By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Logo of the Dawn of Freedom Brigades

One of the more noted recent trends in rebel dynamics in Syria is the weakening of the Islamic Front, widely noted last year as the most powerful rebel alliance in terms of manpower and fighting capabilities. However, the coalition was always weaker than it seemed at first sight, with one of the most pertinent questions being why the constituent groups never abandoned their own individual names and banners if they were really so united. This year, the Islamic Front has seen its constituents- particularly Ahrar al-Sham- hit by defections to the Islamic State (IS), assassinations of leaders, and fracturing on account of tensions between and within the coalition’s factions. The group Liwa al-Tawheed- previously considered one of the most powerful Aleppo factions- has suffered from internal fragmentation and manpower loss, with many of its local eastern Aleppo province affiliates having become defunct but now re-emerging as break-off groups, lacking any distinct ideological program equivalent to the Islamic Front’s “Project of the Ummah” that aimed for a clear assertion of the Islamic Front as a serious Islamist political force to be reckoned with.

The new rebel coalition Tajammu’ Alwiya Fajr al-Hurriya (‘Grouping of the Dawn of Freedom Brigades’) is a case-in-point. For example, one of the constituents of this coalition is Kata’ib Shams al-Shamal (‘Sun of the North Battalions’), whose official Facebook page ‘likes’ a page set up for the Manbij Martyrs’ Battalion, a one-time Liwa al-Tawheed affiliate in the town of Manbij that has since January of this year fallen under the exclusive control of the IS, having previously been a place where IS was merely one of a number of groups in the town including local Islamic Front groups’ affiliates. This points to the link between the Kata’ib Shams al-Shamal formation and the now defunct Liwa al-Tawheed affiliates it has come to supersede in the northeast of Aleppo province.

Logo of Kata’ib Shams al-Shamal: “The Free Syrian Army.”

The Facebook ‘likes’ of Kata’ib Shams al-Shamal, including the Manbij Martyrs’ Battalion.

The Dawn of Freedom Brigades coalition is of importance at the moment because it is a participant in the fight against IS in the Kobani (Ayn al-Arab) area (e.g. see this video, said to be in the countryside just to the south of the main town) that is one of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) self-declared autonomous cantons. The coalition is thus cooperating with the PYD’s armed wing the People’s Protection Units (YPG). This cooperation, as will be seen below, is something openly admitted: compare with this video* announcing the “Euphrates Volcano” joint operations room including Kata’ib Shams al-Shamal and the YPG for eastern Aleppo countryside to fight IS.

This pointedly contrasts with last year’s dynamics that saw the parent organization Liwa al-Tawheed work with IS against the YPG in Aleppo province, in part contributing to severe losses for the YPG in that area. Such coordination with IS- following on from the YPG’s expulsion of IS and Jabhat al-Nusra from Ras al-Ayn town in Hasakah province in mid-July- was also undertaken by other major rebel groups like Ahrar al-Sham. It was justified by many rebels at the time as necessary against a perceived ‘regime agent’ but was also rooted in wider Syrian Arab suspicion of Kurdish autonomy or separatist agendas. Undoubtedly the cooperation between IS and these rebel groups against the YPG allowed IS to grow.

To be sure, relations somewhat shifted at the start of this year as infighting broke out between IS and rebel groups across northern and eastern Syria: limited cooperation, for instance, was in evidence between Liwa al-Tawheed and Jabhat al-Akrad- a front-group for the YPG- in the Azaz countryside, but there was nothing on a par with rebels helping the YPG to defend a stronghold under PYD control. The current Dawn of Freedom Brigades-YPG effort in Kobani needs to be tied to a broader trend of some FSA-banner figures coming to terms with past mistakes vis-a-vis relatons with the YPG: foremost embodied in one-time Aleppo FSA Military Council head Col. Oqaidi’s visit to the YPG in the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in Aleppo province in late August, reflecting a 180 degree turn from his defences of IS and anti-YPG stance in summer 2013, even as he goes on about the need for unity against the ni?am (‘regime’).

In my view, however, this cooperation is too little, too late to lead to substantial setbacks for IS, hindered as it is also by Turkey’s hostility towards the PYD on account of links with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Western regard for such concerns. In the long-run too, there is a problem of differing agendas: the PYD has too little interest or resources to attempt to take the fight all the way to Raqqa city, for example, being more concerned with its own proto-state project in the territory it already controls.

Below is an interview I conducted with Abu al-Layth, one of the leaders of the Dawn of Freedom Brigades (see here for the Dawn of Freedom Brigades’ organizational structure).

Q: What are the factions in the Dawn of Freedom Brigades? Is it true that the factions used to be in Liwa al-Tawheed?

A: The majority of the military factions were sidelined from Liwa al-Tawheed and others beside it previously; and we do not fight with any side that has no firm decision-making on the ground.**

Q: What are your aims? Do you want a democratic state or a state in which Shari’a is the sole source of legislation?

A: We are not planning on anything for when Assad falls. We hope that there will be protection for all the peoples [of Syria] and that we will co-exist- all of the Syrian people. And it [the Syrian people] is the one that decides what it wants. We are with the Syrian people.***

Q: With protection for all sects?

A: The people decides and we came out because of the racism of Bashar al-Assad.

Q: Is there cooperation with the YPG in the Ayn al-Arab area against the IS organization?

A: Yes. We of the Dawn of Freedom Brigades- when IS launched the assault on Ayn al-Arab- sent 250 fighters to Ayn al-Arab to protect the Kurdish and Arab people in this area. And we have tried to protect the Suleyman Shah tomb**** but we will not be able to do so because of the paucity of our heavy equipment.

Q: In your opinion are the American airstrikes helping the effort against IS?

A: This is in God’s hands. We are against the coalition’s airstrikes because they do not target the regime which is greatly criminal. The two states [i.e. IS and the regime] compete as to who can destroy civilian life more.

Q: And is it a problem also that the strikes are targeting Jabhat al-Nusra that fights the regime?

A: No. Jabhat al-Nusra fights on all sides, but has also yielded on more than one of the fronts between it and the regime.***** Examples: the battle of Kassab; it and Ahrar al-Sham of the battle of Hama recently; it and the Islamic Front in the battle of the Industrial Area in Aleppo. I mean they have many bad things about them as well. And we as a Syrian people don’t accept any organization that is neutral or against our people.

Q: So the Islamic Front also withdrew from the Industrial Area in Aleppo?

A: The reason being the weakness of the two fronts [Nusra & the Islamic Front], so the regime seized the Industrial Area. Weakness and not withdrawal: I mean retreat.

Notes

*- Others mentioned in the video include brigades that have been working with the YPG for several months now following IS’ takeover of all major urban areas in Raqqa province, such as Liwa Thuwar Raqqa (ex-Nusra affiliate) and Liwa al-Jihad fi Sabeel Allah (tied to the Western-backed SMC). The cooperation originates from the fact that many members of these groups sought refuge with the YPG west of Tel Abyad. The YPG would then help these groups to reclaim some villages from IS in return for power-sharing in those localities.

**- Referring to the lack of real unity and direction with the Islamic Front.

***- The mark of a non-ideological program, also contrasting with the “Project of the Ummah” of the Islamic Front from which the Dawn of Freedom Brigades coalition has emerged.

****- The site has been under the protection of Turkish troops and IS allegedly threatened an attack in March this year if they did not withdraw within 3 days, though even if the threat had been real, it was never acted on.

*****- cf. Aron Lund’s article on Jabhat al-Nusra, which notes also the consolidation of control of towns and territory in Idlib province that have followed on from at least some withdrawals.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Introduction

In a post for Jihadology in August 2013, I documented examples of foreign support for what was then the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Signs of such support included anonymous placards and other gestures from ‘Bilad al-Haramain’ (Saudi Arabia), a rally in Somalia for ISIS, support for ISIS in Gaza, an apparent pledge of allegiance from jihadis in the Sinai area to ISIS, along with hints from Lebanon (particularly the Tripoli area) and support from the Ansar al-Shari’a movements in Tunisia and Libya, resulting in disproportionate representation of Tunisians and Libyans in the foreign fighter ranks of ISIS. Over the course of 2013 and into the start of this year, some of these trends solidified: the most notable example being statements of support shown for ISIS in the face of its fight with rebels in Syria put out by the Gaza-Sinai jihadi organizations Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen and Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis. Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia also advertised this year on its official Twitter feed a placard of support shown by an ISIS fighter in Syria.

However, a key shift now in the question of support for Baghdadi and his project is the fact that ISIS has now become the Islamic State (IS): a Caliphate demanding formal allegiance from all Muslims. The declaration at the end of June was of course partly designed to unleash a new wave of support for the group on the domestic and international level: at the former, there has certainly been some success when coupled with IS’ advances on the ground and displays of superior military and financial power. For instance, in Iraq, the jihadi group Jamaat Ansar al-Islam- which has the same end-goal of a Caliphate but has rejected IS’ claim to be a caliphate/state in a dispute going back to IS’ incarnation as the Islamic State of Iraq- has seen its presence significantly eroded in Ninawa province in particular as members have pledged allegiance to IS. The defections have undoubtedly been facilitated by ideological overlap.

On the international level, the Caliphate declaration has not quite proven as galvanising in the face of ongoing competition with al-Qa’ida. Most importantly, it needs to be stressed that having come out in support of what was then ISIS does not translate to being ‘IS-aligned’ now. Below, examples of support for and alignment with what is now IS will be examined by country and region.

Gaza-Sinai

The main online presence associated with Gaza-Sinai alignment with the Caliphate: “al-Nusra al-Maqdisia” (“Maqdisi Support”).

