syria
By Jesse McDonald – @JJMcDonald10 
For Syria Comment – April 22

What does the future hold for political groups operating in the Syrian theater?  The plethora of loyalist militias and whether they fall under the central governments authority is something to monitor.  However, there are forces also politically represented who have remained obedient without straying too far outside the regimes orbit.   One group in particular developing quite rapidly at the grassroots level is the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which the remaining of this article focuses on.

Now, there is a faction of the SSNP which initially joined the opposition, including its leader Ali Haidar, who is currently the Syrian Minister for Reconciliation (an extremely important ministry).  This split, known as the intifada bloc, never caused too much of a headache (as evidenced by Ali Haidar’s appointment).  In fact, Haidar is quoted as saying he is opposed to a complete break with the regime since that also entails a break with its popular base.  As a result, SSNP headquarters in Beirut and Haidar in Damascus seem to have reconciled, an act needed considering they are united on standing with Assad.

This paper will highlight the SSNP’s sudden influence in Syria since the war began, in part due to their relationship with both the Assad regime and Ba’ath Party.  It explores the possibility of some form of cohesive partnership between the SSNP and Ba’ath in the years ahead.  A partnership generated by the necessity to maintain and hold allies during this delicate phase.  Then, showcasing several areas in Syria where the SSNP has flourished will be presented, before ending on the party’s connections to Hezbollah and Russia.

SSNP’S STRENGTH

Ironically, one of the characteristics which hurt the SSNP in the past, namely competition with the Ba’ath, may in fact be a great asset looking to the future.  The two parties have always been close (going back to the 1940s), but it was the SSNP ultimately banned in Syria from 1955 until 2005. Previous competition stemmed mostly from similarities opposed to outright hostility based on solid discrepancies rooted in their core.  Both competed for members who often switched party lines.  For lack of a better term, these feuding cousins appear to have sued for peace during Syria’s current turbulent environment.  War can bring historical political rivals closer together when allies are desperately needed.

The Assad’s have always been closer to the Syrian nationalism side of their Arabism vision compared to one focused on a traditional Michel Aflaq –type Ba’athism.  Additionally, and more importantly, numerous Syrian political groups with initial SSNP leanings eventually merged into the Ba’ath Party.  One example being Akram al- Hawrani- a leading figure in Syrian politics and one of the SSNP’s first members.  Akram helped found the National Youth Party, becoming its leader in 1939.  Negotiations for cooperation with the SSNP failed, so Hawrani turned the National Youth Party into the Arab Socialist Party in January 1950, before merging with the Ba’ath Party in 1953. 

MORE OVERLAPP

Ghassan Jadid, a leading member of the SSNP in the 1940s and 1950s, rose to the position of defense chief for the party in 1954.  His brother Salah, first paid his allegiance to the SSNP before switching over to the Ba’ath in the 1950s.  Salah Jadid was one of the five members of the secret Military Committee catapulting the Ba’ath to power in Syria.  Hafez al-Assad was another one of these five members.

Hafez al- Assad was married to Anisa Makhlouf al-Assad, Bashar’s mother, who was an active member of the SSNP before her marriage to Hafez.  Anisa’s brother, Mohammad, was also a member and one of his sons, Rami Makhlouf, recently declared he was a party member in 2013.  Rami Makhlouf, Assad’s first-cousin, is considered the wealthiest man in Syria with vast influence over multiple sectors of Syrian society.  It goes without saying his addition would be a major boost to the SSNP’s role in the years ahead.  A declaration of support by a figure of Rami’s magnitude would have been unfathomable years ago.

BA’ATH / SSNP UNION?

As somewhat touched upon above, such a shift of allegiance is not staggering considering the two parties interests overlap in many ways.  Championing secularism, espousing anti- Zionist views, attracting minorities, and passionately defending the integrity of the Syrian nation are a few common attributes that have brought these two closer.  Melting together behind a matching vision for Syria, and considering the ease both have targeting similar support networks, enables the SSNP and Ba’ath a certain degree of flexibility to join forces.  Any potential ‘merger’ works for the Ba’ath in this regard while simultaneously allowing the SSNP valuable time to attract followers and reestablish themselves in society after fifty years sitting on the sideline.  High ranking officials in the Assad / Mahklouf camp have an avenue, by working together more with their SSNP allies, to preserve their status without disrupting any assets or the day-to-day affairs of running the country.  A smooth transition could very well occur even if no formal announcement or legal procedure makes it official.

