Lebanon's by-election to be held in the Metn, the heartland of Christian Lebanon, is a bellwether. It will give us a good indication of whether Michel Aoun, an ally of Hizbullah, or Amin Gemayel, an ally of Saad Hariri, is stronger in the Christian north.

Aoun and Gemayel stage simultaneous rallies, drawing thousands of supporters, Daily Star

Aoun addressed the rally in Dbayyeh from behind a bullet proof shield and dubbed his electoral opponents "windmills of lies" with nothing to offer voters but lies and unfulfilled promises. "I will not call them sons of snakes, but sons of rumors, and rumors are like a rootless weed, once you pluck it out it dies," Aoun said of his opponents.

"They frighten you and tell you there will be trouble [Sunday], we tell you have no fear, the army and security forces are there to protect you and so are our [fists]," Aoun said, warning all those who try to use violence, close roads or attack supporters Sunday, adding that the Metn is a peaceful and civilized place.

"Our choice is that of peace for Lebanon, but not the peace of the weak," Aoun said, adding that his electoral opponents thought the FPM was weak when they tried to reach a consensus to avoid the electoral battle. He said that not one of the government's promises have been met in the last two years.

At the rally in Antelias, Gemayel warned his opponents that "Metn will never be a suburb of Damascus" building on anti-Syrian feelings to warn the people of Metn that a vote for Aoun is a vote for the return of Syrian tutelage.

As for opponents' claims that voting for Khoury is like voting to return Lebanon to Syria, Khoury said: "It is well known who struggled against the Syrian line over the past 15 years … We not only faced the Syrians but many Lebanese who today claim to defend sovereignty and independence and are among the ranks of March 14 but who made deals with the Syrians to return to Lebanon."

Polling by Information International ahead of next Sunday's by-elections in the Metn to fill the seat left vacant after the assassination of March 14 MP Pierre Gemayel. The pollers said that Amin Gemayyel would receive 60 percent of Maronite voters, while Khoury would get 85 percent of the Armenian votes and 55 percent of the Orthodox votes. It said both candidates would get an equal number of votes from Catholics.

Friday Lunch Club writes that the Metn Polls suggest that Aoun's candidate will win over Amine Gemayel by 6000 votes. He also writes:

Kataeb nomenklatura instructed their voter-supporters to "vote very early in the AM and go home". The plan is to create "disturbances" at the ballot locals, prompting early closures.

Elaph carrries an anti-Aoun story:

BBC MidEast: Lebanon's Awn Reportedly Meets Syrian Security
2007-08-03 16:30 (New York)

Text of report by London-based, Saudi-owned Elaph website on 3 August

A Western diplomatic source has disclosed that Lebanese Deputy Michel Awn who visited Germany last week on the pretext of meeting with German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier went to this European country to hold a secret meeting with senior Syrian security official Major-General Muhammad Nasif (Abu-Wa'il).

The source said the meeting between Awn and "Abu-Wa'il" focused on the parliamentary battle in north Al-Matn which Awn is contesting in an attempt to prevent Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil from winning the seat that was occupied by his son Pierre who was assassinated last November. The source stressed that Maj-Gen Nasif underlined the need for Awn to contest the elections battle against Al-Jumayyil to the end and that Syria is willing to place all its resources at his disposal.

The Syrian official insisted that Awn should not back down on the attle and reiterated that Damascus would ask the parties it influences to back Awn's candidate to the utmost limit. He pointed out in this respect that Syria is capable of pressuring the Armenian Tashnaq Party to have all its votes go to Awn's candidate.

It was noticed that Awn returned from Germany with hard-line stands that prevented any compromise in Al-Matn after Muhammad Nasif asserted to him that Syria was capable of ensuring his candidate's success and would put its weight and that of all its allies behind achieving this goal.

It is known that Maj-Gen Nasif is responsible for the Shi'i dossier in general and the Shi'i one in Lebanon in particular and has a history of strong relations with all the Shi'i parties, foremost of them "Hezbollah" and "Amal." The senior Syrian security official visits Germany frequently for treatment.

(c) 2007 BBC Monitoring Middle East.

Michael Young gets in a few wacks at Aoun as well, but in contrast to Elaph, he argues in "Is Michel Aoun walking into a trap?" that Syria is not backing Aoun, but secretly hopes he will lose in order to divide Christians. He writes:

Syria is looking to weaken Aoun, just as its main intention is to push the Christians into a destructive internecine crisis. Why? Perhaps to advance an alternative presidential contender at the right time, and to ensure that the Christians are so divided after the Metn election that they will be unable to agree on a different consensus candidate for the presidency.

Nasrallah slams Bush for 'meddling' in Lebanon's affairs

Security Council adopts statement on Lebanon

Murr and Feltman discuss US military aid to Lebanon

Itamar Rabinovich has published an article today (in the mean time I believe it is only in Hebrew) saying basically that situation today reminds him of Egypt and Israel back in the early 70's, when Sadat wanted to have peace but ended up in waging a war.

He also says Syria and Israel had secret nego's in the 90's and 2000, not always with the presence of the Americans.

He suggested that Israel should reject the condition set by Assad in his last speech – that Israel agrees to withdraw from the Golan prior to opening talks – which is a much tougher condition than before. Nevertheless, he says, Israel should not push Assad to the corner.

Aug. 2 — President Bush said Thursday that the United States would freeze the property and assets of anyone trying to undermine Lebanon’s democratically elected government — a move intended as a sharp warning to Syria and its ally Hezbollah.

The announcement, in an executive order and an accompanying letter to Congress, reflects heightened concern in Washington that Syria is trying to reassert control over Lebanon. It comes a little more than a month after the administration announced that it was enacting a travel ban, barring “those who have contributed to the breakdown of the rule of law in Lebanon,” possibly including leading Syrian intelligence officials, from entering the United States.

Taken together, the steps are an effort to ratchet up pressure on Syria at a time when the administration contends that it is helping to fuel the insurgency in Iraq, as well as creating instability in Lebanon. Mr. Bush’s order deems interference in Lebanon’s government to be an “extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States,” and declares it a “national emergency.”

Administration officials say they are especially concerned that the fragile democratic government in Lebanon, headed by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, could splinter if the Lebanese president, Émile Lahoud, who has close ties to Syria, tries to establish an alternate government. That concern has grown in recent months, said an administration official involved in formulating the executive order.

Experts say it is unclear what effect, if any, freezing property and assets will have. Jon B. Alterman, a Middle East expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington who visited President Assad about a month ago, said Mr. Assad and his associates were deeply concerned that the Siniora government could threaten his own.

“They are concerned that a hostile government in Lebanon will be a means to undermine the government of Syria, and they’re determined to undermine any government in Lebanon that they see as hostile,” Mr. Alterman said, adding, “I don’t think economic measures can deter people from what they regard as their strategic goals.”