Above it was noted that both Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen had come out in support of ISIS at the beginning of this year, arguing for the group’s right to ‘self-defence’ in the fighting with other rebels. However, neither group has declared allegiance to IS’ Caliphate, which is so even as Reuters reported contact between Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis and IS with the latter providing advice on carrying out operations. The Egyptian press had circulated rumours of a supposed pledge of allegiance to IS by Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, but as I have documented previously, the sourcing was faulty and not going back to any actual source or authority within the group. It would thus seem that Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is trying to have it both ways: showing sympathy for IS while not subsuming itself under the Caliphate. In turn, IS does not seem to mind this position, as the group’s spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani hailed the jihadis in Sinai- without specific mention of any group- for their efforts against the Sisi-led Egyptian government. In addition, it should be noted that Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’ statements and photos are advertised on pro-IS media, including forums such as al-Platform Media (al-Minbar al-‘Ilami al-Jihadi).

Of more interest is an obscure group called Jamaat Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al-Maqdis (‘The Group of Helpers/Supporters of the Islamic State in Bayt al-Maqdis’), whose official outlet is al-Platform Media. Also known as “Ansar al-Khilafa”, the group engages in da’wah activity for IS in Gaza and has sent fighters and specialists to join IS in Syria via Sinai. IS, it should be recalled, has a Gazan contingent known as the Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi Battalion. Thus it would be fair to characterize Jamaat Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al-Maqdis as IS’ network in the Gaza-Sinai area. Though the group claims a West Bank coordinator, little evidence has emerged of meaningful activity in the West Bank. In any event, Jamaat Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al-Maqdis should be borne in mind amid sensationalist Israeli media coverage that has often mistaken rallies for Hizb-ut-Tahrir (which rejected the IS Caliphate announcement) and simple black flags of jihad as indicating support for IS.

More recently, a statement was put out on jihadi forums with the announcement of a “Jund al-Khilafa bi Ard al-Kenana” (“Soldiers of the Caliphate in Egypt”), declaring a pledge of allegiance to IS. Pointing to the actions of the “dogs of the Rafidites- the agents of the Majus from the filthy Safavids, and the disbelieving Nusayris [Alawites]” against Sunnis in Iraq and al-Sham, and attacking the “dog of the Jews- the disbelieving tyrant of Egypt” Sisi, the purported new group pledged its allegiance to “the commander of the believers, the Caliph of the Muslims- Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini (may God protect him).” A threat was also issued to the “enemies of Islam from among the Americans and the Cross-Worshippers,” making clear that their bases and embassies are legitimate targets. But perhaps most notably, affinity was declared with Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis: “We have not found from the ‘ulama of Egypt whom we reckoned sincere anyone who would make clear to the people what was ambiguous and clarify rulings except Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis: may God protect them and given them victory…” This illustrates the affinity IS supporters show for the group despite its lack of pledge of allegiance to IS.

Tunisia

Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia was known for its staunchly pro-ISIS stance last year, as one of its leading members had written a lengthy tract concluding that it was obligatory on members of Jabhat al-Nusra to switch allegiance to ISIS. However, the group has found the notion of IS as the Caliphate more difficult to accept, having shared on an official Facebook page al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb’s [AQIM] rejection of the Caliphate announcement. Despite this rejection, Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia’s leadership still wants to show appreciation for IS, extending tribute to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in its Eid al-Fitr message this summer, but it should also be noted that this message paid regard to Aymenn al-Zawahiri. This position is ultimately incoherent.

One problem that Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia may face is a disconnect between its leadership and rank-and-file ground members aligning with IS and then heading off to Iraq-Syria to become fighters for IS. One group dedicated to da’wah work that may be an activist front for Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia- namely, “Shabab al-Tawhid in Tunisia”- continues to advertise IS material, at least going by social media pages bearing its name.

A “Shabab al-Tawhid in Tunisia” logo

A “Shabab al-Tawhid in Tunisia” Facebook page advertising a pro-IS online initiative: “The Islamic State: Emirate of Tunisia: Islamic Kairouan.”

Similar to the previous photo: “Emirate of Kairouan: Islamic Tunisia.” It should be noted that Kairouan can refer either to a region in central Tunisia or Tunisia as a whole. The region of Kairouan is known as a hotbed of pro-IS sentiment, as will be discussed below.

Example of “Shabab al-Tawhid in Tunisia” Facebook page advertising IS material.

A more concrete example is the case of a recent statement put out in the name of “Katiba Uqba ibn Nafi“- a joint insurgent project between AQIM and Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia, as I have mentioned before. The statement- declaring support for IS- was not shared by any official outlets for Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia, which might serve as a grounds for skepticism as regards its authenticity. What seems equally possible if not more likely is that it is only reflecting a provincial contingent of Katiba Uqba ibn Nafi that has been a source for IS’ Tunisian fighters: namely, the contingent in Kairouan province. This conclusion, which I share with Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, is in my view strengthened by one additional point about the statement: if it were reflecting the whole Katiba Uqba ibn Nafi, then it would have to be a pledge of bay’ah [allegiance] to IS rather than a mere affirmation of nusra lil-dawla al-islamiya [support for the Islamic State] that is essentially a re-statement of already existing pro-IS sentiment in the face of growing international action against IS. Here is my translation of the relevant parts of that statement (parts in italics my own emphasis):

“Kairouan Support for the State of the Islamic Caliphate,

[…]

Before the Ummah of Islam in general and the State of the Islamic Caliphate in particular lies an alliance of the proprietors of global disbelief and the forces of idolatrous tyranny of the Arabs and hypocrites, with their brawl against them [the Ummah etc.] and their coming together to wage war on them and break their courage and the courage of the Muslims…and in response to the command of God and His Messenger (God’s peace and blessings be upon him), the mujahideen brothers in the Katiba Uqba ibn Nafi from the land of Kairouan show support, help and aid for the State of the Islamic Caliphate, and urge it to continue moving forward in breaking the borders and smashing the thrones of the forces of idolatrous tyranny in every place, and we say to our brothers in the Islamic State: ‘Do not be in despair or be sad, for you are supreme if you are believers.’

Oh God, give victory to the Islamic State, raise its banner and unite the ranks of the mujahideen in every place…”

Libya

Like Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia, many of Ansar al-Shari’a Libya’s rank-and-file members have undoubtedly had IS leanings, translating to a Libyan fighting division within IS: Katiba al-Bittar al-Libi, which played an important role in fighting in eastern Syria both in fending off rebel attacks on IS’ southern Hasakah province stronghold of al-Markadah and pushing into Deir az-Zor province in an ultimately successful bid to capture it. However, other Ansar al-Shari’a members had ties with the Katiba al-Muhajireen in Latakia that joined Jabhat al-Nusra at the end of 2013. In any case, there has been no formal pledge of allegiance to the Caliphate from Ansar al-Shari’a Libya. Of interest though is a statement from the Abu Mohjen al-Ta’ifi Battalion, which describes itself as “Tanzim al-Qa’ida in Libya.” For ‘Sha’aban 1435 AH’ (30 May-28 June 2014), the group issued a statement warning the United States against intervention in Libya, invoking a prior warning from the “amir [commander] of the Ummah” Aymenn al-Zawahiri, reflecting the group’s allegiance. Yet on 4 July 2014, after the Caliphate declaration, the group issued a statement offering “munasara” (‘support’) for IS but not explicitly affirming a pledge of allegiance and still calling itself “Tanzim al-Qa’ida in Libya”:

“From the amir of the Abu Mohjen al-Ta’ifi Battalion to our sheikh- the amir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham- as-salam alaykum wa rahmat Allah wa barakatuhu. We heard your recent speech about the Islamic State, so I ask the Almighty to bless your effort…and that the state should spread the spring of the land in its perfection. And I ask Him- the Exalted- to accept your blessed jihad. And thus, we have decided to send 50 mujahideen: among them the doctor, an oil engineer, someone experienced in military tactics, and suicide bombers. Accept this oh our sheikh…oh our beloved in the Islamic State…I ask God- Almighty and Exalted is He- to strengthen you on tawheed and jihad and to establish the Islamic State over the entire Earth and that its light may be accomplished at your hands.”

It would appear that this battalion is like Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia trying to have it both ways (i.e. showing support for Baghdadi while not formally subsuming itself under the Caliphate): on the one hand the group refers to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as ‘our sheikh’ but uses at the beginning of the statement IS’ prior name ISIS and does not mention the word ‘Caliphate’ once, which is now a fundamental part of the group’s image. There is also no renunciation of the prior reference to Aymenn al-Zawahiri as the ‘amir of the Ummah’.

Maghreb Area

Of note here is a pro-IS break-off from AQIM known as “Jund al-Khilafa fi Ard al-Jaza’ir” (‘The Soldiers of the Caliphate in the land of Algeria’), which released a statement this month affirming a ‘renewal’ of allegiance to the Islamic State, criticising the “corruption” of the “manhaj [program] of al-Qa’ida.” This group, following on also from a pledge of allegiance in the summer by “Katiba al-Huda from the Islamic Maghreb,” is said to be under the leadership of one Khalid Sulayman. Invoking discussion of “the victorious sect,” the statement concluded with a vow to follow Baghdadi’s orders as the caliph, promising to help raise the banner “from China to Andalus” (i.e. accomplishing the more immediate goal of a Caliphate spanning the Muslim world). More recently, Jund al-Khilafa fi Ard al-Jaza’ir has come to public attention for the beheading of a French hostage, as part of a “message from Jund al-Khilafa fi Ard al-Jaza’ir to the dog Francois Hollande.”

In keeping with the alignment with IS, the group in a 22 September media release on the hostage taking cited Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s speech calling for supporters of IS to ‘defend’ IS and attack citizens of countries participating in the fight against IS, singling out in particular among Westerners the “hateful, filthy French.” In the media release, one of Jund al-Khilafa fi Ard al-Jaza’ir’s members had announced:

“[…] The Almighty has said: ‘Indeed the believers and believing women are helpers of one another’ [Qur’an 9:71], for we are the soldiers of the Caliphate in the land of Algeria in compliance with the orders of our amir- the Caliph of the Muslims- Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (may God protect him)- and on the tongue of the official spokesman Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (may God protect him)- we give a deadline of 24 hours from the issuance of this statement to the Hollande, the president of the criminal French state, to stop its aggression against the Islamic State; if not, the fate of their citizen will be beheading. If you want to preserve his life, you must put out an official statement making clear your aggression against the Islamic State will be ended…”

It is likely that the name of Jund al-Khilafa has served as the inspiration for the outfit just announced in Egypt using the same name. However, too little suggests that this AQIM break-off in Algeria has fundamentally hurt AQIM.