Active in Syria since the 1930s and sharing a long history with the Ba’ath Party puts the SSNP in a unique position.  This is a party whose rich literature coupled with an abundance of educational publications available to Syrian’s provides a foundation to cultivate future generations.  Entrenched in the political landscape with a structural organization already in place has allowed the party to accelerate their outreach to Syrian communities. who receive all the necessary medicines.  Not only is the regime aware of their activities, they actively join in some of the SSNP’s celebrations.  Such events include, honoring Syrian soldiers who have died, culture seminars, opening offices and publicly teaching SSNP ideology, which will be explored below.  Notwithstanding, Ba’ath Party officials direct participation in these events, exhibits a level of understanding between both parties.  Trust is further solidified following years of the regime fighting together with the SSNP’s militia- Eagles of the Whirlwind.

SSNP SPREADS ITS WINGS

Over the last couple years (2014-present), the SSNP has significantly increased its presence throughout Syria, particularly in Homs and Hama, but also in Latakia, Damascus and its suburbs.  Their growth in these governorates primarily centers around towns and cities inhabited by minorities but this should not take away from the fact that the party is indeed expanding.  Becoming the second largest party in Syria behind only the Ba’ath.  It appears the SSNP is able to accomplish this in coordination with the regime, not in spite or because of any rebellion due to regime weakness or inability to act.

The following are several displays of the SSNP’s activities in Syria, beginning in Homs.

The SSNP’s stronghold in Homs is located in the city of Homs’ Old City neighborhood.  Here, SSNP members are in full control of certain areas, even conducting security checks and manning checkpoints.  Vehicles are checked for bombs by local SSNP men and party celebrations are guarded by armed members. These acts point to confidence in the regime and the local population.

SSNP HOMS FB POST on 3.13.16 OPENING A NEW OFFICE IN THE OLD CITY PART OF HOMS FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OVER 50 YEARS. SSNP LEADER IN HOMS-NIHAD SAMAAN ADDRESSED THE CROWD.

However, such overwhelming freedom from a party banned until as recently as 2005 does not seem to be threatening the regime.  The regime is instead delegating authority to a trusted partner who as of now does not challenge Assad or circumvent his authority.  In fact, the two parties participate together at speeches, rallies, seminars and anniversary events in the city.

SSNP HOMS FB POST 11.17.17 CELEBRATING WITH THE BA’ATH PARTY ON THE SSNP’s FOUNDING ANNIVERSARY.

The SSNP has a big following in Wadi al-Nasara (‘Valley of the Christians’) in western Homs and also in the towns of Sadad and al-Qaryatayn- members are most likely gelled with NDF or SAA units in these two cities.  However, there are indications Sadad is completely controlled by local fighters in the SSNP.  Nevertheless, the SSNP’s freedom to operate, often with members of the Ba’ath Party, is quite striking.

In Hama, the SSNP is most visible in the towns of Marhdeh, Suqaylabiyah, and Salamiyah, with fighters participating in battles on the provinces eastern countryside front.  Marhdeh and Suqaylabiyah, in northern Hama, have been on the front lines for years and SSNP fighters were with government troops spearheading assaults on rebel positions stationed in adjacent towns (such as Halfaya).   The city of Salamiyah (birthplace of Fatimid Caliphate) has witnessed its share of attacks with local Isma’ili men joining the SSNP to defend their town.  Consequently, since fighters with the SSNP in these three cities are often locals, as danger recedes, the SSNP is already fairly entrenched to carry out municipal administration.  As recently as last November the party opened a radio center in Marhdeh but have had offices serving local needs for a couple years at these three locations.

SSNP Hama FB post on 8.1.17 showing SSNP members handing out candy to Syrian troops in Marhdeh

SSNP Salamiyah FB post on 12.1.17 celebrating the party’s founding anniversary.  Syrian Peoples Assembly member and SSNP figure Mazen Azzouz (who was born in Salamiyah) attended along with a member of the Ba’ath Party in Hama.