Comment by JL: In the comment section of the last post, several readers remarked that the wording of this executive order was broad enough and ill-defined enough that it could easily be used to harass journalists and perhaps even bloggers. Some readers suggested this was nonsense, placing their faith in US authorities to respect freedom of speech.

I will recount a personal anecdote that reflects on this. On my return from my last two trips out of the United States, I have been stopped by Homeland Security at the exit ramp of the airplane and retained for four hours or so of interviews and security checks, while notification was sought from authorities in Washington to see if I could be released, causing me to miss my onward flights. My calling cards, contents of my wallet, and personal papers were scanned to add to my computer files. My luggage was also screened for indications of who I had met and what I had done.

Why has my name on the security-threat list? The only conclusion I could come to is that one of my many admirers in Washington had placed me there in order to amuse themselves. When I inquired how I might get my name removed from the list, I was told to have "my lawyer" make inquiries at a Washington address. My hunch is that this would be an exercise in futility even if I were to retain a lawyer. Homeland Security is under no legal obligation to release the reason for which I was replaced on the list. I will have to play the Syrian game of figuring out who I know in the security apparatuses of Washington who might have access to my files and can help to clear up the matter. Security services seem to be surprisingly similar on both sides of the Atlantic.

In Iraq, a Perilous Alliance With Former Enemies
By Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post
Saturday, August 4, 2007; Page A01 

U.S. commanders are offering large sums to enlist, at breakneck pace, their former enemies, handing them broad security powers in a risky effort to tame this fractious area south of Baghdad in Babil province and, literally, buy time for national reconciliation.

American generals insist they are not creating militias. In contracts with the U.S. military, the sheiks are referred to as "security contractors." Each of their "guards" will receive 70 percent of an Iraqi policeman's salary. U.S. commanders call them "concerned citizens," evoking suburban neighborhood watch groups.

But interviews with ground commanders and tribal leaders offer a window into how the United States is financing a new constellation of mostly Sunni armed groups with murky allegiances and shady pasts.

The two-week-old initiative, inspired by similar efforts underway in Baghdad, Anbar and Diyala provinces, has more than halved attacks here against American troops, from 19 a day to seven, U.S. commanders said. But in a land of sectarian fault lines and shifting tribal loyalties, the strategy raises concerns about the long-term implications of empowering groups that steadfastly oppose the Shiite-led government.

Shiite leaders fear that the United States is financing highly trained and well-armed militias that could undermine the government after American troops withdraw. Shiites worry such groups could weaken central authority and challenge democratic institutions that many would like to see take root.

U.S. generals said they vet the backgrounds of every recruit, but ground commanders here said that is all but an impossible task.

"Officially, we will not deal with those who have American blood on their hands," said Balcavage, 42. "But how do you know? You don't. There's a degree of risk involved. A lot of it is gut instinct. That's what I'm going on. They didn't teach me how to do this at West Point." 

Comment by JL: US troops are calling this policy "Rent a Cop," but its correct name is "khouah" or protection money. The Ottomans were particularly adept at paying khouah to the Arab tribes in order to keep them from raiding settled areas or the annual Hajj caravans. French and British colonial authorities did the same thing. In Syria, the French established a tribal authority, which paid subsidies to the major tribes in order to keep them from raiding. The Shaykhs were further bought into the system by giving them secure seats in the parliament. During the early independence era, Syrian authorities slowly brought this practice to a halt, but it wasn't easy. When Akram Hourani and other opposition leaders in parliament called for an end to tribal subsidies in the late 1940s, the Shaykhs brandished their side-arms which they always wore in the chamber of deputies and threatened to rise up in revolt and kill Hourani dead. Hourani wisely backed down. Today, many tribal leaders retain secure seats in the Majlis al-Shaab. The American notion that the US could ignore the power of tribes was born of foolishness and ignorance. It would seem to have little to do with democracy, but establishing a modicum of stability is a prerequisite to developing law and order, which, in turn, must precede democracy. Unfortunately, it would seem Iraq has returned to Ottoman realities.  

Nobles News, a newish Syria news site, carries the following interview with me about the the possibility of war with Israel. Although many here see a possibility, I don't. 

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Roving Gastronome – Syria: The New York Times travel section  

The Syrian Academy of Gastronomy competed to have the International Academy of Gastronomy award Aleppo the annual Grand Prix for Gastronomic Culture, the second city after Paris to receive this prize.

Celebrating this important event, the Syrian Academy of Gastronomy has the honor to welcome a delegation of the International Academy of Gastronomy to Aleppo to deliver the award in September 2006.

The choice of Aleppo as Capital of Gastronomic Culture bestows on us a major responsibility to do our utmost to preserve our local gastronomic culture and heritage, of which we may be justly proud.

Syria: No Subsidence of Subsidies
Oxford Business Group
30 July 2007

Syria is to allocate $7bn in its budget for 2008 to subsidise energy, basic commodities and food supplies, further increasing the drain on the treasury at the very time the country is trying to implement reforms to ease the state out of the marketplace.

On July 23, Abdulla Al Dardari, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, said the government was committed to protecting the Syrian people and their standard of living through the provision of subsidies.

Al Dardari said that the subsidies would be "distributed effectively among citizens, affirming the government's commitment to delivering support to deserving groups".

The government will also keep its promise to provide free education and health services, with funding to be made available in the 2008 budget, Al Dardari said.

If the Syrian government does follow through on its spending commitments, it will face a massive increase in its outlays in the coming year, expenditures it may find hard to support. With much of the country's agricultural industry reporting poor harvests due to drought, the key cotton and wheat sectors in particular being hard hit, export earnings and tax revenues are expected to be down this year.

The $7bn in subsidies represent a major increase in spending by the state. By comparison, the 2006 budget set aside just $500m for subsidy payments for basic foodstuffs, electricity and fuel, according to a report by the US embassy in Damascus. Analysts doubted the accuracy of these figures, believing they did not reflect the full extent of the subsidies being distributed. A US government report issued in early 2006 suggested fuel subsidies alone would amount to $1bn for the year. However, none of the estimates made at the time came close to the 2008 total announced by the deputy prime minister.

With Syria's gross domestic product currently estimated at around $38bn, the figure announced by Al Dardari represents over 20% of GDP, well up on the 15% given in an International Monetary Fund report issued in early 2006.

However, while committing the state to boosting subsidy payments, Al Dardari also flagged an overhaul of the system.

"Any new aid system will be gradual to eliminate economic and social shocks and achieve tangible improvement in living standards for the majority of Syrians," he said.  

Hamas to Show an Improved Hand: Organization Aims to Capitalize On Intelligence Gains From Gaza Takeover
By CAM SIMPSON in Jerusalem and NEIL KING JR. in Washington
Wall Street Journal
July 30, 2007; Page A4

When the Islamist group Hamas conquered the Gaza Strip in June it seized an intelligence-and-military infrastructure created with U.S. help by the security chiefs of the Palestinian territory's former ruler.