Somalia

I noted above that there had been some show of support for ISIS in Somalia last year (specifically, note the photos released by the pro-IS ‘al-Sham Media’). Since the Caliphate declaration there has been no indication of pledges of allegiance: on the contrary, the al-Qa’ida affiliate Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen (HSM) reaffirmed its allegiance to Aymenn al-Zawahiri after the death of its leader Mokhtar Abu Zubayr.

However, an interesting statement was issued on 6 May this year by the “Rightly Guided Leadership for Jihad in Somalia” regarding supposedly one-time close relations between HSM under Abu Zubayr and ISIS. It should be noted that this “Rightly Guided Leadership for Jihad in Somalia” consists of al-Qa’ida-aligned critics of Abu Zubayr’s leadership of HSM deriving from the fact that Abu Zubayr had killed one of HSM’s founders Abu Bakr al-Zaila’ie (Ibrahim Haji Juma/Ibrahim al-Afghani) in June 2013 as he had been a long-standing critic of Abu Zubayr:

“Our brothers in God:

It has no longer remained hidden from anyone the truth of what has happened and is happening in Somalia as regards corruptions in the manhaj with killing and eviction for the mujahideen and their leaders just as the mutual affection between Harakat al-Shabab in Somalia under Abu Zubayr’s leadership and the group of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham is not hidden.

And it is well known that Abu Zubayr’s leadership has previously shown through its media foundations, channels and broadcasts a great deal of courting and nearness to jamaat ad-dawla [‘group of the state’- standard AQ terminology now for ISIS and IS] that rebelled against the orders of its leadership in tanzim al-Qa’ida [AQC] and their instructions. The situation came to such a point that the publication and circulation of Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri’s speech and Sheikh Abu Azzam the American’s [Adam Gadahn] speech (may God protect them both) among the ranks of the soldiers of Harakat al-Shabab in Somalia were prevented.

But after the speech of Abu Azzam the American (may God protect him) in which mercy was extended to the leaders of jihad whose blood had been spilled at Abu Zubayr’s hands and he described whosoever killed them as tyrannical, and after many indications emerged that the general leadership in Khorasan had received a picture of the situation and the truth of what happened in Somalia without distortion and concealment and had thus begun to adopt stances critical of Abu Zubayr’s leadership that had deviated from the upright direction and become entangled in the bloodshed of the mujahideen, the leadership of Harakat al-Shabab began to turn over again but this time again against jamaat ad-dawla, for a general notice was issued not to publish anything relating to jamaat ad-dawla, including their nasheeds in their broadcasts, and described them as khawarij…And we announce here that the mujahideen in Somalia coming out openly with the truth are neither with extremism nor the aggressors as the criminal Abu Zubayr circulates: further they will continue coming out openly with the truth before the oppressors despite the wounding of us on account of misfortunes like killing, assassinations and arrests.

Some days ago, Abu Zubayr’s deputy…spoke before a gathering of the Muslims and described jamaat ad-dawla as khawarij, and that they are ‘the movement’ following Sheikh Aymenn (may God protect him) so the attendance said to him: “If dawla are khawarij, then you are like them, for you have killed and sowed corruption just as they have done but more so than they,” so the attendance was very angry.

[…]”

If this statement reflects true developments, compare the apparent prior ISIS-sympathetic position of the HSM leadership of Abu Zubayr with the stance of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula’s [AQAP] Ma’mun Hatem, who showed sympathy for ISIS even after AQC had disavowed links with ISIS but remained in the fold of AQAP. In any case, this document also says the same HSM leadership eventually did a 180 degrees turn, and to this day the affirmation of loyalty to AQC remains.

Philippines

There have been some indications of support for IS (and its prior incarnation ISIS) from some members of the jihadi group Abu Sayyaf: the most notable case being a bay’ah to IS by a senior Abu Sayyaf leader called Isnilon Hapilon, who emerged with a group of followers in a video pledging allegiance to the ‘Caliph’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This fits in with an earlier release by the pro-IS media outlet al-Bittar Media, which in late June just prior to the announcement of IS had released a video entitled “Filipino Support for the Islamic State (in Iraq and al-Sham): Jamaat Abu Sayyaf,” featuring a speech by a purported member of Abu Sayyaf called Abu Muhammad the Filipino, declaring support for ISIS in the face of efforts against it by the group’s opponents, and so he affirmed that ISIS is in Abu Sayyaf’s prayers for success: “You are our brothers in religion and creed, so it is our obligation to support you.”

Advertisement for the al-Bittar Media release.

One should also note this video from some members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front offering bay’ah to Baghdadi.

Lebanon

Last year, I noted that the main place to watch for pro-ISIS sentiment in Lebanon was the city of Tripoli. This trend of support- extending into the period since the Caliphate’s announcement- has endured. Online, it is represented by an outlet calling itself “News of Tarabulus [Tripoli] of Sham” (reflecting the fact that Lebanon is considered a part of al-Sham).

Logo of “News of Tarabulus al-Sham,” which recognizes on its Twitter page the “State of the Islamic Caliphate.”

During this summer, pro-IS sentiment has been reflected in the clashes in Qalamoun (Damascus province) extending into rebel incursions into Arsal in Lebanon. Though some months back, a Jabhat al-Nusra spokesman for the Qalamoun area in an interview with me had tried to downplay ISIS’ presence (contrasting with the earlier public vow to defend ISIS on the grounds of ‘same manhaj’), it is apparent that ISIS/IS and Jabhat al-Nusra in the Qalamoun area have been quite close for some time and work together, translating to cooperation in Arsal as well. Occasionally this closeness has been reflected publicly on social media.

“The soldiers of Jabhat al-Nusra and the soldiers of the Islamic State side by side in Arsal.”

More recently, in the wake of U.S.-led coalition airstrikes on IS, combined with IS and Jabhat al-Nusra playing on sectarian tensions and local animosity in Arsal against Hezbollah, there was a pro-IS demonstration in Arsal after Friday prayers this week, featuring the slogan: “The people want the Islamic State.”

Conclusion

The examples of support shown for IS above are by no means insignificant but fail to show that ‘IS has eclipsed al-Qa’ida.’ All of al-Qa’ida’s affiliates at the highest level have retained their allegiance to Aymenn al-Zawahiri, and any defections that have occurred from within AQAP, AQIM and HSM have not split the organizations such as to damage them. It is also of interest to note that despite IS’ demand for allegiance that cannot really allow for any in-between stances, some within the global jihadi community are still aiming for an incoherent compromise position of showing support/sympathy for IS and al-Qa’ida. In short, I would say the overall trend is not definitely pointing any way just yet. I do not quite buy the notion that al-Qa’ida needs to carry out a large-scale attack on the West in the near-term to fend off competition for support with IS.

That said, projections into the future need to take account of current developments and possible scenarios. First, it still remains true that the majority of foreign Sunni jihadis who head to the Syria-Iraq arena join IS, primarily because it is easier to join than Jabhat al-Nusra and places emphasis on the Islamic state-building enterprise and its ultimately global scope: how the Arab world jihadis who end up returning to their home countries will affect local jihadi group dynamics needs to be considered. Further, in my view both IS and al-Qa’ida Central are vulnerable to loss of stature if the leader is taken out: IS has invested so heavily in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s image as a caliph- particularly with the lineage claims- and his accomplishments that it seems doubtful IS has a contingency plan for succession to the Caliphate in the event of his death. Meanwhile, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, one can legitimately ask if there is anyone in al-Qa’ida Central to replace Zawahiri in the event of his death.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

I have previously written about Druze militias in Suwayda province and other areas of southern Syria here and here. To summarize briefly the conclusion of those studies, it is clear that ‘Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ (‘Army of the Monotheists/Unitarians’) and ‘Forces of Abu Ibrahim’ are banners for Druze militias of mainly pro-Assad orientation, working with regime forces via ‘Popular Committees’ that had been set up in coordination with the regular Syrian army; further, the boundaries are not always so clear cut between these militias/banner names and organized regime forces. Indeed, many of the localities where these Druze militia banners are advertised are also identifiable sources of recruits for the Syrian army and the National Defence Force (NDF: an evolution from Popular Committees). Unfortunately though, Wikipedia, in attempting to summarize my work, erroneously presents ‘Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ as a coherent military group spanning localities.

In any event, I present the northern Suwayda province village of Dama as a new case study into the use of the banner ‘Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ for Druze militias: around a month ago (16 August), the locality came under attack from rebel forces, subsequently being occupied by them. These rebels were purportedly from Jabhat al-Nusra, though it should be noted that the source for this claim is regime sourcing and so of course the attack will be ascribed to Jabhat al-Nusra, considering that there is no Islamic State presence in Deraa or Suwayda provinces. The locality was reportedly recaptured from rebel forces in less than 24 hours, albeit with some casualties among the Druze locals. A ‘Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ activist source gives the following ‘martyrs’ list for the “Battle of Dama” (this list also contains ‘martyrs’ for a battle in a nearby locality called Deir Dama):

To translate, the names of the ‘martyrs’ for Dama are:

Sheikh Danial Yusuf al-Shabali (Jaysh al-Muwahhideen)
Sheikh Yamin Sa’adu Hamsho (Jaysh al-Muwahhideen)
Sheikh Ihab Salman Azzam (Jaysh al-Muwahhideen)
Sheikh Rami Salam al-Khatib (Jaysh al-Muwahhideen)
Nuris Sa’id al-Safidi (Popular Committees)
Milad Jayid al-Safidi (Popular Committees)
Adham Ammar Faraj (Popular Committees)
Naji Saleh Abu Shaqra (Popular Committees)
Adham Saber al-Jaramani (Popular Committees)

Here also are photos of some of those mentioned above:

Sheikh Yamin Sa’adu Hamsho

Sheikh Danial al-Shabali

Adham Ammar Faraj, said to be from the Suwayda village of Ghariya

Nuris Sa’id al-Safidi

Adham Saber al-Jaramani

Pro-regime TV claims a variety of forces who helped to recapture Dama from the rebels, including Popular Defence Committees, the Ba’ath Brigades and the Syrian army. Of interest though is the ‘Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ graphic above that distinguishes ‘martyrs’ according to ‘Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ or the ‘Popular Committees’. According to this source in an interview with me, the distinction made between the ‘Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ and the Popular Committees is as follows:

“Jaysh al-Muwahhideen is composed of mashayakh [Druze sheikhs] protecting the land, honor and religion against every attacker- whoever he may be- and is independent. Popular Committees are composed of families supporting the army.”