The SSNP is also very active in the city of Latakia, hosting sporting matches, excursions for the youth, and training seminars.  The province of Latakia is an Alawite, and subsequently Assad stronghold, so the SSNP’s activities in this area is something to pay attention to.  Lastly, the countryside and suburbs of Damascus with an SSNP presence are the cities of Maaloula, Zabadani and Saidnaya (Eagles Whirlwind fought in all three cities) located outside the capital, with an office also in Damascus.  The SSNP’s flag openly waiving in Damascus, even if solely for visual effects, is significant for a party beginning to taste freedom under Bashar’s regime.

SSNP FB POST SHOWING A YOUTH TRAINING FACILITY IN LATAKIA

SSNP DAMASCUS FB POST ON 6.11.17 SHOWING MEMBERS DISTRIBUTING FOOD AS PART OF A SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAM IN THE CAPITAL

SSNP DAMASCUS FB POST ON 3.22.17 SHOWING MEMBERS IN THE CAPITAL HANDING OUT SWEETS TO PEDESTRIANS ON MOTHERS DAY

The regime forming local committees or delegating security still ensures movements and decisions are under the watchful eye of the central government.  Changes, such as conceding room for organizations like the SSNP to maneuver, have been imposed out of necessity.  The Assad regime is aware that on their own they will not be enough to guarantee its power.   Weapons provided to the SSNP or sensitive decisions ultimately rests with high level regime officials.  This might explain why the SSNP is able to: stage rallies; open media centers and headquarters throughout several cities; hold seminars, conduct training sessions in party ideology as well as fitness exercises; hand out leaflets to civilians informing them of the parties message; and organize blood drives for Syrian troops (the list goes on).  All of the above suggest regime trust in the SSNP.  If Rami Makhlouf is indeed a SSNP comrade, and considering his families history of allegiance to the party, coupled with an overlapping interests between the SSNP and Ba’ath parties, such developments might be an early indicator of a new alliance.

High ranking officials will head to the party which preserves their interests while ambitious individuals with the means will follow in search of prosperity.  For decades the Ba’ath was the only option.  Consequently, people joined.  The situation in Syria might not allow for the Ba’ath to continue as it did before the war.  Hence, gravitating, or blending in with various elements of the SSNP could be a viable option to safeguard their status moving forward.

SSNP FB POST SHOWING NEW MEMBERS BEING SWORN IN ON 8.26.17 IN HAMA

Distributing leaflets in Homs city on anniversary of SSNP’s founding FB post 11.17.17 

SSNP’s ALLIANCE WITH HEZBOLLAH IN SYRIA

Given Hezbollah’s vital and dominant position in Syria’s war, the organizations link to the SSNP is relevant when analyzing what role the SSNP could play in the years ahead.  Upholding a Syrian nationalist attitude, re-establishing control of cities (SSNP fights with SAA and Hezbollah to do this), maintaining and even expanding economic hegemony and not upsetting support coming from Damascus to supply Hezbollah in Lebanon remain priorities for Assad.  The SSNP is not, for the moment at least, deemed a threat in the matters mentioned above.  There aren’t sweeping reports of looting, violence, or insubordination (plaguing many regime militias) in the areas they have most clout.  Perhaps this signals a degree of comfort on the part of the regime to allow SSNP added freedom.  Garnering the trust of Hezbollah also certainly helps.  Moreover, the SSNP is in a political alliance with Hezbollah in Lebanon (March 8^th) and the two sides fight together at times in Syria.

SSNP FB POST SHOWING SSNP FLAGS ALONGSIDE HEZBOLLAH’S AND LEBANON’S FLAG

EXAMPLES WHERE THE SSNP & HEZBOLLAH FOUGHT ON THE SAME FRONT IN SYRIA

There are not many independent Syrian forces fighting with the SAA and Hezbollah, certainly not while also representing a political party.  Below features several strategic Syrian cities and provinces where Hezbollah and the SSNP fought together.  This section is not going to delve into every front or town, but rather, inform the reader on areas of higher interest that witnessed a more sustained presence of fighters.  Let’s begin with the historical town of Maaloula near Damascus.