According to current and former Israeli intelligence officials, former U.S. intelligence personnel and Palestinian officials, Hamas has increased its inventory of arms since the takeover of Gaza and picked up technical expertise — such as espionage techniques — that could assist the group in its fight against Israel or Washington's Palestinian allies, the Fatah movement founded by Yasser Arafat.

Hamas leaders say they acquired thousands of paper files, computer records, videos, photographs and audio recordings containing valuable and potentially embarrassing intelligence information gathered by Fatah. For more than a decade, Fatah operated a vast intelligence network in Gaza established under the tutelage of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Hamas leaders are expected as early as tomorrow to go public with some of the documents and the secrets they hold.

The exact nature of the threat posed by the intelligence grab in Gaza — including any damage to U.S. intelligence operations in the Palestinian territories and the broader Middle East — is difficult to ascertain. U.S. and Israeli officials generally tried to play down any losses, saying any intelligence damage is likely minimal.

But a number of former U.S. intelligence officials, including some who have worked closely with the Palestinians, said there was ample reason to worry that Hamas has acquired access to important spying technology as well as intelligence information that could be helpful to Hamas in countering Israeli and U.S. efforts against the group.

"People are worried, and reasonably so, about what kind of intelligence losses we may have suffered," said one former U.S. intelligence official with extensive experience in Gaza.

A U.S. government official said he doubted serious secrets were compromised in the Gaza takeover. Other officials said they had no reason to believe that U.S. spying operations elsewhere in the Arab world had been compromised.

Close ties between Hamas and the governments of Iran and Syria also mean that intelligence-and-spying techniques could be shared with the main Middle East rivals of the Bush administration. As the White House prepares to lead an international effort to bolster Fatah's security apparatus in the West Bank, the losses in Gaza stand as an example of how efforts to help Fatah can backfire.

The compromised intelligence Hamas says it now has ranges widely. The group alleges it has videos used in a sexual-blackmail operation run by Washington's allies inside Fatah's security apparatus. But the group also says it has uncovered detailed evidence of Fatah-controlled spying operations carried out in Arab and Muslim countries for the benefit of the U.S. and other foreign governments. Hamas also alleges that Fatah intelligence operatives cooperated with Israeli intelligence officials to target Islamist leaders for assassination.

"What we have is good enough for us to completely reveal the practices [of Fatah-controlled security services], both locally and throughout the region," said Khalil al Hayya, a senior Hamas official in Gaza, who has assumed a leading role on the intelligence issue for the Islamist group.

Michael Scheuer, a former top CIA counterterrorism analyst who left the agency in 2004, said the U.S. had provided the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority with "substantial help" in training as well as computers, other equipment and analytical tools. Other former intelligence officials confirmed that the U.S. gave Fatah-controlled services sophisticated intelligence-gathering equipment, including eavesdropping technology, though these officials wouldn't provide more precise details about the technology.

This kind of technology, along with the knowledge it yields, is broadly known in intelligence circles as "Sigint," which is shorthand for "signals intelligence." It can include eavesdropping equipment, devices used for intercepting radio, microwave and telephone communications and telemetry technology that allows the user to pinpoint the location of someone holding a communication device, such as a cellphone.

"The United States invested a lot of effort in setting up this system in Gaza — construction, equipment, training… filings, the logistics, the transportation. It was a big operation, and it's now in the hands of the other side," said Efraim Halevy, who formerly headed both the Mossad, which is Israel's foreign-intelligence agency, and Israel's National Security Council. Mr. Halevy said, however, that he didn't want to overemphasize the value of Hamas's potential intelligence gains.

Avi Dichter, Israel's public-security minister and the former head of Shin Bet, the domestic intelligence-and-counterterrorism agency, also said he didn't want to overemphasize the potential benefits to Hamas. But he confirmed that the Islamist group seized Sigint technology and expertise during its Gaza sweep. He declined to provide specifics, but said it had been provided by the Americans, the British and the French.

Mr. Dichter, who left the Shin Bet when his five-year term as its chief ended in 2005, also said the potential damage goes beyond Hamas's ability to turn the technology against its enemies. Now, he said, the militants could gain an understanding of how such technology is used against them, allowing them to adopt more sophisticated counter measures.

"It's not only the tools. It's also the philosophy that's behind them," he said.

Hamas leaders are being vague about the equipment and technological know-how they captured. Mr. Hayya said some important former Fatah operatives in Gaza, all of whom were granted amnesty after Hamas took over, were now cooperating with the group on intelligence matters.

Easier to assess is the threat posed by the military hardware Hamas picked up after the takeover. The militant group seized an arsenal of arms and munitions captured from U.S.-backed security forces loyal to Fatah and its leader, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

Mr. Dichter said Hamas gained roughly the same number of weapons during a few days that it would have taken the group nearly a year to amass from smuggling operations.

Hamas says it is using the armaments to build a popular army in Gaza. Israeli intelligence and security officials estimate the Islamist group has some 13,000 armed men in Gaza.

As for Fatah's secrets, Hamas leaders say they grabbed intelligence stashes from three locations: the headquarters in Gaza City of the Preventive Security Force; the Palestinian Authority intelligence headquarters, which were housed in a Gaza City office known as "Il Safina," or "the ship"; and a nearby satellite-intelligence office dubbed, "Il Mashtal," or "the nursery."

As Hamas fighters moved in during their June sweep across Gaza, Fatah officials burned some papers and stripped data from computers. But the Hamas conquest was so quick that significant caches remained for the taking, according to the militant group.

All three sites were long under the sway of Fatah strongman Mohammed Dahlan, who first became an important CIA ally in Gaza in 1996. At the time, then-CIA director George Tenet began working openly with Mr. Dahlan and other Palestinian officials to build up security services aimed at combating the rise of Hamas and like-minded extremist groups that rejected the Oslo peace accords.

Through a spokesman, Mr. Tenet declined to comment on the CIA-Fatah cooperation, his relationship with Mr. Dahlan or Hamas's gains. Mr. Dahlan on Thursday formally resigned his Palestinian Authority post. Mr. Dahlan hasn't commented publicly since resigning and he couldn't be located for comment. Associates in the West Bank said he was abroad.

Mr. Hayya, the senior Hamas leader, said hundreds of the group's Hamas's operatives have been culling through and analyzing the intelligence troves since their seizure, with specialists in security, forensic accounting and administration conducting detailed assessments. Significant portions of these assessments are close to completion, Mr. Hayya said.

