As the American military Attaché reported, “July was a bitter month for Syria. Arab acceptance of the Security Council cease-fire order practically ended chances for an immediate success of the Palestine `Jihad.’”[1]On the eve of the cease-fire the Syrian army had repulsed strong Zionist attacks on the Mishmar Hay Yarden bridgehead and had taken a key height overlooking the settlements of Dan and Dafne. Even though the odds against continued Syrian success were overwhelming, the soldiers at the front took the view that “if only” they had not been double-crossed by the politicians they could have pressed forward to victory. To make matters worse for Quwwatli, the Israelis had recently acquired three Flying Fortresses from America which they used to bomb Syrian positions on the front and down-town Damascus for three days after the truce had been declared.[2]When Quwwatli announced the cease-fire, the Syrian public was at the height of martial ardor. The question which plagued the government was whether the Syrian “volcano” would erupt on hearing the news.

            Foreign observers were surprised that it did not. To keep the Syrian capital from breaking out into protests and riots, Quwwatli used every resource at his disposal. In an attempt to deflect blame for the decision, he announced that Syria had voted for the continuation of war and had agreed to the cease-fire order only to maintain Arab League unity. This line, many Syrians believed, was a “first class face-saving device for the Mardam Government.” Foreign sources, however, later confirmed that the government version “was not far from wrong, for all reports indicated Syria had argued against surrender.”[3]

            Jamil Mardam, who since 14 May had been named military governor of Syria and ruled under martial law, took firm action to control crowds and clamp down on the press. The Muslim Brotherhood chief, Mustafa Siba`i, under threat from the government, personally gave the order that dispersed the biggest Damascus demonstration. Barazi ordered prompt police action in seizing leading agitators which caused several other demonstrations to fizzle out.[4]The success of such measures could not last forever. But as the U.S. Attaché reported, the government had been very lucky that “neither Parliament nor the schools, two forces which could challenge even a dictatorship, were in session. But there might be repercussions when they convene.”[5]Indeed, few schools did begin classes in September as scheduled, for they were conveniently housing Palestinian refugees. Moreover, Michel `Aflaq was arrested in September as insurance against student agitation. In taking these measures to suppress public opposition to his government, Quwwatli took a large step down the slippery slope toward military rule.

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     [1]USNA, Robert Memminger, charge’ d’affaires, (Damascus) to Sec. of State, “Syria, Monthly Political Review – July – 1948,” (31 July 1948) 890D.00/7-3148.

     [2]Ibid. Though the Syrian government complained bitterly to American officials in Damascus that the airplanes proved the U.S. was not respecting its arms embargo, U.S. officials announced that the planes had been acquired from American civilians over whom the U.S. government had no control. Damascenes found some poetic justice when one of the bombs dropped by a Flying Fortress hit the residence of the U.S. military Attaché, badly damaging his house and slightly wounding the Attaché. The Syrian government censored all press reports about the provenance of the bombers in order to avoid further stirring up the passions of the local populace.

     [3]Ibid.

     [4]Ibid.

     [5]Ibid.