A delegation from SSNP’s leadership presented condolences and congratulations on the death of three reporters from al-Manar crew in Maaloula Syria on March 14, 2014.  Asad Hardan was part of this delegation while head of SSNP’s political bureau, Ali Qansu, expressed his condolences on behalf of the SSNP in a statement to al-Manar (showing the strong partnership with such high level representation).  It is important to remember that when fighting erupted in Maaloula in 2013, Hezbollah was fighting with the Syrian army and members of the SSNP for control of the ancient Christian town.  In September of that same year, allied rebels alongside what was then al-Nusra, briefly took control of a section of Maaloula.  However, Hezbollah and their allies mentioned above were able to regain control and drive the rebels out.  It was at this time, when residents and media outlets began to investigate what had just occurred, al-Manar’s crew was ambushed and killed.  Such instances of cooperation however further strengthen Hezbollah’s and the Assad regime’s argument that they are the protectors of minorities.  Bashar paid a visit to Maaloula, where residents still speak Aramaic, the following Easter and Hezbollah has the ability to demonstrate their bodyguard role for Christians in Lebanon as well as in Syria.

Other examples of Hezbollah fighting side by side, or at least in the same town, as the SSNP:

The mountains of Latakia province have been a particularly deadly area for the Eagles of the Whirlwind.  The Kurd Mountains (Jabal al-Akrad) and also the towns of Kabani and Kinsaba are several hot spots where members of Hezbollah and the SSNP found themselves fighting on the same front.  According to Fars News Agency, in 2016 large number of reinforcements from the provinces of Tartous and Homs were sent to the Northwestern battlefields where many were to replace the Desert Hawks (Liwa Suqour al-Sahra) in Jabal al-Akrad.  The SSNP were one of these groups tasked with protecting captured territory.  Besides holding territory, SSNP fighters have been very active as part of offensives in the countryside of Latakia over the years.

In addition to fighting with Hezbollah in Latakia countryside, SSNP fighters were also stationed together in the Qalamoun region along the Syria-Lebanon border, primarily in the battle to retake the town of Qaryatayn.  The following is from one report out of Fars News Agency: The Syrian army’s 81^st and 120^th brigades of the 2^nd Division- in close coordination with the Syrian Social National Party (SSNP), Dara’a Qalamoun (Qalamoun Shield), and Liwa Suqour Al-Sahra (Desert Hawks Brigade)- liberated several sites from ISIL near the strategic city of Quaryatayn in Homs provinces’ Southeastern countryside. Homs province is another part of Syria with a heavy SSNP presence.  Speaking with members based in Homs city, the party plays an overwhelming role in security, checking for car bombs, and making sure vital services are running properly.

In 2015 the Syrian army pushed to gain control of the strategic town of Zabadani.  According to several media reports, the units involved were from the Syrian army’s 63^rd Brigade of the 4^th Mechanized Division, in coordination with Hezbollah, the National Defense Forces (NDF), and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP).  The Eagles Whirlwind were mostly stationed in the eastern sections of Zabadani acting as a bulwark against attempts by forces from the FSA, Nusra, and Ahrar al-Sham to infiltrate into the city.  While the SSNP’s forces were stationed in the East, Hezbollah alongside the Syrian army, were spearheading the advance in the western sections.  Similar to reports coming out of Latakia countryside, indications point to the Eagles of the Whirlwind acting more as protectors of a secured territory as opposed to a force on the front lines of an attack.  Perhaps such a maneuver is strategic from the Assad regime or perhaps this simply comes down to a lack of experience / manpower from those fighting under the Eagles emblem.

To close this section, both parties are also present in Hama province.  Specifically, in the northern countryside of the province, with the city of Mahrdeh being a focal point.  The strategic town sits along a highway connecting the provincial capital and is considered one the largest Christian cities in Syria.  There is a definite SSNP presence with a growing local party office, along with a local NDF unit.  When offensives were launched from Mahrdeh, particularly on the town of Halfaya, SSNP forces were on the front lines alongside (reports of) Hezbollah fighters.  Hezbollah’s presence in Mahrdeh was addressed thanks to a letter by a group calling themselves ‘Syrian Christians for Peace.’

RUSSIAN CONNECTION

Russia’s military intervention certainly changed the dynamics of the war.  In addition to conducting airstrikes, Russian generals are stationed on the ground to assist with reconciliation deals.  This aspect of the war, local committees engaged in dialogue, as well as peace talks held in Astana and Sochi, witnessed members of the SSNP partner with the Russians.  Ali Haidar (mentioned above), leader in the SSNP and long- time oppositionist to the Assad regime, now is Syria’s Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs, inevitably putting him in contact with Russia.  It is also highly likely both sides would have interacted due to the Eagles of the Whirlwind and SAA fighting together.