Some of the most potentially explosive claims from Hamas center on the alleged activities beyond the Gaza Strip of Palestinian agents loyal to Fatah. Mr. Hayya alleged the CIA utilized Palestinian agents for covert intelligence operations in other Middle Eastern countries. Hamas, he said, now possesses a roadmap detailing the names and actions of "those men whom thought were going to continue to be their hand across the region."

Some former U.S. intelligence officials who worked closely with the Palestinian Authority confirmed that such overseas spying arrangements beyond Gaza existed with the Palestinians in the past and said they likely continued, bolstering the credibility of Hamas's claims.

Whitley Bruner, a longtime CIA officer in the Middle East, recalled that "some of our first really good information on [Osama] bin Laden in Sudan" in the early 1990s "came from Palestinian sources." Before leaving the agency in 1997, Mr. Bruner participated in many of the first cooperative sessions organized by Mr. Tenet between the CIA and the Palestinians.

"It's not unlikely that continued to do things for the U.S. well beyond the territories," Mr. Bruner said. "Palestinians are embedded all over the place, so they have access to things that the U.S. doesn't."

Others are more circumspect. Bruce Reidel, who worked for nearly 30 years as a U.S. Middle East specialist, both as a CIA intelligence officer and as an adviser to Presidents Clinton and Bush, said there is sure to be "quite a treasure trove of materials that would document relationship with the CIA." Mr. Reidel said during his time in government, which ended in 2005, "the Palestinians were always trying to prove that they had unique access and information," but he said he was skeptical of Hamas's claims that such operations ventured far beyond Gaza and the West Bank.

Mr. Hayya alleges that while many officials from Arab and Muslim nations knew Mr. Dahlan was cooperating with U.S. intelligence agencies inside the Palestinian territories, many of those same leaders "are going to be amazed and surprised when they discover had actually worked against them for the Americans." He wouldn't directly answer a question about which nations were allegedly being spied on, but he said Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had the most to be concerned about from potential disclosures.

Jabril Rajoub, a Fatah rival to Mr. Dahlan who was long his West Bank counterpart and most recently served as Mr. Abbas's national security adviser, said he was aware of the alleged outlines of these operations, though he said he was unaware of their details. He called the Gaza-based network a "for-hire" intelligence operation, adding that it was active around the Middle East and provided information to the Americans, the British and others.

Mr. Hayya also said there is a substantial amount of evidence detailing cooperation between Fatah and Israel. There is evidence several militant leaders were targeted as a result of such cooperation, he alleged. This includes circumstantial evidence that he was personally targeted in an Israeli assassination attempt after he was fingered by Fatah intelligence officers as a top security threat.

After taking over Gaza, Mr. Hayya said Hamas recovered notes from a meeting of senior Palestinian Authority intelligence officials in which they discussed Mr. Hayya's value to the Islamist group. On May 20, less than a week after the meeting, an Israeli missile was fired into his home, killing eight people. Mr. Hayya was en route at the time, but says the strike came about five minutes after his 35-year-old cousin, Ibrahim, entered the home. The Hamas leader said he and his cousin look very similar.

"They thought it was me," he said.

A spokeswoman for the Shin Bet declined to comment.

Posted by Alex.

Haaretz

By The Associated Press

Fifty-one percent of Syrians said they would favor peace with Israel if it withdraws from the Golan Heights and recognizes Syrian sovereignty there, according to a poll released Wednesday.

Peace negotiations between Israel and Syrian broke down in 2000, without determining the fate of the Golan Heights which Israel captured from Syria during the 1967 Six-Day War, and annexed in 1981.

The poll also revealed that three-fourths of Syrians support financial assistance for Iraqi fighters, the Palestinian groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as the militant group Hezbollah which Israel fought in Lebanon last summer.The poll was sponsored by Terror Free Tomorrow, a bipartisan organization that seeks to erode support for international terrorism. Its advisory board includes Senator John McCain of Arizona, a Republican presidential candidate, and former House Speaker Thomas Foley, a Democrat from Washington state.

Earlier this month, the group released a survey of Iranians that found most favored their country developing nuclear weapons.

In the poll that dealt largely with U.S.-Syrian relations, most respondents said they favor working with the United States to seek an end to the Iraq war, yet also support financing Iraqi insurgents and other Middle East groups the U.S. considers terrorists.

The survey also found that an overwhelming number of Syrians consider trade and political relations with Western countries important, but they narrowly oppose closer ties with the U.S.

The United States has largely sought to isolate Syria, which it considers a major destabilizing influence in the Middle East

The U.S. has repeatedly accused Syria of allowing foreign fighters to cross its border into Iraq to join forces with al-Qaida and anti-U.S. insurgent groups, which Syria denies. Syria has also been accused of helping the Hezbollah militia in Lebanon, Palestinian radicals and other militant groups.

In the poll, 63 percent of Syrians said they favor their country working with the U.S. to resolve the war in Iraq. By a slight 44 percent to 39 percent margin, most said they oppose fighters crossing from Syria into Iraq.

In addition, seven in 10 said Syria should refuse U.S. investments and trade to create more jobs in Syria, with similar numbers opposing U.S. investments in energy refineries and U.S. humanitarian aid.Even though they do not support the U.S. – in fact that's an understatement, they're very negative about the U.S. – they still want to work with the U.S., said Ken Ballen, president of Terror Free Tomorrow. They still want the war resolved, and they're willing for their government to work with the U.S. to resolve it.The telephone survey of 1,004 adult Syrians was conducted in Arabic for Terror Free Tomorrow by D3 Systems of Vienna, Virginia, from July 11 to 14. An estimated 75 percent to 80 percent of Syrian households have landline telephones.

The calls were made from a country near Syria that Terror Free Tomorrow did not identify, saying it wanted to protect the interviewers' confidentiality.

Telephone interviews were used to speed the research process and because in-person questioners in Syria may face harassment, the group said.

The survey has a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3.5 percentage points. The results were weighted, or adjusted, to ensure that responses reflected the actual number of Syrians living in rural areas, and those over age 55.

I am heading for the mountains and my father-in-law's village for a few days before flying back to the States. Just a few observations before I get onto a bus for Qadmous. I will not be posting for a few days.

Syria's new policy on Lebanon, begun with president's speech two weeks ago, is to stop public pronouncements on Lebanon, tell Western diplomats what they want to hear – that Syria will do what it can in Lebanon – yet, at the same time, explain that the West must go to Lebanon to find answers. The public stand is that Lebanon's problems are her own and Syria cannot do much about it. This is, of course, posturing and fits the Western insistence that Syria must not play a role, which Syria refuses. The result is that Syria and the West will both pretend that no one is influencing Lebanon. It is a good pretend policy. 