This re-affirms a familiar line of the Druze militia narrative of strict self-defence and repelling anyone who infringes on Druze land- regime-affiliated or rebel. It should also be noted that on the day of the attack on Dama, Druze militias under a variety of names in Suwayda province (Jabal al-Arab) issued a statement under a Jaysh al-Muwahhideen umbrella banner:

“Jaysh al-Muwahhideen in Syria announces general mobilization and all targets in the line of its fire, and warns that any operations within Jabal al-Arab will be met with a severe response and without mercy.

– Saraya Sultan al-Atrash
– Kata’ib Abu Ibrahim
– Saraya al-Jabal
– Special Forces: Jabal Commandoes
– Saraya Souria al-Assad
– Kata’ib al-Tawheed”

What to make of the testimony relayed regarding the ‘Popular Committees/Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ distinction? It may make sense here at the local level of the village of Dama and the surrounding area: that is, perhaps Druze mashayakh in Dama have organized their own ‘Jaysh al-Muwahhideen’ militia intended only for local mashayakh and without help in the first place from the Syrian army. Yet in practice the distinction is meaningless, because there is no evidence of concern about the regime infringing on Druze land in Dama. The natural result is that there will be close coordination with regime forces- in the form of the Syrian army with the Popular Committees- to repel attacks on the area, which will for the foreseeable future be the work of rebels trying to bring Suwayda province out of government control. This translates to an Assad-aligned orientation, which is in fact apparent from the source I interviewed anyway. In short, the case study of Dama reinforces the conclusions from the earlier studies mentioned above.

by Matthew Barber

The plight of thousands of Yazidi women, kidnapped by the Islamic State (IS) during its August 3 attack on Iraq’s Sinjar mountains and in the following weeks, has received some media attention, but most people are unaware of just how far-reaching this disastrous phenomenon is. Boko Haram kidnapped girls in the hundreds, prompting international outcry and an online campaign demanding that they be freed; IS has kidnapped Yazidi women and girls in the thousands in a sexually-motivated campaign  that has rent apart countless families and wrought unimaginable levels of pain and destruction.

During the Syria conflict there have been numerous allegations of forced jihadi marriages that have been difficult to confirm, and widely denied by IS supporters online. Many of those stories were dropped, lacking credible evidence. As the past few years in Syria have demonstrated, rumors run rampant in contexts of conflict, and the initially difficult-to-confirm cases of kidnapped Yazidi women of this summer have been treated with appropriate caution.

Despite this initial caution, the sheer scale of the kidnapping of Yazidi women and the firsthand reports of escaped survivors—and those still in captivity via telephone—have made details of the phenomenon, and its sexual motivations, certain.

Having stayed in northern Iraq all summer, I can confirm the assertions of the journalists who have written about the problem. I have worked directly with those involved in rescue efforts and have personally interacted with families whose daughters have been kidnapped and are now calling their relatives from captivity.

I have no trace of doubt that many women have been carried off and imprisoned; the question that remains is about the numbers. Restrained estimates have posited numbers of kidnapped Yazidi women in the hundreds. However, the reality is likely to be in the thousands.

Though the picture is grim, if the US is willing to back up its overtures of support for Iraqis and Kurds with action, we have the ability to help quickly free a large percentage of the kidnapped Yazidis.

Yazidi refugee women, young and old, share their fears and sorrows with me in an empty warehouse now housing their families. Photo: Matthew Barber/Syria Comment 

The enslavement phenomenon is real

Yazidi leaders and volunteers have been working over the past month with families whose female members were kidnapped, and they have been able to piece together a much clearer picture of the numbers—and locations—of the kidnapped women.

It is no longer a secret that many of the kidnapped women still have their cellphones with them and are calling their families. Many of their captors haven’t even taken steps to prevent this; in some cases jihadists have exploited this contact as a means to sow further terror, in other cases the new “masters” are allowing their “slaves” to have contact with family as they seek to incorporate the kidnapped woman into a slave’s household role with certain privileges and duties.

By speaking with kidnapped women and girls by telephone, and by speaking with the families receiving calls, Yazidis working on the problem are beginning to form more accurate counts of incarcerated women in various places.

It is also no longer a secret that extensive rescue operations are underway, through the participation of local Arabs and Muslims in the communities where the girls are entrapped. Some have been able to purchase girls from IS jihadists and then return them to their parents. Others have been able to escape on their own.

Other kinds of rescue efforts are underway as well. A Yazidi friend I’ve been working with in Dohuk arranged for a group of gunmen to be paid to carry out a rescue operation in one Iraqi city, far to the south of Mosul, where girls had been taken. They broke the girls out of the house where they had been imprisoned by their jihadist “owner” and carried them to safety. Those who conducted the operation are Sunni Arab fighters who do not align with IS (and who are willing to conduct such an operation in exchange for compensation).

These particular girls were transported halfway across the country, placed in the house of their “acquirer,” and made to cook and clean. The new “master” told them: “You are our jawari [slaves taken in war], but don’t worry, you will become as our own women,” meaning that they would be integrated into the household and live as the other wives.

One of the rescued girls was only 15 and was tortured for resisting the demands of her captor for sex. Another suffered such severe psychological trauma due to the kidnapping, subsequent rape, and being shipped across Iraq that she is now very ill.

Attempts to find a religious justification

The philosophy underpinning the taking of Yazidi slaves is based in IS’ interpretation of the practices of Muslim figures during the early Islamic conquests, when women were taken as slave concubines—war booty—from societies being conquered.

Though they have robbed them of their wealth, IS has not targeted the Christian community in the same way that they have the Yazidis. As “People of the Book,” Christians are seen as having certain rights; Yazidis, however, are viewed by IS as polytheists and are therefore seen as legitimate targets for subjugation and enslavement, if they do not convert to Islam.

Many discussions will continue regarding the similarities and differences between IS’ methods and the actual practice of the early Islamic community. Historical context will be discussed by scholars, and God’s intentions will be parsed out by those with a theological bent. But regardless of how our contemporaries interpret the past, IS’ attempts to recreate and relive a period in which slaves were taken in war have shattered families that now reel in pain after their children have been snatched away from them.

First moment of pause: After fleeing the violence and kidnapping in Sinjar, a teenage Yazidi girl sits & cries upon arriving in her new home—a school classroom in Zakho. Photo: Matthew Barber/Syria Comment

Is this the Islamic State or just bands of local criminals?

The online jihadists (or “ehadists”) that defend IS on Twitter and Facebook have had three options in how they respond to this shocking moral collapse. The first is to deny that the kidnapping of Yazidi women and forcing of them into sexual slavery (“concubinage”) is occurring.

But despite the denial of IS supporters on social media, these are not rumors, but cases to which I’m personally connected. Journalists have attested to the same phenomenon in their reporting (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10), and I spent the summer making contact with Yazidi families who have endured this scourge.

The second option for IS supporters on social media is a line of argumentation that acknowledges this trend of sexual slavery while attempting to justify it as a form of revenge for oppression of Sunnis (which, ironically, Yazidis have never participated in—rather, they were victims of some of the highest levels of al-Qaida violence during the Iraq war, as well as previous targets of religious persecution).

The third argument, coming from some IS supporters, claims that this sick and deplorable pattern is not occurring at the hands of the IS membership itself, but is rather the action of other local Sunnis who are opportunistically taking advantage of the war-chaos to rape, pillage, and kidnap. I have also been perplexed by the question of IS’ methods and behavior and have felt a need to understand the fact that they work according to specific ideals and a strict religious code for behavior, yet often seem to act outside of what such a code would permit. They are not alien creatures but human agents with aspirations of state building who even demonstrate acts of compassion. Christians who fled one Iraqi town described to me how IS fighters provided food for their elderly and disabled Christian relatives who were not able to flee, and then later transported them to an area near Kirkuk where they would be able to rejoin their relatives. How are we to reconcile these humane instances of goodwill with the apparent criminality and destruction that is so pervasive with IS?

Regardless of how we come to understand the IS movement psychologically, this third argument—that responsibility for all repugnant acts lies only with local, self-seeking, non-IS actors, and not with IS fighters—is patently false.

It is certain that many local actors have stepped in and plundered their neighbors’ wealth during IS attacks on new areas. However, I have confirmed with multiple eye-witnesses who were present upon IS’ initial Aug. 3 attack of Sinjar, including Sunni Muslims, that the operation of separating women from men and carrying the women off in trucks was conducted by the IS fighters themselves and was carried out as soon as the fighters reached the area.

Muslims trying to flee Sinjar city described to me how, even before reaching the city itself, fighters conducting the initial attack intercepted fleeing families on the road, stopping their vehicles and taking the female passengers—if they were Yazidi. The campaign to seize female Yazidis and enslave them as concubines is an Islamic State project.

US airstrikes could quickly free several thousand Yazidi women and even entire families

Kidnapped women have been transported all over the Sunni regions of Iraq, and into Syria. The location with the highest number of kidnapped is likely Mosul itself. Rescue efforts for many of these women will take years. Some may never return. Some may remain in captivity and reemerge at some distant point in the future. Others will continue to be rescued or escape in the near future.