Recently, a delegation composed of three members of the SSNP held talks with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow.  The talks zeroed in on the conference in Sochi and Turkey’s military maneuvers near Afrin.  Additionally, Ali Haidar has been working more closely with the Hmeimim – based Russian Coordination Center as one team, to boost local reconciliations throughout Syria.  He was recently seen with Russian General Victor Bankov from the coordination center meeting members of local reconciliation committees.  Moreover, fighters with the Eagles of the Whirlwind have received medals of excellence from the Russian Ministry of Defense.  Further evidence of the growing alliance between the SSNP and another power with influence over Syria’s affairs.

SSNP EAGLES OF THE WHIRLWIND MEMBER RECEIVING A RUSSIAN MEDAL OF EXCELLANCE

ANOTHER SSNP FB POST SHOWING AN EAGLES OF THE WHIRLWIND FIGHTER RECEIVING A RUSSIAN MEDAL

CONCLUSION

Syria is increasingly under the stewardship of a new class of businessmen with ties to the Assad’s and Makhlouf’s.  Reconstruction deals favoring these connected individuals will only benefit them at the expense of Syrian citizens.  While still operating under the Ba’ath Party guise, it is uncertain how the party will emerge through the scars of war or restructuring due to possible peace deals.  Regardless, the SSNP has a deep-rooted history with many of these power brokers, which is worth paying attention to when analyzing the party’s potential cushion in absorbing Ba’ath party officials.  Such a scenario might paint a picture of revamping the political establishment, while in reality nothing much would change, at least in the short term.

The SSNP not only has a close relationship with the Assad’s and Mahklouf’s, but also more so recently, with the Ba’ath Party.  Meaning, members are familiar with one another’s vision for Syria, which is currently geared around stabilizing the Syrian state and cohesion of Syrian society.  The party is also in a position of strength negotiating reconciliation deals with rebels through Ali Haidar’s ministry.  Assad relies on Haidar’s (and the SSNP’s) image as opposition figures to appear more neutral during negotiations.  Moreover, the party has an active fighting force (Eagles of the Whirlwind), and a long record of political involevement in Syria, helping cement its position in towns across the country.  Figuring the parties intimate friendship with Hezbollah (thus factoring in Iran), and now Russia into the equation, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) is in a favorable spot during this critical moment of Syria’s history.

–Al-Akhbar. “Hezbollah military investigation reveals who killed Al-Manar TV crew.” http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/19459

-Al-Akhbar. “Syria’s Ali Haidar: Both Sides Have Extremists.” http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/9716

-Fars News Agency. “Hezbollah Hits ISIL’s Military Positions in Lebanon’s Al-Qalamoun Region.” http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13950121000473

-Fars News Agency. “Syria: Thousands of Fresh Recruits Joining Army’s Imminent Operation in Idlib.” http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13941221000333

-McDonald, Jesse. “The SSNP’s Military: The Eagles of the Whirlwind & Their Emblem.” Syria Comment. www.joshualandis.com/blog/24853-2/

-Pipes, Daniel. “Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition.” Page 102.

-SANA. “Minister Haidar: We work with Russian coordination center in Hmeimem as one team to boost local reconciliations.” http://sana.sy/en/?p=121734

-Seale, Patrick. “Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East.” Page 63.

-Syria Times. “SSNP Politburo Member to ST: Sochi Congress Must be Based on Current Military Developments in Syria.”  http://syriatimes.sy/index.php/editorials/opinion/34516-ssnp-politburo-member-to-st-sochi-congress-must-be-based-on-current-military-developments-in-syria

-Syrian Christians for Peace FaceBook post on April 3, 2017. https://www.facebook.com/syrianchristiansforpeace/

-Zaman Al Wasl. https://www.zamanalwsl.net/index.php?url=news/article/47283

Trump May Be Right
By David W. Lesch
For Syria Comment – April 17, 2018

In the wake of the recent US targeted attack in Syria, President Trump’s comments a couple of weeks ago that the US needs to get out of Syria as soon as US-backed forces mop up the remnants of the Islamic State has run up against elements in the administration who want a sustained US presence in the country. They believe a couple of thousand troops and some military bases supporting the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are needed in the country in order to assure that ISIS is defeated and does not re-establish itself, to provide some leverage vis-à-vis the Bashar al-Assad regime in Damascus regarding any sort of political settlement, and to contain Iran, which many fear is well on the way to creating a strategic land bridge from Teheran to Beirut. There seems to be a real battle in the administration over the direction of Syria policy.