Foreign policy makers in Syria were very optimistic following the Sharm al-Shaykh meeting between Rice and Moualem and believed that it might signal an opening. That mood broke two weeks later, when the UN passed the International Tribunal, George Bush renewed sanctions on Syria, and added a layer of new sanctions. Cousseran neglected to visit Syria before the Paris conference on Lebanon in contrast to his meeting with Iranians. Moreover, the SEC in New York is threatening to drop about 20 European companies with contracts in Syria from the New York Stock exchange. All of this sent a message to the Syrians, the Rice is not making policy and that the US administration remains determined to isolate and harm Syria.

Meanwhile the US is urging Syria to support the Maliki government and its policy in Iraq. But US-Syrian relations are completely jammed up and everyone is talking past each other. Syria is sitting on its hands and waiting for the US to begin pulling out of Iraq. Most officials here believe the Maliki government will collapse in short order and refuse to get on board a sinking ship. In the meantime, Syria is filling up with Iraqi refugees. The Americans are trying to threaten the Syrians that the refugee problem will grow much worse if America loses. Syria, for its part, is obstructing where it can and refusing to be impressed with this argument. It is a damned if you do and damned if you don't situation for the Syrians and Americans, both. The situation will get worse.

Indications that it could get worse are evidenced in the growing fear that Israel could strike at Syria or Lebanon again in order to reverse the momentum in the region.  

NoblesNews, a relatively new on-line Syrian news outlet, reports that the Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon, ???? ??? ?????? , says that his country is acting as a go-between for Saudi Arabia and Syria and trying to improve their relations, particularly as concerns Lebanese affairs.

Rice, Gates Team to Lobby Arabs on Iraq
By ANNE GEARAN
The Associated Press, July 28, 2007

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates will visit Egypt and Saudi Arabia for a rare joint lobbying effort to prod Iraq's mostly rich, Sunni-led Mideast neighbors to help stabilize the chaotic country and support its weak Shiite-headed government.

"The United States wants to persuade all the countries in the region to be proactive in a helpful way," said Samir Sumaida'ie, Iraq's ambassador to Washington. "Waiting and watching is not a helpful posture."

Other Arab diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, said waiting and watching is exactly what they plan to do, at least as long as the killing does not spread beyond Iraq's borders … "There is the general sense that no one wants to get aboard a sinking ship," said one diplomat, who like others requested anonymity to describe sensitive discussions within his government and with U.S. officials.

The neocon armchair generals (Via War in Context)
By Scott Horton, No Comment, Harpers, July 27, 2007

To hear President Bush tell it, all he does is sit back and patiently take the advice of his generals in the field and in the Pentagon. But every field commander to return from Iraq and put on his civvies has told a different tale: the White House hammers ridiculous strategies down their throats, doesn't listen to a word they say, and instead takes direction from a group of juveniles in their fifties over at Neocon Central Command, the American Enterprise Institute.

This is another point on which White House lies are wearing thin and the truth is beginning to shine through. And Rowan Scarborough over at the D.C. Examiner has offered up an extremely revealing vignette. He looks at where the current strategy for the surge got cooked up. He notes that in the final analysis, there were three plans sent to the White House. One was prepared by General Petraeus and his team out in Baghdad. The second was crafted by the Joint Chiefs in the Pentagon. And the third plan was put together by a bunch of overgrown teenagers who play with lead soldiers at the American Enterprise Institute. And guess which one the White House picked? That's right, the AEI plan. [complete article]

The administration damped down expectations and indicated the meeting would focus on Palestinian institution-building rather than deeply divisive topics such as Jerusalem and refugees.

"I think a lot of people are inclined to try to treat this as a big peace conference. It's not," clarified White House spokesman Tony Snow. "This is a meeting to sit down and try to find ways of building fundamental and critical institutions for the Palestinians that are going to enable them to have self-government and democracy."

Meanwhile, the US has announced a 20 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia. In order to pass this through congress, it has promised to increase Israeli military aid over the next decade by some 45% to over $30 billion.

Two new excellent blogs are:

1. Daniel Levy's, "Prospects for Peace." In his most recent posts he discusses Solomon's WSJ article on the Syrian Brotherhood and makes some interesting points. He also discusses David Wurmser's departure from Cheney's office. Wurmser has been pushing for regime-change in Syria since the very beginning. In fact, my very first post on Syria Comment in 2004 was on David Wurmser. His wife, Meyrav, is a founder of MEMRI.
2. Jim Lobe's, Lobelog: Jim Lobe has been reporting it like it is for a long time. He has a fine nose for neocon silliness and reports on them with humor and wisdom. His most recent post, "Follow-up on Syria" explains how "Michael Ledeen and Mark Steyn wrote that they were deeply disappointed that stronger action was not recommended and were particularly provoked by Gerson’s description of Damascus’ (and Tehran’s) roles as mere “accelerants to Iraq’s frothing chaos.” Read his post on Syria and the neocons.

Jihad Yaziji writes in the Syrian Report that only 14% of Iraqi refugee children in Syria enroll in school.

Only 14 percent of school-aged Iraqi children residing in Syria are currently enrolled in Syrian schools according to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). During his first tour to the region after he was appointed in June, Craig Johnston, deputy high commissioner of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), told Iraqis gathered at the UNHCR refugee centre in Damascus to send more of their children to school, according to a report by IRIN. Only 35 000 out of an estimated 250 000 school-aged Iraqi children attend school.

An explosion at a weapons depot in the north killed at least 15 soldiers and wounded 50 others, the official news agency SANA reported. It said that the blast could be heard for miles and was a result of a heat wave that has gripped the country and that the authorities had dismissed the possibility of sabotage. Witnesses said high temperatures, which reached 113 degrees Fahrenheit, also caused fires in northern Syria starting Wednesday night that might have spread to the military complex. The depot belonged to a military unit in Musalmiya, about 200 miles north of Damascus, SANA said.

France unlikely to repeat Libya triumph in Lebanon
By Alistair Lyon
27 Jul 2007, Reuters

BEIRUT, July 27 (Reuters) – Fresh from diplomatic success in Libya, France is pursuing a reconciliation drive in Lebanon that could prove a daunting task for Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, who starts a visit to Beirut on Friday.

Navigating Lebanon's complexities looks far harder than persuading Libya to free Bulgarian medics under a deal clinched by French President Nicolas Sarkozy only after years of patient diplomacy by the European Union, Britain, Germany and others.

"It's mission impossible," said Ousama Safa, director of the Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies. "The answers aren't in Lebanon, but in Damascus, Washington and Tehran.

"In Libya, the French could offer European incentives that the Libyans really wanted. In Lebanon, the Syrians want American incentives and the Americans are not in a mood to offer any." "The United States wants a solution that keeps Siniora in power and doesn't give the Syrians anything," Safa said.

But the omens from three days of preparatory contacts by French envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran this week are not promising.

Lebanese political sources say he had suggested all parties discuss a package deal on electing a new president and forming a national unity government to end an eight-month-old impasse.