Despite the enormous challenge of responding to such a monumental tragedy, the possibility exists of freeing a very large number of those kidnapped in a short time. I’m referring to around 2,000 kidnapped Yazidis currently imprisoned in towns and villages in the vicinity of the Sinjar mountains.

Just south of Sinjar are a number of sites where kidnapped Yazidis are being held. Through phone conversations with captured victims, Yazidi leaders in the Dohuk governorate who are working on the problem have been able to get counts and exact locations for most of them. In over a dozen primary holding sites within at least six separate towns, approximately 2,000 Yazidis are trapped. Most of these contain just women, but at least one site contains entire families that have been kidnapped, including male members.

One man I spoke with lost seven family members: his daughter, her husband, and their five children were nabbed by IS in one fell swoop. They were able to contact him once and inform him of their location, but contact was severed after that.

Most of these kidnapped people know where they are. They’re in familiar territory, not far from Sinjar. If their captors were subjected to an aerial campaign—an intense helicopter assault on IS targets for as little as a half-hour—most of these people would be able to flee. The attacking force wouldn’t even be required to regain control of these towns, they would only need to occupy the moderate numbers of IS fighters in the area. The window of distraction would allow many to escape.

Prior to the Kucho massacre (in which IS jihadists lined up and shot all Yazidi males of the town, on Aug. 15), my contacts inside the town (no longer alive) said that every time a US airstrike occurred on nearby IS positions, the IS militants would run for cover. This was without the IS stronghold in Kucho itself being attacked. Kucho was more isolated and even in those moments of distraction the flight of the townspeople wasn’t possible. But for the large numbers of Yazidis currently imprisoned just south of the city of Sinjar, a different outcome is possible.

US airstrikes could also be conducted while coordinating with the newly formed “Yazidi Forces for the Protection of Sinjar,” local volunteers that have been working with the Peshmerga, trying to defend the remaining parts of Sinjar not captured by IS, and hoping to regain their own villages and towns. If a more sustained aerial campaign was undertaken to combat IS in Sinjar, these local Yazidi forces could cooperate in joint rescue efforts and help free many of the enslaved.

Let’s get as many back as possible

Though US airstrikes were conducted to prevent IS from pushing into Dohuk and Erbil (without which I estimate IS might have reached Dohuk in as few as two days), no sustained campaign has been undertaken to facilitate the Kurdish re-taking of Sinjar. People are confused as to why, and I have no answers.

What I do know is that without greater US air support, 1) Sinjar will not be regained by Kurdish forces and the people of Sinjar will not be able to return home, and 2) large numbers of Yazidi women who might otherwise be freed will continue to be sold by IS jihadists as sexual objects. The Dohuk governorate is bursting at the seams with hundreds of thousands of Yazidi and Christian refugees, who, following those that already fled three years of conflict in Syria, have pushed the area’s capacity for refugees beyond its breaking point. Schools should be opening for local children this week, but they cannot, because hardly any school exists in the entire governorate that doesn’t have several families sleeping on the floors of every room.

Sinjar is the population center for the largest segment of Yazidi people in the world. The Yazidi religion is also inextricably linked to holy places in Sinjar. If they are unable to return, it will do lasting damage to one of the Middle East’s last non-Abrahamic minorities, and thousands of victimized women will remain enslaved in 2014. Let’s do what it takes to get these people safely home and free of the most selfish form of evil I’ve personally witnessed in my life.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Intro and Analysis

This new joint statement from al-Qa’ida’s affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP and AQIM)- which seems unprecedented- comes in opposition to the U.S.-led international coalition to fight against the Islamic State (IS), characterizing instead as war against Islam and Muslims. Several things to note in analysis:

a)- This statement does not mean AQAP and AQIM are getting closer to IS or warming to the idea of pledging allegiance to IS. Indeed, they have firmly rejected IS’ Caliphate declaration, and have maintained their loyalty to al-Qa’ida Central (AQC). For comparison, note that members and supporters of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam- an Iraqi jihadi group (with a Syrian branch) which like al-Qa’ida does not accept IS’ claim to be a state or caliphate- have also denounced the U.S. airstrikes etc. targeting IS as constituting war against Islam, and like al-Qa’ida would want an ideal situation where all jihadis having the end-goal of a Caliphate unite against a common enemy, while rejecting IS’ assumption of supreme authority. Thus Abu Bakr al-Iraqi of Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, who previously praised IS’ beheading of James Foley while condemning IS’ massacre of the Sha’itat rebellion against its rule in Deir az-Zor province:

“America in its war against Islam will rely on two components:

1st. Its allies outside of Syria and Iraq who will provide it their military bases, financial support, and increase the stranglehold on the two lands.

2nd. Its allies inside Syria and Iraq and they are:

1. The Safavid Iraqi army.
2. The secular Kurdish army [Peshmerga]
3. The so-called ‘moderate Syrian opposition.’
4. Some of the mercenary gangs of the Sahwa of money and slaves of the dollar.” 

Others outside the transnational jihadist circles have also not hesitated to characterize the U.S.-led initiatives as war on Islam, most notably the Islamic Army in/of Iraq, which by admission of sources from within the group and its supporters is having problems with IS in Iraq. Nonetheless, the group’s spokesman Ibrahim al-Shammary affirmed the following:

“On the anniversary of 11 September [9/11], America is forming an international alliance while claiming that it is for the war on terrorism. Oh Muslims, be wary and heed the strongest warning, for you are the intended target.” 

These kinds of statements have wider implications for outside hopes of building an internal Sunni coalition within Iraq to fight against IS beyond those already working with the central government. Interestingly, the joint AQIM-AQAP statement is dated 11 September: just as AQC in its propaganda portrayed post-9/11 as part of a new initiative of war on Islam, so too AQIM and AQAP, like Ibrahim al-Shammary, attach significance to the building of the anti-IS coalition by Obama as coinciding with the 13th anniversary of 9/11.

In short though, it is the internal Iraq insurgent dynamic that is of greater analytical interest, while AQ-affiliates denouncing the U.S. actions as war on Islam is fairly predictable. One might argue that a recent purported statement from Katiba Uqba ibn Nafi [KUN]- a joint AQIM-Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia project- in support of IS as a Caliphate project reflects an international jihadi trend getting behind IS in the face of the U.S.-led alliance against IS, but I share Daveed Gartenstein-Ross’ skepticism of the authenticity of this statement for some reasons of my own. First, Ansar al-Shari’a Tunisia’s official Twitter news feed, which advertises KUN social media output, has not shared this statement, and second, its only source appears to be in pro-IS circles: besides this, other problems exist with the statement, such as a lack of date on it.

[Update: However, it is also to be noted that the opening of the statement refers to “Kairouan support for the state of the Islamic State”- thus, as Gartenstein-Ross notes, this statement could be genuine and just from a Kairouan province contingent of Katiba Uqba ibn Nafi- which has produced a number of IS alumni- rather than on behalf of the whole battalion as the statement might misleadingly imply at first sight, because ‘Kairouan’ is also used to refer to Tunisia as a whole].

The problem for IS in trying to get new allies for its Caliphate is that its fighting other rebels- including Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria- and brutality towards Muslim dissenters and opponents within its dominion often blunts any potential sympathy for its actual project in the face of U.S. airstrikes etc.

b)- The joint statement refers to IS but without prefixing jamaat [‘group’] to IS’ name to indicate rejection of IS’ claim to be a state/caliphate. This is an interesting contrast with the standard al-Qa’ida approach (also echoed by Jabhat al-Nusra), which had previously accepted IS’ prior incarnation of the Islamic State of Iraq as a legitimate emirate in its own right, despite lacking control at the time of substantial contiguous territory and the workings of an actual state. Nonetheless, I would urge that one should not make too much of this and it most likely just reflects the broader official anti-fitna stance of this statement urging for unity in the face of the U.S.-led coalition (including an end to infighting and name-calling), thus I suspect AQAP and AQIM simply do not wish to bring up the fundamental AQC-IS dispute at this point.

c)- The tribute to Ahrar al-Sham in the wake of the massacre of its leadership comes as no surprise, to be noted in conjunction with Jamaat Ansar al-Islam’s tribute to the group. This reflects the high regard in which global jihadism generally holds Ahrar al-Sham and the group’s status as the link between this ideological trend and Islamist projects focused on the national framework (cf. Jaysh al-Mujahideen Iraq– a Salafi nationalist, revolutionary and anti-Shi’a insurgent group- also extended tribute to the fallen leaders of Ahrar al-Sham).

Below is a translation by me of the statement.

Joint Statement (11 September: Statement No. 1)
Situation: Support for Muslims over the alliance of Crusaders and Apostates.

[…]

The suffering of our people in Iraq and al-Sham has not been absent from our minds, and what they have offered from bodily sacrifices. Nor have the negative consequences- which have followed on for the people of al-Sham from the infighting of the mujahideen- been absent from our minds. Nor has the sadness of the arenas of jihad for the loss of its best leaders and sons from infighting- in which the beneficiary has been the people of the Zionists [Israel], the Cross worshippers, the Rafidites [Shi’a], the Nusayris [Alawites] and their followers- been absent from our minds.

Then there is America- the head of disbelief- and the symbol of the enemy and tyranny, rearing its head again, enlisting behind it allies from the Crusaders and their apostate collaborators, leading the Crusader attempt to wage war on Islam and Muslims, to increase the misfortunes of the Ummah, under the pretext of striking the Islamic State and annihilate it- so they have claimed!! We ask God to render them disappointed, defeated and slaughtered.

As for this oppressive Crusader effort, we can only stand with Islam and Muslims, against Crusader America and its alliance (Jewish-Crusader-Safavid-Apostate) that is the true enemy of the Ummah and the Path and the first to wage war on Shari’a, so we declare this stance of ours to please God, to support our mujahideen brothers over the disbelievers, and defend our Muslim people wherever they are. Thus we say:

. Our mujahideen brothers in Iraq and al-Sham…stop infighting among yourselves and stand as one rank in the face of the initiative by America and its Satanic alliance lying in wait against us all to break us again and again. Counter the unity of the nations of disbelief against you by your unity against them, in accordance with the speech of the Almighty: “And fight the polytheists as a whole just as they fight you as a whole, and know that God is with those aware of Him” […]

. Oh mujahideen and ansar [helpers/supporters], stop name-calling and hurling of insults, and turn your truth-telling pens and cutting swords on the head of disbelief- America- and its oppressive, aggressive alliance.