But let’s examine these goals a little more closely.  What exactly is the US doing there? Certainly the Kurds are not counting on a continued US presence, especially not after Trump’s remarks; indeed, they have long been striking deals with the Syrian government and the Russians to hedge their bets.  Frankly, once the US leaves, Damascus would then be free to negotiate a modus vivendi with the Kurds regarding autonomy over something less than the 27% of Syrian territory now under their sway, which could then ameliorate the Turks, who might feel secure enough to pull back from northern Syria.

Staying in Syria in order to ensure the defeat of the Islamic State is laudable.  But what does “defeat” look like? ISIS still holds pockets of territory along the Iraqi border, but it seems to be reverting to what it was before, i.e. a terrorist organization carrying out attacks against perceived enemies. It appears that eliminating those last bastions of ISIS control, in order to protect Iraq as much as Syria, will do the trick in terms of satisfying Trump.  This can be facilitated with a Turkish-US modus vivendi that will allow the SDF to re-focus its attention to the east rather than be diverted to protect its Kurdish comrades fighting Turkish forces in the northwest. The Turks, probably giddy with Trump’s desire to get out, might just let the Kurds resume anti-ISIS operations knowing that a US departure would facilitate their Kurdish objectives in Syria.

Over the long term, however, only stabilization efforts in the cities and towns abandoned by ISIS will prevent it from re-establishing a presence or finding safe havens in which to brew it special brand of chaos. Stabilization will only seriously occur once there is a political settlement. However morally repugnant, this means that the government of Bashar al-Assad and his allies, Russia and Iran, will ultimately be responsible for stabilization. Russia and Iran did much more to help Assad stay in power than the US and its allies did to remove him.  So, to the victor go the spoils, and that includes putting Syria back together again and all the challenges that it entails.  Political and economic opportunity meet target on one’s back.  Trump does not want that target to be US troops. In any event, if the EU and regional Arab powers such as Saudi Arabia, can stomach Assad staying in power, perhaps the spigots of reconstruction aid will open up in a way that will help stabilize the country. Syria still has a functioning central authority that retains a certain amount of legitimacy which can, with international assistance, prevent it from falling into full failed state status, which is exactly the terrain in which ISIS operates.  We already have too many Yemens and Libyas in the area.

Regardless, the US is on the outside looking in on a political settlement.  That ship has sailed for all intents and purposes.  The Russians, Iranians, and Turks are setting the table, and the Syrian government at the moment is not entertaining any serious concessions of the kind the US and various Syrian opposition groups have been clamoring for. How can we lose leverage when we never really had it? Yes, the US-supported SDF hold the vast majority of Syria’s oil wells in the east, which the Syrian regime desperately wants back—this is potential leverage.  But the regime will be patient.  It has already proven its ability to extract the necessary resources from its population and its allies to stay in power. It will just wait a little longer.

Finally, the Iranian corridor:  well, folks, it’s already there, and there is not much we can do about it short of going to war with Iran. Teheran has already achieved most of its strategic objectives in Syria, first and foremost by keeping Assad in power.  Besides, there is a much better deterrent in the region than the US to keep Iranian influence in check:  Israel.  The Israelis have already sent a very strong message to Iran (and Assad) through its forceful military response to the Iranian drone that was shot down over Israeli territory earlier this year.  In fact, many believe Iran’s relatively low profile in the Syrian government’s retaking of Eastern Ghouta over the past few weeks was in direct reaction to this.  It doesn’t want to bait the Israelis to intercede even more forcefully.  This apparent passivity just means that Iran already has what it wants.  Keeping it at that level will be the job of the Israelis and also the Russians, who are keen to not let the Iran-Israel dynamic ignite a regional war. We can expect an Israeli-Iranian dance in Syria in coming months, if not years, to determine exactly where the red lines are.