But the Shi'ite Hezbollah group, allied to Syria and Iran, demanded a unity cabinet before any dialogue on other issues. The opposition has long sought veto power in a new cabinet so that its assent would be needed (Continued)

U.S. kills plans to build embassy in Hezbollah area of Beirut

U.S. Officials Voice Frustration with Saudis' Role in Iraq
By HELENE COOPER
New York Times, Published: July 27, 2007

Bush administration officials are voicing increasing anger at what they say has been Saudi Arabia’s counterproductive role in the Iraq war. They say that beyond regarding Mr. Maliki as an Iranian agent, the Saudis have offered financial support to Sunni groups in Iraq. Of an estimated 60 to 80 foreign fighters who enter Iraq each month, American military and intelligence officials say that nearly half are coming from Saudi Arabia and that the Saudis have not done enough to stem the flow.

One senior administration official says he has seen evidence that Saudi Arabia is providing financial support to opponents of Mr. Maliki. He declined to say whether that support was going to Sunni insurgents because, he said, “That would get into disagreements over who is an insurgent and who is not.”

Senior Bush administration officials said the American concerns would be raised next week when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates make a rare joint visit to Jidda, Saudi Arabia.

Officials in Washington have long resisted blaming Saudi Arabia for the chaos and sectarian strife in Iraq, choosing instead to pin blame on Iran and Syria. Even now, military officials rarely talk publicly about the role of Saudi fighters among the insurgents in Iraq.

Several officials interviewed for this article said they believed that Saudi Arabia’s direct support to Sunni tribesmen increased this year as the Saudis lost faith in the Maliki government and felt they must bolster Sunni groups in the eventuality of a widespread civil war.

The former ambassador, Edward W. Gnehm, who has served in Kuwait and Jordan, said that during a recent trip to the region he was told that Saudi Arabia had pressed other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council — which includes Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman — to give financial support to Sunnis in Iraq. The Saudis made this effort last December, Mr. Gnehm said.

…One adviser to the royal family said that Saudi officials were aware of the American accusations. “As you know by now, we in Saudi Arabia have been active in having a united Arab front to, first, avoid further inter-Arab conflict, and at the same time building consensus to move toward a peace settlement between the Arabs and Israel,” he said. “How others judge our motives is their problem.”…

The administration “thinks the Saudis are no longer behaving the role of the good vassal,” said Steve Clemons, senior fellow and director of the American Strategy Program at the New America Foundation. The Saudis, in turn, “see weakness, they see a void, and they’re going to fill the void and call their own shots.” (continue)

Comment by JL: The Syrians also see a void created by the US in Iraq. The US is asking them to support its policy and the Maliki government in Iraq, but Syrians are asking themselves why they should support leaders they believe will, in all likelihood, end as losers at the expense of opposition members that may very well become winners. It would not be surprising if Syrians are eyeing Saudi Arabia's new interest in "Arab unity," announced at the Riyadh summit meeting this spring, and the Kingdom's financing of Iraqi Sunnis with the hope of building a common Syrian-Saudi policy toward Iraq. By supporting the Kingdom in its Iraq policy, Syria may see a means to close the rift opened up between the two countries over their divergent Lebanon policies. At the very least, Syria will seek to act as a mediator between Saudia Arabia and Iran in Iraq, a role that will be extremely difficult and undoubtedly strain relations with Iran.

Bush line distorts Iran's real interest in Iraq (Via War in Context)
By Gareth Porter, IPS, July 25, 2007

As U.S. and Iranian diplomats met in Baghdad Tuesday for a second round of talks on Iraq, the domestic U.S. political climate appears decidedly more supportive of an aggressive U.S. posture toward Iran than just a few months ago, reflecting the apparent triumph the George W. Bush administration's narrative on Iran's role in Iraq.

That new narrative threatens to obscure the bigger picture of Iranian policy toward Iraq, widely recognised by regional specialists. Iran's strategic interests in Iraq are far more compatible with those of the United States than those of the Sunni regimes in the region with which the United States has aligned itself.

Contrary to the official narrative, Iranian support for Shiites is not aimed at destabilising the country but does serve a rational Iranian desire to maximise its alliances with Iraqi Shiite factions, in the view of specialists on Iranian policy and on the security of the Persian Gulf region. [complete article]

The United States finds few non-Iraqis among insurgents (US News & World Today).

Insurgents meet on post-U.S. future (Via War in Context)
By Rebecca Sinderbrand, Time, July 24, 2007

The convention of Iraqi insurgents was scheduled to take place Monday at the resort-like Sahara Hotel outside Damascus but, within hours of the plenary session actually starting, the Syrian government suddenly canceled the summit. However, high-level representatives of much of the Iraqi nationalist insurgency, remained at the venue informally negotiating and laying out a framework for what a post-U.S. Iraq would look like.

Late Monday evening, dozens of conference attendees — a group drawn primarily from the ranks of former military officers, Ba'athist officials, and the Sunni insurgency — gathered for a catered dinner beside the hotel's outdoor pool. Several, including a high-ranking former military officer now overseeing Ba'athist resistance activities in his region, talked openly, if carefully, about strategy, although some asked that their names be withheld. ("We are not afraid," said the former Iraqi army colonel, as waiters delivered the main course of steak and carrots, "but we do not want to give the [Shi'a] militias justification to kill us.") They said victory was in the air; one delegate celebrated the looming U.S. withdrawal over Diet Pepsi and watermelon slices. "This gathering here is unprecedented. When this conference occurs, it will be historic," said Sarmed Abdel Karim, founder of the popular iraq4all website and a non-insurgent who calls the gathering one of "the Iraqi opposition." "It will be the cornerstone of a new Iraq." [complete article]

Towards Peace in the Middle East: Lessons for European Policymakers
by Gareth Evans 
President of the International Crisis Group
3 July 2007

Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to Closing Session, PSE/Socialist Group in the European Parliament Conference on  Moving Toward an International Peace Conference for the Middle East,  European Parliament, Brussels, 3 July 2007

The only objective that matters is a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict – which has at its heart a two-state solution in which Israelis can live in safety behind secure and recognized borders, at peace with Palestinians and all their neighbours, and in which Palestinians have a recognized, viable state of their own, with its capital in East Jerusalem, borders based on those of 1967 and a just resolution of the refugee issue.

Looking back, it is extraordinarily depressing to recall how the tactics of the moment have led the key players to miss the main game, for example:

o the failure, twice now, to recognize the historic significance of the Arab Peace Initiative,  parsing the words,  missing the sentiment and overlooking the scale of the bargain on offer;

o the failure to support Abu Mazen in 2005, after he had won in a landslide, was the uncontested leader of all Palestinians, and in a position to sell difficult compromises; and

o the recurring failure to learn the key lesson of Oslo, that incremental and sequential solutions will never work, condemning everyone to be prisoners of the last extremist on either side: that there simply has to be an endgame-first approach, working back from first-agreed parameters….. (Continued here.)