. To all who bear arms in the face of the tyrant Bashar and his shabiha, it is you that America will seek to finance with its double-dealing and deception, that you may deviate from your path and only be banners in its hand realizing its interests.

. To our people- the Ahl al-Sunna [Sunnis] in Iraq and al-Sham, do not forget America’s crimes against your lands, and do not forget its stance in the line of your battles, and its poisonous daggers remain planted in your chests, so do not let its trickery deceive you, or enter into its alliance, or become among its soldiers against your mujahideen sons. 

. We call on our Muslim Ummah to support our people in Iraq and al-Sham, and support them with what is precious and costly, and stand in their rank against America, the head of disbelief, the source of evil and the symbol of corruption and oppression.

. We call on our Muslim Ummah to disavow the calls of the apostate rulers and their collaborators in error and leading astray to support the disbelieving Americans against the mujahideen, just as we call on them to stop their conscripted sons from participating in this oppressive enemy war that aims in truth to preserve American Crusader hegemony over our Muslim Ummah and protect the state of the people of Zionists [Israel].

. We call on our people in the Arabian Peninsula in particular and in all the states in this Satanic alliance in general to stand against their collaborationist governments and prevent them- by all lawful means- from continuing this war on Islam under the pretext of waging war on terrorism.

. As for you, oh allies of disbelief and evil, take heed of what will afflict you, for black days await you. For these leaders of yours today are sinking and are afraid to confront the knights of Islam. And indeed you hav tested the swords of the soldiers of Islam and the assault of the heroes of Iraq and al-Sham, so God brought you to defeat and degradation at their hands, and your armies were defeated bearing the consequences of failure.

. We conclude these calls by reminding the Islamic Ummah of the words of the renewer of time and vanquisher of the Americans- Sheikh Osama [bin Laden] (may God have mercy on him and make good his soil): “Consult no one in [fighting] the Americans.”

To conclude this statement, we offer our sincere condolences to the mujahideen of the group Ahrar al-Sham…and we ask God to have mercy on their martyrs and remunerate us and them in their misfortune and render us better from it, just as we offer to our people in al-Sham in general and the families of martyrs in particular our sincere condolences and we ask God the Almighty, the High to connect with their hearts and pour out endurance on them.

God, provide for this Ummah a just situation in which the people who obey you are made mighty and the people of your misfortune are laid low. God, give victory to our mujahideen brothers in Iraq and al-Sham and in every place.God, ruin America and whoever of its allies and those taking its side against the mujahideen.

[…]

Qa’ida al-Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb.

Dreaming of Home : Syrian Refugees in Jordan’s Cities – Will They Be Repatriated?
by Matthew R. Stevens – @Matt_R_Stevens
for Syria Comment, Sept 16, 2014

“What do I think will happen?” He sighs. “I think that it is over. I think Bashar will win.”

I am cross-legged in the sitting room of a Syrian family, hot tea half-forgotten in my hand. I give the man a long, searching stare. He nods in confirmation. Asad will win. Asad already has won.

This point of view has become familiar through the first three months of research on post-conflict Syrian social structures in Irbid. The second largest city in Jordan, Irbid rests about 20km from the Dar’a border crossing. Irbid Governate held a population of approximately one million before the conflict began in Syria; now, it is home to an additional 160,000 Syrians.

Opportunistic sampling of Syrians living in Irbid has revealed greater diversity in political leanings than initially expected. Few report being staunch supporters of either Asad or the FSA. Irrespective of previous political hopes for Syria, many seem to be playing a pragmatic game of reconciliation—re-obscuring political affiliations in a preparation for rehabilitation with the regime.

ISIS Is Weaker Than It Looks
By Balint Szlanko – @balintszlanko
For Syria Comment, Sept 13, 2014

ERBIL, Iraqi Kurdistan—The extremist group known variously as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or simply Islamic State, has maneuvered itself into a difficult situation over the last couple of months. Fanatical groups like this are prone to violent overreach and they often end up with everybody else ganging up on them. ISIS is no different and now it will pay the price. It may also be far weaker than it looks, for it’s only really been able to shine against much weaker enemies.

ISIS’ big gains in Iraq (they took Mosul in early June and the Sinjar region in early August) have led to a situation where most of the region’s players have allied themselves against it, including archenemies like Iran and the U.S.—and that was before the Obama administration started building a broad international coalition against them. The Iraqis have already got rid of their incompetent prime minister, Nour al Maliki, whose sectarian policies are largely responsible for driving many Sunnis into the arms of Islamic State. The new Iraqi government seems to have a broader political and sectarian basis, although whether that will have any effect on the ground remains to be seen. As it has been pointed out elsewhere, Iraqi governments usually have a broad confessional basis, the problem is that this doesn’t really get reflected in policy outputs.

More important is that the military cooperation between the Iraqis, the U.S. and the forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government is already delivering results. The Kurds have got a much-needed morale boost from the American airstrikes against ISIS and the Western military aid that is already being flown into Kurdistan (so far small arms, ammunition and anti-tank weapons have arrived, ministry of peshmerga officials told me in Erbil, but heavy weapons have been promised as well). They pushed back ISIS forces around the Mosul Dam Lake, west of Erbil, and in the south of the KRG around Jalawla, though Jalawla itself remains under ISIS control.

The Iraqi Army, helped by Shiite militias, has also gained some ground (though it may be more accurate to say that Shiite militias, helped by the Iraqi Army, have gained ground, which is bound to cause big problems later). Even in Syria we are seeing some results by anti-ISIS forces: the militants have been stopped north of Aleppo by a coalition of moderate rebels who have even retaken some of the villages they lost in August. In the east, the Kurdish militia, the YPG, drove them all the way down to the south of Hasaka city. To be sure, these frontlines all have their own dynamic and developments there should be analysed more or less independently. But the fact remains that ISIS is now facing determined adversaries on several very long frontlines both in Iraq and Syria, clearly a big problem for any state or insurgent group. It will soon face more U.S. airstrikes too.

The bottom line is that while ISIS looks strong, it really isn’t as strong as its fearsome reputation suggests. It is an organised, highly motivated guerrilla group with lots of experienced fighters. It builds on the weaknesses of its enemies by sending its highly mobile, quick-moving forces to places where they are least expected, uses suicide bombers as just another battlefield tool, and it magnifies the fear created by its shocking brutality with effective publicity. And now it has also got a significant amount of heavy weapons and armour, captured from the Iraqis, plus an influx of men, some from disenchanted Syrian rebel groups, some from Sunni tribes and other Iraqi insurgent group. It also has a lot of money, some from robbery, some from kidnappings and some from protection rackets.

And yet ISIS have only really been successful in areas where it faced no serious resistance: in the political and military vacuum of the Sunni heartland, in eastern Syria and central and western Iraq. Its significant battlefield successes have really only been against disorganized and undermotivated enemies, such as the Iraqi Army or Syria’s disparate rebels, or isolated outposts of the Syrian Army, under siege for a very long time. Whenever it had to confront a determined and organised adversary, such as the Kurdish YPG in northeastern Syria, it has always been bested. Even Syria’s ragtag rebels managed to kick it out of northwestern Syria early this year, though that was before its big Iraqi victories and associated growth in strength. The same thing is likely to happen now, if only because launching surprise attacks against largely undefended cities is very different from defending the large geographic area it now controls against coordinated attacks (and the U.S. Air Force).

This means that ISIS can be contained, its abilities degraded, perhaps quite severely. It doesn’t mean it can be destroyed, not with these tools alone. For that, the dysfunctional policies of the Sunni heartland would have to be addressed, its institutions strengthened, so that their own moderate parties can contain the impulses that have led to ISIS’ emergence, without the need for American airstrikes and Kurdish or Shiite militias. Clearly this is the real challenge and there is no obvious solution in sight. ISIS’ brutality may or may not lead to local resistance—so far those who have tried paid dearly. The Sunni tribes, the heartland’s only visible institutions, are too weak, as are Syria’s moderate rebels. The Syrian and Iraqi states, or what has remained of them, are discredited. It is probably impossible to put these countries back together again. But that doesn’t mean ISIS cannot be contained in a manageable geographic area. My bet is that it’s likely to stick around for a while but in a much weakened form.

Balint Szlanko is a freelance journalist who has covered Syria since early 2012 and has recently completed two trips to the Kurdish areas

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

I have previously documented part/predominantly foreign fighter battalions in Syria here, here and here. Below are a couple more groups as part of this series.

Jaysh Muhammad in Bilad al-Sham

Logo of Jaysh Muhammad in Bilad al-Sham, with motto reading: “We are victorious or we die.” The group’s other main slogan is: “The law of God rules us,” similar to the mentality of other foreign fighter battalions like the Imam Bukhari Battalion of Uzbek fighters.

Al-Mi’ad Media, the media wing of Jaysh Muhammad.

Jaysh Muhammad is a jihadi faction led by one Abu Obeida al-Muhajir (of Egyptian nationality). The group primarily operates in Aleppo province but has extended operations to other governorates: for example, the group participated in October 2013 with the Green Battalion and the Islamic State (IS), among other “Islamic battalions,” in an offensive on the Sakhna region in Homs province.

In Aleppo province, Jaysh Muhammad worked and co-existed with the Islamic State in some areas prior to and somewhat after the start of wider infighting between IS and other rebels. For instance, in July 2013, a joint operations room as part of “The Battle of True Dawn” was formed in an attempt to capture the two Shi’a localities of Nubl and Zahara’ in Aleppo province, including Jaysh Muhammad, IS, Ahrar al-Sham and a local north Aleppo battalion. As for the aftermath of the beginning of infighting in January 2014, the most notable instance of Jaysh Muhammad-IS cooperation came in the “And Don’t Separate” initiative- an alliance of jihadi factions including Jabhat al-Nusra and independent groups like the Green Battalion- to capture Kweiris military airbase to the east of Aleppo city. It quickly fell apart though as all battalions except IS withdrew.

The most interesting case of IS-Jaysh Muhammad relations was the locality of Azaz, which was seized by IS in autumn 2013 from the FSA-banner brigade Northern Storm. To recap briefly the story of what went on there, IS entered the town of Azaz in the summer of 2013- to the chagrin of some locals– and the group moved into what was a services office to engage in da’wah and social outreach, without initially having a military presence. It was only when IS decided to seize on a pretext to take over the town that fighters and tanks were called in from outside.

That said, in a recent interview with me, a spokesman for Northern Storm- which has since returned to become the sole ruling authority in Azaz following IS’ withdrawal earlier this year and has formally joined the Islamic Front- affirmed that while Northern Storm and IS had worked together in the fall of Mannagh airbase in summer 2013, IS had been stockpiling weapons seized from the base in what was then its da’wah office. In any event, when fighting initially broke out in Azaz in September 2013, a ceasefire agreement was mediated by Liwa al-Tawhid and required both Liwa al-Tawhid and Jaysh Muhammad to implement the agreement.

It turns out that while Liwa al-Tawhid was nowhere to be seen in the face of IS’ subsequent breaking of the ceasefire agreement to expel Northern Storm entirely from Azaz, Jaysh Muhammad had remained in Azaz, having a base there and essentially standing by as IS took over the town. Whereas Liwa al-Tawhid’s inaction at the time appears to have been the result of an informal condemnation of Northern Storm by Aleppo’s Shari’a Committee, Jaysh Muhammad more likely did nothing out of jihadi ideological sympathy for IS.

What happened in the run-up to IS’ strategic abandonment of Azaz at the end of February- considering that the area was cut off from the rest of IS’ contiguous territory in east Aleppo province- is also of interest. If we are to believe the testimony of foreign fighter and Twitter personality “Abu Hamza al-Erhabi”- who at the time claimed affiliation with Jaysh Muhammad- then Jaysh Muhammad planned in advance to abandon Azaz if IS left. According to Northern Storm’s spokesman in an interview with me, Northern Storm imposed an ultimatum on Jaysh Muhammad to leave Azaz, join the fight against IS, or face war.

Despite past events in Azaz and elsewhere suggesting affinity with IS, Jaysh Muhammad actually seems to have been closer to Jabhat al-Nusra all along, even as all three groups of course ultimately have the same goal of a global Caliphate. Indeed, Abu Hamza al-Erhabi had described his group as “sort of” Jabhat al-Nusra. However, in July this year, Jabhat al-Nusra in Aleppo put out a statement disavowing organizational relations with Jaysh Muhammad:

“Jabhat al-Nusra in Aleppo announces that the Jaysh Muhammad battalion under the leadership of the brother Sheikh Abu Obeida the Egyptian- may God protect him- has no organizational connection with Jabhat al-Nusra, for the behavior of the battalion is not considered appropriate in Jabhat al-Nusra’s eyes with the maintenance of a relation of brothers, affection and sincerity between us.”

Jaysh Muhammad then issued a response affirming that it never had allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra in the first place and attempting a further clarification:

“In response to the prevailing view regarding the statement of the Jabhat al-Nusra brothers in Aleppo- may God give them strength- and the clarification of the relationship between Jaysh Muhammad in Bilad al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra, we clarify the confusion that has arisen: Jaysh Muhammad did not pledge allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra from the beginning and Jabhat al-Nusra has no pledge of allegiance on the neck of Jaysh Muhammad for it to be understood that Jaysh Muhammad was expelled from Jabhat al-Nusra.

But the statement was published on account of what is prevalent among the people: that Jaysh Muhammad is under allegiance to Jabhat al-Nusra on the basis of coordination and cooperation between Jaysh Muhammad and Jabhat al-Nusra: but this is mistaken, for in reality there is joint cooperation and organization between Jaysh Muhammad and Jabhat al-Nusra; moreover, this has not ceased their continuing to be our brothers and beloved ones, and there continues to be a relationship of being brothers in God, affection and sincerity.”

The current status of the relationship between Jabhat al-Nusra and Jaysh Muhammad is unclear, but arguably as part of the wider trend of non-IS jihadi groups beginning to implement their own state/proto-state legislation projects as territory in Syria is increasingly gobbled up by the regime and IS,[i] Jaysh Muhammad announced in July its intentions of implementing Shari’a and hudud regulations in their entirety in all captured areas. At the moment nothing suggests that Jaysh Muhammad has joined some of the other jihadi groups operating in Aleppo province that formed the Jabhat Ansar al-Din coalition.

Update: It has now emerged that despite the Northern Storm ultimatum, Jaysh Muhammad has retained a base in the wider Azaz area (though not participating in any way in governance of the town of Azaz), as the Islamic Front has just released a statement giving Jaysh Muhammad three days to evacuate the Azaz area in light of the fighting against IS. 

Jund al-Aqsa

Flag of Jund al-Aqsa

Jund al-Aqsa media committee.

Jund al-Aqsa (“Soldiers of al-Aqsa”) is a foreign fighter battalion of a variety of nationalities (including some of South Asian origin)- as well as comprising a native Syrian contingent- primarily operating in Idlib and Hama governorates. The group was in January of this year confronted by rebels on the grounds of being an ally of IS, but with IS’ withdrawal from Idlib and Hama provinces, any tensions between Jund al-Aqsa and other rebels have since calmed down, and the group has notably taken part in joint offensives with Ahrar al-Sham of the Islamic Front (e.g. capturing the village of Ma’an in Hama province in February, which culminated in a massacre of local Alawites). More recently, Jund al-Aqsa has been participating with the Islamic Front in an operation to capture Hama military airport: Ghazwa Badr al-Sham al-Kubra, announced last month and ongoing. Indeed, it is notable that even as other jihadi groups have set about working on their own administrative initiatives, it is striking that Jund al-Aqsa still remains focused on advertising military operations.

Jund al-Aqsa claiming to fire heavy weaponry at regime aircraft as part of the offensive on Hama military airport.

Jund al-Aqsa claiming to target regime positions around Hama military airport as part of the same offensive.

Jabhat al-Nusra has also continued to work with Jund al-Aqsa, pointing to Jund al-Aqsa’s closer affinity at the present time to Jabhat al-Nusra than IS, whatever the prior relations were with the latter. In this photo released in June, Jabhat al-Nusra claims coordination with Jund al-Aqsa in targeting a hotel building in Idlib city that members of Hezbollah were supposedly using as a base.

Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Qatari, the amir of Jund al-Aqsa killed in fighting with rebels in January. Of Palestinian origin, he was apparently a veteran of the jihad in Iraq for some time before going to Qatar and continuing to support the insurgency against U.S. forces in Iraq.

Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Masri: an Egyptian fighter for Jund al-Aqsa whose death was announced on 26 July this year.

Muhannad al-Ansari, from Saraqeb (Idlib province), killed in the Ghazwa Badr al-Sham al-Kubra. Death announced on 30 July.

Notes

[i] Though Jabhat al-Nusra has tried to backtrack in its public rhetoric on the leaked ‘emirate’ announcement by leader Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani, its recent record on the ground of seizing territory from one-time allies of the Syrian Revolutionaries Front in Idlib in particular and the announcement of economic and societal regulations therein undermine its attempts at ‘clarification.’

Undoubtedly too the behavior by Jabhat al-Nusra is partly explained as the result of a perception that some rebels are receiving Western arms on the condition of not cooperating with Jabhat al-Nusra and therefore constitute a threat in the long-run as territory available for control- particularly crucial border areas- becomes increasingly scarce.

by Justin Schon

“In the interest of our national security, we are prepared to close the border if — God forbid — anarchy breaks out in Syria or we see an unprecedented humanitarian crisis,” Jordanian Minister of State for Media Affairs and Communications and Government Spokesperson Samih Maaytah said in January 2013. This statement may not seem noteworthy for one of Syria’s neighbors, but it did signal increasing concern from the Jordanian government about the growing influx of Syrian refugees. These security fears have only grown over time.

In response to civil conflict in a neighboring state, it is not uncommon for states to close their borders. Border closures are commonly seen as one method to reduce the likelihood of conflict spreading from neighboring countries. In theory, border closures should prevent weapons, supplies, armed groups, and civilians from flowing through the country. For example, Kenya has attempted to close its border with Somalia. However, just as Kenya has proven unable to stem the flows of weapons, Al Shabaab fighters, and Somali refugees, Jordan’s attempts to restrict movement across its border with Syria have achieved little success. Arguably, they have even made Jordan less safe.

Ultimately, it is not possible to completely control a border. Over 600,000 Syrians have entered Jordan since the start of Syria’s conflict in 2011, with several hundred thousand of them having arrived since Jordan began to seriously restrict entry. This seems to have begun around March 2013, when Jordan was accused of closing the crossing at Nassib. Jordan finally admitted in June 2013 that it had closed several illegal crossing points and limited the entry of refugees through other border crossings.

These restrictions did not stop the flow of refugees into Jordan. Even by early 2012, it had already become more difficult for Syrians to enter Jordan. This simply prompted many Syrians to cross illegally into Jordan. These crossings occurred along at least 45 illegal crossing points. With a 231 mile border, much of it located in harsh desert, the Jordan-Syria border is very difficult to secure.

Yet, by May 2013, the Jordanian government had managed to shut down most of these crossings. Now, the best hope for Syrians to cross into Jordan lies in travelling to the East, where Syrians must endure the harsh desert, government checkpoints, bombings, pro-government militias, and Bedouins who often demand bribes to allow fleeing civilians to pass. As one refugee told me, “From Deraa, it can take about 15 days to travel to the desert border crossing near Ruwayshid [city in eastern Jordan]. When people arrive there, they are almost always out of food and water. Many need medical care. But then they have to wait for Jordan to let them enter. This can take one week, one month, or more.”