Although awkwardly expressed in a manner that telegraphs our intentions and diminishes our diplomatic leverage, Trump’s assertions are consistent with how he has viewed US involvement in Syria from the beginning.  His initial tweets in response to the chemical attack on April 7 displayed anger and exasperation.  It was almost as if Trump was saying to Moscow and Damascus: “I told you I was getting out, but you guys keep doing stupid stuff that pulls me back in.” The limited nature of the response suggests that Trump’s view on Syria still holds for now, as long as the the Syrians behave—or at least get the Russians to control their client-state (good luck with that).

Ironically, maybe getting out of Syria will in the end save the most lives in the country by eliminating the regional and international tug of war that Syria has become and creating space for a political settlement. An imperfect peace is better than the wars—actual and potential—in Syria.

*David W. Lesch is the Ewing Halsell Distinguished Professor of History at Trinity University in San Antonio, TX and author or editor of 15 books on the Middle East.

Bulldozers remove barriers from a road in Harasta, east of Damascus (SANA via AP)

By Erwin van Veen

While all eyes were fixed on the US-led military response to the alleged chemical attack in East Ghouta, a little-noted event occurred that could potentially have a much greater impact on Syria’s future. About 10 days ago, President Assad’s regime passed Law no. 10. The law foresees the creation of local administrative units in each district of regime-held territory that will be in charge of reconstruction efforts. All Syrians will be required to register their private properties with these units by providing proof of ownership, in person or through legal representatives. This must be done within roughly the next two months. The risk of noncompliance is that the Syrian state will take possession of the unregistered properties.

With half the Syrian population displaced and many property transfers prior to 2011 having been done informally, this will be a mission impossible for many. Depending on the implementation and enforcement of the law, its most likely consequence is that the Syrian state will acquire a substantial amount of property in the near future—land, buildings, and other immovable assets—within the territories it currently controls. The real implication here is twofold. Most importantly, President Assad’s regime will lay its hands on the assets it needs to finance the country’s reconstruction and reestablish its power base, preserving its long-term viability and independence. Moreover, it will dispossess hundreds of thousands of Syrians—possibly millions—who escaped the fighting or forced recruitment. Law no. 10 is a Faustian masterstroke—both in its injustice and its ingenuity.

The background is this: The World Bank has estimated the tab for reconstructing Syria at upwards of USD $200 billion. The Syrian regime has been broke for some time, kept financially afloat by the Iranian Central Bank and assorted Lebanese banks. Russia and Iran have neither the will nor the funds to finance Syria’s reconstruction. The Gulf countries, United States, and European Union have made it clear that likewise they will not carry Syria’s reconstruction without a “meaningful political transition”—a reference to their desire for real political concessions in the future governance of Syria. Most who are familiar with the conflict expect such a transition to happen when hell freezes over.

And yet, reconstructing Syria is essential to President Assad’s regime. This is not because it cares about restoring basic services like healthcare and housing to a decent level, or about the return of Syrian refugees. Figures like Syrian Major General Issam Zahreddin (since killed in battle) made it abundantly clear some time ago that returning refugees should not count on a warm welcome.

No. Rather, reconstruction is essential to the regime’s survival because it must reward the networks of businessmen, military, and militia leaders that helped it win the war. Reconstruction is also vital to the regime’s autonomy because it must re-establish its powerbase and independence vis-à-vis its international backers who will expect the future loyalty of a faithful Syrian ally when this conflict is over. Iran, for example, is already working to establish a long-term social, religious, and military presence in the country.

The imperatives of regime survival and autonomy mean that its reconstruction logic will echo its warfighting logic: indiscriminate punishment of disloyalty to impose fear, selective co-optation, and deal-making with opposition groups where this offers a low-cost solution on regime terms and safeguards core regime interests. Initial urban reconstruction efforts of the regime in Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo, on the basis of Decree 66 (2012), already show how the regime uses high-end property developments to generate funds and reward loyalists through forcible dispossession below market rates, as well as the use of regime-linked real estate and construction companies. The nationalization of property enabled by the closely-related Law no. 10 will take this approach to a new level.

An additional consequence of Law no. 10 is that it will enable large-scale demographic engineering by reallocating appropriated property to new owners. This will not necessarily be sectarian in nature as the majority of both Syrians and regime-loyalists are Sunni. Rather, it will create large loyalist urban centers to underpin the regime’s power base and limit the return of refugees, who are largely not perceived as supporters of President Assad.

In addition to remaking urban centers as areas of repopulated loyalist concentration, the strategy will probably also involve undoing the existence of impoverished Sunni-belts around Syria’s main cities from which so many rebels were recruited. Insofar as these poorer suburbs are currently depopulated due to rebel recruitment, casualties, and flight, the regime is likely to use Law No. 10 to appropriate the land (in many such areas, property rights were not well established even before the war) and to then prevent their resettlement if and when refugees return. Any Sunni populations that have not fled but are still living in such suburbs at present will also be at risk of forced displacement and dispossession commensurate with the extent of their perceived disloyalty to the regime. It is clear that the regime has no problem initiating displacement on a large scale when it suits regime interests. Dealing with the suburban belts in this fashion will remove a source of resistance against the regime once and for all.

Though these are the primary aspects of the strategy, Law no. 10 may very well additionally facilitate small-scale sectarian demographic engineering in a few strategic areas. The “four-town deal” that swapped the population of two Sunni villages with two Shi’i ones west of Damascus suggests that the Syrian-Lebanese border could be such an area. Incidentally, this particular deal was enabled by Qatar as the price for release of their captured royal hunting party in Iraq.

If the re-entrenchment of the Syrian regime was not already a sad enough finale, the emerging parallels with the plight of many Palestinians are uncanny and will constitute a further source of international concern. Not only is the relative size of the Syrian diaspora growing fast, but Law no. 10 may well have an effect similar to the Israeli Absentee Property Law, which effectively nationalized Palestinian lands whose owners had fled after November 1947. The Israeli/Palestinian problem still haunts the world’s conscience 70 years later, though apparently not enough to end its neglect and resolve the problem.

In 2017, Pearlman quotes Talia—a fleeing TV correspondent in Aleppo—regarding a sad but remarkably poignant moment: “I waited for the driver outside. I kissed the walls on the street, because I knew that I was never coming back to them.”

Law no. 10 just brought this scenario one step closer to reality.

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Erwin van Veen is a senior research fellow at Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Follow on Twitter.

Addendum: “Displaced Syrians ensnared by new property law stand to lose everything” by Bahira al-Zarier & Barrett Limoges for Syria Direct, 17 April 2018.

Law 10 gives property owners both in Syria and abroad just 30 days—starting April 11—to present their deeds to local council offices in the country. Otherwise, the state can liquidate their titles and seize their holdings. Once the registration window closes, “the remaining plots will be sold at auction,” reads Article 31 of the law.

For citizens living abroad like Muhammad, family members as distant as a second cousin may present the documents in their stead.

However, the millions of Syrians impacted by Law 10 include refugees and internally displaced people without family back home to assist with registration, as well as people whose deeds were lost or destroyed during the war.

Perhaps most ominously for opposition supporters, all property owners wishing to register their lands must first obtain approval from state security officials, a lawyer in Damascus familiar with the law told Syria Direct. The lawyer spoke on condition of anonymity for fear of repercussions.

“Without this approval, they will not be able to prove ownership of the property,” said the lawyer. “Therefore, it would be sold at auction or claimed by another person.”

“Herein lies the seriousness of this decree,” she added.

The need for security clearance could exclude large swathes of the Syrian population inside and outside the country with outstanding arrest warrants or known anti-government sympathies from registering their property.

Muhammad is one of them. Although he still has the deed for his house and land in the south Homs village of al-Buwaidah a-Sharqiyah, he says the Syrian government has issued an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

“I am wanted by the regime on charges of incitement and attending demonstrations,” says Muhammad. “I understand that the regime means to take our property with a legal text, creating new laws to suit their interests.”

These two clarifications were tweeted by “Syria Law Journal”

A key misunderstanding of the new Urban Renewal Law 10/2018 in Syria is that nobody has to prove their property ownership until a new zoned development is established by decree. And this requirement will only apply to persons whose ownership isn’t recorded in the Land Registry.

— Syrian Law Journal (@syrian_law) April 19, 2018

The new Urban Law 10/2018 in Syria doesn’t permit expropriation of private property. Rather, it converts a proprietor’s land ownership into shares in the new development. And that shareholding will correspond to an ownership in a specific plot of land in the new development.

— Syrian Law Journal (@syrian_law) April 19, 2018