Sharp rise in Israelis seeking German citizenship (Reuters). Some 300,000 Israelis are entitled to German citizenship. The past year has seen 4,300 Israelis receive German citizenship.

Thoughts on the Attempted Murder of Palestine
The Siren Song of Elliott Abrams
By KATHLEEN CHRISTISON, Former CIA analyst
Counterpunch, July 26, 2007

"Coup" is the word being widely used to describe what happened in Gaza in June when Hamas militias defeated the armed security forces of Fatah and chased them out of Gaza. But, as so often with the manipulative language used in the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel, the terminology here is backward. Hamas was the legally constituted, democratically elected government of the Palestinians, so in the first place Hamas did not stage a coup but rather was the target of a coup planned against it. Furthermore, the coup — which failed in Gaza but succeeded overall when Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, acting in violation of Palestinian law, cut Gaza adrift, unseated the Palestinian unity government headed by Hamas, and named a new prime minister and cabinet — was the handiwork of the United States and Israel.

The Fatah attacks against Hamas in Gaza were initiated at the whim of, and with arms and training provided by, the United States and Israel. No one seems to be making any secret of this. Immediately after Hamas won legislative elections in January 2006, Elliott Abrams, who runs U.S. policy toward Israel from his senior position on the National Security Council staff, met with a group of Palestinian businessmen and spoke openly of the need for a "hard coup" against Hamas. According to Palestinians who were there, Abrams was "unshakable" in his determination to oust Hamas. When the Palestinians, urging engagement with Hamas instead of confrontation, observed that Abrams' scheme would bring more suffering and even starvation to Gaza's already impoverished population, Abrams dismissed their concerns by claiming that it wouldn't be the fault of the U.S. if that happened… (Continued here.)

Turkish poll starts seismic power shift
By James Button, Sydney Morning Herald, July 24, 2007

A landslide win by Turkey's former Islamist party in national elections is set to redraw the country's political landscape, making a coup unlikely and dramatically reducing the power of the military and secular elite.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by the charismatic Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, won nearly half the vote on Sunday, an increase of 13 percentage points on its 2002 victory and the highest vote recorded by any party in 50 years.

The result gives the party about 340 seats in the 550-member parliament and reveals a huge transfer of power from the Istanbul and Ankara elites – which have accused the AKP of secretly planning to introduce Islamic law – to business people and traders in Anatolia, the Turkish heartland. [complete article]

Welcome to Richistan, USA
By Paul Harris, The Observer, July 22, 2007

America's super-rich have returned to the days of the Roaring Twenties. As the rest of the country struggles to get by, a huge bubble of multi-millionaires lives almost in a parallel world. The rich now live in their own world of private education, private health care and gated mansions. They have their own schools and their own banks. They even travel apart – creating a booming industry of private jets and yachts. Their world now has a name, thanks to a new book by Wall Street Journal reporter Robert Frank which has dubbed it 'Richistan'. There every dream can come true. But for the American Dream itself – which promises everyone can join the elite – the emergence of Richistan is a mixed blessing. 'We in America are heading towards 'developing nation' levels of inequality. We would become like Brazil. What does that say about us? What does that say about America?' Frank said. [complete article]

(Comment by JL) I couldn't help but see a few similarities with Syria, which is developing a serious class gap. Globalization is dividing nations in both the West and East. Richistan is here and there, but will they begin to marry each other?

Dialogue is in Syria's and America's interests
Anthony H. Cordesman
THE DAILY STAR, July 27, 2007

Editor's Note: The following is the third and last part of a series of articles on Cordesman's recent visit to Syria with colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS].

One clear message from the Syrians we spoke to was that Syria had no intention to attempting to send troops back into Lebanon or in attempting to reoccupy the country. Several Syrians felt that leaving Lebanon had helped push Syria toward economic liberalization and development, while staying in Lebanon had bred corruption and economic indifference. At the same time, there was an almost exaggerated fear of having a "hostile" Lebanon on Syria's border and the outcome of the UN investigation into former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's assassination. Moreover, Syrian and Iranian ties to Hizbullah were one of the few areas where it was hard to have a frank discussion.

President Bashar Assad also stated that Syria did recognize Lebanon's independence, that he had been to Lebanon and saluted the Lebanese flag, and that it would be possible to exchange embassies if Lebanon no longer had a hostile regime.

The US and Syria cannot agree on policy toward Lebanon at this point in time; there will not be sudden changes in US proclamations on the issue or the Accountability Act, and the UN investigation will play out its course. Lebanese politics will remain a divided, sectarian and ethnic mess, and Hizbullah will not suddenly go away or become another political party.

At the same time, the key issue is not the past but the future. If Syria repeatedly makes it clear that it does recognize Lebanon and has no intention of sending troops back that is a message well worth sending. If Syria quietly makes it clear it is not supporting Sunni Islamist extremists with links to Al-Qaeda in Lebanon – Palestinian or Lebanese – that will be a positive message as well. If Syria quietly shows it is discouraging Hizbullah adventures on the Israeli-Lebanese border and is not sending in new long-range rockets and offensive weapons to Hizbullah, that message will be a major step in improving the possibility of progress on the Golan Heights.

No one can criticize Syria for wanting a friendly regime in Lebanon, or strong economic ties. These are vital Syrian national interests. At the same time, "spoiler" operations and marginal adventures in trying to shape Lebanese politics by force, do not serve Syria's national interests and are doing much to alienate Europe and the United States. A positive, peacefully proactive Syrian policy toward Lebanon could do far more to help create the kind of regime Syria wants, avoid dragging Syria into Lebanon's endless confessional quarrels and morass, and greatly improve Syria's relations with the US and outside world.

This series of articles has focused on Syrian actions in Syria's national interest that could lay the groundwork for improved relations with the US. It has not suggested a single concession by either side, but it is clear that the US should respond by acting in its own interest as well. Each step above would be a new reason for the US to increase its dialogue with Syria, and pursue other areas of mutual cooperation.

More tangibly, there are several other steps the US should take. Not having an ambassador in Syria and not actively engaging with the Syrian mission in the US is pointless. If the US wants to encourage change in Syria, the best possible way is to have the strongest US country team in Syria. Similarly, the US does not have to send a Secretary of State or Deputy Security on a new round of visits to Damascus, but shunting Syria aside or not taking the time to listen is counterproductive and dangerous. It encourages precisely the Syrian actions the US objects to.

There is no country in the world where the US should focus its diplomacy and policy solely around punitive measures or "sticks." The US should not make any more concessions in pursuing its own national interests than it can expect Syria to make – which to all practical purposes is none. The US does, however, have strong national interest in many incremental actions by Syria of the kind just listed. It should be prepared to provide carefully limited incremental incentives or cooperation. All or nothing diplomacy inevitably tends to be nothing diplomacy.