These controls have prevented many Syrians from being able to leave Syria at all. Those unfortunate enough to be in this position are often forced to live in large displaced persons camps around Nassib, Tel Shihab, and other border towns. This problem is aggravated by the inability of many Syrians living north of Deraa to find out about the border restrictions. Thus, many Syrians go to Deraa, only to learn that they cannot cross into Jordan from there. Instead, they have to go back north to Damascus, then to Sweidah, and then east to the desert border crossing from which they can reach Ruwayshid in Jordan. People without the money to pay for this trip are often left with no options other than staying in the displaced persons camps.

These camps host thousands of people, and sadly have not been safe from bombing by the Syrian government, including barrel bombs. As fighting moves closer to the border, there is an increased likelihood for violence to cross into Jordan. On Monday, August 11, a rocket fired from Syria reportedly landed a few hundred meters from Zaatari. Jordanians have also been hit by stray bullets from fighting along the border. Bold attempts to cross have even forced the Jordanian military to take lethal action, such as when it destroyed trucks with Syrian rebels attempting to enter Jordan in April 2014.

This situation leads to the Jordanian military intercepting as many refugees as they can when they cross the border. Thousands of refugees have been sent directly to the Zaatari refugee camp. Now, with the opening of the Azraq refugee camp, all refugees are sent to Azraq except refugees for whom UNHCR determines there are protection concerns. Regardless, most refugees, understandably, strongly dislike the camps.

Hence, there are many attempts to leave them. The main system that the Jordanian government has implemented to allow people to leave is known as the bail-out system. This system, which I briefly discussed in my previous post, was originally meant to be a compromise between UNHCR and the Jordanian government. For UNHCR, it is a way to give people some freedom to leave the camps. For Jordan, it is a way to facilitate effective monitoring of refugees when they leave the camps.

In practice, refugees have often avoided this system, choosing instead to bribe Jordanian military officers for the opportunity to leave the camps. These refugees do not get registered with the Jordanian Ministry of Interior, and only sometimes register with UNHCR. Therefore, large numbers of people are outside the official system, making them extremely challenging to monitor. It is therefore unlikely that Jordan would be hosting an estimated 100,000 unregistered Syrian refugees, as it currently is, if it were not for the border closures and restrictions. Now that there are so many unregistered refugees, officials fear that there is a serious risk that these unregistered Syrians will become involved in radical groups.

Through its own attempts to maintain its security, Jordan is creating security challenges for itself. Its decision to close and/or restrict entry at its border crossings with Syria has contributed to a situation where there is insecurity along the border and a growing number of unregistered, poorly monitored Syrians. Without such controls, there would surely be more Syrians in Jordan, but they would be easier to monitor. It is also likely that border areas would be more secure. Jordan would be safer as a result.

10 Things to Know About Refugees in Jordan
by Justin Schon, a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at Indiana University Bloomington. His research focuses on insurgency and population displacement during conflict. He can be followed on twitter @goliathSchon

This post is the first of two posts I will be writing for this blog. It is based on the observations I have made and conversations I have had during my fieldwork in Jordan. This is by no means an all-inclusive list, but they are all points that are important to know about the refugee situation in Jordan.

1)     Syrians are not the only refugees in Jordan

Although Syrians have stolen much of the attention in recent years, Jordan is actually home to many groups of refugees. The largest of these groups is Palestinian refugees. However, Jordan also hosts large and growing numbers of Iraqi refugees. Then there are many other smaller groups of refugees, such as Sudanese and Somali refugees, as is discussed here. All of these groups face serious challenges in Jordan.

At the same time, the types of challenges these groups face can be very different. Syrians are currently the high profile group, so there are a lot more aid organizations focusing their efforts on them. At the same time, they may also be more likely to be the victims of backlash against refugees than other refugee groups because of that high profile. On the other hand, Sudanese and Somali refugees are a small and often ignored group. These groups even have difficulty acquiring refugee status.

Thus, when thinking about responses to refugee influxes in Jordan, it is a mistake to lump all refugees in Jordan into one category. Their needs are different, and they can require very different responses.

2)     Most Syrians are not living in the refugee camps

Currently, more than 80% of Syrian refugees in Jordan do not live in a refugee camp. Zaatari may capture a lot of the public interest and media headlines, but the refugee camps only contain a small portion of the total Syrian refugee population in Jordan.

This means that the focus of the response to Syrian refugees needs to be on urban refugees. The Jordanian government has stressed, justifiably, that aid programs should target geographic areas, rather than refugees specifically, so that Jordanians can benefit from these programs as well. UNHCR and the broader INGO and NGO community generally agree with this goal, so it should not be seen as controversial.

3)     Refugees strongly support the Free Syrian Army

Many refugees in Jordan have friends or family that fought with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and the FSA is instrumental in helping many people leave Syria. So, it should come as no surprise that many of the refugees in Jordan support the Free Syrian Army. There is speculation about how much support IS/ISIL/ISIS has among Syrian refugees in Jordan, but my own work has made me skeptical of this claim. Some Syrian refugees are even convinced that the Assad government and ISIS are in an alliance, making it even more unlikely that they would be willing to support ISIS.

4)     It is unlikely that there would be a large voluntary repatriation of Syrian refugees if Assad were allowed to take control of southern Syria.

One of the arguments for allowing Assad to win the war is that it would at least be a way to bring stability to Syria and provide a way for Syrian refugees to return to Syria. There is some logic in this, but the conversations I have had with refugees in Jordan do not support the argument.

For many refugees in Jordan, they were specifically fleeing from government troops and pro-government militias. Even if Assad were to create stability in Syria, many Syrians would be unlikely to return voluntarily because the source of their fear would remain in power.

The word voluntary is important because the Jordanian government is showing a desire to encourage Syrian refugees to return to Syria, even at the cost of suffering protests from UNHCR and numerous NGOs. If Syria becomes stable, then Jordan could use the norm of safe return, rather than non-refoulement, as its rationale for repatriating Syrian refugees. In short, safe return is the idea that refugee return is facilitated by host governments when the origin country becomes safe. It does not have to be a voluntary return. Non-refoulement means that refugees should not return to their origin countries unless the decision has been made voluntarily and without coercion. This legal distinction between safe return and non-refoulement is important to consider, and could become relevant in the case of Syrian refugees.

5)     Refugees often pay close attention to what is happening back in Syria.

Every refugee that I have spoken with has told me that they regularly call friends and family that are still in Syria. They even frequently watch television and surf the internet. Social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter are also used by many people. So, the Syrian refugee community in Jordan is very engaged in following and discussing the events taking place inside Syria.

6)     Syrians in Jordan know more about the conflict in some ways than Syrians in Syria.

Consuming so much information does often mean that Syrian refugees are consuming more information than they were when they were back in Syria. In addition, many people that primarily watched movies and television series before the war switched to watching the news during the war. Meanwhile, many television channels and internet websites have gotten blocked by the Syrian government. Television channels can change their broadcast frequency, but this is still an impediment for those attempting to get their news from watching television.

This may seem counter-intuitive, but it is actually consistent with some recent work published by Oxford’s Refugee Studies Centre. Refugees often consume more information than other civilians.

7)     Syrian refugees are not welcome in Jordan long-term.

Syrians currently make up about 10% of the population inside Jordan. This influx has strained Jordan’s economic resources, security services, and environmental resources. Thus, Jordan has made it very clear that aid organizations should avoid livelihoods programs or any measures that would encourage Syrians to stay long-term. For example, Syrians cannot obtain work permits, and Syrians caught working without a permit risk serious harassment or punishment from the Jordanian government. There is even a possibility of deportation back to Syria in some of these cases.

While it would be preferable for Jordan to welcome Syrians for as long as they should choose to stay, the government’s response must be taken in context. It is facing security challenges in both Iraq and Syria, high unemployment domestically, water shortages, and rising discontent among its domestic population with the Syrians. One could even argue that it is amazing that Jordan has not struggled even more with the strain of hosting so many refugees.

8)     There is disagreement about whether Syrians that want to return to Syria should be encouraged to do so.

This is related to the previous point. UNHCR considers Syria unsafe for refugee repatriation, even if it is voluntary. However, the Jordanian government encourages refugees to return to Syria if they are willing. Therefore, UNHCR has chosen to monitor these returns to ensure that they are least voluntary. As time passes, this dynamic is important to watch.

9)     The bail-out system is flawed.

One quirk of the Jordanian system of hosting refugees is that Syrians can leave the refugee camps if a Jordanian pays 300 JD and agrees to take responsibility for the refugee. This system was meant to be a way to allow Syrians to leave the refugee camps while providing a way for Jordan to continue monitoring the movements of Syrian refugees.

Officially, the Jordanian is supposed to be of a certain age, be married, have no criminal background, and satisfy several other characteristics. Unofficially, additional money can be paid to get around these requirements. Fake papers are used in some circumstances. These issues have meant that the bail-out system, which was originally meant to be a compromise with good intentions, has now become a system that encourages bribery and pushes many refugees under the radar once they leave the refugee camps.

10)  Border closures have many negative effects upon civilians.

Jordan’s decision to close border crossings from Syria has produced many additional hardships for displaced Syrians. Syrians unable to cross at the border crossings near Deraa often have to find an illegal border crossing. Much of the crossing happens in the eastern part of Jordan, where there is little but desert. Making this trip takes much more time, costs a lot of money, and exposes fleeing Syrians to the risk of more checkpoints. This is not to mention the large displaced persons camps that have emerged along the border due to being forced to wait for permission to cross the border.

In my second post, I will discuss these challenges in greater detail. I will be focusing on this point because border closures do involve tremendous costs for displaced Syrians. These costs merit additional discussion.

* This work was supported by a Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) scholarship and a grant from the Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis.
my website: http://justinschon.yolasite.com/