The US, like Syria, should make its objections to the other states conduct and policy clear. It should not, however, demonize Syria and should make it clear that it has no interest in regime change in the sense of trying to force a new government on Syria. The US has nothing better than the present regime to offer, and the risk of Syrian internal instability or a government dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood is serious enough to indicate that any near-term alternative is likely to be far, far worse. Encouraging evolutionary reform and change is one thing, and something many Syrians would encourage, but Iraq is the last experiment the US should ever make in neoconservative fantasies about the merits of violent change and instant "democracy."

There are also many practical aspects of US and Syrian relations where improvements might be made in ways that serve both nations' interests. There is no reason not to book educational and cultural exchanges and relations, despite bureaucratic neglect, delays and pointless time consuming procedures. Exports of medical goods and services, legitimate visas, and similar low-level actions that benefit both the Syrian people and US interests in Syria are all areas where careful review might improve the current situation. Carefully reviewing the details of the Accountability Act and various US regulations to see where the US can encourage economic reform and modernization in productive ways is another area for progress. Selective cooperation in counterterrorism and intelligence, with tight security to prevent embarrassment to either side is still another area where common interest may lead to an improvement in relations.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.

How to Manage Assad
By Jon B. Alterman
Washington Post, Friday, July 27, 2007; Page A21

Regime evolution can only serve Syria's national interests
Anthony H. Cordesman
(c) 2007 THE DAILY STAR, BEIRUT, LEBANON.
Beirut — First person by Anthony H. Cordesman

Editor's Note: The following is the second of a three-part First Person on Cordesman's recent
visit to Syria with colleagues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS].

The US cannot take any practical steps toward regime change in Syria, and Syria will make no concessions in this area. There are, however, areas where Syria can send important signals to the US and show that regime evolution is taking place and the government is taking important steps to help its people.

Syria has every possible reason to keep pursuing economic reform and modernization. Economic security and growth aid the regime, as does sending signals about reducing corruption. As China and other Asian states have shown, it is far easier to wait for political evolution when the people benefit from economic reforms, and when the government shows it can make major progress in this area. There also is no better way of checking the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist extremist activity than raising living standards, employment, and offering opportunity rather than stasis.

Moreover, the more economically modern and secure Syria is, the more Israel will have reason to feel it may be able to deal with a stable state, the easier Syria will find it to deal with withdrawing from Lebanon, and the more incentive it will offer Iraq in terms of trade, pipelines, and joint ventures. The stronger and more liberal the Syrian economy becomes, the greater the future incentive for outside investment from the EU, US, and other states, and the better the tourist infrastructure and income.

As for alternative investment in arms and military forces, it does not take much time or calculation to see that Syria simply cannot compete in a new arms race. Syria does need to modernize some aspects of its forces, but Israel can outspend it by at least 4:1, has access to far more advanced military technology, and begins with far better forces and a more advanced technological base. Triggering an arms race you cannot win is a miserable substitute for economic progress where you cannot lose.

The US and Syria are not going to agree on the definition of a terrorist in the near term, particularly in regard to the actions of Hamas and Hizbullah. Several Syrians made it clear, however, that they saw Sunni Islamist extremists as a major threat to Syria, whether in Syria, Iraq or Lebanon. Several mentioned the Muslim Brotherhood, and elements within the Iraqi refugee population as serious problems.

Aggressive Syrian action against such extremists is in Syria's interest, and directly parallels the interests of the United States. Limited intelligence exchanges and cooperation may be possible, even if broader cooperation is not. Strong unilateral action by Syria in its own interests would lay the groundwork for easing US and Syrian relations.

Syrian efforts to fight terrorism do not need to be linked to broader security constraints and repression. One problem throughout the Arab world that goes directly against the interests of both regimes and their peoples is to enforce excessive and pointless security measures against figures and NGOs that speak out for reform, peaceful change, economic progress, and against nepotism and corruption. No nation in the region currently has struck the right balance between even the narrow interests of its rulers and over-enforcing security in ways that suppress the kind of evolutionary progress that is ultimately vital to maintaining support for the regime and stability.

Syria is no exception. It does face very real threats from Islamist extremists, from the Muslim Brotherhood, and possibly from elements in its growing population of Iraqi refugees. What it does not face is a meaningful threat from its more secular and moderate Muslim voices for change, from added concern for human rights and the rule of law, and for criticism of the government that calls for change without threatening the regime. Syria needs strong moderate voices, even when they are critical. It cannot afford to silence or arrest a single such voice when the main impact of these moderates is to move the country forward and act as a counterbalance to the Islamist extremists that are the only real-world internal threat to both the regime and the nation.

No one can credibly expect an instant shift to US and European practices and values, but the time for excessive internal security measures and constraints is over. Both Syria's regime and Syria's people will benefit from easing the current level of constraint and from a more liberal climate for all but extremist elements. The signal to the United States and the world will also be one that could greatly improve future relations.

There did seem to be a growing understanding in Syria that playing a spoiler role in Iraq, and encouraging or tolerating insurgent operations in Syria, and transit to Iraq, threatened Syria with added support for Islamist extremism in Syria, an unstable Iraq on its border, further floods of refugees and being a potential front line in a Sunni vs. Shiite struggle for control of Iraq. Officials like Syria's foreign minister stressed Syria's interest in Iraqi unity, a strong central government, and effective military and police forces, although they also emphasized formal identification of Iraq as an Arab and Islamic state.

It is unclear how much Syria is prepared to act on these words, but it again has a clear interest in doing so. Syria cannot afford to become tied to the Shiite cause and does not have the same interests as Iran. It does not need instability and civil conflict on another border.

Stronger Syrian initiatives to support Iraq in political conciliation, crack down on insurgent operations inside Syria and crossing its border, and securing the Syrian border with Iraq are all directly in Syria's interest. The creation of a stronger Iraq border security force and forts also gives Syria something far more tangible to cooperate with, and such Syrian action would lay the groundwork for an improvement in US and Syrian relations.

Syrians downplayed the risks of Iran's nuclear efforts, but did recognize that
Syrian and Iranian interests do differ
significantly and that Iranian dominance of much of Iraq, adventures in Lebanon, or adventures with Hizbullah would not be in Syria's interest.

Syrian restraint in dealing with Iran again serves Syrian interests, and exercising that restraint would again lay the groundwork for improved relations.

Syria also has a clear national interest in a phased US withdrawal from a more secure and stable Iraq. A US departure, or phasedown to obviously defensive levels, removes any lingering specter of US military intervention in Syria, while helping to create a more stable and unified Iraq.

Like Americans, and most of the world, Syrians expressed deep concern over the split within the Palestinians. One point several Syrians made was that some voices within Hamas had used the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 boundaries as a way of indirectly signaling that they could coexist with Israel.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS.